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ABSTRACT
THE DEONTIC QUADECAGON
SEPTEMBER 1990
PAUL MCNAMARA, B.A., CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI
Ph . D
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor FRED FELDMAN
There are a number of concepts of common— sense
morality, what one must do, what one ought to do, the
supererogatory, the minimum that duty allows, the morally
optional and the morally indifferent, that philosophers
have been hard-pressed to represent in an integrated
conceptual framework. Indeed, many philosophers have
despaired at the attempt and concluded that only a fragment
of these concepts belong to that fundamental sphere of
morality that is the central focus of the ethicist. For
ex amp 1 e, the traditional scheme, with its triad of the
obligatory
,
the forbidden and the permissible, pigeonholes
all actions into three mutually exclusive and exhaustive
classes: those which are obligatory, those which are
forbidden and those which are optional. Hence, at best, it
can represent exactly two of the six aforementioned
concepts. For from the standpoint of this scheme, what one
must do and what one ought to do can’t be distinguished and
xv
hence they can’t both be represented. Although the morally
optional can be represented, the supererogatory
,
one of its
subclasses, cannot be represented. Furthermore, the
morally indifferent
,
another subclass of the optional —
one which is obviously disjoint from the supererogatory --
cannot be represented. Finally, the minimum that duty
allows finds no distinctive place in the traditional
scheme. Thus, on the face of it, the traditional scheme is
radically incomplete.
I present, motivate and defend a new conceptual scheme
for common-sense morality in which these concepts (and
others) are represented and systematically integrated. An
intuitively motivated semantic framework underpinning this
conceptual scheme is also presented. Such a scheme, along
with the associated semantic framework, is motivated by
reflecting on the supererogat i on i s t ’ s objections to
utilitarianism and to the traditional scheme. But in
addition, a new integrated network of linguistic
motivations for this conceptual scheme is uncovered, one
which is completely independent of supererogationist ic
considerations. Hence, these two separate sources of
evidence for the centrality of this new scheme to our pre-
theoretic thinking corroborate one another — thus jointly
boosting the evidence beyond the mere sum of their separate
evidential values.
xv 1
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INTRODUCTION
There are a number of concepts of moral appraisal, what
one must do, what one ought to do, the supererogatory, the
minimum that duty demands
,
the morally optional and the
morally indifferent, which philosophers have been hard-
pressed to represent in an integrated conceptual framework.
Indeed, many philosophers have despaired at the attempt and
concluded that either some of these concepts are
philosophically bankrupt or that only a fragment of them
belong to that fundamental sphere of morality that is the
central focus of the ethicist. This dissertation is
intended as an attempt to rectify this matter. I will
motivate, develop and defend a conceptual scheme in which
all these concepts (and others) are represented and
systematically integrated. A semantics framework for this
scheme will also be motivated and defended. The standard
deontic scheme will turn out to be a proper fragment of
this substantially richer scheme.
The framework in question will be motivated informally
in Part I. Part II will be primarily dedicated to applying
this framework precisely and developing a relatively rich
deontic scheme in its light.
1
Part I begins with an informal introduction to the
rudiments of deontic logic. We then drive our way towards
a very general formal framework for deontic logic. A major
presupposition of this dissertation is identified, thus
providing us with the larger context in which the narrower
context of our investigations is set. With this
identification of the backdrop for this dissertation,
behind us, we move on to the task at hand. In Chapter 2,
we start by examining the tension between supererogation
and utilitarianism and then move on to the more general
implications of the possibility of supererogation. We also
informally sketch some general conditions that a proper
framework for supererogation ought to meet. Next, in
Chapter 3, we offer a componential analysis of utilitarian
doctrine, with the hope that we can adopt a minimum
mutilation strategy: institute the minimal alteration that
is required of utilitarianism in order to countenance the
legitimacy of the two supererogat i on i s t i c objections to it.
Having offered a componential analysis that appears to be
well-suited to such a conservative approach, however, we
find our minimum mutilation strategy grinding to a quick
halt. For we find that a virtually universal bipartisan
presupposition of Twentieth-Century ethics entails that all
the utilitarian components must go in one fell swoop if we
countenance the objections. This leads to a detailed and
somewhat circuitous examination (justifiably so) of the
2
soundness of this bipartisan presupposition. Despite its
pervasiveness, a case is made for rejecting this
presupposition. While motivating its rejection, additional
and independent linguistic support for the
supererogationist’s case against utilitarianism is
uncovered. As a bonus, we also uncover additional support
for the remainder of our minimum mutilation: the "non-
guilty" components of utilitarian doctrine. Thus our
circuitous examination of the bipartisan presupposition not
only puts us back on track, but pays off with excess
dividends -- thus reinforcing the appropriateness of our
strategy. However, the most important by-product of our
investigation into this bipartisan presupposition is an
informally characterized semantic structure that appears to
be quite fundamental to our pre-theoret ical thinking on
both ethical and non-ethical matters. For this semantic
structure is precisely what the uncovered linguistic
evidence against the bipartisan presupposition itself calls
for. Furthermore, this linguistically motivated general
framework appears to be much like that which the classical
conception of supererogation called for. It is this
general structure that provides us with the deontic
framework that we explore in detail in Part II.
3
general
We begin Part II by providing a precise
characterization of the informally characterized
framework of Chapter 3. We then apply it to the linguistic
data that served as grounds for our rejection of the
bipartisan presupposition. The rest of Part II, is
dedicated to additional applications of this framework. As
it turns out, the applications are surprisingly rich, given
the simplicity of the framework. Happily, the framework
itself ends up guiding us to uncovering additional
linguistic evidence that it is indeed quite fundamental to
our thinking. As the evidence for the centrality of this
framework increases, the evidence for the
supererogat ionist ’ s case increases in tandem. Indeed, they
corroborate one another. In particular, the evidence
supports distinguishing what is obligatory from what is
optimal, and allows for the possibility of permissible sub-
optimizing something central to the classical conception
of supererogation, and central to contemporary debate in
normative ethics. 1
A variety of operators "predicted*' by this semantic
framework turn out to be operating parts of the most
ordinary moral discourse. The general behavior of the
previously unexamined idioms of this discourse is explored
here in fair detail. Then the most salient predictions
that our semantic framework makes about the logical
4
behavior of these idioms is surveyed. The concepts that
the idioms express appear to be the very landmarks of the
conceptual scheme that was, in part, implicit to the
classical conception of supererogation. Hence our separate
linguistic reflections appear to have brought us full
circle back to where we began. With our development of
this new deontic scheme at an end, some we 1 1
-mo t i vat ed
objections to the proposed scheme are considered. None of
these objections, I maintain, are at all telling. Finally,
I provide a summation of our investigation and turn briefly
to an assessment of what has and has not been accomplished.
5
Introduction Not.p.q
See [Scheffler 1982] and [Scheffler 1988]
a highly acclaimed essay of Scheffler’s;
• The former
the latter is
recent volume in The O xford Readings in Philosophy
contemporary issues anthology series.
PART I: TOWARD THE DEONTIC QUADECAGON
7
CHAPTER 1
RUDIMENTS OF DEONTIC LOGIC
Normative Ethics And Deontic Logic
One fundamental project of normative ethics is to
provide and defend an interesting set of necessary and
sufficient conditions for the moral normative "statuses".
An example of such a statement is:
something is (morally) permissible for an agent if
and only if it is in the agent’s power and there is
nothing else in the agent’s power that has better
consequences for the agent’s welfare.
This would constitute a statement of necessary and
sufficient conditions for the status of permissibility.
With such a statement, the normative ethicist might claim
to have provided a deeper understanding of the nature of,
or at least the basis of, permissibility. In this case,
that enlightened self-interest is the foundation for
permissibility. For she might claim that anything, x, that
is permissible for an agent, s, is so in virtue of the
corresponding instance associated with the right half of
her formula. Loosely speaking, the normative ethicists
wants to provide an interesting substantive analysis of
each normative status.
8
The fundamental task of the deontic logician is
certainly less ambitious than that of the normative
ethicist. However, the deontic logician, like the
normative ethicist, takes a special interest in normative
statuses. No attempt will be made to give an explicit
definition of a normative status. However, the following
list of words expressing (at least in some contexts) moral
normative statuses does provide a "characterization by
example" -- and the list contains examples that the vast
majority of philosophers have traditionally considered to
be paradigm cases.
permissible, right, all right to do;
forbidden, wrong, prohibited;
obligatory, required, duty;
gratuitous, all right not to do;
opt ional
;
ought, should;
supererogatory, beyond the call of duty;
indifferent.
The deontic logician attempts first and foremost to
systematically explore the "logic of" such statuses. For
example, there is a sense of the expression "obligatory"
for which it is obviously true that:
If the conjunction of two things is obligatory, then
each conjunct is obligatory.
Indeed, it is dubious that there is any sense of this
expression for which this is not so. Such a truth will be
deemed by the deontic logician to be a matter of the
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logic of this expression. Of course, the goal here would
be to give a systematic and economical characterization of
a large and varied class of such truths of the logic of
obligatory" and if possible, to give one which is
complete. A list simply won’t do.
Now it is interesting to note that a normative ethicist
may offer an analysis of a normative status which conflicts
with one of the principles of deontic logic that is
associated with the status. Consider any analysis of the
following sort:
x is obligatory for s if and only if x is the best
of the things in s’s power.
Suppose that x is obligatory for s, that x is a conjunction
of y and z, and that x, y and z are genuinely distinct.
For example, x might involve returning two books to the
library. Then, by the previously mentioned deontic
principle, it must be the case that each conjunct, and
hence y itself is obligatory for s. By similar reasoning,
z must be obligatory. But then it follows from the
substantive analysis that x, y and z, which are all
distinct from one another, are each the best of the things
in s’s power -- which is impossible. Provided that the
sense of "obligation" which the normative ethicist was
trying to analyze is one for which the principle of deontic
logic cited holds, such a conflict indicates, at the very
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least, that the intended analysis is inadequately
formulated
.
1 And the crucial link in showing that this was
so, is the principle of deontic logic cited above. So if
someone wants to maintain this substantive analysis, they
must either deny the cited principle of deontic logic or
maintain that it is impossible to ever be obligated to do
things like return two books to the library. Each appears
to be a rather desperate maneuver.
We can detect a similar flaw with the analysis of
permissibility given in the first paragraph of this
section. Suppose that x is in fact permissible, and x is
again the conjunction of y and z. Now let’s also suppose
that x has better consequences (for the agent of x) than
either y or z itself have. For example, it is permissible
for me to both have breakfast and take my medication. Then
it follows from the substantive analysis that neither x nor
y is permissible. Hence I’m permitted to do the conjuntion
of y and z but I am not permitted to do y and I am not
permitted to do z — which certainly seems absurd. That it
seems absurd is due to an implicit recognition of the
universal truth of another deontic principle:
If the conjunction of two things is permissible then
each conjunct is itself permissible.
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Examples of this sort suggest that an intuitively
motivated deontic logic can be seen as placing some
significant minimal constraints on the adequacy of any
substantive analysis of the corresponding status. Hence
constraints on the normative ethicist.2 Indeed, we can see
a such a logic, if adequate, places deontic logic for a
certain status (or statuses) as a highly organized
collection of fundamental data available to the normative
ethicist attempting to analyze the status (or statuses)
associated with the logic. The logic can be used as one of
a battery of tests to run on a proposed substantive
analysis. Provided that such a logic is adequate to the
status in question, a correct substantive analysis of such
a status will have to at least be consistent with all the
principles of the logic and we might hope that it would
even "predict" these principles--thus providing us with a
deeper understanding of why these principles in fact hold.
Furthermore, the logic itself might, in some cases,
serve as a guide to discovering the correct substantive
analysis. For a careful study of the various logical
connections between a logic’s operators may suggest that a
certain abstract formal structure could account for these
logical connections at a deeper level. Reflection on the
abstract formal structure might in turn lead to an
isomorphic structure that is neither formal nor abstract,
12
Thus a
but substantive and intuitively well-motivated,
logic may also serve as a significant guide in discovering
substantive analyses of the targeted normative statuses
that its operators are intended to represent. So the study
of the proposed logic might not only serve as one of a
collection of useful tools for confirming the adequacy of
an already discovered substantive analysis; it might
provide a vital tool leading to such a discovery.
Of course, things can also go the other way. For
example, if we are concerned with constructing a deontic
logic for a certain normative status, S, there may be some
candidate principles which we can formulate, whose logical
status will not be obvious and which are not implied by any
of the principles or rules of inference which are obviously
valid for S. In such a situation, we may know of a
substantive analysis of the status in question which we
have some independent reason for believing -- one which,
among other things, agrees with the obviously valid and the
obviously invalid principles. It may then turn out that
this substantive analysis has some positive implications
regarding some of those principles whose status was not
intuitively obvious. In particular, this analysis may
imply that some of these principles are in fact valid ones.
In such a case, the substantive analysis of the status
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provided by the normative ethicist may legitimately lead to
an augmentation of the deontic logician’s system for this
s tatus
.
So although the task of the deontic logician is
certainly less ambitious than that of the normative
ethicist, the deontic logician and the normative ethicist
can be seen as working in tandem — their projects are
complimentary.
Informal Interpretations of Operators
Agent-relativized and Non-r e 1 at i v i zed
Interpretations
In many case we want to say that a certain person, or
group is obligated to do something. In such cases, our
notion of obligation is a relativized one: s^ is obligated
to see to it that such and such. If we wanted to let this
r e 1 a t i v i z at i on be explicitly expressed in our logical
system, we might introduce an obligation operator which
entered into well-formed sentences such as this: s 0B$ . B u
this is not necessary. Instead we can think of a logic
with sentences such as " 0B$ " as being implicitly
relativized to some arbitrary John Doe. That is, in
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designing the logic, we can have as our target laws that
hold for an agent-relativized concept of obligation without
having this r e 1 at i v i z at i on made syntactically explicit. If
this is our intention, then the logical laws we will state
will be intended as holding for all possible agents. So
that, for example, if we endorse "If OB$ then PF$” as a
thesis, we can be seen as implicitly endorsing the thesis
that for any agent, s, if s is obligated to see to it that
$, then s is permitted to see to it that $. Of course, if
we want to endorse a principle such as "if someone is not
permitted to see to it that $, then not everyone is
obligated to see to it that $", the implicit relat ivizat ion
approach will not work. However, such truths as the latter
are best construed as appropriate to more sophisticated
systems of deontic logic. The system with the implicit
r e 1 a t i v i z a t i on is a more basic deontic logic.
It may also turn out that such a logic shares important
affinities with, or can even do duty for, the logic of
another non-agent-relative status. Such results are happy
results. They are precisely the sort that constitute one
motivation for that pervasive family of abstract structural
studies of which logic is a distinctive member. For
example, individual-relativized moral obligation, group-
relativized moral obligation, individual-relativized
prudential obligation and group-relativized prudential
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obligation share a common underlying basic logic. This
becomes apparent when the relat ivizat ion to agent (be it
individual or group) is syntactically suppressed, and of
course when the species of obligation (prudential vs.
moral) is also syntactically suppressed.
Also, some normative statuses are not agent-
relativized. Consider the claim "it ought to be the case
that benefits and burdens in life are distributed according
to merit
. There is a sense in which this is true. Yet I
do not think that it is plausibly interpreted as implicitly
relativized to some agent, be it an individual or a group.
For, it would appear that any such interpretation would
have to rely on the assumption that some group or
individual has it in his or its power to see to it that the
benefits and burdens are so distributed. But such an
assumption is ludicrous. Only a small fragment of the good
and bad in life are even in the control of mankind
collectively. Various diseases, deformities, natural
disasters, etc. are not (currently) subject to our control,
individually or collectively, and neither are good health,
natural talents, etc. Hence, if the above claim is true,
which it appears to be, there are normative statuses which
are not even implicitly agent-relativized.
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Species of Obligation
There are obviously a variety of "species of" agent-
relativized obligation. Consider some examples. There is
plain old moral obligation: I am morally obligated to
fulfill my promise to my neighbor. There is prudential
obligation: I am prudentially obligated to take my
medication. There is legal obligation: I am legally
obligated to pay my taxes. There is club obligation: I am
club obligated" to pay my dues. There is religious
obligation: I am religiously obligated to attend services.
No doubt this list is merely suggestive of the variety of
target concepts of obligation for which one might want to
construct a special deontic logic. Again, many of these
may turn out to have the same basic underlying logic.
Conditional and Absolute Obligation
Many of our obligations are "absolute". For example,
it would be wrong, plainly and simply, for me to drive home
today and murder my mother. It is not that "it would be
wrong provided that she did send me a birthday card" — it
is just plain wrong. I am obligated to not do this thing,
and the obligation is not conditional on anything. In
particular, if it were a fact that I was going to do this,
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this fact would have absolutely no effect on the status of
the action, and if you were to say, in such circumstances,
You mustn’t do that, it is wrong" you would have spoken
truly. Your utterance would be a statement of "absolute
obligation"
.
The point here is not that there is no possible
circumstance under which it would not be wrong to kill
one’s mother. Suppose that my mother is the U.S.
President, she has gone mad and is about to send the
missiles flying and the only way I can stop her is to shoot
her, etc. In such an unhappy circumstance it might not be
wrong for me to kill her. But I’m happily not in any such
circumstances. Indeed, I’m luckily in a set of
circumstances where I am absolutely obligated to not kill
my mother.
In contrast, if you thought that I was contemplating
doing such a thing (and you thought that nothing you could
do would stop it) you might aptly say "If you are going to
kill your mother then you must kill her painlessly ". 3 Here
you would have expressed a statement of what has come to be
called "conditional obligation." No absolute obligation
was expressed. For you are convinced that it is clearly
wrong for me to kill ray mother and hence wrong to kill her
in any manner. Even if it is true that I am going to kill
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my mother, the fact that I am going to do this does not
result in its becoming obligatory that I kill her
painlessly. For if I am going to kill my mother, I am
going to do something which is hideously wrong -- no ma
how I accomplish it.
But this indicates a peculiarity of such deontic
conditionals. For example, the logical form of the
previous conditional is not that of "If I go to the beach,
then I’ll take my football. For the logical form of the
latter is such that we may validly infer that it is true
that I’ll take my football from the truth of this
conditional along with the truth of my going to the beach.
Hence, despite superficial grammatical similarity, the
sentence "if you’re going to kill your mother, then you
must kill her painlessly" uttered in the context suggested
above is not to be interpreted as having the same logical
form as this beach-football sentence. In particular, its
logical form is not that of an absolute obligation
conditional on a circumstance. For if it were, then the
additional fact that I was going to kill my mother
painlessly anyway, would not only get me off the hook, but
entail that it was now downright mandatory that I do some
thing that I can’t do without killing my mother!
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or sentences uttered
There may of course be sentences,
in 3 context
» that do express an absolute obligation
conditional on a circumstance in the context. For example,
consider the sentence "if that’s Bob then Bob has an
obligation to provide us with an explanation", said in a
context where Bob was expressly forbidden to be present.
This is plausibly interpreted as an absolute obligation
conditional on a circumstance. For here, upon discovering
that it is indeed Bob that we are looking at, we may
validly infer from this conditional, that Bob has an
obligation to explain his presence. But this is the
exceptional case . 4
Despite all this, we will follow contemporary practice
and employ the expression "conditional obligation" to refer
to what such sentences express. However, we should think
of this as a descriptive term which is based on the
superficial grammatical form, not on the logical form, of
such sentences. As it turns out, the logical form of such
expressions brings us sufficiently beyond the logical form
of statements of absolute obligation that he logical
treatment of such obligation statements falls outside the
scope of the most elementary deontic logic. We will return
to this topic later.
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Strict and Non-Strict Obligation
If all things considered, it is prudentially incumbent
on me to do x, then it is plausible that there can be no
other thing which it is also prudentially incumbent on me
to do, all things considered, which precludes my doing x.
Hence, there is a notion of prudential obligation which
precludes the possibility that such prudential obligations
conflict. Such an obligation is a "strict obligation". In
contrast, some notions of obligation do not preclude the
possibility of conflict. For example as a club member, I
may be obligated to pay my overdue dues and obligated to
see to it that no money from the club’s treasury is stolen.
Yet plainly enough, I might find myself in the position
where I can pay the dues only if I steal the necessary cash
from the treasury. Since I can pay my dues only if I steal
from the treasury, the two club-duties are conflicting.
Each of these is a "non-strict obligation" and the concept
of obligation expressed is a concept of non-strict
obligation. As we shall see shortly, this distinction,
between strict and non-strict concepts of obligation, is
reflected in a fundamental bifurcation of systems of
deont ic logic
.
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The Compliments o f the Expressions of Normative
The Statuses as Sentential Operators
In constructing a logic, there are usually a few target
expressions which appear to have an important logical role
and which naturally group together, and it is with an eye
to representing the logical contribution which these words
make to the truth conditions of the sentences in which they
occur that we design our logics. In doing so, we attempt
to highlight the logical roles of these expressions by
abstracting from the remaining content of the sentences in
which they occur. Thus, in sentential logic, where we are
concerned with the logical force (truth-functional force)
of words like "not" "and" "or" etc., we abstract from the
content of the simple sentences that are constituents of
the compound sentences which contain these words (in their
truth-functional uses), thereby highlighting the logical
contribution these words make to the substantial class of
compound sentences in which they occur. We emphasize what
we wish to study by de-emphasizing all the rest.
In deontic logic, as in the case of more familiar
logics, we want to do essentially the same thing:
abstract from all those eatures of the sentences in which
the relevant class of words can occur which won’t
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contribute to revealing the contribution these words make
to the truth conditions of these sentences. Thus, in the
case of the statuses, we want to represent them in such a
way that we can both represent the fact that they are parts
of sentences while abstracting from any features of the
sentences m question which are extraneous to representing
the logical force which these words enjoy. Such
abstraction occurs at the level of the syntax of the system
of logic we intend to construct.
One immediate question which arises is how will we
represent the syntactic form of normative status
expressions. For example, should obligatoriness be
syntactically expressed as a predicate, so that the basic
logical form of obligation sentences mimics these:
"George’s keeping his promise is obligatory" or "that
George keeps his promise is obligatory"? The problem with
this approach is technical. In order to devise a minimally
interesting logic of obligation we will want such a logic
to contain representations of the truth-functions. The
most natural way to do this is to dovetail our
representation of obligatoriness onto a truth-functional
logic. But if obligatoriness is syntactically represented
as a special predicate, we will first have to introduce an
abstraction operator to the language in order to convert
our syntactic representations of sentences into names of
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In addition s ince we
what these sentences represent,
would have to introduce at least one single-place
predicate, we would be entering into predicate logic,
albeit without quantifiers. For " George keeps his promise
is obligatory" is ill-formed. Introducing such an
abstraction operator and a special one-place predicate is
an unnecessary complication which we will avoid. An
alternative, is to have our syntax mirror sentences like
It is obligatory that George keeps his promise". This has
become standard practice among deontic logicians and we can
do no better.
Consider the following sentences:
(1) It is not the case that someone enters.
(2) It is obligatory that no one enters.
In the case of (1), negation is syntactically expressed as
a sentential operator. "It is not the case that" is an
expression which when prefaced to a declarative sentence
results in another declarative sentence. Similarly, in the
case of (2), obligation is syntactically expressed as a
sentential operator. Generally, "It is not the case that"
and "it is obligatory that" are such that, where $ is any
English statement, the result of immediately preceding $
with one character space and either of these expressions is
also an English sentence. (I’m ignoring certain niceties
such as capitalization and punctuation.) It would appear
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that for most any obligation we can assert with obligation
syntactically expressed as a predicate, there is a
necessarily equivalent way of expressing it with obligation
syntactically expressed as a sentential operator. So that,
for example, "George’s keeping his promise is obligatory"
can be expressed just as well as "It is obligatory that
George keeps his promise."
The Legitimacy of Iteration
One immediate question which arises is whether we should
allow for iteration of statuses in the sequences of
expressions which are to be deemed well-formed. Well the
rule we just gave for "it is not the case that" and "it is
obligatory that" predicts that the following will also be
English sentences.
( 3 ) It is not the case that it is not the case that
someone enters.
(4) It is obligatory that it is obligatory that no
one enters
.
This is as it should be, for they are both clearly
English sentences. Yet it is sometimes said that in
devising a deontic logic for obligation, we should not
represent sentences like (4). For it is claimed that
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although (3) makes sense, is legitimate, is meaningful, (4)
does not make sense, is not legitimate and is meaningless.
But such a stance is ill-founded.
First of all, if we wish to represent the way the
expression "it is obligatory that" does behave we will have
to represent it as a sentential operator, for that is what
it is in English. As such, it can occur in iterated
contexts and hence if it is to be accurately represented
syntactically, it must be represented by a sentential
operator in a language which also allows for its
representation to iterate. Someday, someone is going to
have to represent the fact that (4) is perfectly legitimate
in English, and I don’t see any reason why a deontic
logician should avoid constructing a syntactic system which
accords with just such iteration in English. Secondly,
even though there is something unusual about (4), we should
be very hesitant to assume that the oddity is a matter of
the meaning of the (4). It should be more apparent in the
case of deontic logic than in the case of more familiar
logics that the oddity of (4) may be a function of certain
pragmatic features of the use of (4). Thirdly, any system
of logic which allows for the representation of (2), but
not (4) is expressively less rich than a logic which allows
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for the representation of both. Hence, a system of logic
which allows for the representation of both (2) and (4),
all other things being equal, will be expressively richer
than the former sort of language. Finally, we should not
preclude the possibility that despite the fact that there
may be no transparent intuitions about the logical status
of (4), it may nonetheless be a logical truth or a logical
falsehood. Sometimes, the construction and systematization
of a logic for a fragment of a language may provide us with
fair reason to presume that some of these sentences or
their negations, which initially have no obvious logical
status, are in fact logically true. If this proved to be
the case, a logic without iteration for this operator would
be fundamentally deficient from the purely logical
standpoint: it could not characterize the full class of
logical truths involving this operator.
With these considerations in mind, we shall be
considering only languages which represent various statuses
as iteratable. Nonetheless, we will not be concerned here
with whether any particular iterated sentences should or
should not come out logically valid. Our concerns will be
more basic than this and such niceties will be bracketed
here
.
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Doing Something Versus Seeing to Something
Let’s also note something that may seem odd at first:
that I may be obligated to see to something that I can’t
do. For I may be able to see to it that a certain boulder
is moved by seeing to it that Andre the Giant moves the
boulder and hence I may be obligated to see to it that the
boulder is moved, even though moving the bolder is
something that I can’t do — an action that I am unable to
perform. Similarly, I might be able to see to it that
something happens 100 years from now by setting a chain of
events in motion, even though the event constituting the
said outcome 100 years hence is not something that I can
do. I would be responsible (causally) for that event, but
that event would not be one of my actions, and hence it
would not be included in one of my available courses of
action.
Indeed there will be things I am obligated to bring
about that are not actions at all, mine or anyone else’s,
because they are not even events. For example, my mother
says to me "I want this room in order, pronto!". Let’s
suppose that her saying so renders it obligatory for me to
see to it that her wish is satisfied. To be sure, my
room’s being in order is something that requires some
action to bring about — a lot of action if I recall
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an action
correctly but the room’s being in order is not
at all, mine or anyone else’s. Rather, it is a state that
my room would be in if I complied with my mother’s wishes.
The reader should recall this point if later on, when
we are talking about obligations involving disjunctions and
b i condi t i onal s , etc, that we are not suggesting that one
can do a disjunction or a conditional. But one can see to
it that a disjunctive state of affairs or a conditional
state of affairs obtains.
Our Primary Concern
In this essay, I will be primarily concerned with
agent-relativized notions of obligation. However, in the
systems of deontic logic we will be studying, this
relat ivizat ion will be implicit. In addition, I will be
focusing in my examples on obligations that individual
agents might have, but most of what I say, and the systems
in particular, can easily be interpreted more generally as
implicitly relativized to groups of individuals construed
as a class of such). The case of an individuals
obligations would then be the special case where the
relativized group is a group with one member.
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Furthermore, the notion of obligation I will be
primarily concerned with is that of moral obligation. For
example, I am now morally obligated to see to it that I do
not kill my neighbor today. I believe that I could have
such an obligation even if there were no acknowledged laws,
conventions or whatever telling me not to murder. Indeed,
I take it that I could have such an obligation even if
there were acknowledged laws, conventions or whatever
telling me to murder people in apartments numbered " 148 ".
Furthermore, I take it that I could have such an obligation
even if it were in fact prudentially obligatory for me to
kill my neighbor. I also take it as a mark of the sort of
obligation I am interested in that if I have an obligation
of this sort, then it overrides any other obligations of
any other sorts which I might have. So that it can be the
case that if I have an obligation of this sort, to do some
thing, then it would be wrong, all things considered, not
to do it — even if the dictates of law convention,
prudence, etc were precisely that I do not do the thing in
question. These things are said to help you understand
what I mean by a "moral obligation", they are not
stipulative. You may sense what concept of obligation I am
alluding to, but not agree that it has the all the
properties that I have just mentioned.
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I will also be taking it as a datura (at this point)
that one aspect of the notion of moral obligation I’m
interested in is that it precludes "internal" conflicts of
such obligations. That is I take it to be a matter of the
logic of the intended notion that if I am truly morally
obligated to not kill my neighbor, then there is nothing
which I am also morally obligated to do, which I can’t do
unless I kill her. In particular, I am taking the notion
to be such that if I am obligated to do something, then I
cannot at the same time be obligated to not do this very
thing. Such a notion of obligation can be said to be a
notion of "strict obligation".
To be sure, there is a sense of obligation, and an
admittedly moral sense, in which it does appear that I can
have conflicts. For example, to rehearse an classic case,
suppose that I borrowed a gun from my friend and promised
to return it whenever she asked. Suppose, also that she
comes by in a deranged state mumbling that she is going to
kill her family and requesting that I give her her gun.
Many have thought that this is a case in which I have a
conflict of obligations. They would say that in such a
case I have an obligation to return her gun on the one hand
and I have an obligation to see to it that I don t return
her gun on the other. These might be thought to follow
respectively from the more general obligations to keep ones
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promises and to refrain from contributing to the harm of
innocents. However, I think that it is plain that in any
such non-remote situation, it would be wrong to give the
gun to my friend. And if we were to claim in such a
situation that what I have to do is not give her the gun,
that it would be wrong to keep my promise and that I do not
have to keep my romise, we would probably have expressed
the concept of obligation (and forb iddeness ) that I am
interested in examining.
So I will be assuming that there is a concept of
obligation which is moral, absolutistic (non-conditional),
strict and agent-relative. Such a sense of absolute strict
agen t
- re 1 at i ve moral obligation is the primary notion of
obligation targeted here. Similarly for the other
normative statuses we will be considering.
The Five Fundamental Statuses and "Deontic Systems"
The Five Statuses and Interdefinability
The terms for the primary normative statuses are those
indicated on the first five lines of the list given above
(1.1). Since two or more members of a single line are
thought to be roughly equivalent, and since we will be
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syntactically representing these concepts as sentential
operators, we will tentatively settle on the following
representatives as our "five primary terms":
it is obligatory that
it is forbidden that
it is permissible that
it is gratuitous that
it is optional that
Some of the notions expressed on the remaining lines are
thought to be equivalent to or "definable" in terms of one
of these five primary terms. But we will pass over this
here— suspending judgment until later.
Traditionally, it is assumed that any one of the first
four of these five statuses can be taken as primitive and
the remaining terms can be introduced derivatively. If we
let $ be a variable ranging over sentences and we let " OB",
" FO"
,
" PE"
,
" GR”
,
and " OP" represent the five statuses
respectively (construed as sentential operators), and if we
let "~" and "&" represent negation and conjuntion
respectively (construed as truth-functional sentential
operators), then the following alternative
interdefinability schemes are standard:
FO$ = df 0B~$ 0B$ r d f FOT%
PE$ =df PE$ =df ~ F0$
am =df ~ ob% am =df ~fo~$
OP$ =df ~0B$ & ~OB~$ 0P$ =df ~ F0$ & ~ FCT$
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0B$ = d f ~ PET $
FO% = df ~PF$
GP$ = d f PET $
0B% =df "'em
fo$ =df ^0/r$
PF$ =df Gir$
o P$ = df PF$ & ppr% 0P$ =df GP$ & GIT%
In each of these schemes, one of the first four
operators is taken as primitive and the remaining operators
are, relative to this scheme, taken as non-primitive. It
does not appear that we can take the fifth operator, the
operator for optionality, as primitive and then define the
rest. In this respect, the optionality operator is
essentially non-primitive. Obviously, which of the
remaining four operators a system of logic takes as
primitive is, in principle, arbitrary. However, in accord
with contemporary practice, we will follow the first scheme
in which the obligation operator is taken as basic. Doing
so will allow for a greater ease of comparison between
various competitive logics for the five primary statuses.
Broadly construed, we can think of this operator, the
"deontic necessity operator", as expressing deontic
necessity — that which one must or has to do, in a sense
which can vary with the relevant normative interpretation
under consideration.
Although a minor modification of this traditional
definitional scheme will be introduced later, for the time
being we will assume that the remaining four operators are
soundly defined in terms of deontic necessity according to
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the scheme above. That is, we will assume (for the time
being) that the rationale for the definitions is sound --
namely the necessary equivalence of the definiens and the
definiendum in each case.
Deontic Systems
It will be convenient at this point to introduce a bit
more precision. Let’s introduce two terms: "deontic wff"
and "deontic system".
DEONTIC WFFS :
A . Vocabulary :
PV (propositional variables): Pi, ..., Pi, ...
— where "i" is a numerical subscript.
MO (modal operator): OB.
CONN (connectives): ~, ->
.
PARENS (parenthesis): (, ).
B . Grammar :
The set of D -wf f
s
(deontic well-formed formuli)
is the smallest set satisfying the following
conditions
:
FR1. PV is a subset of D-wffs.
FR2 . For any $, $ is in D-wffs only if ~$,
and OB$ are also in D-wffs.
FR3 . For any $ and $ and $’ are in D-wffs
only if ($ -> $’) is in D-wffs.
C. Abbreviat ional Definitions:
DF1-3
.
&, V1 , <--> as usual.
DF4 . PE% = df ~ 0B~ $
.
DF5 . FO% = df OB~$ .
DF6. am = df ~0B$ .
DF7 . OP = df ( ~ OB$ & ~O0~$)
35
^ S tandard Readings of Deontic Operators :
OB$ - It is obligatory that $.
PE% - It is permissible that $.
FO% - It is forbidden that $.
GR% - It is gratuitous that $.
~ It is optional that $.
We will say that something is a deontic wff just in
case it is a member of the set of D-wffs. Since the only
systems of deontic wffs we will be interested in are the
ones in which all the laws and rules of classical
propositional calculus (PC) hold we will call such a system
a "propositional deontic system", or just a "deontic
system". The following makes this notion explicit:
S is a Deontic System
-df S is a set of deontic wffs
such that a) any deontic wff that is tautological in
form is in S; b) for any deontic wffs, $ and $’, if
$ and ($ -> $’) are in S, then so is $’.
So informally, the smallest or minimal propositional
deontic system (or just "deontic system" for short) is
merely the propositional calculus (PC) with an enriched
class of wffs -- one containing all those deontic wffs
which contain " OB" and which are instances of propositional
laws, in addition to those "deontic wffs" that are just the
familiar pure tautologies of propositional logic. For this
minimal deontic system, the enrichment is not due to the
introduction of any laws of logic with a distinctively
deontic flavor. Such a system is also "minimal" in that
every deontic system will have this minimal deontic system
as a subset
.
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As is usual, where S is such a system, we will say that
a wff $ is a theorem of S, " ] - s $”, just in case $ is a
member of S. Similarly for rules of a system S. So that,
for example modus ponens, the rule that if $ and ($ -> $)
are both theorems then so is $\ is, given clause b) above,
a rule of any deontic system. Similarly for derived rules
of inference. Also, as is usually the case, we will allow
ourselves the luxury of sometimes talking about a "deontic
system" in the more familiar and fine-grained manner — in
terras of axioms and primitive transformation rules. A
system in this second sense can be seen as a specification
or characterization of a system in our official sense. Two
such systems, in this second sense, are equipollent just in
case they characterize the same deontic system in our first
sense. Such a characterization or specification of a
system, S is sometimes ailed an axiomatic basis for S.
From the standpoint of any deontic system, the
definitions introduced are merely shorthand for wffs
expressed in the primitive notation of the system which
contains " OB" as its sole deontic operator. So that, for
example, 0B~$ -> F0$ is a theorem of any deontic system in
virtue of the fact that 0B~$ -> 0B~$ is an instance of the
tautology, Pi -> Pi and F0$ , is, by definition, just 0B$ in
disguise. With the four remaining operators thus defined,
various deontic laws will be " def i n i t i onal 1 y contained" in
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various deontic system, although implicitly so. This may
make the definitions, and the def i n i t i ona 1 1 y contained
laws, look trivial and riskless. But this would be a
mistake. The intuitive legitimacy of such def in i t i ona 1 ly
contained laws is a measure of the adequacy of the
substantive rationale for the definitions. If some
def in i t i onal ly contained law proved to be intuitively
implausible for a given deontic system, this would count
against either the system itself or against the substantive
rationale for the corresponding definitions.
For any deontic system, it is an immediate consequence
of the definitions, plus the tautologousness of any wff of
the form $ <-> $, that the following equivalences hold:
FO% <-> OB~$
PE% <-> ~OB~$
GP$ < - > ~ OB$
OP$ <-> ~0B$ & ~ 0B~$
These can easily be seen to be tautologically equivalent
t o
:
~ FO$ <-> ~OB~$
~ PF$ <-> 0B~$
~ GP$ <-> 0B$
~ 0F% <-> OB% v 0B~$
Although these results are not completely without interest
(as we shall later see), the results we can get are
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extremely limited. For example, it is obviously desirable
to have 0B% -> ~ PE~ $ as a theorem. (After all, this wff
merely expresses one half of the equivalence between what
would have been definiens and definiendum had we chosen the
alternate scheme of definition in which " PE" is taken as
primitive instead of " OB".) As things stand this wff is
def init ional ly equivalent to 0B$ -> which reduces
by PC to 0B$ - > OB $ . But the latter formula is not a
theorem of the minimal deontic system, since it is not
tautologous. Ignoring the definitions, so far we have
deontic wffs and sentential logic, but no deontic logic.
The Traditional Scheme and Its Fundamental Presupposition
Aside from the soundness of the definitions of the non-
primitive operators introduced above, it is traditionally
assumed that the three classes, The Obligatory, The
Forbidden and The Optional, are mutually exclusive and
exhaustive for the class of objects for the normative
statuses. We will call this scheme "The Tripartite
Classification". In addition, it is traditionally assumed
that the Aristotelian Square of Opposition for the four
fundamental categorical propositions has an exact deontic
analogue: the Deontic Square of Opposition. Both of these
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relatively ancient assumptions hinge on a special
presupposition which is worth highlighting.
The Tripartite Classification
According to the Tripartite Classification, the objects
of the normative statuses can be seen to be partitioned
into The Obligatory, The Forbidden, and The Optional. The
following diagram geometrically represents this
partitioning (in addition to the place of The Gratuitous
and The Permissible for this classification):
The Gratuitous
/ \
i
i
i
i
The Obligatory 1 The Optional
•
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
! The Forbidden
i
i
i
i
\ /
The Permissible
The diagram is intended to be interpreted as asserting
that every action available to an agent fits into one of
the three boxed categories and into only one of the three.
The division is exclusive and exhaustive.
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The Deontic Square of Opposition
In turn, we can geometrically represent the logical
relationships between the first four of the five primary
statuses with the Deontic Square of Opposition:
0B$ fo$
As with the Aristotelian Square of Opposition, the
square is to be interpreted in such a way that the diagonal
lines are taken to join contradictories (conditions which
can neither be both true nor both false); the upper
horizontal line is taken to join contraries (conditions
which can’t be both true, but which might be both false);
the lower horizontal line is taken to join subcontraries
(conditions which can’t be both false, but which may both
be true); and the two vertical lines are taken to join
subalternates (the condition at the top of each line
implies the corresponding condition at the bottom of each
line) .
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Their Fundamental Presupposition
Obviously, the Tripartite Classification can be
syntactically represented in any deontic system by the
following wff:
(TC) [OB% v FO$ v OP$] & & FO$ ) & ~ ( OB$ & OP$
)
& ~ ( FO$ & OP$ ) ] .
Now we can show that the first part of this, must hold
for any deontic system, given our definitional scheme:
(EXH) 0B$ v FO% v 0P%.
For this is def i n i t i ona 1 1 y equivalent to OB$ v 0B~$ v (~C>£$
& OB $), which just has the form of, p v q v (~p & ~q), a
PC-tautology
. So the exhaustiveness (hence "EXH") of the
three categories of The Obligatory, The Forbidden and The
Optional follows from PC and the definitions of the deontic
operators alone. So EXH is a theorem of any deontic
system.
So if the second half of TC is also a theorem of any
system, so is TC itself. But we cannot show that the three
categories are mutually exclusive. That is we cannot prove
the fol lowing:
( ME ) ~ ( OB$ & FO$ ) & ~(0B$ & OP$) & ~ ( FO$ & 0P$ ) .
42
The reason that we cannot prove ME is that we cannot prove
all three of the conjuncts composing ME:
( ME 1 ) ~ ( OB$ & FO$ )
(ME2) ~( OB$ & 0P$ ) .
The first conjunct, "ME1", is particularly significant.
Relative to a deontic system, its assertion expresses the
claim that obligations can’t conflict (in the strong sense
that one can’t be obligated to bring about a state of
affairs and obligated to bring about its negation. For ME 1
is def init ional ly equivalent to
(NC) ~( OB$ & OB~$)
.
But the latter obviously does not follow from PC and the
definitions alone. For from the standpoint of PC its form
is just: ~(p & q). As we shall see below, the presence or
absence of NC in a system corresponds to what is perhaps
the most fundamental division among systems of deontic
logic. However, the two remaining conjuncts of ME are
theorems of any deontic system. ME2 is def i n i t i ona 1 1
y
equivalent to ~
(
OB$ & ~ OB$ & ~ 0B~ $). Since this has the
same form as ~ ( p & ~p & q) , ME2 is obviously a theorem of
any deontic system. Similarly for ME3, which is
definitionally equivalent to ~{0B~~$ & ~ 0B$ & ~'0B~'$). Given
all this, we can express the fact that NC is the
43
fundamental presupposition of the Tripartite Classification
as follows:
(FP1) ]- a TC just in case ]
-
s NC
,
for any deontic
system S.
The Deontic Square of Opposition corresponds to the
conjunction, DS, of the following deontic wffs:
( D S 1 ) OB$ < - > ~ GP$
( DS2 ) FO% <-> ~ PE%
( DS3 ) ~(OB$ & FO$)
( DS4 )
( DS5 ) OB$ -> PF$
(DS6) PO$ -> GP$
(contradictories)
(contradictories)
( contraries
)
(sub-contraries)
(sub-alternates)
(sub-alternates)
In primitive notation, DS is:
(DS1) OB% <-> ~~0B$
( DS2 ) OB~$ <-> 0B~$
( DS 3 ) ~{OB$ & 0B~$)
( DS4 ) ~( 0B~$ & ~~OB$)
( DS5 ) OB$ -> ~OB~$
(DS6) OB'"
$
-> ~ OB$
DS1 and DS2 are trivial tautologies, and hence
contained in every deontic system. On the other hand, DS3-
6 are tautologically equivalent to each other, and DS3 is
just our friend NC again. Hence the fundamental
presupposition of the Deontic Square of Opposition can be
expressed as follows:
(FP2) ] -s DS just in case ] -s NC
,
for any deontic
system S
.
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If we take the fundamental characteristics of the
traditional conception of the five primary statuses to be
the equivalences underlying the definitions we’ve
stipulated for the operators, along with the Tripartite
Classification and the Deontic Square of Opposition, then
the fundamental presupposition for the traditional
conception is that the obligations in question cannot
conflict. We can take this presupposition to be reflected
in our framework by the conjunction of FP1 and FP2
:
(FP) Any one of the wffs, TC
,
DS or NC are in S just
in case they are all in S, for any deontic
system S.
That is, relative to any deontic system, TC
,
DS and NC are
tautologically equivalent.
It is also easy to see that the assumption that The
Gratuitous is just the union of The Optional and The
Forbidden rests on NC. This assumption corresponds to the
wff: ( 0P% v FO$) <-> 67?$. By PC, this holds only if FO$ ->
67?$ holds. In primitive notation, this comes to 67?"$ ->
" 0B$
,
which is tautologically equivalent to NC. Similarly,
the assumption that The Permissible is just the union of
The Obligatory and The Optional corresponds to the wff:
( OB$ v 0P$) <-> PF$. By PC, this is true only if 0B% ->
PF$ is true. In primitive notation this is just 0B$ -
>
"67?"$, which is also tautologically equivalent to NC
.
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So the traditional scheme for deontic logic rests
squarely on the soundness of the substantive deontic
principle, NC
,
along with the traditional definitions of
the operators. Without NC
,
the Deontic Square of
Opposition and the Tripartite Classification (along with
the place of The Gratuitous and The Permissible for this
classification) collapse. With NC, we have genuinely
entered into the realm of Deontic Logic.
Normal Modal Logics and Normal Modal Semantics
Modal logic has developed at a near frantic pace in the
last thirty years or so. This development has yet to wane.
One major area of recent development, based on the
collaborative work of E. J. Lemmon and Dana Scott (Lemmon
and Scott 1977), has resulted in a tremendous integration
of a large class of interesting modal logics. This large
class of logics, called "normal modal logics" (or normal
modal systems"), can be seen to be "built on" a weak basic
logic (the minimal normal modal logic) and an analogously
general notion of a "normal modal model" can be specified.
As a result, certain properties which were previously
demonstrated to hold for specific logics in a piecemeal
fashion, are now demonstrated to hold for all logics of a
relevant subclass of normal logics. In addition, all the
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major steps required in proving completeness for a given
modal system (with respect to a class of models) are
demonstrated to hold for all normal logics, and as a
result, the completeness proofs for specific logics often
become relatively trivial and can often be stated in a
short paragraph.
Although it is beyond the scope of this essay to delve
too deeply into these matters, we will take a superficial
look at the fundamental notion of a normal modal logic
, and
what I will call a normal modal model . We do this for two
reasons. First of all, a large number of deontic systems,
including what has come to be called "the Standard Deontic
Logic (SDL) are normal modal logics, and hence many
results obtained in the Lemmon-Scott framework carry over
to these deontic systems. In addition, elementary deontic
logic is often viewed as a special branch of modal logic.
In particular, elementary deontic logics are often taken to
be just special normal modal logics. In the next section I
will take up the questions of whether the minimal normal
modal logic is stronger than the arguably minimal deontic
logic and whether there is a need to introduce a distinct
notion of a normal deontic logic. Hence, it will be useful
to have these elementary concepts from the Lemmon-Scott
framework before us.
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Normal Modal Logics
As far as the syntax (vocabulary and grammar) of a
normal modal logic goes, we will carry over the
characterization of the syntax of the deontic wffs, with
the trivial exception that we abstract from the particular
typographical character of the non-truth-funct ional
operators. We thus prevent various logics which are merely
notational variants of one another from being rendered
ineligible as normal modal logics in virtue of using a
different symbol for the basic modal operator. We will let
" *" range over unary modal operators. It will stand for
the primitive modal operator of any given normal logic —
so that as far as syntax goes, our earlier definition of a
deontic wffs, with "OB" as primitive operator, will be
eligible as a normal logic with respect to syntax.
Similarly the syntactic system we would have gotten had we
used "I" instead of "OB" will be equally eligible.
We can think of " *" as expressing necessity broadly
conceived. As one recent classic on normal modal logics
puts it, we can think of this " *" in a sufficiently
flexible way that, with respect to what its sentential
compliment expresses, "we may mean that it is logically
necessary, or that it is 'deontically necessary’ ... or
that it is unpr even t ab 1 e , or that it will be true
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hereafter, or that it is prescribed by the rules of a
certain game, or any of a number of other things” [Hughes
and Cresswell, 1984, pp. 3-4] . = of course, the p reS ence or
absence of certain wffs in a particular normal logic will
preclude some of these informal interpretations (e.g. the
presence of " *$ -> $" precludes the deontic
interpretation). If we then call any set of such wffs, "a
system of modal wffs” we can define a normal modal logic as
foil ows
:
S is a Normal Modal Logic =df S is a system of modal
wffs such that
:
(1) S contains all PC-valid wffs (i.e. S-wff
instances of PC-valid schemata);
(2) S contains all wffs of the form:
K\ *( $ -> $’) -> ( #$ -> -*$’);
(3) if $ and $ -> $’ are in S, so is $’ (MP);
(4) if $ is in S then so is -*$ (N).
We can then specify particular normal logics by reference
to various additional schemata, $i, . .., $ n , -- taking the
intended logic to be the smallest normal modal logic
containing
,
$n . Such a system, since it is normal,
will contain what clauses (1) - (4) above require and, in
addition, anything which these clauses require it must
contain if it also contains the schemata displayed, $i
,
. .., $ n • Aside from the requirements with respect to
syntax, the definition of a normal logic simply tells us
what minimal conditions a system of modal wffs must meet to
be normal. The modal system which does not exceed these
conditions is the weakest modal logic: that system which
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contains no other wffs than those which any system must
contain to be a normal modal logic. This weakest normal
modal logic is called "K’\ after the wff with the same name
in clause (2) above.
Consider the following schemata:
T: *$ -> $
B : ~ $ - > .*$
4: *$ -> **$
5 : ~ <*$ - > .*$
Following Lemm on - S c o t t , we can denote other normal modal
logics by joining names of various wffs to "K". For
example the most well-known modal logics, most often
referred to as logics T, B, S4 and S5 are all normal modal
logics. Using the names for the wffs above, and the logic-
denoting conventions of Lemmon-Scot t , these logics are
respectively, KT, KTB, KT4 and KT5 . Obviously, these
classic modal logics contain T. However we can just as
easily denote an alternative sequence of logics by dropping
"T": K, KB, K4 and KE.
One other wff is worth noting:
D : -*p - > ~ p .
Deontically interpreted, this just amounts to NC above: if
it is deontically necessary (obligatory) that $ then it is
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not deontically necessary (obligatory) that ~$. it is well
known that the weakest normal modal logic containing D is
none other than the "Standard Deontic Logic". This is
variously called "SDL", sometimes just "D", or, using the
above method of denotation, "KD".
With logics thus organized, proofs about logics
typically take the form of proofs about all normal logics
of some general sort. For example, in the limiting case,
that of all normal logics per se, it is easily shown that
the law of substitution of provable equivalents holds.
Hence the validity of this law carries over at once to any
particular normal modal logic and hence it can be employed
without further ado. We now turn to the corresponding
semantic framework.
Normal Modal Models
The two essential concepts are the following:
A normal modal model structure ( m . s
)
,
is a sequence
<W,R,P>, where W is non-empty set of "worlds", R is a
dyadic relation drawn from W, the "accessibility"
relation, and P is an infinite sequence, Pi, ...,Pi,
..., of subsets of W, or "propositions".
A normal modal model
,
M, is then simply an ordered
pair <Z,V>, where Z is a model structure and V is a
valuation on Z -- a function from the modal wffs to
the value set {0,1} -- meeting the following
conditions
:
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[At] For every variable, Pi, and world w,
V(Pi
,
w ) - 1 if w is in Pi
,
otherwise
V ( Pi , w ) = 0;
For any modal wffs $, $’ and world, w:
[V~] V (
~$ , w ) = 1 iff V ( $ , w ) = 0;
[ V > ] V(($ -> $
’ ) , w ) = 1 iff either V($,w) = 0
or V (
$
’
, w) = 1 ;
[V*] V(*$,w) = l iff V ( $ , w ’ ) = 1, for each w’
such that <w,w’> is in R.
Obviously, a specific normal modal model is completely
determined if we specify the corresponding model structure,
that is, if we specify three things: (1) what the elements
of W are; (2) which pairs of members of W, <w,w’>, are in R
[hereafter indicated by "wRw’
" ) , and (3) which sequence of
subsets of W constitutes Pi, ..., Pi, ... (the initial
assignment of a "truth set" or "proposition" to each
variable or atomic wff: Pi).
In turn, we can specify whole classes of such models by
merely specifying structural restrictions on R. Such a
class would then be the class of all normal modal models in
which R satisfies the said structural restrictions. Normal
logics are often shown to be characterized or determined by
such a restricted class of normal modal models (i.e. shown
to be both sound and complete with respect to the class of
models). The notion of a special model, a "canonical
model", for a normal modal logic can be specified with full
generality. Then all the preliminary theorems regarding
the canonical model for a logic which are involved in a
completeness proof for a given logic with respect to a
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given class of models can also be demonstrated with full
generality (i.e. without specification of the logic or the
relevant class of models). Because of the generality of
the approach, all that has to be shown to demonstrate the
completeness of a particular logic with respect to a
particular class of models is to show that its canonical
model does indeed satisfy the restrictions on R for the
class of models in question (i.e. that the canonical model
is indeed a member of the relevant class of models, and
hence represents the class). If so, it follows at once
that the logic is complete with respect to the said class
of models.
For example, with the proof of these highly general
preliminary theorems regarding the canonical model for any
logic, it is easily demonstrated in a series of short
paragraphs that the logics K, KT, KTB
,
KT4 and KT5 are
complete with respect to (a) the class of all models, (b)
those in which R is reflexive, (c) those in which R is
reflexive and symmetric and (d) those in which R is
reflexive and transitive, (e) those in which R is an
equivalence relation, respectively. In the case of KD
(SDL), it is complete with respect to the class of all
models in which R is serial for W (i.e. such that for any w
in W, there is a w’ such that wRw’). All that needs to be
shown is that the associated canonical model satisfies the
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associated constraint on R. Validity is then defined
derivatively in the usual way: a wff $ is valid with
respect to a class of models C, ]
=
c $, just in case V($,w)
= 1, for every world w in every model in C. With this
before us let’s return to the deontic logics.
Normal Deontic Logics
SDL and Von Wright’s System
The study of deontic logic in the Anglo-American
philosophical world was single-handedly launched by Georg
Henrik Von Wright in the early 1950’s. 6 What has come to
be called "The Standard System of Deontic Logic" (SDL) is
essentially Von Wright’s initial system (with a modified
syntax) augmented by the addition of one axiom schema. It
is reasonable to think that any notion of a normal deontic
logic ought to have the result that Von Wright’s system
(with the syntax suitably modified) is a normal deontic
logic. This in itself is enough to preclude elementary
deontic logics from being normal modal logics, however.
Let’s see why. Von Wright’s (VW) system is not a normal
modal logic for two reasons. First, iterated deontic
sequences (e.g. OBOB% -> 0B$) are not wffs of Von Wright’s
system (and shouldn’t be on his intended interpretation),
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and mixed sequences (e.g. $ -> 0B$) are not wffs (and also
shouldn’t be on his intended interpretation). We will
ignore this minor difference here. Secondly, and more
importantly, Von Wright rejects Necess i tat ion
. He thinks
that the following is contingent: 0B( p -> p). As he sees
it, having this as a logical law suggests that the
existence of obligations is a necessary truth. (We shall
return to this issue later.) Hence tautologies are neither
to be obligatory as a matter of logic, nor are they to be
non-ob 1 i gat o ry as a matter of logic. Since Neces s i t at i on
would make all tautologies obligatory it cannot be a rule
in a Von-Wr ightean logic. Since all normal modal logics
satisfy Necess i t at i on
,
the minimal normal deontic logic
will not be a normal modal logic. Just how weak the
minimal normal deontic logic should be is a question we
will attempt to answer in this section. However it will be
instructive to work our way toward answering this question
by first looking at Von Wright’s system in tandem with SDL.
Let’s assume Von Wright’s syntax has been brought in
line with that which we gave above (in section 4), so that
Von Wright’s system, along with SDL, will be a "deontic
system" as there defined. Also, since we will be looking
only at the primitive vocabulary, without mention of OP ,
we will let " 0" stand in for "OB". Von Wright’s system can
then be axiomatized (via schemata) as follows:
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P'ft' AO PC Schemata
A1 0( $ & $ ’ ) <-> ( o$ & <9$ * )
NC 0$ -> ~<9~$
MP If ]- ($ -> $’) and ]- $ then ]- $’.
RE If ]- $ <-> $’ then ]- <9$ <-> (9$’.
SDL is then obtained by adding one axiom schema to VW:
SDL AO PC Schemata
A 1 0( $ & $ * ) <-> ( <9$ & (9$ ’ )
NC 0$ -> ~<9~$
NE (9( $ -> $)
MP If ]- ($ -> $’) and ]- $ then ]- $’.
RE If ]- $ <-> $* then ]- <9$ <-> 0$ * .
First, note that necess itat ion is not a primitive rule
in SDL. However SDL yields Neces s i t at i on as a derived
rule:
MT1
Neces s i t at i on is a rule of any system of deontic wffs
with PC, NE and RE.
Proof
Suppose ]- $’. By PC, ]- [$’ & ($ -> $)] -> [$’ <->
($ -> $)], and ]- $ -> $. So by Conjunction and MP
,
J- ($’ <-> ($ -> $). But then by RE, ]- 0$ ’ <->
0($ -> $). And by PC and NE
,
]- 0$
'
.
(Having the force of necess itat ion represented as an axiom
schema in SDL will prove useful for characterizing a normal
deontic logic, thus allowing for a greater integration and
ease of comparison between the members of a large class of
deontic systems, some of which, such as VW, don’t have the
force of neces s i t a t i on at all.)
56
Secondly, note that if we replaced RE in SDL with RM
if
-1^ $ -> $ then I" ~> 0$» . RE itself is easily
derived
:
MT2
RE is a rule in any system with PC and RM
.
Proof
For suppose ]- $ <-> $’. Then by PC, ]- $ -> $’. S oby RM
,
and PC, ]- 0$ -> 0$’
. In the same manner, we
can derive ]- 0$’ -> 0$ . But then by PC, we get]- 0$ <-> 0$’ .
This, along with MT1, immediately yields:
MT3
Necessitation is a rule in any system with PC, NE
and RM.
We might also consider replacing Al in SDL with the
more standard K, 0( $ -> $’) -> ( 0$ -> 0$ * ) , an axiom schema
in all normal modal logics. Let us call the result of
replacing both RE with RM and Al with K in SDL, "SDL’":
SDL ’ AO PC Schemata
K 0($->$’)->(0$->0$’)
NC 0$ -> ~0~$
NE 0($ -> $)
MP If ]- ($ -> $’) and ]- $ then ]- $’.
RM If ]- $ -> $’ then ]- 0$ -> 0$’.
RE is then a derived rule of SDL’. We shall prove below
(COR MT4 ’
’
)
that SDL’ is equipollent to (has the same class
of theorems as) SDL. (It is also equipollent to the normal
modal logic, KD
,
presented in the previous section.)
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This question naturally arises
:
Is SDL’ minus NE
equipollent to VW? After Von Wright, and in anticipation
of a positive answer, let’s call this Von Wrightean system
(SDL’ minus NE ) "VW’’’:
VW
’
AO PC Schemata
K <9($ -> $ ’ ) -> ( <9$ -> <9$ * )
NC 0$ -> ~<9~$
MP If ]- ($ -> $’) and ]- $ then ]- $’.
RM If ]- $ -> $’ then ]- <9$ -> (9$’.
MT4 provides the answer:
MT4
VW is equipollent with VW’.
Proof
Given the overlap between the two systems, we need
only show that RM and K are derivable in VW and that
RE and A1 are derivable in VW’ . That is, we need
only show the following:
(1) If ]-vw $ -> $’ then ]-vw <9$ -> 0$’. [ RM ]
(2) ]-vw <9( $ -> $’) -> ((9$ -> (9$’) [K]
(3) If ] v w 1 $ <-> $’ then ]- vw < 0$ <-> 0$’. [RE]
(4) ]-vw' <9( $ St $’) <-> ((9$ St <9$ ’ ) [ A 1 ]
(1)
Assume ]- V w $ -> Then, by PC, ]-vw ($ & $’)
<-> $. So by RE, ] v w <9( $ St $’) <-> 0$ . By PC, we
get ] v w (9$ -> <9( $ & $’). But by A1 , we have ]-vw
<9( $ St $’) <-> (<9$ St (9$’). So by PC (hyp. syll.), we
have ] v w (9$ -> ( 0$ St (9$’). This yields ]-vw (9$ ->
<9$’
,
by PC.
(2) By PC, ]-vw (($ -> $’) St $) -> So by RM
(which we just derived), ]-vw 0( ( $ -> $’) St $) ->
<9$’. By Al, ]-vw <9(($ -> $’) St $) <-> ( <9( $ -> $’) &
(9$). So by PC (hyp. syll.), we get ]-vw 0( $ -> $’) St
(9$) -> (9$’. By PC (exportation), we get
]-vw 0($ -> $’ ) -> (0$ -> 0$’ ) .
(3) [Immediate consequence of MT2 above.]
(4) First we show ]-vw' ((9$ St <9$ ’ ) -> 0( $ St $’): By
PC, ]
—
v w » $ -> ($’ -> ($ & $’))• Hence, ]-vw* 0$ ->
0{ $ ’ -> ($ St $’)), by RM. But by K, ]-vw' 0{ $ ’ ->
($ St $’)) -> ((9$’ -> <9( $ St $’)). So by PC (hyp.
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syll.), we have ]- vw « 0$ -> ( 0$ ’ -> 0{ $ & $’)). Andby PC again (importation), we have ]-vw' ( 6>$ & o$ ’ )
“> °( $ & $’)• Secondly, we show ]- vw * 0{ $ & $’) ->
( 6>$ & 0$’): By PC, ]~vw> ($ & $’) -> $. So by RM,
J-vw> 0($ & $’) ~> 0$ . Similarly, we can get ]- vw *
(9($ & $’) -> 6?$’. Then by PC we get ]- VW ' 0( $ & $’)
-> ( ’ ) . These two results yield
]-vw' ( 0$ & 0$’) <-> 0($ & $*), by PC.
Here are some corrollaries:
COR MT4
Al, K, RE and RM are derivable in both VW minus NC
and VW’ minus NC
.
Remark
In proving (l)-(4) above no use was made of NC or
anything which depended on NC . So these four items
are derivable in the weaker systems which result from
deleting NC from VW and VW’.
COR MT4
’
VW minus NC is equipollent to VW’ minus NC
.
Remark
Given the previous corollary, we need only note that
the systems agree in their primitive basis except
with regard to Al, K, RE and RM
.
COR MT4 ’
’
SDL is equipollent to SDL’.
Remark
SDL is VW plus NE and SDL’ is VW
’
plus NE . Given
MT4, we know that VW and VW’ are equipollent. Hence,
any systems resulting from adding the same wff/s to
VW and VW’ must also be equipollent.
Toward the Weakest Deontic Logic
Given these equipollence results, the members of each
of the three pairs, <SDL, SDL’>, <VW, VW’> and <VW - NC,
VW ’ - NC>, represent the same classes of wffs. The three
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classes of wffs are in fact distinct. Letting SDL’, VW’,
and VW’ - NC be the respective representatives of these
three classes of wffs, it is obvious that the first class
contains the second and the second contains the last.
VW’ - NC
,
the weakest class, is fairly weak at that. It
allows for the possibility that there are no obligations
and it allows for the possibility of explicit conflicts of
obligation. It is not hard to imagine the motivation for
considering a logic which allows for these things. But it
also allows for the possibility that one is obligated to do
the logically contradictory. This does not appear to be
very attractive. Consider the following two formulas:
NC 0$ -> (also "D")
C ~<9($ & ~$)
The first formula (No Conflicts) corresponds to the dictum
that one’s obligations can’t conflict : one can’t be both
obligated to do something and obligated to fail to do that
very thing. It is perhaps the weakest version of this
dictum. The second formula (Kant’s principle) corresponds
to the dictum that one can’t be obligated to do what one
can’t do . It is also perhaps the weakest version of this
second dictum: one can’t be obligated to do that which is
logically contradictory. Now it is an interesting fact
that any system with PC, K and RM (e.g. all the systems
we’ve considered so far), and which has either of these two
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formuli as a theorem has the other as a theorem also. In
other words, from the standpoint of a system with PC, K and
RM
,
NC and C are equivalent:
MT5 a
Any system with PC, K, RM and C, is a system with NC
.
Proof
Suppose that C is a theorem of such a system:
]- 0 ( $ & ~$). Then we have already seen above
(part (4) in proof of COR MT4 ) that we have
aggregation, ]- ( 0$ & 0$') -> <9( $ & $’) in such a
system^ So in particular, we have ]- ( 0$ & £T$) ->
0( $ & ~$). By our assumption and modus tollens, we
get ]- ~ ( £?$ & ) . And this yields ]- 0% -> ~£T$ by
PC
.
MT5b
Any system with PC, K, RM and NC is a system with C.
Proof
Suppose that NC is a theorem of such a system: ]- £)$
-> CT $ . As we saw above ((4) in proof of COR MT3),
we have ]- 0{ $ & $’) -> ( 0% & 0§ ’ ) in such a system.
So in particular, we have ]- 0( $ & "$) -> ( 6>$ & C>~$).
But by PC, our assumption yields its equivalent:
]- ~(<?$ & (9~$). But then by modus tollens,
]- ~ 0($ & ~$) .
Putting these two results together, we get MT5 proper:
MTS
Any system with PC, K, RM and either C or NC, is a
system with both NC and C.
REMARK
Follows immediately from MT5a and MT5b.
COR MT5
’
The smallest system with PC, K, RM and C is
equipollent to the smallest system consisting of PC,
K, RM and NC
.
REMARK
Follows immediately from MT5
.
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What this means is that from the standpoint of systems
with PC, K and RM, there is no way to distinguish between C
and NC, despite the fact that there content does seem to be
different on the face of it.
Many deontic logicians have been working on devising
systems which are intended to represent notions of non-
strict obligation for which (by definition) it is genuinely
possible that there be conflicts. To be sure, they are
usually concerned with devising a system rich enough to
also allow for a resolution of conflicts, so that from this
class of non-strict obligations emerge strict obligations,
but they want to do this in such a way that they genuinely
represent real conflicts of obligation to begin with.
Suppose that someone wanted to devise such a deontic logic.
Then a substantial fragment of such a logic would involve
an obligation operator for which NC was undesirable. But
they needn’t, and shouldn’t, rule out C. The two
principles certainly seem to be distinct on the face of it.
It does not appear to follow intuitively from the
possibility of conflicts that it is possible to be
obligated to do the impossible. It is one thing to say
that it is impossible to do everything that one is
obligated to do and it is quite another thing to say that
one is thereby obligated to do something impossible.
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Although a case can be made for at least the
plausibility that there is a sense of obligation in which
we can be obligated to do one thing and obligated to not do
that same thing, I do not think that the typical cases
which appear to support the occurrence of this sort of
conflict have any appearance of cases in which I am
obligated to do the impossible. For example, we might want
to assert that Mary (as a doctor) might be obligated to
stay late at the hospital and (as a spouse or parent) be
obligated to not stay late at the hospital. But I do not
think that we should go on to assert, that Mary would
thereby be obligated to both stay and not stay at the
hospital. Similarly, I might promise you that I will show
up, and perhaps I am thereby obligated to show up. And I
might, also promise someone else that I won’t show up, and
perhaps here to I acquire an obligation to not show up.
But there is little plausibility in concluding that such
distinct obligations now result in the single obligation to
both show and not show up. So I think that such a logic,
if well-motivated, will assert the possibility of C’s being
true while NC is false.
Indeed, I think that such a logic should take the
stronger course of asserting C as a theorem without
asserting NC. Suppose I am in a circumstance where I agree
to kill the would-be-assassin, Mr. X, without killing Mr.
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— ’
anc* unknown to either my government or myself, Mr. X is
Mr. Y. Do I thereby have an obligation (i.e. a single
obligation) to both kill and not kill Mr. X? I don’t think
so. I think that the mere fact that Mr. X is Mr. Y
immediately precludes my being obligated to both kill Mr. X
and not kill Mr. Y. It does not however preclude the
possibility that by agreeing to do this impossible thing, I
have thereby acquired the separate obligations to kill Mr
.
X an d to not kill Mr. Y . For in having agreed to the
impossible conjunctive thing I may have thereby agreed to
the conjuncts, and each of the conjuncts is readily
possible. There just may be cases where promising to do a
conjunctive thing whose conjuncts are separately possible
does not thereby result in a non-strict obligation to do
that conjunctive thing, although it may result in the
separate non-strict obligations to do each conjunct.
The fact that I don’t know that I agreed to the
impossible, and that I would swear up and down that I had
an obligation to both kill Mr. X and not to kill Mr. Y,
should not convince us that I was obligated to do the
impossible. If someone agrees to do something which we
(but not he) knows is impossible, do we take him to be
thereby obligated ( non-strict ly) to do that thing?
Certainly not! If a child promises to clean his room, he
may thereby be non-strict ly obligated to do so, but if he
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promises to find Santa Claus and bring him home, he surely
does not thereby acquire an obligation to do so — whether
strict or non-strict. But then I don’t think that one can
acquire an obligation to do the impossible, even if no one
realizes that the thing in question is impossible. And if
we have ample reason in every day life for believing that
some people take themselves to be obligated to do things
which they are not obligated to do (and that some people
are obligated to do things which they don’t take themselves
to be obligated to do), then we should not be surprised to
find out that in some cases this is because, as with the
child, they couldn’t possibly do what they promised.
(Incidentally, if this is right, to promise is not to
thereby be obligated even in the weak sense of non-
strictly obligated.)
Finally, if we are obligated to see to it that both $
and ~$
,
then by RM (the principle to the effect that we are
obligated to bring about the consequences of what we are
obligated to bring about), we are obligated to do
absolutely everything. For anything we please follows from
the contradictory and hence by RM, anything we please is
obligatory once the impossible is. But this is obviously
counterintuitive. In the case above, where I promise to
kill Mr. X w/o killing Mr. Y, there is absolutely no
plausibility in thinking that I am thereby obligated to
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kill the president or hop on the next bus and kill its
passengers. So it is plausible to assert C as a logical
truth while denying this status for NC (provided we are
devising a logic for a non-strict concept of obligation of
course)
.
However, as we saw in the proof of MT5a
,
such a position
requires the denial of the aggregation principle
: ( 0$ &
0$ ) -> 0 ( $ & $’). For from this principle we get ( 0$ &
0 $) -> 0 ( $ & ~$) as a special instance and then from C and
modus tollens we get ~ ( 0$ & 0~$), which is just NC in
feeble disguise. Since the aggregation principle is
derivable in any system with K, RM and PC (see proof of
MT4
, (4) ) , and VW’ - NC is the weakest system of this
sort, VW’ - NC plus C can’t represent a non-strict concept
of obligation. Something must go, and K is the likely
candidate. For from the standpoint of a system with PC, RM
and C, K and the aggregation principle (AG) are equivalent.
That is, where S is the smallest system consisting of PC,
RM
,
C and K and where S’ is the smallest system consisting
of PC, RM, C and AG:
MT6
S is equipollent to S’
PROOF
S and S’ differ only in that S has K where S’ has AG.
So it is sufficient to show that AG is a theorem of S
and that K is a theorem of S’. But in part (4) of
the proof of MT4 we saw that AG was derivable from
PC, RM and K alone. So obviously it is derivable
from these augmented by C -- which is superfluous
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here. So all that remains is to show that K is atheorem of S’. By PC, ]
-
s - (($ -> $•) & $) _> $ .So by RM, ]-a ’ <9(($ -> $’) & $) -> o$*. But, by AG,
] s' (0($ > $’) & (9$) -> (0($ -> $*) & <?$>). So, byHyp. Sy 1 1
.
,
]- s . (0($ -> $’) & o$) -> 0$ ’ . But
then by exportation, ]
-
s * 0( $ -> $’) -> ( o$ -> <9$ ’ ) .
Normal Deontic Logics
C and RM seem to be very plausible general principles,
consistent with virtually any interesting notion of
obligation, whether it be a notion of strict obligation or
one which allows for conflicts. This suggests taking the
minimal normal deontic logic as follows:
MS AO PC Schemata
C ~<9($ & ~$)
MP If ]- ($ -> $’) and ]- $ then ]- $’.
RM If ]- $ -> $’ then ]- (9$ -> <9$’.
We could then define a normal deontic logic (normal
deontic system) as follows:
D1 : S is a Normal Deontic Logic =df S is a system of
deontic wffs such that:
1) S contains all PC-valid S-wffs (i.e.
S-wff instances of PC-valid schemata);
2) S contains all wffs of the form: C :
~<9($ & ;
3) if $ and $ -> $’ are in S, so is $’ (MP);
4) if $ -> $’ is in S, then so is (9$ -> (9$’
(RM) .
MS is then a normal deontic logic and it is the minimal
deontic logic. We can now organize things more
economically. First we list some various basic candidate
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system components:
PC: Propositional Calculus Schemata and MP
RM : If ]- $ -> $’ then ]- <9$ -> <9$ ’
C: ~0($ & ~$)
K: 0($ ->$’)->(
-> q$ > )
NE: 0 ( $ -> ~$)
Logic MS is then just PC, RM and C. Logic VW’ is then just
MS plus K, and SDL is just VW’ plus NE (normative non-
emptiness — something is obligatory). Of course, we could
also add NE alone to MS (w/o also adding K). Call this
logic, for want of a better term, MSNE
.
Intuitively, MS and MSNE are the sorts of logics which
might be favored by those who want to represent conflicts
of obligation. For each allows for the possibility that (9$
and (9~$ are both true. They differ in that MS allows for
the possibility that absolutely nothing is obligatory (that
no wff of the form 0% is true) and MSNE guarantees that at
least something is obligatory (in particular that theorems
are obligatory). In contrast, VW’ and SDL’ are the sorts
of logics which might be favored by those who want to
represent a concept of strict obligation, for which
conflicts are impossible. They differ in that VW’ allows
for the possibility that nothing is obligatory, while SDL
guarantees that there are at least some obligations.
Schemat ical ly
:
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LOGIC INGREDIENTS SALIENT FEATURES
MS
MSNE
MSK
(VW)
PC + RM + C
MS + NE
MS + K
Allows Conflicts,
Doesn’t guarantee any
obligations
Allows Conflicts,
Guarantees every theorem
is obi igatory
Disallows Conflicts
Doesn’t guarantee any
obligations
MSKNE MS + K + NE
(D, SDL)
Disallows Conflicts
Guarantees every theorem
is obligatory
The philosophically interesting basic deontic logics
can be characterized ax i omat i cal 1 y as follows:
The Non-Strict Logics:
MS AO : PC Schemata
C: ~0($ & ~$)
MP: If ]- ($ -> $’) and ]- $ then ]-
RM: If ]- $ -> $’ then ]- 0% -> 0$ ’ .
MSNE AO: PC Schemata
C: & ~$)
NE: C>($ -> $)
MP: If ]- ($ -> $’) and ]- $ then ]- $’.
RM: If ]- $ -> $’ then ]- <?$ -> 0$ ’ .
The Strict Logics:
MSK AO : PC Schemata
(VW) C : ~<?($ & ~$)
K: 0($ -> $’) -> ( o$ -> 0$’)
MP: If ]- ($ -> $’) and ] - $ then ]
-
RM: If ]- $ -> $’ then ]| - 0$ -> 0$’ .
MSNEK AO : PC Schemata
(SDL) C: ~0($ & ~$)
K: 0($ -> $’ ) -> (0$ -> 0$’)
NE : 0($ “> $)
MP: If ]- ($ -> $ ’ ) and ] - $ then ]
RM: If ]- $ -> $* then ] I8i
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We turn now to the problem of a semantic framework for
normal deontic logics.
Normal Deontic Semantics
Normal Modal Models and VW
Recall the semantic clause for the necessity operator
in the definition of a normal modal model:
[V*] V(*$,w) = 1 iff ( w ’ ) (if Rww ’ then V($,w’) = 1).
Among other things, such a clause ends up validating NE
,
along with the rule of Necess i t at i on . For the
necess i t at i on of what is true at every world in every
model, is also true at every world in every model. That
[
V
*] automatically yields neces s i t at i on is fine for all
normal modal logics (and hence for SDL) since, by
definition, the rule of neces s i t at i on holds in these logics
and NE is easily shown to hold for such logics.
Patently, the above clause will not do for VW , which
can’t be characterized by a class of models which ratifies
NE . Hence, VW (MSK) is not a normal modal logic and is not
amenable to a semantic treatment by the normal modal
models. For Von Wright wants to allow for the possibility
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that nothing is obligatory and hence that logical truths in
particular are not. Semantically, this amounts to
asserting that there may be models with no deontic
alternatives to a given world. But in such a situation the
standard clause for " 0" still yields that every theorem is
obligatory at such a world. For it vacuously yields the
obligatoriness of anything we please at such a "dead-end”
world. 7
However, if we alter the standard semantic clause for
" (in a minor way), we can retain the rest of the
standard semantic framework for normal deontic logics at
least as strong as VW. The needed change is obvious. We
need to make the truth of an obligation statement at a
world (in a model) depend on the existence of deontic
alternatives for that world. To wit:
[ V <9] * V(<9$,w) = 1 iff there is a w’ such that wRw’
and, for every w’ if wRw’ then V($,w’) = 1.
Let’s call the result of replacing the clause for the
necessity operator in the definition of "normal modal
model" with the above clause a "quasi-normal modal model".
With this shift in the clause for " 0"
,
NE is invalid. In
particular NE comes out logically contingent. For (1)
there will be quasi-models in which there are worlds with
no deontic alternatives and hence quasi-models in which
this wff will be false (as will all wffs of the form 0$ )
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and (2) there will be quasi-models in which some world has
an alternative and in all such worlds, NE will be true.
We noted above that the class of normal modal models in
which the relation R is serial (some world or other is
accessible from every world) characterizes or determines
the logic SDL (MSKNE, KD). Seriality is the semantic
condition associated with 0$ -> in this framework.
Notice, however, that seriality in a quasi-model has a new
import. With the original semantic clause, (2$ ->
could be false in precisely those cases where there were no
deontic alternatives. For then, any wff preceded by an " 0"
would be vacuously true. But given the above alteration in
the semantic clause for " O"
,
we have precisely
,
reversed
this ruling at dead-end worlds. For the first conjunct of
[ V 0] * tells us that " (2$ ” can be true in a model only at a
world which does have deontic alternatives, that is only at
worlds which are not dead ends. Hence in any quasi-model,
any world at which the antecedent of NC is true is a world
which does have deontic alternatives. But by the second
conjunct of [
V
O ] * , we are guaranteed that no world with
alternatives can have both "<?$" and true at it,
because none of these alternatives can have both "$" and
" true at it. Hence NC is ratified in all quasi-models
and seriality is disassociated from NC for quasi- models.
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So, with [VO]*, we lose the validity of NE and gain the
validity of NC for all quasi-normal modal models.
Interestingly enough, seriality is now tied to NE
. For
NE is valid for the class of quasi-models which are serial.
For above, in showing how there could be falsifying quasi-
models for NE, we noted that quasi-models with dead-end
worlds falsify NE . In fact, these are the only worlds at
which NE can be false. Hence since the class of serial
quasi-models contains no models with such worlds, NE is
valid for this class of quasi-models. For $ -> $ is true
at every world in every model. Hence, in particular, it is
true at every alternative to every world in every serial
model. But then by [
V
O ] * , 0( $ -> $’) must be true at every
world in every such model, since each world must have an
alternative if the model is serial.
It is easy to see that with such an alteration in the
clause for ” 0”
,
the resulting definition of a quasi-model
is such that VW (i.e. MSK, KD) is sound for the class of
all such quas i -mode 1 s . Since ($ & ~$) is false at every
world in every quasi-model, there is no world in any quasi-
model in which 0( $ & "$) is true. Hence its negation, C,
is valid for the class of all such quasi-models. Similarly
for K. If 0( $ -> $’) and 0$ are true at any world in any
quasi-model, then there must be deontic alternatives to
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this world, and at all of them, $ -> $’ and $ must be true.
But then $’ must be true at all of them also. But then by
[
V
0 }
* , must be true at any such world. Finally, the
rule RM preserves validity. For if ] = $ -> $’, then $ ->
$ is true at every world in every quasi-model. So for any
quasi-model, if <?$ is true at w in the quasi-model then,
non- vacuous 1 y , every alternative to w is an $-world. But
then these w-a 1 1 erna t i ves must be $’-worlds. So <9$’must
also be true at w.
S cho t ch- J enn i n gs Models
Although we have succeeded in producing a semantic
framework which is adequate to both SDL and VW — certainly
a desirable result -- this increase in semantic generality
is still too weak. For we saw that Von Wright’s system is
sound for the class of all quasi-models. But then no logic
weaker than Von Wright’s can be handled in the quasi-normal
model framework. For any logic which is genuinely weaker
will be a proper sub-logic of VW. Hence such a logic will
be missing theorems which Von Wright’s system has and all
of which are valid for the class of all quasi-normal modal
models (as we saw above). So, given the way we organized
the normal deontic logics, and assuming that none of these
have redundant rules or axioms (which they do not), then it
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follows at once that no quasi-normal modal model could
possibly characterize MS, the minimal normal deontic logic.
For this logic is weaker than Von Wright’s. Hence a new
framework is called for in order to handle MS.
In fact both sorts of models we’ve looked at so far,
normal or quasi-normal, are unsuitable for logics which
want to handle non-strict obligation. For in the quasi-
normal framework NC is valid, and it is a mark of logics of
non-strict obligation that they do not have NC as a
theorem. On the other hand, we argued above that MS is the
weakest logic of strict obligation, and MS contains C. But
it turns out that C is valid only for the class of serial
normal modal models. For ~ 0 ( $ & ~$) can be false at a
world in a normal modal model if the world is a dead end
(and hence 0 ( $ & ~$) is vacuously true at the world). In
fact, this is the only way that C can falsified. So in
order to validate C, we must restrict ourselves to the
class of serial normal modal models. But as we saw above,
NC is also valid for the class of serial normal modal
models, and NC is anathema to logics of non-strict
obligation. Hence with respect to the normal modal
framework, NC and C are semantically indistinguishable.
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There is, however, an interesting general framework
specified by Schotch and Jennings [1981] which is more
adequate to our notion of normal deontic logics and which
can semantically distinguish NC and C. I will present a
brief sketch of their framework, and then make a minor
modification in there approach, one which mirrors the
modification [VO]*. The result will be a notion of a
normal deontic model which is to our normal deontic logics
what the notion of a normal we’ve been heading in this and
modal model is to normal modal logics. This, of course, is
where the previous section.
First lets look at the notion of a S cho t ch-Jenn i ngs
model (SJ model), and see why it needs to be modified.
Informally, an SJ model is just a generalization of the
notion of a normal modal model. The crucial shift is that
we now allow there to be numerous alternativeness
(accessibility) relations, Ri , . .
.
,
R
n
,
in a model rather
than exactly one. We then say that a certain obligation,
(9$, holds at a world w (in a model) just in case there is
some alternativeness relation Ri (in the model) such that
every world which is an alternative per Ri to w is one
where $ holds. More precisely:
An SJ model structure
,
is a sequence <W, Ri
,
. . . Rn
,
P>
,
where W is non-empty set ("worlds"), each Ri is a
dyadic relation drawn from W, (the "alternativeness"
relations), and P is an infinite sequence of subsets
of W ("propositions"): Pi
,
. .
.
,
Pi
,
. . . .
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An SJ—
m
o d e 1 is then simply an ordered pair <Z,V>,
where Z is an SJ model structure and V is a valuation
on Z (a function from the deontic wffs to the value
se t ,0,1}) meeting the following conditions:
[At] For every variable, Pi
,
and world w, V(P,
,
w ) =
1 if w is in A, otherwise V(P i)W ) = 0;
For any modal wffs $, $’ and world, w:
[V~] V ( ~ $ , w ) = 1 iff V ( $ , w ) = 0;
[V->] V(($ -> $
’ ) , w) = 1 iff either V($,w) = 0 or
V($’ , w) = 1;
[ V 0] V(f>$,w) = 1 iff there is an Ri such that
for each w’, if wRiw’, then V($,w’) = 1.
So the only change in the notion of a normal modal
model structure is that there may now be any finite number
of alternativeness relations (but at least one) rather than
exactly one. Indeed, the normal modal model structures are
just those SJ model structures where R n = 1. Similarly,
the only change in the clause for the necessity operator is
that it is truth of the operators sentential compliment at
all worlds which are alternatives 1 to the world of
valuation, for some one of the alternativeness relations,
R 1 .
It can be routinely verified that the rule RM is valid
for the class of all SJ models. However, C is not. For on
this semantics, if a world, w, has no alternatives for any
R 1
,
then it is vacuously true that for each R 1 and every
w’, i_f wR‘ w 1 then V($ & ~$) = 1. Hence, in such "SJ dead-
end worlds", anything you please is obligatory, even if it
is contradictory. So if we want a match between this
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notion of models and the minimal deontic logic, MS, we need
to require that all the models be SJ-serial:
For each w in W, there is some w’ and some R‘ such
that wR 1 w ’
.
If we add the above restriction to the definition of the SJ
model structures, then MS is sound for the class of
associated models. So let’s call these structures "serial
SJ model structures", and the associated models we’ll call
serial SJ models". Then the logic MS is sound for all
serial SJ models
.
Despite the fact that C is valid for all serial SJ
models, NC is not (which should come as no surprise) . For
$ may be true at all the alternatives to this world
relative to R 1 and may likewise be true at all the
alternatives to this world relative to some distinct Rj
.
The semantic condition associated with NC in the SJ
framework is the following:
For each w in W, if there is some w’ and R'
,
such
that wR' w’
,
then there is some w’ such that for each
R 1
,
wR 1 w ’ .
Call this condition "Compatibility". Intuitively, this
condition says that for every world w, if I have any duties
at all at w, then there is a way for me to discharge all of
my various duties. That is, if I have any deontic
alternatives at w then there is a world, w’ , which is a
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common alternative", in that every alternative relation
relates w to w’, and hence in such a w’ I discharge all my
duties. If, for example, we think of the Ri' s as "office
or station induced relations", respectively relating John
Doe to worlds where he behaves in a way which is consonant
with the duties of his respective offices or stations, then
the above condition guarantees that Doe has a way to
satisfy all the various duties associated with his various
positions if he has any duties at all. Thus none of
Doe’s duties unresolvedly conflict in such a situation. 8
Normal Deontic Models
One virtue of the SJ framework is that it has the result
that normal modal models are SJ models (i.e serial and non-
serial), and hence that normal modal logics can also be
treated in this framework. However, this means that it
also has one of the same liabilities as normal model
models: NE is valid and the rule of necess i tat ion holds
for all SJ models. For $ -> $ is true at every world in
every SJ model, and hence 0 { $ -> $) is true at every world
in every model (at the SJ dead-end worlds it is vacuously
true). Hence this framework is inadequate for modeling MS
and for modeling VW, both of which do not contain NE. For
no subclass of SJ models can possibly characterize
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(determine) these logics if non-theorems are valid for the
class of all such models. Hence serial SJ models in
particular are inadequate. So we are still not home.
The needed modification is analogous to the one we
introduced to accommodate VW in the clause for " 0" in
normal modal models. Once again, we need to make the truth
^ ^ ^ ^ obligation statement at a world (in a model) depend
on the existence of alternatives. That is we retain the
characterization of an SJ model structure, but alter the
clause for 0" in the definition of an SJ model structure
as follows:
[ V 0\ * V ( 0$ ,
w
) = 1 iff there is an Ri such that for
each w’, where wRiw’, V($,w’) - 1 and there is
a w’ and R' where wR‘ w’ .
This reverses the ruling of [VO] on wffs of the form 0% at
SJ dead end worlds. On [VO], all wffs are true at such
worlds, no matter what their content. But with [
V
0 ] * , all
wffs are false at such worlds. Hence in non-serial SJ
models, wffs of the form 0($-> $) in particular will be
falsified per [VO]*.
Let’s take the result of replacing [VO] by [VO]* in the
definition of "SJ model" to be our sought after definition
of a normal deontic model. I will now argue that MS is
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sound for the class of all normal deontic models as just
dubbed.
That PC is valid for the class of all normal deontic
models, I will take to be established. So let’s consider
C, 0( $ & $). Obviously, no wff of the form $ & ~$ can be
true at any world in any model. But then neither can 0( $ &
~$)* For in order for this to be true at a world, w, w
must satisfy two conditions: it must not be an SJ dead end
nnd it must be such that all its alternatives per some R 1
are ($ & $)-worlds. But if it satisfies the first
condition then it can’t vacuously satisfy the second
condition. But neither can it non-vacuous ly satisfy the
second condition, for no world can be an ($ & ~$)-world.
Regarding RM
,
if ]= $ -> $’, then $ -> $’ it true at every
world in every model. But if <9$ is true at a given world,
w, in a model, then by [VO]* there is an R 1 such that non-
vacuously, every R 1 -a 1 1 er n at i ve to w is an $-world. Thus,
with equal non- vacuousness
,
every R 1 -al ternat i ve to w is an
$’
-world. But then, by [VO]*, 0$ must be true at w also.
We have already seen that NE is invalid for the class
of all normal deontic models, for it is falsified by any
model which is not SJ-serial. With the above soundness
proof for MS, this demonstrates that NE is indeed
independent of MS, so that the logic MSNE is a genuine
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extension of MS. It is equally apparent that NE is only
falsified in normal deontic models which are not serial.
Hence MS NE is sound for the class of all serial normal
deontic models.
Regarding MSK (VW), we first note that K is not valid
for the class of all normal deontic models, and that hence
MSK is also a genuine extension of MS. For consider normal
deontic models meeting the following conditions: (1) Ri
,
... Rn = Ri
,
R.?
; (2) for some w, w’ and w’’, w’ is the only
world such that wRiw’ and w’ ’ is the only world such that
wR 2 w’’; and (3) w’ is a (~p & ~q)-world and w’’ is a (p &
~q)-world. Then in virtue of Ri
,
0( p -> q) is true at w
and in virtue of R 2
,
Op is true at w. But q is not true at
either w’ or w*
’
,
and these are the only alternatives, by
any Ri in such a model. Hence, Oq is false at w in any
such model. But then K, 0( $ -> $’) -> ( <9$ -> <9$ ’ ) has
false instances at some worlds in some normal deontic
models. The condition needed to validate K is:
For any w, w’ and any Ri
,
Rj in any model, wRiw’
Call this condition "Agreement". K is valid for the class
of all agreeable normal deontic models. For if 0 ( p -> q)
and Op are true at a world, w, in such a model, then by
agreement, for each Ri and every w’ such that wRi w’ , (p ->
q) and p are true at w’. But then q is also true at every
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such w
,
and hence Oq is true at w. In addition, it can be
easily verified that agreement will also validate AG (the
aggregation principle). Intuitively, agreement holds in
just the case where, for example, all the alternatives
associated with each of my offices are the same. So if I
have some duties, not only is their a way to discharge all
the duties of my various offices (compatibility), but there
is no way to discharge those of one office w/o thereby
discharging those of all my other offices. Vacuously, all
conflicts are resolvable, because there are no conflicts to
resolve. Of course, a normal modal model is just a
special case: where R n = 1. We noted above that NC is a
theorem of VW
. The semantic condition associated with K,
namely agreement, is easily verified to be sufficient to
ratify NC
,
for agreement obviously implies compatibility
and we saw above that the latter is sufficient to ratify
NC . Hence VW (MSK) is sound for the class of agreeable
models.
Finally, we have already noted that NE is valid for the
class of all SJ-serial normal deontic models and that it is
invalid for any class of non-serial normal deontic models.
But it is easy to see that the class of agreeable models
will contain some non-serial models. So NE is not valid
for the class of agreeable models. Since we just saw that
MSK is sound for this class of models it follows that NE is
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independent of MS K and that MSKNE (SDL) is thereby a
genuine extension of MSK
. It also follows from the fact
that NE is only invalid for classes containing non-serial
models, that MSKNE is sound for the class of agreeable
serial models
.
We can summarize the salient semantical results
(abbreviating "normal deontic models" as "ndms") as
follows
:
SMT1 :
(1) MS is sound for the class of all ndms;
(2) MSNE is sound for the class of all serial ndms.
(3) MSK is sound for the class of all agreeable ndms.
(4) MSKNE is sound for the class of all agreeable
serial ndms.
SMT2 :
(1) K is not valid for the class of all serial ndms.
(2) NE is not valid for the class of all agreeable
ndms .
(3) K is independent of MS and MSNE.
(4) NE is independent of MS and MSK.
(5) MS, MSK, MSNE, and MSKNE are distinct logics.
SMT3 :
(1) NC is valid for the class of all compatible ndms.
(2) AG is valid for the class of all agreeable ndms.
(3) All agreeable ndms are compatible ndms.
Hence the notion of a normal deontic model we have
arrived at in this section provides an adequate semantic
framework for the notion of a normal deontic logic that we
arrived at in the previous section. So we have a plausible
general framework for elementary deontic logics.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to place the subsequent
work of this essay in a larger context. It seemed
appropriate to see what the larger picture might look like
before we turned to an investigation that will take place
in a narrower context, with its associated presuppositions.
The central tenet of the ancient Traditional Scheme is
NC: the logical impossibility of conflicts of obligation.
As we saw, this supposition is the very essence of this
scheme. Furthermore, classical modern deontic logic,
beginning with Von Wright’s unary system and leading to the
standard unary system, SDL, are also classical in as much
as they also accept this supposition (and they utilize only
unary operators). We carefully examined the logical
interaction between various principles of various axiomatic
presentations of Von Wright’s first system and of SDL.
Aside from revealing interdependencies between various
combinations of fundamental theses and rules, this helped
provide us with materials that aided us in our quest to
find the weakest general deontic logic. With such a
candidate for the weakest deontic logic, one that could
plausibly be taken to hold for any interesting pre-
theoretical concept of obligation, we could define a class
of normal deontic logics that would encompass all the
85
logics of all such concepts of obligation. On the way to
this goal, we saw that NC is not only the central tenet of
the relatively weak Traditional Scheme, but it is the
central tenet of orthodox" deontic logic generally. For
NC is a thesis of both VW and SDL, and the latter is the
standard basis for most systems of unary deontic logic.
Furthermore, although conditional obligation is a somewhat
more recent "post-classical" development, one that we have
left in the background, such systems are also typically
orthodox in that they entail the definitional equivalent of
NC
. Hence the orthodox systems of deontic logic are
logics for concepts of strict obligation. 9
We also argued that C [
~ 0B{% & ~$], unlike NC
,
appears
to hold for all interesting pre- theoret i cal concepts of
obligation, strict or non-strict. This brought yet another
mark of the centrality of NC to orthodox deontic logic to
the foreground: NC and C are simply "indistinguishable" in
the orthodox systems, VW and SDL (and hence all of their
extensions). We were finally led from the latter
observation, coupled with the desirability of eliminating
the automatic validity of the force of necess i t at i on , to
the weakest system of deontic logic, and thus to the
derivative definition of a class of normal deontic logics.
We then provided a general semantic framework for this
class of logics, one that followed the work of Sckotch and
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Jennings, but modified so as to rule out the automatic
validity of necessitation. We also briefly explored the
correlation between various semantic conditions
formulatab le in this general framework and the main logical
theses that distinguished the main systems we had examined.
In particular, we saw that although C is automatically
validated by this framework, NC (and NE) are not. Clearly,
the most significant division among these systems of normal
modal logic, is that between those that contain NC and
those that do not.
We have suggested that one way to view the issue
surrounding NC is to say that there are concepts of
obligation that are strict, and there are concepts of
obligation that are not strict. A strict obligation is not
subject to the possibility of conflicts. The orthodox
context is then one in which the central concept of
obligation is always strict. This is simply part of the
logic of the targeted concept. Whereas non-classical
deontic logics, are unorthodox in countenancing the
possibility of genuine conflicts of obligation. We have
suggested that these logics are intended to model concepts
of non-strict obligation. We have tried to sketch a
general framework, stemming from Sckotch and Jenning’s
work, that accomodates both classical and non-classical
unary deontic logics. And our rationale has been based on
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the tenable assumption that there are both strict and non-
strict concepts of obligation and hence legitimate orthodox
and non-orthodox deontic logics.
Alas, although Leibniz would be pleased with our
reconci 1 iatory approach, our position is not uncontentious.
There are many who would argue that there simply are no
concepts of strict obligation — or at least no such pre-
theoret ical ly employed concepts for philosophers to turn
their reflection on. In particular, they would argue that
there are cases where one is obligated to see to $, one is
obligated to see to $’, one can’t see to both — and the
concept of obligation is the one that has always been
traditionally central to ethicists. So that, it is not
that the classical conception is onto a concept for which
this can’t happen. Rather, the concept that they are onto
is the one for which this does happen and the orthodoxy has
simply been mistaken about the logic of this concept. This
claim, which has received a great deal of attention in
recent years 10
,
is clearly a challenge to the vast majority
of systems of deontic logic. Indeed, given the centrality
of NC to the orthodox view, this challenge goes for the
orthodox jugular. Thus, I would submit that the most
fundamental issue in the foundations of deontic logic is
the question of the soundness of this principle for the
traditional concept of obligation in normative ethics.
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It is beyond the scope of this essay to take this issue
up in a judicious manner. I can only ask the reader to
reflect and ask herself if she thinks that there is a pre-
theoretic concept of obligation for which it ma^ very well
be the case that conflicts of obligation are not possible.
If she answers this question in the affirmative, that is
enough to justify moving on. I think there is such a
concept and this presupposition will be in active force,
though not in focus, for the rest of this essay. Thus the
context of our investigations will be purely orthodox.
Since we will spend virtually no time discussing
conditional deontic concepts, the context will also be
classical. Discussion of conditional obligation has been
by far a more prominent area of research than that of unary
obligation. I suspect that this is due, at least in part,
to the fact that there is a perception among many ethicists
and deontic logicians that the subject of unary deontic
logic is uninteresting because it has been essentially
exhausted. We will see soon enough, I think, that this
perception is ungrounded. Indeed, I believe that, to the
contrary, the subject of unary deontic logic has more
philosophical interests than that of conditional deontic
logic and that the latter will eventually be seen as a
somewhat minor elaboration of the former . 11
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Chapter 1 Notes
1* Castenada (1968) noted that traditional formulations of
utilitarianism were subject to just such a problem.
2. Of course, if a given deontic logic appears to conflict
with a substantive analysis of a status, it may turn
out that the conflict is only apparent. For the logic
may be designed for a status other than that which the
normative ethicist is analyzing -- despite the fact
that the respective statuses are expressed by the same
word, or by distinct words which appear to be
equivalent
.
3. This specific example is similar to one presented by
Forrester (1984). Chisholm is responsible for bringing
the importance of such conditionals to the center of
the community’s attention (1963a).
4. If the reader is unconvinced, then imagine this said at
a convention on the distinction between absolute and
conditional obligation: "If that’s Bob, then Bob has an
absolute obligation to provide us with an explanation"
5. This is a post-Lemmon-Scot t follow up to their earlier
classic [Hughes, G. E. & Cresswell M. J. 1968]. With
trivial modifications, my presentation follows that in
their more recent text.
6 See Von Wright 1951. There were of course predecessors
in this century, but it is fair to say that Von Wright
is responsible for single-handedly launching the
academic discipline. For information on some of Von
Wright’s immediate predecessors, see Follesdal and
Hilpinen 1971.
7. Hughes and Cresswell (1984, p.9) credit Segerberg for
this colorful description.
8. I add "unresolvedly"
,
because there is a sense in which
Compatibility is clearly compatible with conflicts.
For example, it may still be true that there are many
worlds that are acceptable relative to one office-
induced R 1 that are not acceptable to another office-
induced R * .
9. Note also that since the Traditional Scheme has been
endorsed by the vast majority of normative ethicists,
NC constitutes a fundamental presupposition of general
philosophical interest and not just a "philosophically
irrelevant nicety of deontic technicians".
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10 .
11 .
See, for example, the recent anthology, Gowan 1987.
Of course, this is not to deny that conditional deontic
logic is quite philosophically interesting nor to deny
that, analytically, the conditional concepts are prior
to the unary ones.
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CHAPTER 2
SUPEREROGATION, UTILITARIANISM AND STRONG TRIPARTISM
Introduction
In this chapter I examine the critical import of
supererogation as traditionally conceived. This involves
first drawing out those features of the classical
conception which bear on criticisms of utilitarianism. Two
such criticisms of utilitarianism are then examined, the
traditional one and one which has only recently been given
the attention it deserves. In the process of examining the
latter objection, a frequent misrepresentation of the
supererogatory is exposed. This constitutes sections 2.1
and 2.2. In section 2.3 we turn to the more general
critical import of supererogation. This involves a
discussion of the notion of the morally indifferent and its
relation to supererogation. In turn, a view, "Strong
Tripartism", which conflicts with the possibility of
supererogation is discussed and compared with the
tripartite classification of the Traditional Scheme. This
leads to a discussion of a related view, "Moral Rigor"
which is equivalent to Strong Tripartism and is often
tacitly endorsed by both ethicists and deontic logicians
alike. This section ends with a discussion of Urmson’s
classic "Saints and Heroes" (1958), and a discussion of a
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confusion about the import, of supererogation that has
pervaded much of the subsequent literature. In the
concluding section, I draw out the implications of
supererogation for the Traditional Scheme (and elementary
deontic logic) and summarize some of the salient points of
the chapter. I then briefly look ahead.
It should be kept in mind that the classical literature
on supererogation presupposes that there are no conflicts
of obligation — in the sense of "obligation" relevant to
the classical conception of supererogation. Hence it falls
within the orthodox context. Furthermore, conditional
obligation is virtually never discussed, so, in particular,
it falls within the classical context. That is, a concept
of unary strict obligation is almost always presupposed in
discussions of the supererogatory. Similarly, the
necessary equivalence between the paired definiens and
definienda of the operators in the traditional framework is
also presupposed. As we saw in Chapter 1, these
presuppositions constitute the Traditional Scheme (the
Square of Deontic Opposition + the Tripartite
Classification). Hence the soundness of this framework is
presupposed throughout our discussion in Chapter 2.
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T he Traditional Superero g at ionist ic Objection
Some Salient Features Of The Supererogatory
I think that it is fair to say that most of the
literature regarding supererogation has been written in the
context of utilitarian polemic. Most of the material has
consisted in either "the friend of supererogation"
employing the alleged possibility of supererogation to
attack utilitarianism or "the friend of utilitarianism"
criticizing such attacks. Although much of interest has
been said on both sides, few have attempted to offer
anything approaching a precise analysis of supererogation,
much less a full-blown alternative conceptual framework
that would give supererogation its proper place among the
other major normative statuses. 1 However, there is a
central objection that the supererogat ionist has
traditionally employed against utilitarianism and a second
more recent objection brought into focus by McConnell
[ 1 9 8 0
]
2 It will prove useful to begin our approach to such
a full-blown analysis by looking at these objections, but
first let’s extract the two features of the supererogatory
that are crucial to the two objections.
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As Chisholm has pointed out, the etymology of
supererogatory" (strictly, the conjunction of the
etymologies of the word’s roots) is "that which is over and
above what is called for" [Chisholm, 1963b]. The "what is
called for refers to that which morality demands of a
given agent, and "the over and above" refers to an excess
that is valuable. Sometimes, "supererogatory action" and
the familiar "action beyond the call of duty" are used
interchangeably. However, we should beware of identifying
their respective meanings as a matter of course.
Currently, "supererogation" is a quas i-technical term that
became a familiar part of the vocabulary of Anglo-American
philosophers only recently, and as we have already
mentioned, it reeraerged in the context of utilitarian
polemic. It was intended to express a type of action that
proved particularly troublesome for utilitarianism. In
contrast, the familiar term, "action beyond the call of
duty" is an expression that primarily connotes over-
subscriptions to the dut i es/ r espons- ib i 1 i t i es associated
with more or less well-defined roles, jobs or institutional
positions. It belongs to the same family of expression as
"is off-duty" and "is on duty" (e.g. as said of a
policeman). 3 Indeed, perhaps the most natural paradigm for
this expression is its use in the context of military
institutions for acts of military heroism. In such a
context, "beyond the call of duty” could be used to refer
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to the unjust and morally wrong actions of a soldier
fighting in an unjust war in which it is morally wrong for
him to be participating in the first place. This seems to
be a natural consequence of the fact that the word "duty"
is itself tied to the expected tasks associated with a
position or role in some social institution setting
(broadly construed), and such roles can range from morally
laudable to morally hideous. In contrast, the term
"supererogation" has no particular tie to institutional
positions or roles and the "duties" exceeded are the agents
strict moral requirements. In fact, I think that this is
also often true of the philosopher’s use of the familiar
non-technical phrase "action beyond the call of duty". The
latter prhaes, as typically used by philosophers, is really
an appropriation of an ordinary expression for a quasi-
technical purpose. To be sure, it is meant to do a
somewhat similar job in its use by philosophers, but it
would be a mistake to think that philosophers using it or
defining it are merely attempting to employ or analyze the
expression in its ordinary sense. Some of its ordinary
features are to be retained and others are to be modified
or dropped. My primary concern will be with the class of
actions that philosophers have been intending to describe
by their use of either term, and I will take a major clue
for discerning the characteristics of these actions to be
the use that critics of utilitarianism wished to make of
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these actions. Although there has been no pervasive
uniformity in the terminology philosophers have used in
characterizing supererogatory actions, the following
characterizations represent what I
actions that "... are certainly of [positive] moral
worth but that fall outside the notion of duty and
seem to go beyond it" and simply as actions that ...
exceed the basic demands of duty" [Urmson 1958]
;
an act "... it is good, but not obligatory to do";
[Chisholm 1963b] and as actions consisting in "...
non-ob 1 igatory well-doing" [Chisholm 1964];
actions that "... are morally desirable but not
morally required" [Burchill 1965];
"... a class of actions which would produce greater
happiness than anyother actions, but which it is not
our duty to perform" [New 1974];
"An act is a supererogatory act only if it is an act
which one ought to do onthe balance of reasons and
yet one is permitted not to act on the balance of
reasons." [Raz 1975]
actions that "... are morally desirable without it
being wrong not to perform them." [Attfield 1979];
actions of which we would say that "... though they
are ideal and morally meritorious, they are not
obligatory" [McConnell 1980].
I think that the above authors, terminological
differences aside, would all agree that the sort of action
they are concerned with (whether or not they would agree
that there are any actions of this sort) is such that by
their intended use, no action of this sort can be morally
obligatory . The etymology of "supererogatory", and its kin
phrase, "beyond the call of duty" make this perhaps the
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most transparent feature of the supererogatory, and it is
clear that these philosophers intend to retain these
features for their use of these terms. Such an action,
which exceeds (for the good) the demands duty makes on its
agent, cannot be at the same time morally required of the
agent. Had the agent not done the thing in question, he
would not have thereby failed to satisfy the demands
morality had placed upon him, as he would if he was morally
obligated to do something but did not. Hence, perhaps the
most transparent feature of the classical conception is the
following:
CC1: An alternative for an agent is supererogatory
only if its negation is permissible.
As we shall see in a moment, this feature of the supere-
rogatory is crucial for the success of the traditional
super erogat i on i s t i c objection to utilitarianism.
Though it is rarely ever made explicit in the
super er o gat i on i s t i c- u t i 1 i t ar i an polemic, it is nevertheless
clear that the above authors would also take it that no
action of this sort could be forbidden and hence that if
there is any action of this sort it must be morally
p e rm i s s i b 1
e
. The excess over duty involved in the
supererogatory is a good excess. The agent’s performance
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is a permissible one. So this feature is also a component
of the classical conception:
CC2. An alternative for an agent is supererogatory
only if it is permissible.
That this feature tends to be implicit in the classical
literature on supererogation is perhaps a reflection of the
fact that the supererogatory was primarily seen as a weapon
against classical utilitarianism. As will be apparent, CC2
plays no significant role in the traditional
supererogationistic objection to utilitarianism — which
appears to be the first supererogationistic objection
directed at utilitarianism. Most subsequent discussion
centered around the success (or lack thereof) of this
objection. However, we shall also see that there is a more
dramatic objection to utilitarianism for which CC2 (rather
than CC1) is the crucial component.
Recall that an alternative is optional for an agent if
and only if both it and its negation are permissible for
the agent. Hence we can sum up by saying that according to
the classical conception, that which is supererogatory for
an agent is morally optional for the agent. But obviously,
not 5 all morally optional alternatives are supererogatory.
For example, many of the things that are now morally
optional for you have no moral significance whatsoever.
But these things cannot then be supererogatory. All the
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above authors would agree that all supererogatory actions
have some "positive moral significance". We will return to
this feature of the classical conception below. First we
will look at the two major objections to utilitarianism --
and we need only CC1 and CC2 of the classical conception to
appreciate these objections.
Supererogatory Bests
In a nutshell, the traditional supererogationist ’
s
objection to Utilitarianism comes to this ("SB" for
"Supererogatory Bests) :
SB: There are supererogatory alternatives that are
optimific. If so, there are optimific
alternatives that are non-ob 1 i gat ory
.
Utilitarianism is true only if any optimific
alternative is obligatory. Hence utilitarianism
is false.
Consider a typical case derived from one in Feldman’s
Introductory Ethics . A baby is trapped in a burning
building. The fire has reached a very dangerous stage,
sections of the building are in flames, windows are
exploding, thick black smoke is pouring out of the
entrance, etc. Even the firemen have appropriately judged
that the situation is too dangerous to warrant a rescue
attempt. The mailman passes by and seeing the fireman
restraining the frantic mother, he quickly sizes up the
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situation. He charges into the building and makes his way
to the top floor, and finds the infant still alive. On the
verge of passing out, and severely burned, he drops the
child from one of the shattered windows to the fireman
below. Before he can follow, the roof collapses, and he is
consumed by the inferno.
Our mailman’s action clearly appears to be
supererogatory. We can easily imagine the fire to be such
that few of us would even consider the fireman to have been
obligated to go in, much less the mailman. Nonetheless,
nothing need change in our assessment if we add that what
the mailman did was optimific. We can imagine that the
world is a somewhat better place with the child saved to
live out a full life at the expense of the mailman’s
remaining days than it would have been had he not gone in.
But, it is part and parcel of our conception of the
supererogatory that if the mailman’s action was
supererogatory, then it was not obligatory. Hence, not
going in was permissible.
Such a case is paradigmatic for the classical
conception. One of the marks of the cases
s upe r e r o ga t i on i s t s have cited throughout the literature is
that no one could truly say of such cases that the
individuals in question were obliged to perform the actions
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in question. The actions, in some sense, exceeded the
demands that mor a lity made of the agents in the respective
situations. They went beyond the minimum that morality
s_trictly required of them. Also, when the traditional
cases of supererogation were utilized in objections to
Utilitarianism, they had a second mark: the actions taken
were the best ones the individuals could have performed in
the circumstances. They did not just exceed the minimum
demands of duty— the excess was maximal. Yet the
utilitarian identifies the optimific with the obligatory
(at least as necessarily coextens ional ) . Hence the
utilitarian asserts that the actions in question were
strictly required. Thus the conflict between
utilitarianism and supererogatory actions that are
optimific. In a word, the utilitarian claims that the so-
called minimum that duty demands is nothing less than the
max imum
.
Let’s note, in passing, the role of supererogation in
this sort of objection to utilitarianism. Supererogation
comes into the picture in that (a) there is prima facia
reason to believe that there are supererogatory actions,
(b) that at least sometimes (perhaps always) when someone
performs a supererogatory action, he is pursuing the best
course of action available and (c) all supererogatory
actions are non-ob 1 i gat ory
.
4
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We should not assume that an action’s being non-
obligatory yet optimific is equivalent to an actions being
supererogatory. For it may yet be that an action’s being
non-ob 1 igatory but optimific is not a necessary condition
for its being supererogatory. We turn to this possibility
in the next section.
A New Objection
A Misrepresentation of The Supererogatory
It is sometimes suggested that the mere existence (or
possible existence) of supererogatory actions is
incompatible with utilitarianism, so that merely to
acknowledge that there are (or might have been)
supererogatory actions is to commit oneself to the falsity
of Utilitarianism. This argument might be encapsulated as
follows:
There are supererogatory alternatives. If there
are, then Utilitarianism is false. Therefore
utilitarianism is false. 5
A number of people have characterized the
supererogatory in such a way that they at least suggest
that an action’s being optimific (i.e. being either the
best available to the agent or one such that it is best
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that it be done) is a necessary condition for its being
supererogatory:
... a class of actions which would produce greater
happiness than any other actions, but which is not
our duty to perform [New 1974];
actions of which we would say that "... though they
are ideal and morally meritorious, they are not
obligatory" [McConnell 1980];
S’s doing q is supererogatory provided: q ought to
exist [be the case]; it is permitted that S not
perform q; and it is permitted that S perform q[Chisholm 1964 ] ;
An act is a supererogatory act only if it is an act
which one ought to do on the balance of reasons and
yet one is permitted not to act on the balance of
reasons [Raz 1975].
New’s characterization seems to identify the
supererogatory with precisely that sort of action posited
in premise (3) of the "Supererogatory Bests Argument"
above: optimific non-ob 1 igatory actions. McConnell’s
characterization, where "ideal" is meant to have the force
of "morally optimific", implies that all supererogatory
acts are optimific. 6 Chisholm’s characterization is a
full-fledged analysis provided in the context of a rich
analysis of a network of normative concepts. It deserves
separate treatment. However, I think that it is reasonable
to assume that his analysis of the ought to be is such that
if q ought to be the case then it is best that q is brought
about. In this sense, q’s obtaining is optimific. 7
Finally, it seems fair to take it that what we ought to do
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"on the balance of reasons", is optimific, and hence Raz’s
good reasons approach to supererogation also seems to imply
that the supererogatory is optimific. So all of the above
characterizations suggest that something is supererogatory
to bring about only if it is optimific (in some sense).
Let’s call this the "Optimific Thesis".
OT: An alternative is supererogatory for an agent
only if it is optimific.
Is this assumption warranted?
Consider a minor addition to our mailman case. Suppose
that when he finds the child she is holding her favorite
teddy bear. When the mailman picks her up, she drops her
teddy bear, crying out "my teddy, my teddy!". Suppose also
that he could have grabbed the teddy bear at no extra cost,
but didn’t bother. Things are otherwise the same.
Now, it is certainly plausible to think that it might
have been better had he picked up the teddy. After all,
the child will miss it and perhaps cry a few times until
she gets used to her new teddy. Furthermore, it is
plausible to think that there was nothing else our mailman
could have done in the situation that would have been
better than rescuing the child and the teddy . But then what
he did do was slightly less than optimific. Yet would any
of us say that his action is not supererogatory in virtue
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of this? I think not. An action can be less than
optimific without thereby being non-supererogatory. So,
contrary to OT, an action can be supererogatory and non-
optimific
.
8
I think that this sort of picture of the supererogatory
(i.e. one that allows for supererogatory actions to be
less than optimific) is well-motivated by the pre— analytic
considerations that launched supererogation into the
theoretical arena. Hence, I do not think that there is any
pre-theoretical plausibility (for one who is disposed to
acknowledge supererogatory acts) in thinking that it is
necessarily the case that supererogatory acts are
optimific. In particular, when we judge that something is
supererogatory we are not thereby assuming that there was
no option available to the agent that was still better (all
things considered) than what he in fact did. We allow for
the possibility that what the agent did was not the best of
all the available options, though it certainly must be
better than the minimum that he might have permissibly
done. This fact about the supererogatory has been all but
uniformly missed throughout the literature . 9
However, once we recognize the possibility of less
than-best supererogatory actions, a second, more dramatic,
106
argument against Utilitarianism is naturally suggested.
Let’s turn to this objection.
Supererogatory Less-Than-Bests
If an agent’s action is incompatible with his following
an optimific course of action then according to
utilitarianism the action is wrong (or "forbidden"). In
the light of the previous point, the following objection is
forthcoming ("SLTB" for "Supererogatory Les s - 1 han-b es t s
" ) :
There are supererogatory alternatives that are less
than optimific. If so, there are less than optimific
alternatives that are permissible. Utilitarianism is
true only if less than optimific alternatives are
impermissible. Hence utilitarianism is false.
The traditional supererogat ion is t ic objection to
utilitarianism involves cases of supererogation that the
utilitarian is forced to say are morally required, since
the supererogatory action is optimific. This, of course,
puts the utilitarian in an initially difficult position.
The utilitarian can try to explain our intuition to the
contrary away and persuade us that the actions, no matter
how especially praiseworthy, are strictly speaking
required, not merely permitted. But in the teddy bear
version of the mailman case, the utilitarian must buck
intuition a lot harder. For now he must say of the
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mailman s actions, that no matter how especially
praiseworthy they were, they were strictly speaking
impermissible, wrong to do, downright forbidden! The
mailman didn’t do enough. He left the teddy bear behind and
thereby wrongly chose a less than optimific course. This
is much harder to swallow than the claim that the
traditional cases of optimific action were really required.
Here the utilitarian position is more strained. Thus my
suggestion that this sort of objection to utilitarianism is
"more dramatic" than the traditional rejection. As
McConnell puts it (after describing less-than-best cases of
supererogation ranging from favors to supreme sacrifices):
If, as the standard criticism suggests,
utilitarianism were to classify all supererogatory
acts as obligatory, matters might not be so bad.
After all, one might be willing to pay the price of
austerity to gain the theoretical advantage that
utilitarianism offers. But when one sees that some
actions that we would ordinarily say are above and
beyond the call of duty are judged by the utilitarian
to be morally wrong, then the price paid is much
greater. [McConnell 1980, p.37]
We turn now to some of the broader implications of
supererogation. As we shall see, the possibility of
supererogation has import that transcends the particular
account of obligation that utilitarianism happens to offer.
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The Morally Indifferent, Tripartism and Urmson
Moral Indifference and Moral Option ality
We saw above that the two features of the classical
conception of the supererogatory (CCl and CC2) that pertain
to the two respective criticisms of utilitarianism can be
jointly summed up as "The Optionality of Supererogation":
OS: An alternative is supererogatory for an agent
only if it is morally optional for the agent.
So all supererogatory alternatives have this feature of
moral optionality: one is at once both permitted to do them
and permitted to not do them. We also noted, in passing,
that the classical conception of the supererogatory is
certainly not exhausted by this feature. For many morally
optional acts have no moral significance whatsoever, and
hence many optional actions are not supererogatory. That
is, an additional mark of supererogatory actions, and a
salient one, is that they do have moral significance (in
some sense). According to the classical conception, those
alternatives that are supererogatory for an agent are
superior to those compatible with the agent’s strict
adherence to the minimum that morality allows. Hence, the
supererogatory alternatives for an agent (ordinarily) fotm
a proper subclass of her morally optional alternatives.
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Thus, the classical conception supports "The Non-
Indifference of Supererogation":
NIS: An alternative is supererogatory for an agent
only if it not morally indifferent for the
agent
.
Recall that we said that p is morally optional just in
case both p and its negation are permissible. So what then
is the morally indifferent, if it is supposed that it is
distinct from the morally optional? Suppose that I am
grabbing the ingredients for a sandwich from the
refrigerator. In all but bizarre circumstances, it is a
matter of moral indifference whether I grab the bread first
and the cheese second or vice versa. The fact that it is
morally indifferent suffices to preclude its being
supererogatory.
Of course, it is also morally optional that I grab the
bread first. Anything that is morally indifferent is
morally optional. But it is a mistake to think that the
converse is so. Consider another variation on the mailman
case. Suppose that there are two tots in the building this
time, but the mailman can save at most one. Add that they
are twins, Tiny Tom and Tiny Tim, and that each would make
a comparable small contribution to the value of the world,
if saved. The mailman, we suppose, saves Tiny Tom he
barters his life for Tiny Tom’s. In such a case it is
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supererogatory to save a tot, and hence optional to save a
permissible, must have been optional. For in general, tot.
So in particular, saving Tiny Tom, which was certainly if p
is optional, q is not forbidden and q implies p, then
surely q must also be optional. But saving Tiny Tom was
hardly morally indifferent. Such a case, were any of us
with the least moral sensitivity to witness it, would leave
us with a lump in our throat. It was morally optional, but
it was anything but morally indifferent.
Given NIS, the friends of supererogation -- those who
think supererogation is possible — are committed to the
following principle of "Optionality With a Difference":
OWD : It is possible that there are alternatives for
an agent that are morally optional, but not
morally indifferent for that agent.
For, by OS every supererogatory alternative must be morally
optional, and by NIS, no supererogatory alternative can be
morally indifferent. So if it is possible that there are
supererogatory alternatives, then it is possible that there
are alternatives that are at once both optional and not
morally indifferent. Herein, as we shall see, lies the
broader significance of supererogation.
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Strong Tripartism and Moral Rigor
Despite the fact that the existence of supererogatory
actions has been primarily used as a weapon against
Utilitarianism, the implications run deeper than this and
they transcend the boundaries of any particular substantive
account of obligation. As we saw in chapter 1, the
traditional scheme classifies alternatives into one of
three mutually exclusive and exhaustive types: those that
are obligatory, those that are forbidden and those that are
neither. But if the supererogat ion ist is right, the
members of the third class need not be on a par. Yet many
moral theorist and deontic logician have assumed, sometimes
tacitly, that they are. Such an assumption is false, if
supererogation is possible. The kernel of this criticism
occurs in Urmson’s landmark article on the topic, "Saints
and Heroes" [Urmson 1958]. However, his presentation of
the criticism is marred by a confusion that has permeated
much of the subsequent literature on supererogation. It
will prove instructive to scrutinize this criticism, and
its confused presentation. But first a little background
is appropriate
.
The term "tripartist" is often used in the polemical
literature on supererogation to refer to the defenders of a
view that conflicts with the possibility of supererogatory
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actions. For as we have seen, if there are supererogatory
actions then there are actions that are optional but not
morally indifferent. This was our principle, NIS. The
tripartist, whatever her substantive account of moral
obligation (utilitarian or not) endorses a deontic thesis
that, along with the assumptions of the traditional scheme,
is in direct conflict with OWD
. The principle parallels
that of the Tripartite Classification of the Traditional
Scheme (covered in Chapter 1). The first component of the
principle, which I will call "Strong Exhaustion", is:
SEXH: Every alternative for an agent is either
morally obligatory, morally forbidden or
morally indifferent .
In effect this amounts to presupposing that morality
rules with an "iron fist" on all alternatives that have any
moral weight. For it implies that if an alternative is not
indifferent then morality will either demand that it be
done or demand that it not be done. 10 Since the
tripartists are philosophers who accept the Traditional
Scheme’s presupposition of No Conflicts (see Chapter 1) --
they also accept the corresponding "Strong Mutual
Ex 1 cus iveness":
SME : No alternative for an agent falls into more than
one of these categories: the morally obligatory,
the morally forbidden or the morally
indif ferent
.
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It is hard to imagine why anyone who accepted No Conflicts
would want to reject SME, including those who do reject
SEXH. Together, these theses constitute what I will call
the "Strong Tripartite Classification":
STC: Every alternative for an agent is either morally
obligatory, morally forbidden or morally
indifferent, but no more than one of these.
The following diagram geometrically represents this
partitioning (in addition to the place of The Gratuitous
and The Permissible for this classification):
/
The Gratuitous
\
The Obligatory The Indifferent The Forbidden
\
The Permissible
/
It should be stressed that STC is not to be confused
with what we called "The Tripartite Classification" in
Chapter 1
:
TC : Every alternative for an agent is obligatory,
forbidden or optional , but no more than one of
these.
Recall its diagramatic representation:
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The Gratuitous
The Obligatory 1 The Optional The Forbidden
The Permissible
The Triparite Classification follows from the standard
definitions of the five operators in the Traditional
Scheme, along with the deontic thesis of No Conflicts. 11
The strong tripartist is endorsing a much more substantive
claim than that expressed in TC . STC is the result of
replacing "optional" with "indifferent" in the relatively
innocuous TC . The result of this replacement is anything
but innocuous
.
That the morally indifferent should be a subclass of
the morally optional is uncontent ious . But that the
reverse should be true is. Yet plainly, STC implies just
this controversial thesis of "Moral Rigor":
MR: An alternative is morally optional for an agent
only if it is morally indifferent.
For if an alternative is morally optional, then, by
definition, both it and its negation are permissible. But
then on the traditional scheme, such an alternative is
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neither obligatory nor forbidden. Hence, by STC, the
alternative is morally indifferent.
The converse of MR, the Optionality of Indifference",
is trivial:
01: An alternative is morally indifferent for an
agent only if it is morally optional.
Once MR is accepted, given the rather obvious character
of the converse, 01, the "Equivalence of Moral Rigor" is
forthcoming:
EMR: An alternative is morally optional for an agent
if and only if it is morally indifferent.
So one who accepts STC must accept MR and ought to accept
the stronger EMR -- the latter because EMR is just MR plus
the innocuous thesis that whatever is morally indifferent
is also morally optional. But the connection between EMR
and STC is even more intimate than this. On the
traditional scheme, they are tautologically equivalent,
given the single thesis of No Conflicts. For given No
Conflicts, TC follows from the traditional definitional
scheme (as we saw in Chapter 1). Suppose we introduce "Ip"
an additional operator for moral indifference. Then, given
EMR, that whatever is indifferent is also optional and vice
versa (i.e. Ip < — > Op), along with TC, STC obviously
follows tautologically. It is easy to see that the
as
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converse also holds. For, by TC (on the traditional
scheme) an alternative is optional iff it is neither
obligatory nor forbidden. By STC, an alternative is
indifferent if and only if it is neither obligatory nor
forbidden. Hence, by propositional logic, an alternative
is optional if and only if it is indifferent -- which is
EMR. We can sum this up as follows:
EQ: On the assumptions of the traditional framework,
STC is equivalent to EMR.
The relatively uncontroversial components of STC and
EMR are respectively, SME and 01. Each is a non-issue with
respect to supererogation. The relevant controversy ensues
as a result of SEXH and MR. With this background, let’s
turn to this controversy.
Urmson’s Criticism of Strong Tripartism
In the process of using supererogation to attack
utilitarianism, the friends of supererogation often try to
derive a more general conclusion, which is alleged to have
utilitarianism as a special, albeit salient, case. This
larger implication of supererogation, "that the tripartite
scheme must go" is the battle cry of the friends of
supererogation. But there has been much confusion
surrounding this battle cry since its inception with
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Urmson’s "Saints and Heroes". In the second paragraph of
this important article, Urmson grabs the readers attention
with a bold and startling attack on what appears to be the
traditional scheme:
To my mind this threefold classification, or any
classification that is merely a variation on or
elaboration of it, is totally inadequate to the facts
of morality; any moral theory that leaves room only
for such a classification will in consequence also be
inadequate. [Urmson 1958, pp. 198-199]
Notice that whatever classification Urmson is
attacking, he is not merely claiming that it is inadequate,
but "totally inadequate". This is not a mere stylistic or
rhetorical overstatement, for he says that " any variation
on or elaboration of " this classification will be totally
inadequate. If any variation of or elaboration of a
classification is inadequate, then it certainly seems fair
to say that the original classification is not merely
inadequate as it stands but totally inadequate . In the
second half of the sentence, he should not be seen as
softening his position. For he is merely pointing out that
by consequence, any substantive account of morality that
entails this classification system, must also be defective
thereby. So what is the referent of "this threefold
classification"? The answer to this question is provided
in the opening sentences of the article:
Moral philosophers tend to discriminate, explicitly
or implicitly, three types of action from the point
of view of moral worth. First, they recognize
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actions that are a duty, or obligatory, or that we
ought to perform, treating these terms as
approximately synonymous; secondly, they recognize
actions that are right insofar as they are
permissible from a moral standpoint and not ruled out
by moral considerations, but they are not morally
required of us, like the lead of this or that card at
bridge; third, they recognize actions that are wrong,
that we ought not to do. [Urmson 1958
, p. 198 ]
Clearly, the threefold classification in question is
intended to be a mutually exclusive and exhaustive
classification, and it has for two of its classes what we
have called the morally obligatory and the morally
forbidden. But what is the third class? If it is the
optional, then Urmson’s criticism of the second paragraph
is directed against the traditional tripartite
classification scheme and it would certainly be startling
if it could be shown that this scheme is not only
inadequate in some way, but is in fact unredeemable.
Nonetheless, this is precisely the referent of "this
threefold classification". For an optional alternative is
one that is permissible and whose negation is permissible.
But Urmson identifies the third class as "actions that are
right insofar as they are permissible from a moral
standpoint and not ruled out by moral considerations, but
they are not morally required of us". But that an
alternative is permissible yet not required (obligatory) is
equivalent to the conjunction of its permissibility and its
negation’s permissibility, in the traditional framework.
So the third class in question is the morally optional and
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the threefold classification under attack is the
Traditional Tripartite Classification ( TC )
.
But how does the possibility of supererogation entail
that the Traditional Tripartite Classification is not only
inadequate, but totally inadequate? I think that it is
clear in Urmson’s article that it is the "exhaustion
component" and not the "exclusiveness component" that is
alleged to be at fault. But recall what it is that we said
that this thesis amounts to:
EXH: Every alternative for an agent is either
obligatory, forbidden or optional.
But to say that an alternative is morally optional is to
say that both it and its negation are permissible. But EXH
is obviously tautologically equivalent to the claim that if
an alternative for an agent is neither obligatory nor
forbidden then it is optional. But short of considerations
of the agent’s possible non-existence (which is a non-issue
in this context), what could refute this thesis? If in
some circumstance, I am neither obligated to see to p nor
forbidden to see to p (and I exist in the circumstance)
,
then surely I am permitted to see to p (for if not, then
it’s forbidden), and I’m permitted to see to the negation
of p (for if not, then it’s forbidden, in which case p
itself is obligatory).
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The confusion, as the reader probably suspects, is
between that of the Traditional Tripartite Classification
and the Strong Tripartite Classification (STC). Not only
have many friends of supererogation been unclear on the
substantive distinction between these two classification
and the bearing of supererogation on each, but moral
philosophers in general, and deontic logicians in
particular, have been guilty of an associated confusion
that has contributed to the ensuing confusion. The
associated confusion can perhaps be most clearly accounted
for by considering the frequently implicit presupposition
of many moral philosophers as it appeared in much of the
early work in deontic logic.
The strong tripartist thesis was implicitly endorsed by
some of the pioneers of deontic logic, despite the fact
that they had no intention of devising a deontic logic that
reflected a utilitarian account of obligation. In a
nutshell these authors tended to equate the morally
optional with the morally indifferent. For example, in Von
Wright’s landmark article, "Deontic Logic", that single-
handedly launched the contemporary discipline of the same
name
,
he says
,
If an act and its negation are both permitted, the
act is called (morally) indifferent . For instance:
in a smoking compartment we may smoke, but we may
also not smoke. Hence smoking is morally
indifferent. [Von Wright 1951a — the stress is
mine.
]
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Here, the moral optionality of an act is taken, by Von
Wright, to be the defining characteristic of the morally
indifferent. As we saw above, once indifference is equated
with optionality (i.e. once EMR is accepted), the mutually
exclusive and exhaustive classification of alternatives
into the obligatory, the forbidden and the indifferent, is
a tautological consequence of the definitions of the five
fundamental statuses along with the single deontic thesis
to the effect that there are can be no conflicts of
obligation.
Prior, following Von Wright, notes that the analogies
between quantification and alethic modality extend to
deontic modalities:
We may also make a threefold division of moral
operators analogous to that between ‘All’, 'Some but
not all’, and 'None’, or between 'necessary’,
'contingent’, and 'impossible’; namely the division
into 'obligatory’, 'indifferent’, and 'forbidden’.
[Prior 1962, p . 2 2 1 ]
In doing so, once again, the morally indifferent is
identified with the morally optional. 12 And as we saw
above, EMR, the equivalence of the optional and the
indifferent, is tautologically equivalent to the
Strong Tripartite Classification in the context of the
traditional scheme. Hence to endorse either one is to
endorse both — on pain of inconsistency.
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The reason that I said that they endorsed the strong
tripartist thesis implicitly is that they were, strictly
speaking, introducing "the morally indifferent" as an
abbreviation for alternatives that are permissible and
whose negations are permissible. It is the choice of
indifference as opposed to a neutral term such as
optional
,
that reflects their endorsement of the strong
tripartist thesis. This distinction between what is
implicitly endorsed and explicitly endorsed is crucial to
understanding the import of Urmson’s criticism of the
tripartist" and the subsequent confusion surrounding it in
the polemical literature. Before returning to Urmson,
let’s see exactly what the tension is between strong
tripartism and supererogation.
The conflict between STC and supererogation is best
brought out in the form of two arguments, one using strong
tripartism to refute the possibility of supererogation, the
other turning the tables by using supererogation to refute
strong tripartism. The argument against supererogation,
"Strong Tripartism Against Supererogation", can be tersely
put as follows:
STAS: If there are supererogatory actions then OWD is
true. STC is true only if OWD is false. But
STC is true. Therefore there are no
supererogatory actions.
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The rationale for the first premise is simply NIS along
with OS. For together, these entail OWD
,
that all
supererogatory alternatives are optional but not
indifferent. So this premise simply "falls out" of the
classical conception of the supererogatory. Regarding the
second premise, by definition, if an alternative is
optional, both it and its negation are permissible. If
this is so, then in the traditional framework, such an
alternative is neither obligatory nor forbidden. But then
it must be indifferent, given STC. In a nutshell, since
optional alternatives are equivalent to ones that are
neither - obligatory nor forbidden, and hence are indifferent
by STC, and since supererogatory alternatives would have to
be optional w/o being indifferent (OWD), there can be no
supererogatory alternatives. In this way, the strong
tripartist must reject the possibility of supererogation.
The counter argument of the supererogat ionist
,
"Supererogation Against Strong Tripartism", turns the
previous argument on its head by stressing the possibility
of supererogatory alternatives and concluding that the
tripartist thesis must be false. Roughly, it is this:
SAST: If there are supererogatory alternatives, then
OWD is true. STC is true only if OWD is false.
There are supererogatory alternatives.
Therefore, STC is false.
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The first two premises are identical to those of the
previous argument and their rationales are the same. The
third premise merely asserts the possibility of
supererogation. Together, these premises imply the
possibility of alternatives that are neither obligatory,
forbidden nor indifferent
. Thus STC must be false.
Notice that this formulation does not in any way refute
the traditional Tripartite Classification of alternatives
into the obligatory, the forbidden and the opt ional . It
merely utilizes OWD
,
that there might be optional
alternatives that are not morally indifferent (which
follows from the possibility of supererogation as
classically conceived), to refute STC which excludes the
possibility of non-indifferent optional alternatives. When
supererogationists rally behind "the Tripartite
Classification must go", the intended version of the
classification, or at least the one that should be
intended, is the Strong Tripartite Classification.
However, the distinction between the strikingly similar
versions of tripartism is rarely made.
Though we have seen that Urmson’s critical remarks
quoted above referred to the Traditional Tripartite
Classification system, this was not his intended target.
For one thing the example he picked is a paradigm of the
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morally indifferent: ’’like the lead of this or that card at
bridge". (Urmson believes that there are paradigms of the
morally optional that are clearly not indifferent -- one of
the key intended points of his paper.) Secondly, after his
description of the threefold classification (quoted above),
he continues with:
Some moral philosophers, indeed, could hardly
discriminate even these three types of action
consistently with the rest of their philosophy;
Moore, for example, could hardly recognize a class
o f morally indifferent actions
,
permissible but not
enjoined
,
since it is presumed that good or ill of
some sort will result from the most trivial of our
actions. [Urmson 1958, p.198 -- the stress is mine.]
Here Urmson is himself identifying the morally
indifferent actions as the class of optional actions,
"those that are permissible but not enjoined", thus
repeating the implicit endorsement of the deontic logicians
above. Clearly, it is the optional actions that he has
identified as forming the second class of the "threefold
classification" he wished to criticize. The way he
characterizes this second class, in both cases, is
equivalent to our characterization of the optional. This
yields the traditional Tripartite Classification as the
"threefold classification". Yet he labels the category of
the optional as "the indifferent" and like Von Wright, he
gives moral optionality as the defining characteristic of
"the indifferent". Yet in his closing summation, his
intended target is clearly identified:
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To summarize, I have suggested that the trichotomy ofduties, Ind ifferent actions
, and wrongdoing isinadequate. ... It has been my main concern to
note this point and to ask moral philosophers totheorize in a way that does not tacitly deny it [thepossibility of supererogation], as most traditional
theories have. [Urmson 1958 P 215 -- the stress and
parenthetical remark are mine]
Thus it is the indifferent that he intends (or at least
should be intending) as his second class of actions; and it
is the derivative S t rong Tripartite Classification that is
the intended target (or at least should be the intended
target) of his criticisms. The "tacit denial" of the
possibility of supererogation that Urmson has in mind is
that expressed in our "Supererogation Against Strong
Tripartism" argument (SAST), not in the identification of
the optional with the indifferent (for Urmson himself is
guilty of this slip up). Rather it is that strong
tripartism is endorsed w/o a thought about supererogation,
yet it is inconsistent with the possibility of
supererogation, since this possibility implies the
possibility of non-indif ferent optional alternatives.
Hence his critical remarks on the unredeemable character of
the traditional tripartite classification miss their mark
(or have no clear mark). The same holds for many
subsequent discussions by the friends of supererogation.
It is not the traditional tripartite classification system
that is problematic in the light of supererogation, but the
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Strong Tripartite Classification system. For if there are
supererogatory alternatives, then there are alternatives
that are neither obligatory, nor forbidden, nor
indifferent. And no elaboration on strong tripartism can
redeem this classificational system, if supererogation is a
genuine possibility. Hence, any substantive account of
morality (whether utilitarian or not) that entails strong
tripartism (STC) is inconsistent with the possibility of
supererogat ion
.
Conclus i on
Supererogation, Indifference and The
Traditional Scheme
Despite the fact that the supererogat ionist ic claim
regarding the total inadequacy (i.e. falsity) of tripartism
is only aptly directed against Strong Tripartism, I do not
mean to suggest that the possibility of supererogation has
no import for the Traditional Scheme. On the contrary, the
possibility of supererogation does imply a qualified
inadequacy of the Traditional Scheme. Supererogatory
actions are morally optional, but they are not "morally
indifferent". Hence if there are supererogatory actions,
then the morally optional is partitioned into two mutually
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then the morally optional is partitioned into two mutually
exclusive and exhaustive subclasses: those morally
indifferent actions that are morally optional and those
morally optional actions that are not morally indifferent.
But in the traditional scheme no distinction is made among
those of an agent’s actions that are optional. This is no
accident. For the traditional scheme lacks the conceptual
resources to distinguish those actions that are optional
but not morally indifferent from those that are both
optional and indifferent. There is simply no way to
distinguish the morally indifferent from the remaining
optional actions when one has recourse only to the
traditional operators of permissibility, f o rb i ddennes s
,
obligatoriness and gratuitousness. Indeed there does not
appear to be any way to characterize any subclass of the
morally optional within the traditional framework. So part
of the wider import of supererogation, and not that which
Urmson was attempting to establish explicitly, pertains to
this incomp leteness of the traditional scheme.
Of course, it would be an overstatement to claim that
the traditional scheme is "totally inadequate" because
incomplete. No account is totally inadequate because
incomplete, unless it is also incompletable . The
Traditional Scheme is perfectly adequate for its limited
purposes 13
,
and in particular, the three part division of
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alternatives into those that are obligatory, forbidden and
opt ional is unscathed by any considerations pertaining to
supererogation. Its inadequacy lies in its incompleteness.
There are fundamental normative statuses that it cannot
represent: both the supererogatory and the morally
indifferent. Hence the inadequacy is analogous to that of
the standard system of deontic logic in light of the
unrepresent ability of contrary-to-duty-imperatives. The
problem is perhaps more pressing than in the latter case
when we consider that one of these unrepresentable statuses
(the morally indifferent) is both a "sub-status" of one of
the statuses (the optional) that the traditional scheme can
represent, and it is frequently presented as having been
successfully represented in the traditional scheme. Thus,
not only are there two statuses that the traditional scheme
can’t represent, in addition, one of these was targeted for
representation. Urmson, like many others was led astray by
the fact that many have used the expression "indifferent"
instead of the more neutral term "optional" to denote those
alternatives that we are permitted to do or not do. Once
this substantive presupposition creeps in at the level of
abb rev i at i ona 1 definition, it is unlikely that the
substantive character of what is presupposed will become an
object of critical reflection.
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S umraat ion
We saw that one main logical feature of the classical
conception of the supererogatory is its optionality.
Furthermore, we saw that the classical conception seems to
call for some sort of ranking of an agent’s permissible
alternatives. For it is quite in keeping with the
classical conception of the supererogatory that there be
supererogatory alternatives that are optimific, and that
there be supererogatory alternatives that are less than
optimific. We also saw how this bears on utilitarianism.
For the first possibility yields the result that, from the
perspective of utilitarianism, such optimific alternatives
are obligatory — which conflicts with the gratuitousness
of the supererogatory. On the other hand, the second
possibility yields the result that, from the perspective of
utilitarianism, such less-than-opt imif ic alternatives are
forbidden -- which conflicts with the permissibility of the
supererogatory. Regarding the less parochial import of
supererogation, we noted that utilitarians, and non-
utilitarians alike, frequently adopt strong tripartism
(STC) or equivalently (modulo traditional assumptions), the
equivalence of the optional and the indifferent ( EMR )
.
These conflict with the possibility of optional
alternatives that are non-indif ferent -- a consequence of
the possibility of supererogation as classically conceived.
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So no substantive account of morality that implies STC (or
EMR) is true if supererogation is possible. This is
Urras on s key point. But beyond this, assuming the
possibility of supererogation, the traditional scheme is
itself inadequate in the qualified sense that it lacks the
resources for representing the supererogatory or for
distinguishing the morally optional from the morally
indifferent. No theory that has only the operators from
the traditional scheme can succeed in identifying a proper
subclass of the morally optional. In this respect, if
supererogation is possible, the basic deontic logic is
itself incomplete despite the fact that its genesis was
entirely independent of any commitment to utilitarianism.
Hence, on the assumption of the possibility of
supererogation, a criterion of adequacy for any system of
deontic logic that alleges to represent the morally
indif ferent is
:
CA: The morally indifferent must be represented as a
proper subclass of the morally optional.
We can sum up some of the salient logical features of
the classical conception of the supererogatory, along with
the implications regarding the morally indifferent by way
of the following positive and negative principles (where an
arrow represents entailment and a overstruck arrow
represents the denial of the corresponding entailment):
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Supererogatory p => Optional p
Optional p /> Supererogatory p
Supererogatory p => "'Indifference p
Indifference p => Optional p
Optional p Indifference p
We should also note that as with the morally optional, the
morally indifferent satisfies the principle that p’s
indifference is equivalent to the negation of p’s
indifference:
Indifference p > Indifference ~p
As we said above, in one respect, the positive problem
of supererogation is not unlike that which confronted
deontic logic with the discovery of contra ry-to-duty-
imperat i ves . There is just no way to introduce the notion
of supererogation or indifference (as defined operators) in
a system that has selected its only primitive deontic
operators from the traditional quadruple of the obligatory,
the forbidden, the permissible and the gratuitous. So the
s upe r e r ogat i on i s t is committed to the position that the
traditional triad (and its associated partitioning of
actions) stands in need of supplementat ion--and such
supplementation may, in turn, place restrictions on what
will count as an adequate interpretation of obligation. It
is the latter point that accounts for the
s up e r e r o g a t i o n i s
t
’ s preoccupation with Utilitarianism,
which provides a salient instance of a problematic
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interpretation of obligation (in the light of
supererogation). The positive problem is to provide a
conceptual framework that allows us to represent these,
along with the traditional operators.
The main logical feature of the classical conception of
the supererogatory that we have uncovered is that an
alternative is supererogatory only if it is optional but
not morally indifferent. We have not said that this
exhausts the classical conception of the supererogatory,
and the fact that the classical conception calls for a
ranking of permissible alternatives suggests that it does
not. Whether or not the supererogatory can be identified
with the optional but non-indifferent is something we will
bracket for the time being. It will be taken up again in
Chapter 7. We have also not delved into the question of
whether utilitarianism is really incompatible with the mere
possibility of supererogation, as so many utilitarians and
non-utilitarians presuppose. 14 Similarly, we ignored the
question of whether or not utilitarianism is indeed
committed to strong tripartism, as so many utilitarians and
non-utilitarians alike presuppose. 15 Finally, we have not
really evaluated the supererogat i on i s t ’ s case against
utilitarianism in this chapter. This has not been my
concern here. Although I am sympathetic to the case
against utilitarianism in the light of supererogation, and
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believe that there is more presumption in favor of the
traditional supererogat ionist ic "refutation" of
utilitarianism than in the utilitarian "refutation" of
supererogation, I have not wished to add to the classical
polemic. Instead, I will turn to some evidence against
utilitarianism that is epistemical ly independent of
supererogation, that makes a stronger prima facia case
against utilitarianism than supererogation, and that
nonetheless corroborates the supererogationist’s case. The
corroboration is twofold. On the one hand, the evidence in
question, corroborates the supererogation istic case against
utilitarianism; on the other hand, the sort of moral scheme
that this new evidence seems to call for appears to be
presupposed by the sort of moral scheme that the classical
conception of supererogation itself calls for.
Principles and Arguments Cited in Chapter 2
Some Salient Features of the Supererogatory
CCl: An alternative for an agent is supererogatory
only if its negation is permissible.
CC2: An alternative for an agent is supererogatory
only if it is permissible.
Supererogatory Bests
SB: There are supererogatory alternatives which are
optimific. If so, there are optimific
alternatives which are non-ob 1 i gat ory . Hence
utilitarianism is false.
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A Misconception About The Supererogatory
The Incompatibility Argument:
There are supererogatory alternatives. If there are,
then Utilitarianism is false. Therefore
utilitarianism is false.
The Optimific Thesis:
OT: An alternative is supererogatory for an agent
only if it is optimific.
Supererogatory Less Than Bests
SLTB: There are supererogatory alternatives which are
less than optimific. If Utilitarianism is true
then such alternatives are impermissible. Yet
all supererogatory alternatives are
permissible. Hence utilitarianism is false.
Moral Indifference and Moral Optionality
Optionality Of Supererogation:
OS: An alternative is supererogatory for an agent
only if it is morally optional.
The Non- I nd i f f er ence of Supererogation:
NIS: An alternative is supererogatory for an agent
only if it not morally indifferent for the
agent
.
Optionality With a Difference:
OWD : It is possible that there are alternatives for
an agent which are morally optional, but not
morally indifferent.
Strong Tripartism and Moral Rigor
Strong Exhaustion:
SEXH : Every alternative for an agent is either
morally obligatory, morally forbidden or
morally indifferent .
Strong Mutual Exlcus iveness
SME: No alternative for an agent falls into more than
one of these categories: the morally obligatory,
the morally forbidden or the morally
indi f ferent
.
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Strong Tripartite Classification:
STC: Every alternative for an agent is either morally
obligatory, morally forbidden or morally
indifferent, but no more than one of these.
Traditional Tripartite Classification:
TC : Every alternative for an agent is obligatory,
forbidden or optional
. but no more than one of
these
.
Moral Rigor
:
MR: An alternative is morally optional for an agent
only if it is morally indifferent.
Optionality of Indifference:
01: An alternative is morally indifferent for an
agent only if it is morally optional.
Equivalence of Moral Rigor:
EMR: An alternative is morally optional for an agent
if and only if it is morally indifferent.
Meta-Equivalence:
EQ: On the assumptions of the traditional framework,
STC is equivalent to EMR.
Urmson’s Critique of Tripartism
Exhaustion:
EXH: Every alternative for an agent is either
obligatory, forbidden or optional.
Strong Tripartism Against Supererogation:
STAS: If there are supererogatory actions then OWD is
true. STC is true only if OWD is false. But
STC is true. Therefore there are no
supererogatory actions.
Supererogation Against Strong Tripartism:
SAST: If there are supererogatory alternatives, then
OWD is true. STC is true only if OWD is
false. There are supererogatory alternatives.
Therefore, STC is false.
Summat ion
Classical Criterion of Adequacy:
CA: The morally indifferent must be represented as a
prope
r
subclass of the morally optional.
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The Classical Conception Summarized:
A. Logical Principles:
Supererogatory p > Optional p
Optional p -/-> Supererogatory p
Supererogatory p > ~Indi f f erence p
Indifference p > Optional p
Optional p -/-> Indifference p
Indifference p < > Indifference ~p
B. Substantive Features:
(i) The Supererogatory should not be
interpreted as subclass of the optimific.
(ii) Supererogation presupposes a ranked range
of permissible alternatives.
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Chapter 2 Notes
Chisholm is a notable exception. See Chisholm 1963a
and 1964
.
2. Although McConnell doesn’t mention it, New [1974] had
noted the objection earlier. However, New quickly
passed oyer it in his defense of utilitarianism against
the traditional objection.
3. See Feinburg 1961.
Seen this way, we roust remain open to the possibility
that the existence of the crucial sort of action, non-
obligatory optimific action , which the critic of
utilitarianism tries to establish by recourse to
supererogation may be supported by considerations other
than those stemming from reflection on cases of
supererogation.
5. In McNamara, 1987, I show that this argument is unsound
in virtue of the fact that the second premise is false.
There is an extremely limited, but interesting class of
supererogatory actions that are perfectly compatible
with utilitarianism. Though the class is quite
limited, it includes actions that range from trifling
niceties to supreme heroism. Also, the class in
question is one that most any friend of supererogation
would acknowledge to be supererogatory. However, going
into this would take us into issues that are beyond the
scope of this dissertation, and, for our purposes, it
is more interesting to see why the tradition has
virtually universally taken this argument to be sound.
6. McConnell is not endorsing this characterization. On
the contrary, he wishes to dispute its legitimacy.
7. In fairness to Chisholm, I must point out that although
it is plausible to interpret his theory as entailing
that if q ought to be the case then it is best that q
(simply because it is plausible to think that what
ought to be is in some sense best, he once again stands
out from the crowd. For his theory does not entail
that if someone does something supererogatory then it
was best that h_e do so. What one ought to do and what
ought to be are sharply distinguished. I think it is
clear that he would maintain that it may be the case
that it ought to be that p, it is optional for s to see
to p and it is best that lie not be the one who does so.
8. I think that we could also motivate the denial of OT by
considering cases where we take ourselves to in fact be
obligated to do something. In many such case, there
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are a number of different ways in which we candischarge the obligation, some of these are better thanothers, but we do not take ourselves to be obligated todischarge the obligation in question in any particular
manner. In a case where one of these ways ofdischarging the obligation is better than some others,but is less good than the best way, it may still be
supererogatory to discharge the obligation in the
mgnn er in question
, though it is not optimific todischarge the obligation in this manner. It is of
course not supererogatory to discharge the obligation
per se)
.
9. I think that this is due to the fact that most of the
literature on supererogation was preoccupied with the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the previous objection,
which happened to be the first one conceived. That it
was the first one conceived is not surprising given the
unique status of utilitarianism in this century. Given
that status, it was more likely that in thinking about
what utilitarianism implies is obligatory, we would
consider cases of supererogation which were optimific
rather than cases of supererogation which were less
than optimific. However, an examination of the
examples in the literature of supererogation clearly
supports the possibility of supererogatory less-than-
bests -- mischaracter izat ions to the contrary.
10. Fred Feldman has suggested (in conversation) that a
utilitarian need not accept this. For a utilitarian
can say that although two alternatives are tied for
best (mutually exclusive yet both optimal, and hence
optional), they need not be construed as morally
indifferent. After all, they are ranked much higher
than many other alternatives and thus each is superior
to less good alternatives. I agree.
11. See Chapt er 1
.
12. Cf. Von Wright 1951b p.37. Recently, Von Wright (1981)
has used the term "facultative" for those actions which
one is both permitted to do and not to do. He does not
say why he has withdrawn the suggestion that such
actions are morally indifferent.
13. With the qualification that minor modifications need to
be introduced in its definitional scheme.
14. As I indicated in passing above (note 5), I do not
think that it is incompatible with the possibility of
supererogation, though it is incompatible with the full
spectrum of supererogatory actions as envisioned in the
classical conception.
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15. Again, in McNamara 1987, I argue that it is not so
committed. Nonetheless, the conceptions of
supererogation and moral indifference that are
compatible with utilitarianism do not in any way bear
on the two arguments against utilitarianism we have
considered in this chapter (i.e. Supererogatory Bests
and Supererogatory Less Than Bests). Only the
Incompatibility Argument", and the accusation that
utilitarianism is committed to Moral Rigor, each of
which was mentioned in passing, is affected by this
utilitarian account of supererogation and indifference.
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CHAPTER 3
MUST I DO WHAT I OUGHT?
Int roduct ion
The vast majority of literature pertaining to
supererogation is both polemical and parochial. It has
been a battle between the friends of supererogation and the
friends of utilitarianism -- typically concerned with
assessing the supererogat ionist * s case against
utilitarianism and the utilitarian’s case against
supererogation. Although this is an important issue, it is
not all-important. For the utilitarian gives us a
relatively clear account of obligation in terms of
optimality and it is well known that there are formal
representations of this account which provide us with a
neat semantic framework for a standard deontic logic of
absolute strict obligation (and derivatively for the whole
traditional scheme). 1 But when the friend of
supererogation is done with polemic, she is left with some
fundamental questions that have received much less
attention in the literature. The most pertinent logical
questions are: "What additional primitive deontic operators
are called for?", What new operators can be defined in
terms of these additional primitives and how are they to be
defined? "How do all the new operators, along with the
five operators of the traditional scheme, interrelate?",
142
and "What sort of formal semantic structure is adequate to
such an enriched deontic logic?". 2 Here is a real
constructive problem for the supererogat ionist ! For the
supererogationistic polemicist, it is not even clear what
the extended deontic logic is going to look like 3 __ much
less what sort of semantic structure will appear to be
appropriate to such a logic. So the supererogat ionist is
left with the formidable task of constructing a richer
deontic logic and providing a well-motivated formal
semantic framework for it.
Furthermore, once we engage in the positive task of
constructing an enriched deontic logic (along with a new
semantic framework), we are left with an apparent dilemma.
For utilitarians endorse the very plausible sounding
doctrine that "we (morally) ought to do the best we can ". 4
If this must be rejected -- and many supererogat ionists
take this to be what is shown by their polemic — then why
does this utilitarian thesis sound so independently
plausible? I do not think that it is an exaggeration to
say that this utilitarian maxim has the sound, at least to
the pre-theoret ic ear, of an axiom. So whatever deontic
logic and semantic framework the s upererogat ion i s
t
eventually settles for, no philosophical account of
supererogation would be complete without an answer to the
question: "What then is the relationship, if any, between
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optimality and obligation?" It is not enough to merely
reject the straightforward relationship (i.e. necessary
coincidence) whrch utilitarianism endorses. We would like
to supplant this negative thesis (that obligation and
optimality do not coincide) with either a thesis specifying
what relationship, if any, obligation does bear to
optimality, or an account of why the utilitarian maxim has
its initial ring of plausibility, despite its falsity.
It is these topics which will provide the main focus
for the chapters of Part II. I will there provide a formal
specification of a semantic framework for an enriched
deontic logic that includes the traditional logic of
absolute strict obligation as a proper part and appears to
be presupposed by the classical conception of
supererogation
.
5 However, I will do more than merely
sketch the sort of extended basic deontic logic which the
classical conception of supererogation appears to
presuppose. For along the way, (including in this chapter)
I will be providing what I take to be a powerful and
completely independent motivation for the logic required.
For the moment, I suggest that we begin tackling this
task by keeping our focus on Utilitarianism. The strategy
will be conservative: we will consider introducing the
minimal alteration of utilitarian doctrine required --
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retaining (approximately) as much of it as is compatible
with accepting the soundness of the supererogat i on i s t ’ s
objections. So our question for the moment is: "What
should we do if we think that there is something to the
utilitarian doctrine and something to the
supererogationist’s objection to it?" In fact, we might
just as well pretend that we are philosophers who, up until
yesterday, were staunch utilitarians and who have just been
persuaded that the two supererogation’s arguments against
utilitarianism of the previous chapter are sound -- so that
we still find much of utilitarian doctrine attractive and
hence wish to make only the most onservative modifications
required by accepting the soundness of these two arguments.
We will see that, perhaps to the surprise of utilitarians
and supererogat ion is t s alike, less has to be given up than
appears at first glance. That more appears to have to be
given up and that designing a supererogat ionist ic deontic
logic has received far less attention than
supererogat ion is t polemics is due to a pervasively, albeit
implicitly, endorsed presupposition of significant import . 6
Indeed, the presupposition is so pervasive that it would
probably have to figure in any attempt to historically
characterize twentieth-century ethics in an encyclopedia
article on the topic. This presupposition even goes so far
as to infest the work of deontic logicians who have worked
with no commitment to utilitarianism nor concern for
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supererogatory action. For the presupposition cuts across
partisan lines and is endorsed by utilitarians and staunch
non-utilitarians alike. Indeed, I suspect that for every
normative position of the twentieth century which has been
presented as a competitor of utilitarianism, the vast
majority of ethicists holding that position have endorsed,
however implicitly, the presupposition in question. As we
shall see, the soundness of the presupposition hardly has
the transparency to warrant such pervasive and unargued
acceptance.
A Componential Analysis of Utilitarian Doctrine
The Two Fundamental Component Theses
Since our strategy is to introduce the minimal
mutilation of utilitarian doctrine required by accepting
the soundness of the two arguments of the previous chapter,
it will be useful to try to characterize this doctrine
componen t i a 1 1 y . Perhaps we can precisely separate and
identify some component/s of the doctrine whose rejection
is strictly required by accepting the two arguments against
utilitarianism while retaining some unscathed remainder.
This remainder will then be the portion of utilitarian
doctrine whose rejection is not, strictly speaking, called
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for by the two arguments of the classical conception. It
may be that the portion of utilitarian doctrine that
remains can be integrated with an account of obligation
which is compatible with the possibility of supererogation
as classically conceived.
As I see it, there are two major theses which are
associated with the utilitarian doctrine (although it is
perhaps only the first which strictly comprises
utilitarianism prior to "the linguistic turn"). The first
thesis is the utilitarian account of moral obligation:
UT1: A person is morally obligated to see to it that
p if and only if the best that S can do is see
to it that p.
Along with this thesis, are associated theses (typically
derivative) regarding the remaining four operators of the
traditional scheme: the forbidden, the permissible, the
gratuitous and the optional. For example, a person will be
morally permitted to see to it that p if and only if it is
not the case that the best he can do is see to it that p.
For simplicity, we will focus on the utilitarian analysis
of moral obligation, taking this as representative of the
more comprehensive component of utilitarian doctrine which
includes the corresponding analyses of the remaining four
operators.
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It might be thought that this exhausts utilitarian
doctrine, but I think this would be a mistake. For there
is a second component of the doctrine, a component which
pervades twentieth century literature on utilitarianism:
UT2: A person morally ought to see to it that p if
and only if the best that he can do is see to
it that p.
A landmark of twentieth century philosophy has been its
concern with the analysis of terms which are taken to
express concepts of traditional philosophical concern.
Perhaps, with the value terra "good" as its only competitor,
the normative term "ought" has received at least as much
attention as any other term in twentieth century ethical
literature. Literature on utilitarianism has been no
exception. For UT1 expresses the utilitarian analysis of
the moral "ought". Indeed, I do not know of any
contemporary philosopher who takes herself to be a
utilitarian and who does not accept UT2. 7 Furthermore,
those who offer alternative analysis of "ought" take
themselves, as a matter of course, to be offering an
analysis incompatible with utilitarian doctrine. This is
hardly a coincidence and I think it would be an historical
distortion to not include this as a component of
utilitarian doctrine as currently conceived.
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So with the qualification regarding the utilitarian
analysis of the remaining four operators of the traditional
scheme, we will, for the moment, take the conjunction of
UT1 and UT2 as comprising utilitarian doctrine. We turn
now to how this componential analysis bears on the import
of the two objections to utilitarianism which we considered
in the previous chapter.
Supererogation and the Two Components:
An Important Bipartisan Presupposition
Recall that the import of the two objections of the
previous chapter was that (1) the best one could do might
be supererogatory and hence not obligatory and that (2) one
can do something supererogatory which is less than the best
and which is thereby permissible. (1) clearly conflicts
with UT1. For according to UTl, if the best you can do is
see to it that p, then p is morally obligatory for you.
But then such a p can never be supererogatory, for that
which is morally obligatory and that which is
supererogatory are mutually exclusive. Similarly, (2) also
conflicts with UTl. For if seeing to p were supererogatory
while being less than the best, then seeing to less than
the best would be permissible in such a case. But then it
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would be false that you are obligated to see to whatever is
best (and hence to see to what is less than best would be
impermissible after all) 8
. So these objections pertain to
what is obligatory or permissible according to
utilitarianism. They do not directly involve the
utilitarian analysis of "ought". It is the utilitarian
analysis of the traditional scheme which is the central
issue and this is why the related issue of tripartism has
loomed large in the polemical literature.
UT2, on the other hand, remains unscathed by the two
objections to utilitarianism. For UT2 does not, in and of
itself, pertain to the traditional scheme. It is a
logically independent component of utilitarian doctrine.
In either event, the utilitarian (or ex-utilitarian) need
not give up UT2 to countenance the two objections of the
supererogat ionist . For it is UT1, not UT2, that is
precisely that feature of utilitarian doctrine which
results in the conflict between the possibility of
supererogation as classically conceived and utilitarianism.
So UT1 and UT2 are logically separable with respect to the
import of the two objections from the supererogat ion ist ’
s
quarter
.
Yet UT1 is obviously deducible from UT2 along with the
following bi-partisan presupposition:
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BP. A person is morally obligated to see to it that pif and only if he morally ought to see to it that
P-
For if what one is morally obligated to do coincides with
what one morally ought to do and the latter coincides with
what is best to do, then obviously what one is morally
obligated to do must coincide with what is best to do. In
fact, BP itself is deducible from UT1 and UT2 by similar
reasoning. So utilitarian doctrine implies BP, and BP
along with either component of utilitarian doctrine implies
the whole doctrine. Hence, in particular, assuming the
truth of UT2, BP and UT1 are logically interdependent:
I: Given UT2, UT1 is false if and only if BP is
false
.
But notice that BP is not a peculiarly utilitarian
thesis. For BP has been endorsed, albeit it
unreflect ively
,
by the vast majority of ethicists and
deontic logicians of the twentieth century. The fact that
the word "ought" has received the attention it has in
Twentieth Century ethical literature is due to the implicit
acceptance of BP. It has been routinely taken for granted
that "ought" is the term that in ordinary parlance is most
frequently used to express moral obligation. For it is
this presupposition, coupled with the linguistic turn in
philosophy, that provides the rationale for assuming that
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the study of "ought" is continuous with a long-standing
philosophical tradition. First, consider two
representative passages from two renowned ethicists:
Every action which is wrong is also an action which
ought not to be done and which it is our duty not todo; and also,
—
conversely
. every action which ought
not to be done, or which it is our duty not to do, is
wrong. These three terms are precisely and
ab solutely coextensive [Moore 1912, p.15 -- the
stress is mine].
The Two Main ethical concepts are expressed
respectively by the words "good" and "ought" (or
"duty") The action that we ought to do
is also called our "duty" [Ewing 1953, p.12 and
P • 15 ] .
Even in the literature of unary deontic logic, where
the operators of the traditional scheme are given the
familiar standard readings, "it is obligatory that", "it is
permissible that" "it is impermissible that", "ought" is
explicitly presented as an alternate to "obligatory". For
example in Von Wrights early landmark work on deontic
logic
,
we f ind
:
There are the deontic modes or modes of obligation .
These are concepts such as the obligatory (that which
we ought to do
)
,
the permitted (that which we are
allowed to do), and the forbidden (that which we must
not do) [Von Wright 1951, p.58 -- the stress is
mine ] .
Norms of the "ought" character can also be called
obligation- norms That which ought to be
done is that which must not be left undone, and vice
versa. That which ought to be left undone is that
which must not be done, and vice versa [Von Wright
1963, p.73 and p.83].
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If an act is not permitted, it is called forbidden.
We must not do that which we are not allowed to do.
If the negation of an act is forbidden, the act
itself is called obligatory. We ought to do that
which we are allowed not to do [Von Wright 1951
P • 37 ] .
A casual perusal of the literature will bear out the fact
that Von Wright’s use of "ought" as expressive of moral
obligation is quite representative for deontic logic. It
should also be noted that the examples used to illustrate
the logic in question often couch the intended statements
of obligation by way of "ought" rather than "obligatory" or
"ought not" rather than "impermissible". These logicians
are rarely attempting to defend or construct a deontic
logic which is in any way intended to reflect a
distinctively utilitarian position. On the contrary, I
suspect that most of these logicians would see it as a
compromise of the generality which they are typically
trying to achieve if their work reflected a peculiarly
utilitarian slant.
Furthermore, if one looks at the more recent work in
deontic logic on conditional obligation, or "contrary-to-
duty imperatives", one will be hard-pressed to even find
examples which are not couched via "ought". Rarely, do you
see examples of the sort "if you are not going to do such
and such, then you are morally obligated to do ". On
the contrary, the examples are almost invariably of the
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form if you are not going to do such and such, then you
ought to do Although Chisholm is less guilty of
this than most of his successors, his landmark article on
conditional obligation freely interchanges "ought" with
"obligation". After mixing "obligatory" with "ought", he
closes his "Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives and Deontic Logic"
with:
For most of us need a way of deciding, not only what
we ought to do, but also what we ought to do after we
fail to do some of the things we ought to do
[Chisholm 1963
,
p. 303 ]
.
And standard subsequent presentations of the paradox
typically couch the paradox exclusively in terms of
"ought", providing us ith four " ought " -s t at ement s which are
taken to be mutually consistent intuitively and which are
also taken to be incapable of being represented as mutually
consistent utilizing the expressive resources of a deontic
logic of strict obligation (with a unary operator). It is
also interesting to note that the majority of logicians
agree that the import of Chisholm’s paradox is that a
dyadic operator has to be introduced and that this operator
then allows us to define the unary operator as a special
case. But this just confirms the perception that a major
presupposition operating here is BP. For how could the
obligation operator of the traditional scheme be defined
via an "iffy-ought", if the "iffy-ought" didn’t express
conditional ob 1 igat ion to begin with?
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Finally, we should note that the presupposition flows
equally from the pens of staunch anti-utilitarians. And we
noted earlier that many supererogat ionists have presupposed
BP in concluding that it is not the case that you ought to
do that which is a supererogatory best alternative. Again,
a casual, even random, perusal of the literature will
quickly bear this out.
So now we face a new dilemma. Our conservative
strategy is to explore the possibility of retaining some
component of utilitarian doctrine while accepting the
soundness of the two objections to utilitarianism. In
turn, our componential analysis of utilitarian doctrine has
left us with only two components and the first of these
must already go, given the soundness of the two objections.
So we must either give up the long-standing, pervasive and
bi-partisan equivalence expressed in BP or we must
acknowledge the failure of our minimum mutilation strategy
-- thus rejecting both components of utilitarian doctrine
outright. Since (i) BP is such a fundamental
presupposition of twentieth century ethics, (ii) BP is
rarely discussed, and (iii) the truth of BP stops us dead
in our tracks with respect to carrying out our minimum
mutilation strategy, we will turn to an extended assessment
of BP. The assessment will be somewhat circuitous, but I
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hope that it will become clear subsequently that such a
circuitous assessment is methodologically warranted.
The Logic of Some Modal Auxiliaries
Doubts About The Bipartisan Presupposition:
Two Families of Expressions
So, if we wish to retain UT2 and allow for the
possibilities of optimal non-ob 1 i gat ory action and sub-
optimal permissible action, we must reject not only UT1,
but in addition, one of the few relatively universal
bipartisan presuppositions of Twentieth Century ethical
theory. I think this may be just as well. Consider the
following groups of locutions :
Gl: S must see to it that p.
S has to see to it that p.
S is obligated to see to it that p.
S’s duty is to see to it that p.
S is required to see to it that p.
It is imperative that S see to it that p.
It is incumbent on S to see to it that p.
G2: S ought to see to it that p.
S should see to it that p.
It is morally most fitting that S see to it that
p .
It is morally advisable that S see to it that p.
It is morally most appropriate that S see to it
that p.
It is morally best that S sees to it that p.
It is morally ideal that S see to it that p.
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Subtleties aside, the members of G1 form a natural
group as do the members of G2. Furthermore, the
distinctness of the groupings is equally natural. 9 Let’s
focus on "must" (and "have to") and "ought" (and "should").
On the face of it, "S must see to it that p" and "S ought
to see to it that p appear to be non-equivalent locutions.
In particular, the first appears to be stronger than the
second. Abstracting from subject matter and context, there
is no ring of contradiction to "you ought to, but you don’t
have to", while there is a definite ring of contradiction
to "You must (have to) but you ought not (shouldn’t). This
suggests that perhaps "S must (has to) see to it that p"
implies, but is not implied by, "S ought to (should) see to
it that p". Let’s explore whatever differences there are
systematically and progressively.
Some Salient Conversational Differences Between
"Must" and "Ought"
First consider conversational differences between uses
of "ought" and "must", where the uses are naturally
associated with directing action. What does such a given
use of "ought" and a given use of "must" suggest about the
nature of the circumstances in which they are used?
Sometimes at least, to say that one ought to take a certain
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option suggests that the option in question is the optimal
one among some ranked acceptable class of relevant
alternatives. But it also thereby suggests that there are
sub-optimal alternatives, which preclude the optimal
alternative in question, and yet are nonetheless
acceptable. So to say that one ought to do so and so is to
suggest that there are still acceptable sub-optimal
alternatives open to the one addressed. In contrast, to
say that one must take a certain option is to suggest that
something much stronger than this obtains. It suggests
that there simply are no other acceptable options that
exclude this one -- that the action in question is
essential to any option’s being acceptable.
Conversationally, the suggestion of a ranking of acceptable
alternatives does not arise with "must". To say an option
is "a must" simply closes the door on all alternatives
excluding this option — they are simply unacceptable. In
addition to these differences about what is
conversationally implied (typically) about a situation,
there are also salient differences regarding directive
force. To say that one ought to take a certain option is
merely to provide a nudge in that direction. Its typical
uses are to offer guidance, a word to the wise ( counsel of
wisdom"), to recommend, advise or prescribe a course of
action. Its directive force is moderate at best. In
contrast, to say that one must take a certain option is to
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be quite forceful. Its typical uses are to command,
decree, enact, exhort, entreat, require, regulate,
legislate, delegate, or warn. Its directive force is quite
strong and it often expresses some degree of urgency. So
there are at least some striking conversational difference
between the two idioms that we seem to be able to recognize
abstract ly
.
Let’s consider an example. Suppose that you are
driving me somewhere and I am providing the directions. If
I say "You ought to turn here", I am suggesting that
turning here is the best way (at this point) to get to our
destination . 10 However it also suggests that there is
perhaps an acceptable turn I could make further along on
the road, though this would be part of a sub-optimal route.
If for some reason I missed the turn in question, I would
not be at all surprised if I could make a turn two blocks
ahead which would also get us to our destination without
bringing us back to the turn I missed. In contrast, if I
say "You mus t turn here", I am suggesting that turning here
is involved in every acceptable way of getting to the place
in question -- that is, turning here is the only option (at
this point) among the class of acceptable routes. I
legitimately expect that there are no acceptable
opportunities further along on he road for getting to our
destination. If I missed the turn in question, I would
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legitimately expect that I would have to turn around and
double back. Indeed, suppose that you and I are heading
for a place and there are two standard routes for getting
there, you prefer one and I prefer another and we both know
about and tolerate each others preferences. Suppose
further that I, but not you, happen to know that a certain
bridge involved in your preferred route was closed down for
repairs today. As a result my preferred route is the only
route we can take today. We come to the turn we need to
make before the bridge and I say to you "We ought to turn
here". I’m right of course, but I have also violated some
basic conventions regarding communication. By merely
saying that you ought to turn here, I have mislead you into
thinking that I am merely expressing my belief that turning
here is part of the best route and I have said nothing to
suggest that your preferred route is not a viable option.
By using "ought", I have conversationally left open the
possibility of a sub-optimal but acceptable alternative
route. However, if I say "You must turn here", and you
know I am careful about my speech, you might be warranted
in quickly turning and then asking why we "had" to turn
here. In the latter situation, where I know that turning
here is essential to getting there, "must" not 'ought is
appropriate. So, in at least some cases to say that one
ought to do something (with no further qualification) is to
at least conversationally imply that there are other
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acceptable options, though they are not optimal. In
contrast, to say that one must (or "has to") do something
is to imply that there are no other acceptable options --
period.
Regarding directive force, the typical differences are
more obvious. When your boss tells you that you must do
some task, he is typically commanding you to do it or
requiring you to do it. If he tells you that you ought to
do it, he is typically recommending the action, and
advising you to do it. He is not typically commanding you
to do it nor requiring you to do it. If a king says to his
subjects (in a speech) that they ought to store provisions
for the winter, he is advising them -- recommending a
course of action. However, if he tells them they mus
t
store provisions for the winter, he is laying down the law
-- he is commanding his subjects. If a doctor tells you
that you ought to take aspirin and get plenty of rest (say
for a cold), he is prescribing a course of action. In
contrast, if your doctor tells you that you mus
t
take
aspirin and get plenty of rest (say for a patient
recovering from a heart ailment which requires blood-
thinning) then he is commanding you and perhaps warning you
(i.e. there is often an understood "or else" tagged on).
No doubt the reader can easily extend the list.
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Semantical Differences Between Some Uses of
"Must" and "Ought"
But perhaps someone will object as follows. These
contrasting conversational differences do not indicate any
semantical differences. That is, the differences in
question are to be explained only by that component of an
account of language that accounts for utterance
appropriateness conditions. These non-s emant i ca 1
differences should not be taken as reflecting any
difference in the truth conditions for "must" and "ought".
I think that this is certainly incorrect. Just as
there are many cases where there appear to be substantial
conversational differences between these expressions, there
are also at least some cases in which there are definite
semantical difference. We have shown that there are
typical conversational differences between "must" and
"ought" by contrast ing the shifts in conversational
implications and force that result from interchanging these
expression in typical utterances. This is adequate for
showing conversational differences. But to show that there
are semantical differences, it will be more useful to
employ comb ined use rather than contrasted use.
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For example, suppose, once again, that you and I are
driving somewhere, I am providing directions and there are
a number of acceptable ways of getting to our destination -
- though some are a bit better than others
.
11 With perfect
congruity, I can say "You ought to turn here, but you don’t
have to". There does not appear to be anything
contradictory about what I’ve said. However, if I say "You
should turn here but you should not" or "you have to turn
here but you don’t have to" you might be warranted in
thinking that I really have lost my sense of direction.
The two latter utterances are at best hyperbolic and at
worst a cry for help. Not so for the former utterance,
which would ordinarily be perfectly sensible. It certainly
looks as if there are definite semantical differences, in
such a case, between "ought" and "must".
However, we needn’t stop here. In addition to the fact
that I can say with perfect congruity, "you ought to turn
here, but you don’t have to", I can also go on to .justify
what I have said in a variety of ways. For example, I
might add: "We can also take the bridge route, but it will
be quicker if we turn here" or "Although the bridge route
is slightly quicker, turning here will provide us with a
much more scenic ride", or "Although the bridge route is
just as fast, turning here may save you a front-end
alignment", etc. Any of these conversational extensions is
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perfectly appropriate. They provide sensible answers to
the question: ' Why is it that I ought to turn here, yet
don’t have to?"
Surely the natural explanation for these facts
regarding usage is that there is a difference (in this sort
of case) in the truth-conditions for "ought" and "have to".
It is because of this sort of difference, isn’t it, that I
can both assert one and deny the other in the same breath
(modulo same context, subject, sentential compliment,
etc.), and go on to offer perfectly sensible
straightforward justifications for what I’ve asserted?
Surely, I can offer no such straightforward justification
for the prima facia absurd claim that "You ought to turn
here but it is not the case that you ought to turn here".
If I can justify such a prima facia aberrant utterance, I
will be doing just that -- justifying the utterance , not
the truth of what I’ve uttered. (Unless of course my
"justification" indicates a shift in the sense of, or the
parameters governing, the two occurrences of "ought".)
So it appears that there are at least some uses of
"ought/should" and "must/have to" that reflect a difference
not only in conversational force, but in truth-conditions.
For we have just seen that in at least some perfectly
ordinary cases, one can offer a justification for the joint
164
assertion of a "you-ought-to,
-but-y ou-don ’ t-have- 1 o "
-
statement. Hence, it would appear that in at least some
cases, it is true that you ought to do such and such, but
false that you have to do such and such. Furthermore, this
is not so due to any equivocation. For in the case above,
where we are talking about turns to make, the use of
"ought" and "have to" do not involve any shift in relevant
factors determining what counts as a defense of the
respective "ought" and "don’t have to" claims. In both
cases, the considerations are the same: there is a class of
acceptable ways of driving to our destination among which
some are better than others with respect to some
contextually given set of parameters (e.g. time, scenic
quality, and/or safety regarding the auto, etc.). And it
is with respect to precisely the same parameters that we
can say "you ought to, but you don’t have to". It would be
difficult to give a plausible explanation of these facts
without positing differences in truth-conditions between
"must" and "ought" — at least in the sort of context in
question. In particular, there appear to be some perfectly
ordinary cases where "you ought to/should " is true and
"you must/have to " is false. So in at least some
contexts, "you ought to " does not imply "you must/have
to ". And the absence of implication is a sure mark of
the presence of a semantical difference (i.e. difference of
content in the context).
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Aside from the lack of semantic connection just
suggested, that ’’you ought to needn’t imply ’’you must
,
there is a positive semantic connection. For if you
must turn here, then you ought to turn here. Without some
hyperbole or shift in parameters, it does not make sense to
say ’’you must, but you ought not’’ or "you ought to, but you
mustn’t". If I am providing directions and I say "You must
turn here but you shouldn’t", I have said something
contradictory on the face of it. That the parameters have
to shift for this utterance to make sense becomes obvious
if we try to imagine the sort of justification we would
provide if its use were felicitous. For example, we might
add: "A cop is directing all traffic to turn here (hence
you "must"), but we need to go straight despite the cops
direction in order to optimize our chances of getting Bob
(our diabetic friend) to the hospital in time to save him
(hence "ought not"). However, if the context provides no
clues regarding separate parameters, you are justified in
asking me what I could have possibly intended by such an
absurd remark. You would be warranted in saying, by way
of objecting, "If I must, surely I ought to!" Similarly,
if I say "You mustn’t, but you ought to", I have said
something that appears contradictory. Isn’t this because
"mustn’t " implies "ought not ", and the latter
implies "not ought "? So it would appear that in some
cases, although "you ought to " does not imply "you must
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you mustft tff " does imply "you ought to
Finally, suppose you are a governor at a banquet and the
last thing you want is an interruption. I have brought you
some new evidence that raises doubts about a recent murder
conviction. I urge you to listen since the man convicted
is to be hanged this evening. Reluctantly, you do. You
then say, hesitantly, "Well, I guess I ought to postpone
the execution." I, outraged, respond with "You guess you
ought to postpone it -- you must postpone it! A man’s life
is at stake. Perhaps it is with this sort of example
that the fact that "must" is stronger than "ought" is most
dramatically displayed. However, that "must" implies
ought' seems hardly a revelation, and since my primary
goal is to cast doubt on the implication of BP from right
to left, I will assume that "must’s implying "ought" is not
at issue
.
Let’s sum up with a preliminary informal "must-ought"
principle:
PM-O: "ought" typically suggests different things
about the nature of the conversational situation
than "must" does; "must" typically has a
stronger conversational force than "ought"; and
in some cases, "must" properly implies
(semantically) "ought ". 12
Of course, even this has not established a lot. For
it might be claimed that although there is sometimes a
difference between the truth-conditions of "must" and
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"ought", this is not always the case -- in some contexts
the only differences between the two locutions are purely
conversational, if any. It might be further claimed that,
in moral contexts in particular, this is precisely the
case. Rather than considering this response head-on, let’s
turn to a brief examination of just how extensive the
semantic difference in the uses of "ought/should" and
"must/ought " really are.
A Pseudo-Taxonomy of Uses of "Must "-"Ought
"
In this section I will introduce a "pseudo-taxonomy" of
felicitous uses of "must" and "ought". I say "pseudo-
taxonomy" because no claim is being made that this taxonomy
is exhaustive, nor that the classes of uses indicated are
exclusive. Indeed, I deliberately ignore moral contexts.
My only point is to show that the sort of semantical
relationship between the use of "must" and "ought"
illustrated above with our "driving example" is quite
representative -- indeed virtually all-pervasive. A
pseudo - taxonomy will impose some structure on the variety
of uses to be illustrated, thereby indicating that the
illustration/s to be introduced belong to some common and
extensive family of relevantly similar examples. It should
provide some indication of just how extensive the
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semantical principle, that "must" properly implies "ought",
is. Beyond this, the value of the "taxonomy" is nil.
Goal-Achieving Contexts
As we saw above in the direction-giving example,
provided that the parameters are constant, "you must turn
here" properly implies "you ought to turn here". In this
case there was a common goal: to get to our destination
within a certain period of time, in one piece, etc. To say
"you must turn here" is to say, roughly, that turning here
is essential to every acceptable route. To say "you ought
to turn here" is to say, roughly, that turning here is part
of any optimal acceptable route.
Similarly, if someone has come to us for advise on how
to go about proving some theorem, T, we might say something
like this
:
"You ought to try to prove Ll and L2 first. That’s
the best way, though you don’t have t
o
.
You could
prove Ll, L3 and L4 first instead, though this is a
little less elegant. However, you have to prove Ll,
so start there.
In both cases, there is some goal to be achieved, along
with various constraints on the manners of achieving it
(the "parameters"). There is nothing peculiar about these
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examples. Clearly, in such cases, the "mus t "
-s t at emen
t
says something semantically stronger than the "ought"-
statement it properly implies the "ought”-statement
.
Prudential Contexts
At some time in my life (when recovering from illness),
I think I must have had an exchange with my mother that
went something like this:
Paul, you ought to try to eat a light meal. Must I,
Mom? I really don’t feel like eating anything. No. I
don’t think you have to have a meal, but you ought to
Paul, even if you don’t feel like it. However, you
must eat a little something, even if it is only some
toast
.
I suspect most of us have been parties in a conversation
suitably like this one. It seems like a quite ordinary
exchange (though perhaps a bit overly explicit). Once
again, the "must"-statement is stronger than the "ought"-
statement -- it properly implies the "ought ’’-statement
.
Here the context is naturally interpreted as one in which
it is the welfare of the person addressed that is at issue
(not the wishes of Mom). One course of action, eating a
light meal, is thought to be best for the one addressed,
and eating something or other — even just toast is
thought to be essential to any acceptable course of action,
even sub-optimal ones.
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Similarly, if we are driving together, you are
determined to arrive somewhere the current evening and you
are tiring, I might say to you as you drop me off enroute:
Look, Claudia, your getting tired and its affecting
your driving. You ought to come with me, get some
sleep, and start out again in the morning. Thanks
anyway, Paul, but I’m determined to get there
tonight. Well, you could just get a few hours sleep.
However, the next best thing would be to stop and
drink a couple of cups of coffee. You know you can’t
sleep if you drink coffee. No matter how you slice
it, you simply have to stop driving for at least a
little while. I’ll get some coffee, thanks.
In this case two alternatives are mentioned. Both are
thought (by me) to be acceptable from the prudential
standpoint (Claudia’s). One of these is thought to be
optimal from that standpoint, another is thought to be sub-
optimal though acceptable. Neither one is thought to be a
must. However, each requires stopping for at least some
short period of time, and this is thought to be essential
to any acceptable alternative. Stopping itself is simply a
mus t !
So it appears that in contexts in which the concern is
the welfare of some individual (it could also be a group of
course), "prudential contexts", the "must" statement
properly implies the corresponding weaker "ought"
statement
.
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Conventional Contexts
Frequently, there are written and unwritten conventions
placing restrictions or constraints on our behavior. For
example, I can remember being told when a child that I must
take ray hat off in church. At the time, I had no idea why
this was so. I suppose that a rule prescribing against
wearing hats in church may be written down somewhere, but I
suspect that whoever told me had no reason to believe that
it was a written rule. Yet there were other things that I
was told I ought to do, which were not presented as if they
were "must"s (unlike hat-wearing in church). For example, I
remember being told (frequently, I’m afraid) that I ought
to kneel straight up, whereas I was always prone to lean
back and rest my derriere on the seat of the pew.
Similarly, there are (were) many restaurants for which you
(merely) ought to wear a jacket (though you may refrain),
and some for which you mus t wear a jacket. In the former
sort of case, my usual attire would be frowned upon and
perhaps I would be seated in a dark far corner -- but I
would be seated. In the latter sort of case, it would
probably prompt directions to McDonald’s.
In some cases, the pressure of conventions stems from
written documents, posted rules and such. For example,
some of the traditional pseudo-mystical men’s clubs
172
probably have documented rules strictly requiring or
forbidding certain behavior of the Grand Poohbah. These
would be things that the Grand Poohbah must or mustn’t do.
For example, that he must always give the special Lodge
signal when he encounters a brother outside the Grand Hall.
However, undoubtedly, some of these documents list various
virtues that one worthy of the Grand Poohbahship should
possess, and these are meant to serve both as a guide to
those doing the electing and as ideals for the elected’s
aspiration. As the latter, there will be things that the
Grand Poohbah should (or should not do), though many of
these will not be "raust"s (or "mus tn ’ t " s ) . For example,
that at the beginning of any meeting of the elders, he
should recite the magic formula in a clear, powerful and
deep voice.
Typically, where there are "must”-"ought" conventions,
there are associated conventions for dealing with
violations of "must"s and for dealing with violations of
mere "ought"s. Also typically, the conventions for dealing
with violations of "must"s are much stricter than those for
dealing with mere "ought"s. If the grand Poohbah arrives
at an elder’s meeting wearing a Death to America t shirt,
and nothing else, he will probably be impeached for it. In
contrast, if he gives an especially bland reading of the
opening incantation, he may be "reprimanded" (privately; by
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his buddy-elder with no more than a "Gee George, that was
rather uninspired reading for a Grand Poohbah".
a
Projective/Epistemic Contexts
Consider the use of "must" and "ought" in contexts
where we are inferring that a certain non-transparent
condition, C, obtains because of its typical correlation
with some other condition, C’, that is transparent. In
such cases, if the correlation has been constant according
to all known records, so that the transparent condition is
taken to be a "litmus test" for the non-transparent
condition, we will typically feel justified in the face of
C’, in asserting "Condition C must obtain". However, if
the transparent condition, C’, is usually (say 85% of the
time), correlated with the non-transparent condition, C, we
would normally deny this. Indeed, we would be likely to
say something like "No, C doesn’t have to obtain". Despite
this denial, we might well say, felicitously, "Condition C
ought to obtain". In such contexts, the "must "-statement
is stronger than the "ought"-stateraent
.
Also, if the transparent condition, C’, always
indicates that either condition C or condition C’’ obtains,
and condition C obtains ten times more often than condition
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It mustC” , we might say, upon noting the presence of C’, "
be the case that either C or C” obtains and it ought to be
that it is condition C this time, though it doesn’t have to
be. "13
Similarly, at a preliminary point in an investigation,
Sherlock Holmes might say "Mr. ought to be the one --
if my preliminary investigations have not misled. But to
be sure, Watson, I have devised a plan by which he will
incriminate himself and I will need your help, my friend."
However, Sherlock Holmes would never say, at this stage,
"Mr. must be the one." This would be reserved for when
the case was solved. It is precisely because the
preliminary investigation indicates that Mr. ought to
be the one, that Holmes feels justified in setting up a
situation in which Mr.
,
if he is indeed the one, will
(by his own actions) demonstrate that he himself must be
the one. Only when Holmes concludes that he mus
t
be the
one, does the investigation end.
Note that none of these three cases involve actions to
be performed. We have here the "must be true that" and the
"ought to be true that" not the "must do" or "ought to do".
Nonetheless, the same relationship holds: the "must"-
statements imply, but are not implied by, their respective
"ought "-statements.
175
This, I hope, provides a fair indication of just how
pervasive the semantical distinction between "must" and
"ought" is. In each sort of use, "must" appears to
properly imply "ought". So our d i r ec t i on- g i v i n g example is
hardly an exceptional case — if anything, it is an apt
illustration of a general rule.
Aberrant Uses of "Ought" in "Must"-
Felicitous Contexts
It is interesting to note that there are some contexts
in which the use of must M / "have to" is appropriate,
whereas the use of "ought "/"should" is quite odd. Such a
fact may provide an interesting datum for semant icists
.
For we might be led to suspect that if the use of "ought"
is aberrant in some context where the use of "must" is not,
then there may be some ingredient that is missing in this
sort of context, that is intimately tied to the proper
semantical interpretation of "ought", but which is not
intimately tied to the proper semantical interpretation of
"must". Here are two sorts of contexts that have just such
import
.
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Alethic Modal Contexts
We sometimes use modal auxiliaries to express
possibilities and necessities of varying strengths. If we
imagine the various notions of possibility and necessity
laid out on two scales reflecting their relative strengths,
we will arrive at two complementary notions, that of the
strongest sort of necessity and that of the weakest sort of
possibility. The former is sometimes referred to as
"metaphysical necessity" and the latter as "metaphysical
possibility ". 14 Anything that is metaphysically necessary,
will satisfy the conditions for every sort of necessity,
and is thus thought of as the "strongest" form of
necessity. For example, it is necessary in the strongest
sense that nothing is larger than itself. Hence, it is
physically necessary that nothing is larger than itself, it
is necessary with respect to humanity’s collective
capacities (unalterable) that nothing is larger than
itself, etc. In contrast, anything that is possible in any
sense, will also be a metaphysical possibility, and hence
metaphysical possibility is the "weakest" form of
possibility. For example, it is possible with respect to
humanity’s collective capacities (achievable) that there is
enough food for everyone, it is physically possible that
humans are not the only people, and hence, both these
things are metaphysically possible.
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Metaphysical possibility and metaphysical necessity are
complimentary in that something is metaphysically possible
if and only if its negation is not metaphysically necessary
and something is metaphysically necessary if and only if
its negation is not metaphysically possible. Of course,
along with this pair is a complimentary notion of
impossibility: something is metaphysically impossible iff
its not metaphysically possible (or "its negation is
metaphysically necessary"). This will be the strongest
sort of impossibility.
Where the context is one such that the notions of
necessity, and possibility are exclusively the strongest
and weakest sorts respectively, the notions are
collectively referred to as "the alethic modalities".
Let’s call contexts in which all expressions of
possibility, necessity, and impossibility (i.e. "must",
"can", "can’t" and rough equivalents) express alethic
modalities, "pure alethic contexts". Now in pure alethic
contexts, we might say such things as:
It had to have been the case that nothing is larger
than itself.
It could have been the case that humans are not the
only people.
It could not have been the case that something is
larger than itself . 15
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However, note the oddity, in such a context, of the
foil ow i n g
:
I t ought to have been the case that nothing is
larger than itself.
It is false that it ought not to have been the case
that something is larger than itself.
It ought not to have been the case that something is
larger than itself.
These seem to "force” a dramatic shift in discourse when
introduced in purely alethic contexts. Whatever natural
interpretations we may place on them when introduced in
such a context (e.g. epistemic/pro ject ive or deontic),
there are corresponding "mus t " / " have to"-statements that
would naturally be interpreted as being of the same type
(e.g. epistemic/pro jective or deontic, respectively) as the
" ought " -s t at emen t s -- but a type other than a alethic one.
When these matching "must"-statements are interpreted
accordingly, they will have an intimate continuity with the
corresponding "ought "-statement that they will not have
when they are interpreted as statements of alethic
modality. It seems that the mere introduction of an
" ough t " -s t a t emen t in a purely alethic context shifts the
context away from a purely alethic one. Though there are
goal-achieving, prudential, convention, and
epistemic/projective "must "-"ought" pairs that are
perfectly felicitous, there is no alethic "must - ought
pair that is felicitous. There is only the perfectly
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felicitous alethic "must", and the strikingly out of place
"ought"
.
So why is there no felicitous alethic "ought"? I think
the answer lies in what is missing from such contexts: a
non-vacuous ranking of relevant alternatives. Since the
sense of possibility is the weakest one, the relevant or
acceptable alternatives here are simply all those states of
affairs or propositions (perhaps all those maximal ones)
that are possible in any sense. But no salient principle
for ranking these acceptable alternatives is operating in
such contexts. With no such principle operating in such a
context, we are not disposed to identify some of these
states of affairs as ones that are optimal with respect to
such a ranking -- at least not in non-logical circles.
Here lies, I submit, the oddity in introducing an "ought"
in such a context. If "ought" in a context does mean
(roughly) invariance at the top of the heap (of the
contextually relevant possibilities) with respect to a
ranking induced by the contextually relevant parameters,
then is it any surprise that in a context where no salient
ranking is induced by the relevant parameters, its use is
odd?
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Legal Contexts
Notice also that in legal contexts, though "must",
"can" and "can’t" are quite appropriate, "ought" is once
again odd. One mus
t
pay one’s taxes", "One can have an
abortion", "One can’t engage in mercy-killing" are all
perfectly appropriate in a legal context, where the modals
are governed by what is and is not the law. But to say
"One ought to pay one’s taxes", "It is false that one ought
not have an abortion" or "One ought not engage in mercy-
killing" suggests a shift away from a purely legal context
to a prudential or moral context. These utterances seem
out of place in a purely legal context. In such a context,
there are things that are required, things that one is at
liberty to do or not do and things that are forbidden. But
there does not seem to be a principle, provided by the law
itself
,
that yields a non-vacuous ranking of things we are
legally permitted to do. Hence the law does not provide us
with directives for identifying optimal courses of action.
The law tells us what we must do, what we can do and what
we can’t do, but it does not tell us what we ought to do.
To be sure, we can ask a lawyer, "Legally speaking,
what ought I to do?" But this involves a shift. We are
not asking the lawyer to inform us of what the law tells us
we ought to do. Here, we are likely to be asking what we
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ought to do in order to best exercise or protect our legal
rights. For example, I might ask this of a lawyer, if I
have accidentally damaged someone’s property or if someone
else has damaged mine. A proper response to such a
question may well be that (given the limited value of the
item damaged and the time involved in going to court), I
should try to arrive at a settlement outside of court,
while using the possibility of going to court as leverage.
However sensible such advise is, clearly the law does not
"say" that this is what I ought to do.
Of course, it might be suggested that this tells
against not only the extreme position that "ought" and
"must" are semantically equivalent in all contexts, but
even against the principle that "must" implies "ought" in
all contexts. But noting the oddity about using "ought in
such contexts was not meant to suggest that this oddity
definitely entails a semant ic inappropriateness. It may be
that despite the oddity of the result of substituting
"ought" for "must" in "must"-statements that are
transparently true in such contexts, the resulting "ought"-
statement is nonetheless true in such contexts. My point
is that iX such sentences are true in such a context they
are vacuously true and share some of their conversational
oddities with other well-known statements that are deemed
vacuously true. For if it is reasonable (for theoretical
182
reasons) to posit a ranking of states of affairs implicit
in a 1 e t h i c contexts, I suspect that it will be one such
that all possible states of affairs are ranked equally.
Such a "ranking” is mute. For all of the possible items
will be ranked equally and thus all will be at the "top" of
the heap. In such a context, to say that something ought
to be so would imply no more information than is already
implied by saying that it had to be so. For what is
invariant at the "top" of such a homogeneous heap will be
identical to what is invariant with respect to the heap --
period. If in the vast majority of cases where "must" and
"could" are used felicitously, there is a non-vacuous
ranking principle, and if "ought" is used to identify those
acceptable items at the top of the heap with respect to
such a non-vacuous ranking, it would not be particularly
surprising to find that people simply didn’t use "ought" in
contexts where there is no non-vacuous ranking. To use it
in such contexts, even if it were strictly speaking
semantically appropriate, might be systematically
misleading and pragmatically unmotivated. So we must not
hasten to conclude, from the oddity of using "ought" in
such contexts, that all such "ought"-statements are truth-
valueless in such contexts. To assess a semantic account
of a piece of discourse is not so easy. There may be
plausible reasons (even somewhat pressing theoretical ones)
for positing a semantic hypothesis that predicts bona fide
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truth conditions for sentences uttered in contexts where
such utterances seem strikingly odd. We must allow for the
possibility that such an oddity might be reconciled in a
more comprehensive and elegant account of such discourse,
one that included such a semantic account as a proper part.
Nonetheless, if it turned out that "ought"-statements
are best construed as truth-valueless in some contexts
where "must" is both semantically and conversationally
appropriate, it could still be maintained that in all
contexts where an " ought "-statement does have a truth-
value
,
there is a corresponding "must"-statement that
properly implies it, while interpreted as continuous with
the " ought " -s t at emen t with respect to type and parameters
(or what have you). Furthermore, either position regarding
"ought" in such non-felicitous contexts, tends to confirm
both that "ought" is indeed semantically tied to a ranking
of possibilities and that "ought" is not generally
equivalent to "must". For if does semantically presuppose
a non-vacuous ranking, all the more "ought" reason for the
conversational oddity of using "ought" in contexts where no
such ranking obtains, and where the use of "must” is, in
contrast, perfectly felicitous. For "must" does not appear
to presuppose a ranking of alternatives at all only a
selection of acceptable or possible ones.
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"Must”, "Ought", "Can" and "Can’t
For the most part, we have been concentrating on the
semantic difference between "must" and "ought" by
comparing, contrasting and combining their uses in
isolation from various complimentary modal terms .
However, that their is generally a semantic difference
between "must" and "ought" is also born out by comparing
and contrasting their relationships to other modal terms.
For example, it is "must" ("had to"), not "ought"
("should"), that is naturally tied with "can" ("could") and
"can’t" ("couldn’t") in the colloquial analogues to the
familiar equivalences of modal logic (broadly construed):
S can’t see to it that p <-> S must see to it that
not-p.
[or: It couldn’t have been the case that p <-> it had
to have been the case that not-p.
or: It couldn’t be the case that p <-> it must be
the case that not-p.]
S can see to it that p <-> It is not the case that S
must see to it that not-p.)
[or: It could have been the case that p <-> It is not
the case that it had to have been the case that
not-p
.
or: It could be the case that p <-> It is not the
case that it must be the case that not-p.]
On the face of it, "ought" simply lacks the strength
required for the associated equivalences. "Must", in
contrast, clearly has the required strength. It is equally
clear, I assume, that in their alethic uses, "had to",
"could have" and "couldn’t have" satisfy the appropriate
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equivalences
.
Yet we have already seen that in the alethic
contexts, ’ought" is simply inappropriate. Notice that it
is just these sort of equivalences that provide the
rationales for the definitions of non
—
p r i m i t i ve operators
in modal logics (broadly construed).
Let’s look at an example. Consider epistemic/
projective uses of "must" and kin. "It couldn’t be that
the last card drawn is a spade" and "It must be false that
the last card drawn is a spade" are prima facia equivalent.
Similarly for "It could be that the last card drawn is a
spade" and "It is not the case that it must be false that
the last card drawn is a spade". In both cases, the first
implies the second (and vice versa).
Yet if we replace "must" with "ought" in either of
these equivalences, all prima facia plausibility is lost.
Indeed, the results are patently not equivalent. Although
"It couldn’t be that the last card drawn is a spade"
implies "It ought to be false that the last card drawn is
a spade" the converse implication obviously does not hold.
For, the professional gambler, the difference is crucial.
If the converse implication held, a gambler would have no
reason to sweat over a bet on the last cards being a non-
spade, where she was sure that it ought to be false that
the last card is a spade. But in many such cases, she
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ought to sweat. As she well knows, the truth of "it ought
to be false that the last card is a spade" is perfectly
compatible with the truth of "it could be that the last
card is a spade". For the second equivalence, "ought"
fairs no better. First, "It could be that the last card
drawn is a spade" is implied by, "It is not the case that
it ought to be false that the last card drawn is a spade".
For if it is not the case that it ought to be false that
the last card drawn is a spade, then obviously it is not
the case that it must be false that it is a spade. But
then it follows that the last card could be a spade.
However, the converse implication does not hold. Suppose
that the probability that the last card drawn is a non-
spade equals .9. Then it ought to be that the last card is
a non-spade, despite the fact that it is still true that
the last card drawn could be a spade. Again, for a
professional gambler, her bread and butter depend on
knowing the difference.
Similarly, consider the following sentences:
The last card drawn mus
t
have been a spade.
The last card drawn ought to have been a spade.
The last card drawn could have been a spade.
The last card could have been a non-spade.
Imagine that the context is one in which two people are
playing cards, teamed up on the same side, and their
conversation is exclusively concerned with making the
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proper move based on there joint knowledge of the deck,
recollection of previous moves/cards displayed and there
ability to calculate probabilities. Now the falsity of the
third sentence is incompatible with the truth of either of
the first two. However, although the second sentence is
compatible with the fourth, the first sentence is not.
The first two sentences imply the third because,
roughly, the third says that the last card’s being a spade
is (still) a remaining possibility, while the first says
that the only remaining possibilities for the last cards
are ones where it is a spade, and the second sentence says
that the optimal (most likely) remaining possibilities are
ones where the last card is a spade. (We presuppose that
there is some remaining possibility throughout.) The
second sentence is compatible with the fourth because,
roughly, the fourth says that there is still a remaining
possibility where the last card is a non-spade, and the
second sentence does not preclude this possibility, since
it only asserts the 1 ikel iness of a possibility
incompatible with it. Indeed, the two sentences (the
second and fourth) jointly imply that there is a remaining
sub-optimal possibility (i.e. unlikely, but not yet ruled
out) where the last card is a non-spade, don’t they? Seen
this way, the contrasting incompatibility of the first
sentence and the fourth is transparent: the fourth says
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that there is a remaining possibility of a sort that is
incompatible with what the first says is true of all the
remaining possibilities
.
16
So it appears that modal uses of "must" invariably
express some sort of necessity, modal uses of "can"
invariably express some sort of possibility and modal uses
of "can’t" invariably express some sort of impossibility.
In contrast, "ought" seems to express some sort of
optimality, and presupposes a ranking of some sort. As
such, "ought" pertains to what is invariant among just
those items that are optimal with respect to some
associated ranking of possibilities, whereas, "can" simply
pertains to what is possible, "can’t" simply pertains to
what is not possible and "must" simply pertains to what is
invariant among all the possible items taken as a
homogeneous group. Where there is a genuinely relevant
ranking of possibilities, sub-optimal possibilities are
just as important in interpreting the truth-value of
"must", "can" and "can’t" statements, as optimal
possibilities are.
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Field Invariance
In the previous section we have seen evidence for a
number of things regarding semantical and non-semant ical
differences between "must" and "ought". First of all,
there are dramatic differences in what each typically
suggests about the conversational situation and there are
dramatic differences in the conversational force each
typically has. Secondly, we saw that for a quite ordinary
sort of use of each, there are clear-cut semantical
differences between the two. In particular, in the
examples involving giving directions in the car, where the
uses of "must" and "ought" are intuitively continuous (i.e.
subject to the same parameters), the "must"-statements
properly implied the corresponding "ought "-statements
.
Thirdly, we went on to see that the relationship between
"must" and "ought" displayed in the direction-giving
examples is anything but peculiar to this sort of examples.
On the contrary, the semantical relationship of "must"’s
proper entailment of "ought" is quite pervasive. In a wide
variety of types of contexts, we appear to take this
relationship of proper entailment as a matter of course.
And the types of contexts we considered represented a fair
sampling (except for the absence of ethical contexts) of
those contexts where both "ought" and "must" can be used
felicitously. Indeed, our informal taxonomy is much like
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those given elsewhere -- especially for "ought ". 17
Fourthly, we saw that there are contexts where the use of
must" (or "has to", etc.) is perfectly felicitous, while
the use of "ought" in such contexts is, in contrast, odd.
To introduce an "ought" in such contexts is to introduce an
"ought" that would ordinarily be taken to be discontinuous
(with respect to type) with the use of "must". That is,
typically, introducing an "ought in such contexts either
involves a shift to a new context or an enrichment of the
previous context. I suggested that these cases provide not
only evidence for semantical differences between "must and
ought
,
but that in addition, they provide a clue about
the proper semantic treatment of "ought" and "must". To
wit: "ought" requires some sort of ranking of some relevant
class of states of affairs, whereas, "must" merely requires
a specification of a relevant homogeneous class of states
of affairs. It is the absence of an intuitive ranking
principle in these contexts that accounts for the oddity of
using "ought". Finally, we saw that it is "must", not
"ought" that typically, and naturally, links up with "can"
and "can’t" in the standard equivalences reflected in the
modal logician’s definitions of various complimentary
notions of possibility, impossibility and necessity.
Indeed, we saw that, for example, in epistemic contexts,
when we replace "must" by "ought" in the standard
equivalences, the resulting "equivalences" are patently
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false, between the roodals "must”, "ought", "can", and
"can’t", that are All this suggests that there may be some
logical relations invariant. We take up this possibility
and its import in this section.
The Field-Invariance Hypothesis
I think that is fair to say at this point that if a
scientifically sophisticated alien were attempting to
represent the English language (as currently used), and if
the alien was exposed to data of the sort we have been
focusing on and it had a relatively complete semantic
account of English except for the modal auxiliaries we’ve
been looking at (and whatever else that entails), then this
alien might be inductively warranted in positing the
following inf ormal "Field-Invariance Entailment
Hypothesis" :
FIEH: In any given context, c,
(a) if (1) must
_ _
_" and ought
_ _
_"
are of the same type (or field) in c, and (2)
neither " must
_ _
_" nor " ought
_ _
_"
are ambiguous in c and (3) each has a truth-
value in c), then , what " must _ _ _"
expresses in c implies what " ought _ _ _"
expresses in c,
and
,
(b) for every type (or field), there is a context,
c, and a must
_ _
_" and " ought
_ _
_"
of that type (or field) in c such that (1)
neither " must
_ _
nor " ought
_ _
_"
are ambiguous in c and (2) each has a truth-
value in c and (3) what " ought _ _
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expresses in c does not imply what
" must
_ _
expresses in c . 1
8
This is a bit complicated, so let me explain. The
first part of the hypotheses, (a), is intended to reflect,
a bit more accurately, what I have loosely referred to as
must s entailing ought’”; and the second part of the
hypothesis, (b), is intended to reflect, a bit more
accurately, what I have been loosely referring to as
"'ought’ ’s non-entai lment of 'must’". Together they are
intended to reflect what I have been calling ”'must’’s
proper entailment of 'ought’". The remarks about "truth-
value" are there simply to cover cases where either of the
utterances might have no specific content in c. The
remarks about "same type (or field)" are there to assure
that the respective relations, of entailment and non-
entailment are indeed invariant with respect to every field
or type for "must" - "ought". The remarks about non-
ambiguity are to guarantee that the "must" and "ought" are
not only of the same type, but are continuous. For
although we could have a "must" (or "ought") whose type is
uniquely ambiguity because their are two distinct sets of
parameters giving determined, there may still be
potentially different contents to "must" or "ought ". 19
The use of before each modal is to cover cases such as
" John must (see to it that he) take his medicine". In many
cases, will be null.
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Needless to say, there is still a great deal of
simplification here -- especially regarding the grammatical
forms of sentences using "must” or "ought" (as modal
auxiliaries). I excuse myself from the task of taking up
these differences here and hope that the reader will also
excuse me. Although (b) may sound rather weak, it is hard
to see how we could make a stronger statement about
"ought " ’ s not entailing "must". It does tell us the
essential thing: namely that, for every type for "ought",
there will be some context, c, and some choices of
_
and
_ _
where ought
_ _
and " must
_ _
_" will be of
that type in c, they will be continuous, and what the
former expresses in that context can be true while what the
latter expresses in that context can be false. We can’t
make the claim anymore universal, for if itself
expresses something transparently metaphysically necessary
then, derivatively, what is expressed by each utterance in
a given context (where they are continuous) may express
necessarily equivalent propositions. For example, where
the context is purely epistemic, the content of "It must be
the case that no number is larger than itself" will be
necessarily equivalent to the content of "It ought be the
case that no number is larger than itself" (which is not to
say that their contents would be identical).
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Field Invariance and Deontic "Must” and “Ought”
In the next two sections, I will argue that hf FIEH is
true, then what is referred to as "deontic necessity" (by
deontic logicians) must be equivalent to the ethical use of
"must", not "ought". That is, if FIEH is true, then if
moral obligatoriness, in the traditional scheme, is
intended to represent either the ethical use of "must" or
"ought", it is best construed as representing that of
"must". I will also argue that there is strong evidence
that deontic necessity is at least tacitly intended to
represent one of these. This will lead to the conclusion
that if FIEH is true, the Bipartisan Presupposition is
false.
It should be clear that if the type in question is
the (an?) ethical type, then FIEH implies that there will
be some context and some "must"-statement and some "ought"-
statement where the two statements are of this ethical
type, the two differ only in that one contains "ought"
where the other contains "must", they are continuous in the
context, and what the first express (in the context)
properly implies what the second express (in the context).
This would certainly imply, loosely speaking, that there is
an ethical use of "must" and an ethical use of "ought"
where the first is continuous with the second and the first
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properly implies the second. This in turn would obviously
imply that the ethical use of "must" is semantically
distinct from the ethical use of "ought". The
propositional contents in such a case must be distinct.
Hence, if obligatoriness in the traditional scheme is
intended to represent either a deontic "must" or a deontic
"ought", it cannot be taken to represent both
simultaneously. (Similarly, although the necessity
operator in say S5 can be taken as representing physical
necessity at one time and metaphysical necessity at another
(because, perhaps the formalism holds for either
interpretation), we don’t want to take the operator as
representing both simultaneously, for something can be
physically necessary without being metaphysically
necessary.) So which is it typically intended to express?
First of all, I find it transparently appropriate to
say that "must", regardless of its context (provided it is
used as a modal), clearly expresses some sort of necessity.
This much seems to be common to every content we can
express with "must" (as a modal). And if I say to you that
you must do something, even if you do not know whether the
intended context is prudential, ethical, legal, epistemic
or what have you, whatever I’m trying to say, I’m saying
that something is necessary, has to be done. Indeed, I can
freely paraphrase with impunity by saying "It has to be
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done
,
You ve got to do it", and "It is necessary that you
do it
,
Your bound to do it . But I cannot do this with
"ought". We have already seen one case where this is
perfectly clear. I cannot paraphrase "The next card ought
to be a spade" with "It has to be a spade", "It’s got to be
a spade", or "It’s necessarily a spade". However, I can
paraphrase "The next card ought to be a spade", in an
episteraic context, with "The next card is probably a
spade". But something’s being probable is hardly the same
as its being necessary, in any sense. It is simply
inappropriate to refer to probability as a "type of
necessity", and if I’m right about the semantic structure
for continuous uses of "must" - "ought", then to refer to
"ought" as a "necessity operator" is highly misleading.
Philosophers often speak of "moral obligation", intending
to express a notion of s t r i c t -ob 1 i gat i on (we saw in Chapter
1 that the traditional scheme presupposes such a notion
since it was demonstrated to be equivalent to No
Conflicts). Etymologically, "obligation" is linked to the
notion of being bound to something and this etymology has
not been totally lost, for we can at least roughly
paraphrase "morally obligated to" with "morally bound to'.
And "bound", like "must", lends itself to expressing
various sorts of necessity.
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Secondly, we have already seen that generally it is
"must" (has/ve to), not "ought" (should) that is
complimentary with "can" (could) and "can’t" (couldn’t).
For, it is must ', not "ought", that properly associates
with "can" and "can’t" in the colloquial analogues to the
standard equivalences of modal logic. For example, we saw
that although "It couldn’t be the case that the last card
is a spade" implies "it ought to be the case that the last
card is a non-spade", the converse implication obviously
does not hold. And, we also saw that "The last card drawn
could have been a spade" is not implied by, "It is not the
case that the last card drawn ought to have been non-
spade". But these imp 1 icat ional failures are crucial. For
surely the following equivalences hold for any contexts,
and hence for purely ethical contexts (assuming existential
agent import )
:
(El) I can see to it that p if and only if its not
the case that I must see to it that not-p.
(E2) I can’t see to it that p if and only if I must
see to it that not-p.
These must hold whether or not FIEH is true. If they
are not entirely uncon t es t ab 1 e , they are as close as you
can get w/o being there. But these equivalences make it
demonstrable that, if FIEH is true then the corresponding
equivalences, with "ought" are invalid in ethical contexts.
(El’) I can see to it that p if and only if its not
the case that I ought to see to it that not-p.
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I g-3 n * t see to it that p if and only if I ought
to see to it that not-p.
First we will show that (El’) conflicts with FIEH and
(El). For suppose that "must" does properly entail
"ought", even in ethical contexts. Then it is possible for
an ethical "ought" to be true while the associated ethical
"must" is false. So, suppose we have such a purely ethical
context and (i) "I must see to it that p" is false while
(ii) "I ought to see to it that p" is true. Then the
falsity of the first implies that "It is not the case that
I must see to it that not-(not-p)" is true. So, by (El),
"I can see to it that not-p" is also true. But then, by
(El’), "Its not the case that I ought to see to it that
not-(not-p) " is true. But clearly, the latter is true if
and only if "I ought to see to it that p" is not true after
all. Thus, (El’) is false if FIEH is true. In particular,
the implication from left to right in (El’) doesn’t hold.
(We’ve no reason to doubt the implication from right to
left.
)
Similarly, the implication from left to right in (E2’)
is fairly transparent, but the implication from right to
left is illegitimate, assuming FIEH. For suppose again
that "I must see to it that p" is false while "I ought to
see to it that p" is true. Then "I must see to it that
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not-(not-p) " is also false. So by (E2), "I can’t see to it
that not-p" is false in turn. But now by ( E 2
’ ) , "I ought
to see to it that not-(not-p)" is also false. Clearly, the
latter is false only if "I ought to see to it that p" is
false after all. Thus, (E2’) is false if FIEH is true.
These conditional reductio’s show us that assuming
FIEH, along with (El) and (E2) (and substitution of
provable equivalents — an innocent enough assumption),
(El’) and (E2*) are both false. In particular, these
assumptions imply that, even ethically speaking, there may
be something I can do despite the fact that I ought not ( or
equivalently, there may be something I morally ought to do
even though I morally can forbear from doing it). For the
respective problematic components of (El’) and (E2’) really
boil down to the denial of this possibility. The component
of (El’) and (E2’) that does not conflict with our
assumptions, and that is independently plausible in its own
right, boils down to the claim that, ethically speaking,
what I ought to do, I can do (or equivalently, what I can’t
do, I ought not do). Perhaps we should highlight this
point, suppressing the uncontent ious assumptions:
If FIEH is true, then there may be something I
morally can do, though I morally ought not (and
hence, (El) and (E2) are false).
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But now we’ve just about arrived at our destination for
this section. For it is patently clear that "can" and
"can’t" can express permissibility and impermissibility
,
respectively, and often do express these concepts in
ethical contexts. (Note that "permissible", like
"desirable", is roughly equivalent to "worthy of being
permitted
,
not permitted" for the latter, unlike the
former, suggests an actual permission granting authority.)
But, in the traditional scheme, despite the variety of
readings for the basic operators, "permissible" is quite
constant. And even where "forbidden" is used instead of
"impermissible" it is clear that "forbidden" (regrettably
tied more closely to "permitted" in de facto meaning --
suggesting an outlawing authority) is taken to be
equivalent to "not permissible", which is just our
"impermissible" in other guise. Hence, whatever is
typically intended by "obligatory" in the traditional
scheme, it is tied to "permissible" and "impermissible" in
just the way that "must" is tied to "can and "can’t" in
ethical contexts. And although "must" rarely appears in
work on deontic logic (or ethics for that matter), "can"
and "can’t" do so frequently. Hence, the fact that "can"
and "can’t" are frequently used by deontic logicians
especially (and ethicists generally) as either informal
readings for two of their operators or in examples
illustrating their logical principles is evidence that
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whatever concepts they are intending to logicize, they will
stand in the equivalence relationships expressed by either
El and E2 or El* and E2’ or both. But if FIEH is true, as
we have just seen, only the first possibility is a
legitimate one. So if FIEH is true, then, because deontic
necessity is typically linked with "can” and ’’can’t",
deontic necessity must be that expressed by "must" not
"ought". Regrettably, it is "ought" that pervasively does
appear in the literature tied with "can" and "can’t", and
it is "ought" that is typically offered as a colloquial way
of reading the deontic necessity operator. But if FIEH is
true, then we ought, indeed we must, not feel so
comfortable with this state of affairs.
Implications Regarding the Bipartisan Presupposition
Recall the bi-partisan presupposition:
BP: A person is morally obligated to see to it that p
if and only if he morally ought to see to it that
P*
Clearly, this is true only if what I morally ought to do, I
am morally obligated to do. But traditionally, where
ethicists and deontic logicians have spoken of moral
obligation", they have a concept in mind that satisfies the
equivalences of the traditional scheme:
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P is morally permissible if and only if it is notthe case that not-p is morally obligatory; p ismorally impermissible if and only if not-p is
morally obligatory.
But we saw above that despite the fact that examples
intended to illustrate various moral principles often
employ "ought" rather than "morally obligatory", the use of
"permissible" and "impermissible", are pervasively employed
and consistently replaced in examples by "can" and "can’t".
Furthermore, it is clear that "can" and "can’t" do in fact
often express moral permissibility and impermissibility
respectively. Yet we saw above that, if FIEH is true, then
in ethical contexts, "must" satisfies the corresponding
modal equivalences involving "can" and "can’t" (i.e. (El)
and ( E2 ) ) , but "ought" does not (i.e. (El’) and (E2’)
fail). So, if FIEH is true then "must", but not "ought"
expresses moral obligation (or is at least necessarily
equivalent to it). So, the Bi-Partisan Presupposition
really amounts to (is at least necessarily equivalent to)
the following:
BP*: A person morally mus
t
see to it that p if and
only if he morally ought to see to it that p.
Hence, the bi-partisan presupposition is false, if FIEH is
true. And we have compiled a great deal of evidence
(albeit indirect) to suggest that FIEH is true.
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The only ploy that appears to remain available to the
die-hard defender of BP is to say that although there are
various pervasive conversational differences between "must"
and "ought", and, although it is clear that there is also a
pervasive semantical difference between "must" and "ought"
in a wide variety of contexts, namely "must" ’ s proper
entailment of "ought", these differences are nonetheless
not so pervasive as to impinge on the purely ethical uses
of these terms. He might claim that there is a radical
discontinuity between the behavior of "must" and "ought" in
non-ethical contexts and their behavior in ethical
contexts. In particular, he might maintain that the
ethical uses of "must" and "ought" constitute telling
counterexamples to FIEH, albeit perhaps the only
counterexamples.
Notice that, with one exception, we have conspicuously
avoided examining deontic contexts explicitly, both in our
examples and in our taxonomy. Our examination of the
differences between "must" and "ought" has not involved
such uses and the die-hard defender of BP may think that it
is here that FIEH will be countered and BP thereby saved.
We turn to this possibility in the next section.
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Deontic ’’Must" and "Ought
Conversational Differences Between Deontic
Uses of "Must" and "Ought"
We noted two major conversational differences between
must" and "ought" in the context of non— ethical examples:
(i) their respective uses conveyed different information
about the conversational situation and (ii) the
conversational force of "must" was greater than that of
"ought". I think that it is clear upon reflection that
there is no radical discontinuity in the differences in
force and conversational implications that we noted in non-
ethical contexts and those that we find in ethical
contexts
.
Recall the car-driving example, where the passenger is
giving directions to the driver. We noted that here there
are some readily apparent conversational differences
between uses of "must" and "ought". To say that you ought
to turn here is typically to suggest that although turning
here is best (with respect to the relevant parameters of
the context), there are other sub-optimal ways of getting
to our destination which do not include turning here, but
are nonetheless acceptable ways of getting to our
destination (again, with respect to the relevant parameters
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of the context) . That is, "ought" suggests optionality
here. In contrast, to say that you must turn here is
typically to suggest that turning here is essential to all
ways of getting to our destination which are acceptable --
optimal or sub-optimal. Turning here is the only
acceptable move at this leg of the journey. Hence, the
shift from "must" to "ought" conveys different information
about the nature of the conversational situation. "Must"
precludes optionality, as all genuine concepts of necessity
must. But this is not all. We noted that there is also a
difference in conversational force here. When I say that
you ought to turn here, I am providing you with a nudge in
that direction, when I say that you mus
t
turn here I am
providing a strong shove in that direction. In the first
case I am recommending, suggesting, or advising that you
turn here. But in the second case I am doing something
stronger. I am telling you to turn here or warning you
against not turning here . 20
Matters are essentially parallel for ethical uses of
"must" and "ought". First of all, consider the one ethical
example which we sneaked in. Here an unimportant man is
to be executed few hours and new evidence of his innocence
has just been in a uncovered. The governor is at a
politically important banquet and upon being informed (much
to his chagrin) of new evidence raising doubts about the
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man’s guilt, he says, reluctantly and hesitantly, "Well, I
suppose that you are right and that I ought to make the
call". The lawyer who has just informed the governor
responds with proper moral outrage: You suppose that you
°ught to? There are no "if"’s ”and"’s or "but"’s about it.
You absolutely must call! An innocent mans life is at
stake!" (Notice also the patent inappropriateness of
substituting "You absolutely ought to" for the second to
last sentence
.
)
The governors choice of "ought" suggests that there may
be something (morally) optional about his making this call.
Aside from the presence of "suppose", the lawyer, in saying
what she does, is registering her objection to the
governors suggestion that there may be something optional
about the call. The lawyers shift to "must" is precisely
to insist that there are absolutely no acceptable options
at all precluding calling. She resents the suggestion that
the governor is not absolutely required to call -- that it
is merely preferable and morally at his discretion.
Furthermore, the uses of "must" and "ought" here are
par ad i gma t i ca 1 1 y ethical. So it is clear that there can be
the same old difference in what is implied about the nature
of the conversational situation in ethical uses of "must"
and "ought".
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Also, I think that a little reflection will make it
clear that there is nothing peculiar about this example.
We can ignore the contextual details and still recognize
the cogency of what is being suggested in the following
conversational fragments:
A. I ought to meet with Bob today.
B: What do you mean "you ought to"? You must meet
with him. You set up the appointment!
A: I ought to report the accident.
B: What do you mean "you ought to"? You must report
it. You side-swiped a parked car and whoever owns
it will have to at least pay a premium out of their
pocket for your mistake, if you don’t.
A: I ought to punish Bill.
B: What do you mean "you ought to"? You must ! He
smacked little Bobby senseless and took his Big
Wheel
.
In all these cases the natural interpretation of the modals
is ethical and what is conversationally suggested by A’s
use of "ought", namely optionality, is cogently objected to
by B .
Similarly, there is the same parallel difference
between the conversational force of "must" and "ought" in
ethical contexts. If x says to y, who has unjustly
insulted someone, "You ought to apologize", x is typically
recommending, advising or suggesting that an apology is in
order. But, if x says "You must apologize", x is typically
doing more than that. Here, x is typically telling the
person to apologize, demanding an apology, and/or warning
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the person against not apologizing. The first suggests
that a certain degree of disapproval may be in the waiting
if no apology is forthcoming. The latter suggests that a
stronger reaction may be forthcoming (e.g. chastisement).
Indeed, in an old Hollywood movie, such a remark might be
followed by a fight scene, upon refusal to apologize.
So it is readily apparent that with respect to
conversational differences, matters don’t change much as we
drift in and out of ethical contexts. So the die-hard
defender of BP cannot plausibly maintain that there is a
general discontinuity between the way "must" and "ought"
behave in non-ethical contexts and the way they behave in
ethical contexts. For the same salient conversational
differences we have found elsewhere are obviously present
in ethical contexts as well. So it remains for the die-
hard defender to claim that although the same
conversational differences cut across ethical and non-
ethical uses of "must" and "ought", there are nonetheless
no s eman t i ca
1
differences between "must" and "ought".
After all, the defense of BP does not rest on there being
no conversational differences between "must" and "ought"
1 1. only rests on the assumption that moral obligation is
necessarily equivalent to what we morally ought to do. So
it may be granted that moral obligation is expressed by the
moral uses of "must", but maintained that it is
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Forequivalently expressed by the moral uses of "ought",
he may still maintain that in moral contexts "must" is
necessarily equivalent to "ought" — conversational
differences be what they may.
A Pragmatic-Semantic Interlude
Before turning to the issue of semantical differences
between ethical uses of "must" and "ought", I would like to
point out that our die-hard defender of BP is already in a
somewhat awkward position. For, aside from having to posit
a semantic discontinuity that is otherwise quite pervasive,
at this point he must also attempt to explain the parallel
pragmatic differences between "must" and "ought" in ethical
contexts w/
o
recourse to any posited semantical
differences. I think that this will be hard to do in a
plausible way. Let’s see how relatively straightforward
the explanation is when we do have recourse to the general
semantic structure I have posited for "must" and "ought".
Recall that aside from "must"’s proper entailment of
"ought", I have suggested that a plausible general semantic
framework for most "must"-"ought" contexts is one where we
have a class of acceptable total alternatives that are
ranked in some way. "Must" then expresses invariance with
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respect to all the acceptable total alternatives (i. e. if
something is a must, it is included in all these acceptable
alternatives); "can" expresses inclusion in at least one
acceptable total alternative; and "can’t" expresses
exclusion from all such acceptable alternatives. With
operators, the ranking does not come into play, for the
these acceptab les may just as well be thought of as
homogeneous. However, we have seen that there is a strong
presumption in favor of thinking that "ought" expresses
optimality with respect to a relevant ranking of the
acceptable total alternatives. So that "ought" expresses
inclusion in all the highest ranked acceptable
alternat ives
.
I have spoken above of "ought"’s pragmatically implying
some sort of optionality and we have seen that this fact
constitutes a salient conversational difference between
"must" and "ought", even in ethical contexts. But even if
we suppose (to avoid begging questions) that this
implication of optionality is merely pragmatic or
conversational, we would be mistaken to think that what
would thereby be merely conversationally implied is not
intimately related to the semantics of the associated
modals. For the relevant notion of optionality is as
closely linked semantically to "must" and "ought” as "can"
is. Indeed, we can equate optionality with the conjoined
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conditions for can and "can not". That is, something is
optional (in the relevant sense) just in case both it and
its negation satisfies the conditions for "can": it is
included in one of the total acceptable alternatives and
its negation is also included in such an alternative. Now
plainly, the conditions for "must" and for "can’t" are
incompatible with those for optionality, whereas the
conditions for "can" are compatible with those for
optionality. Yet the conditions for "ought" are also
plainly compatible with those for optionality, for
something might be invariant with respect to the optimal
acceptable alternatives while nonetheless being precluded
by some sub-optimal yet acceptable alternative. When this
is so, the conditions for "ought" and optionality will
obviously be jointly satisfied.
Why then, does "ought" conversationally imply
optionality, and the very optionality we’ve just
identified? The die-hard defender of BP must tell us some
story, but I suspect that it will have the appearance of a
fabrication. Our story is a straightforward one, and one
that is consistent with a widely acknowledged picture of
conversational implications. In particular, the
explanation will be perfectly continuous with a widely
accepted picture about the interplay between semantical
analyses and pragmatic constraints in the explanation of
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communicative phenomena. I have in mind the sort of
communicative phenomena that Grice sought to explain by
certain conversational or pragmatic (in the broad sense)
rules coupled with semantical analysis of various natural
language expressions. Let’s consider how our explanation
of "ought " ’ s conversational implication of optionality
would go.
Recall our original example involving the governor, the
lawyer and the condemned man. Here the governor’s issuing
of "I ought to make the call" is protested by the lawyer
with "What do you mean you ought to? You must." Why does
"ought" suggest optionality here? The answer is not that
"ought" semantically implies optionality on my account. It
doesn’t. For "must" clearly precludes optionality
semantically, yet it semantically implies "ought". So
there are cases where "ought" applies and optionality does
not. However, it should also be clear that the only such
cases are precisely the ones where "must" also applies.
But then the widely accepted Gricean picture of
conversational rules will predict that it is typically
misleading and hence conversationally inappropriate to use
"ought" rather than "must" in such a case. Since "must"
implies "ought", if "must" is applicable, then it supplies
more information about the situation than "ought does.
But if a person uses "ought" rather than "must" there is a
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prevalent tendency to interpret this as indicating that the
person not only takes "ought" to apply, but also takes
must" to not apply else he would have used "must" in
the first place. Similar remarks can be made regarding the
three conversational fragments above. The most
straightforward explanation of what’s going on in all these
cases is that "must" expresses a stronger semantic
condition than "ought" and hence to merely use "ought" is
to suggest that the weaker semantic condition for "ought",
but not that for "must" is met in the situation. But our
analysis accords with this explanation. For our semantics
ascribes a stronger condition for "must" than for "ought",
since it results in "must"’s proper entailment of "ought".
So with the semantic framework I’ve posited, "ought"’s
conversational implication of optionality is explained by
recourse to the semantics itself, coupled with a very
general picture of conversational rules for appropriateness
of utterances that is widely accepted. Furthermore, the
way in which the conversational rule is coupled with the
semantics in explaining what is going on in these cases
parallels similar explanations of similar linguistic
phenomena. The examples are manifold. Here is a
representative case. "Sue is the best runner in the
school" properly implies "Sue is at least as good a runner
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as anyone else in the school”. So the former is
semantically stronger than the latter. Now suppose that
Sue is clearly the best runner in the school and someone is
inquiring about her running ability vis a vis her
schoolmates. The person asked responds with "She is at
least as good as anyone else in the school". Someone
overhears this and properly protests with "What do you mean
she’s at least as good as anyone else? She the best runner
we have, period!" Clearly the explanation of what is going
on in this case precisely parallels that in the condemned
man case. For by not explicitly ruling out the possibility
of ties, which could have been easily done by answering
with "She is the best runner we have", it is suggested that
she is mere 1
y
one of two or more equally good runners at
the school. Both the semantics for "the best" and "at
least as good" and a Gricean sort of conversational rule
about specificity are to be utilized in the explanation --
and in exactly the same way that we utilized this
conversational rule and the proposed semantics for
"must*'/"ought" in the condemned man case. So, merely
acknowledging the bona fide conversational differences
between "must" and "ought" in ethical contexts itself tends
to confirm "must"’s proper entailment of "ought" in ethical
contexts.
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Consider a minor alteration of the three conversational
fragments above and suppose that the contexts are such that
it is clear that ’can" is the "can" of permissibility:
A: I can meet with Bob today.
B: What do you mean "you can "? You must meet with
him. You set up the appointment!
A: I can report the accident.
B: What do you mean "you can "? You must report it.
You side-swiped a parked car and whoever owns it
will have to at least pay a premium out of their
pocket for your mistake, if you don’t.
A: I can punish Bill.
B: What do you mean "you can "? You must ! He smacked
little Bobby senseless and took his Big Wheel.
Here again the parallels are striking. "Can" is
semantically compatible with optionality, but since "must"
properly implies "can", "can" is also semantically
compatible with non-op t i ona 1 i ty . But the only case where
"must" is compatible with non-optimality is the case where
the conditions for "must" are met. So the use of "can" is
inappropriate if "must" applies. Its use, instead of
"must", suggests that its author does not take "must" to
apply. Hence the same phenomena is recapitulated here with
"must" and "can". But notice that here there can be no
denial by the die-hard defender of BP of the parallel
semantic differences between "can" and "must", in
particular that "must" properly implies "can" and thus
expresses the stronger semantic condition. So the die-hard
defender must acknowledge the adequacy of the explanation
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given for the last three cases, he must acknowledge the
adequacy of the parallel explanation for "must" and "ought"
in non-ethical contexts and he must acknowledge the
parallel conversational differences between these three
cases and their three earlier analogues with "ought".
Nonetheless, he must deny us the precisely parallel
explanation of the conversational differences between
must and "ought" in ethical contexts by recourse to a
parallel semantic analysis for "must" and "ought". For he
must deny that "must" is semantically stronger than "ought"
(i.e. its proper entailraent of "ought"), and it is the
acceptance of what he must deny that is crucial to getting
the parallel explanation. Not an enviable position, on the
face of it. Let s turn to some ethical cases where we seem
to routinely take it for granted that ought" does not imply
"must"
.
Semantical Differences Between Deontic
Uses of "Must" and "Ought"
I have claimed that generally "must" properly implies
"ought", We have already seen that this proper implication
seems to clearly hold in a wide variety of non-ethical
contexts. This is important in itself, but our primary aim
has been to make a case for the same proper implication
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holding in ethical contexts as well. But "must"’s implying
"ought" is not at issue here. What is centrally at issue
here is the failure of the converse implication, "ought"’s
not implying must" in ethical contexts. However, here as
elsewhere, I think that it is clear upon reflection that we
routinely accept this failure as a matter of course.
At the time that I’m writing this I find myself in a
mild moral dilemma. Two of my sister-in-laws have recently
given birth and each infant will be christened soon. Both
christenings will take place on Sunday afternoons in New
York City. The trip to New York from here is about four
hours each way. Meanwhile, I am teaching three courses at
the University of New Hampshire (UNH) for this semester.
This involves three trips a week to UNH totaling about
nine-hundred miles a week. At the same time that I’m doing
this teaching, I’m under considerable pressure to finish my
dissertation. Among other things, I’m trying to secure a
job for the upcoming academic year, with all the tedious
time consuming work that this involves. These
responsibilities have resulted in a heavy seven day per
week work schedule. In a word, I’m very busy and aside
from a shortage of time, I’m not very keen at the moment on
long trips. Now I could gerrymander ray at-home schedule
for the respective weeks of the christening, by cutting in
to the little bit of off-work time that I allow myself. In
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such a way, I could make either or both of these trips
(though making one rather than the other is probably not an
acceptable option). And I seriously considered doing this
and discussed this with my spouse and family. No one
thought that I had to do this. In fact each person that I
did discuss it with thought that I shouldn’t do this.
Let’s suppose that they are right — I ought to refrain
from going. Nonetheless, not a one, I venture to say,
would maintain that I must miss. Each party thinks that it
is "up to me" (optional), though inadvisable -- I certainly
can make the trips, but I shouldn’t (under the
circumstances). But then the following is true: "I ought
to skip the christenings, yet it is not the case that I
must skip the christenings.
I think that it is clear that the "ought" and the
"must" here are both paradigmat ical ly ethical and they are
continuous — there has been no shift in the contextual
parameters governing each modal. Whether the reader finds
the particular case compelling or not is beside the point.
If it is the stance in the particular case that is at
issue, then I suggest that the reader experiment by
altering the parameters in one of two directions. If the
reader thinks that I do have to go despite the cost, then
alter the case by increasing the cost of making the trips
(or by decreasing the importance of the trip) in small
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increments
.
I think that a new case will result where the
reader is also disposed to say that I ought to skip, but
don’t have to. On the other hand, if the reader thinks
that given the cost, I mustn’t go, then decrease the cost
to me (or increase the importance of the trips) in small
increments. Again, I think that a new case will result
where the reader is also disposed to say that I ought to
skip, but I don’t have to.
Consider another case. I used to play racquetball twice
a week with a friend, Kready. We had been playing
regularly for quite some time. On one occasion, it became
apparent to me that I would not be able to make it the
following Thursday and I reminded myself that I must tell
Kready and I did. When Thursday morning rolled around, I
thought to myself that perhaps I ought to call Kready up
and remind him that there was no game today. Although I
was momentarily unsure about whether I ought to call or
not, I never had any doubt that I did not have to call.
That is, I was sure that I didn’t have to call him (after
all, I had already told him) but I was unsure about whether
I ought to call him anyway (he might forget). The point
here is that the relevant considerations here, the small
chance that he would forget and the relatively minimal
potential cost to him, had a bearing on whether I ought to
call or not, but did not have a bearing on whether I had to
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call or not. Again, if the reader finds the particular
case uncorape 1 1 ing
,
then I ask him to fiddle with the case
by increasing the cost to Kready of forgetting in small
increments (especially if some of the potential cost of
forgetting is increased by unexpected costs). I think that
he will be disposed to make the same sort of judgment for
some such modified case.
Consider one more case. In September we moved into a
new apartment. The apartment hadn’t been painted. I was
informed that the crew scheduled to do the painting backed
out at the last minute — which would reek havoc at any
student complex during end of summer turn-over. I had a
choice to wait a week and have painters come in and paint
around our furniture or I could paint it myself that day
(among many other jobs, I’ve painted apartments). As usual
I was moving myself and was not thrilled by the prospect of
painting between moving out of the old apartment and moving
into the new one. Nor could I expect much help from my
spouse who was suffering from a back injury that preclude
an activity like painting. Aside from the slight risk to
our often second-hand belongings if we let the painters
"paint around" them (and the disruption), I, and especially
my spouse, were disappointed about having to move into a
smaller, considerably less attractive and convenient
apartment to begin with. At the time that I weighed the
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option of ray painting or not, I never had any thought to
the effect that I (morally) must paint it or (morally) had
to paint it (given the circumstances). On the contrary, I
did not believe that 1 (morally) had to, or else I wouldn’t
have spent any time contemplating whether I ought to paint
it or not, I would have just gone ahead and done it (with a
bit of cursing). However, I did decide that I ought to
paint it. I concluded that it would be best, though the
reasoning never led me to think that I had to. It was
optional, but preferable as far as I could tell. (If it be
objected that this is a prudential matter not a moral one,
I would point two things out. If it were a prudential
matter this would prove interesting in itself regarding the
prudential uses of "must" and "ought". However, as far as I
was concerned, prudence was clear in its dictates: you have
enough to do — let them paint it, when the tie comes.
Surely "ought"’s and "must"’s prompted by concern for the
welfare of loved ones are prime candidates for moral
"ought"’s and "must" *s.) If the reader reflects on his day
to day moral cogitations, I think that he will discern many
cases where he is wondering what he morally ought to do,
where there is no corresponding question about what he
morally must do. In many such cases, we are convinced
already that we don’t morally have to do the thing in
question, but we are still left wondering whether we
morally ought to, nonetheless.
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The key point with these cases is that the sort of
position the parties are taking, that I ought to do
something that I don t have to do (or I ought not do
something that I can do)
,
is part and parcel of ordinary
moral thinking and the language used to express this
thinking is part and parcel of ordinary moral discourse.
Common moral discourse simply does not presuppose that
"ought" implies "must" in moral contexts. Indeed, it
presupposes that this implication does not hold. To deny
this is, I submit, to confuse the descriptive with the
revisionary. We all tacitly take it for granted that
"ought" does not imply "must" in moral contexts.
Notice also that in all these cases the relationships
between "can" and "can’t" and "must" and "ought" that we
have observed in non-ethical contexts has its exact
parallels here. For each of the cases, where the modals
are interpreted as ethical throughout, the following
discourse fragments are quite cogent (even if a bit
feigned)
:
A: I wouldn’t go to the christening if I were you. Of
course you can -- its up to you -- but you
certainly don’t have to. And you really ought to
skip it, given the circumstances.
B: You don’t have to call Kready — its not as if you
can’t just let it ride. You’ve already done what
you had to: you made it clear that you wouldn’t be
there. Of course you can call him and perhaps you
ought to, since he does tend to be forgetful, but
you certainly don’t have to..
223
C: I can paint the apartment, but I don’t have to.
Its not as if I can’t just leave it to them. But
I really ought to -- it would be best if we moved
into this place with freshly painted walls.
To drive this point home consider the cogency of the
following considerations which precisely parallel those
discussed in the card-playing example. We will use the
second case above. Consider the following equivalences,
where the modals are construed as ethical in the context:
S can’t see to it that p <-> S must see to it that
not-p
.
S can see to it that p <-> It is not the case that S
must see to it that not-p.
Notice that it is just these sort of equivalences that
are captured by the definitions of non-primitive operators
in deontic logic and they are prima facia plausible
(provided that we presuppose that S exists). I think that
these equivalences lose all their prima facia plausibility
when "must" is replaced by "ought" throughout. "You can’t
fail to remind Kready" and "You must remind Kready" are
prima facia equivalent. Similarly for You can call
Kready" and "It is not the case that you must not call
Kready" In both cases, the first implies the second (and
vice versa). Yet if we replace "must" with "ought" in
either of these equivalences, all prima facia plausibility
is lost. Indeed, the results are prima facia inequivalent
Although "You can’t fail to remind Kready" implies "You
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ou£]rt to call Kready" the converse implication does not
hold. For, You ought to call Kready" is perfectly
compatible with "You can skip calling Kready". After all,
even if it is best that I call him (for he might forget and
be inconvenienced, I’ve nothing pressing at the moment,
etc.), I don’t have to call him. What I had to do in this
regard, I’ve already done: I told him last Thursday that I
wouldn’t make it this Thursday. For the second
equivalence, "ought" fairs no better. First, "You can call
Kready" is indeed implied by "it is not the case that you
ought to not call Kready". For if it is false that I ought
to not call Kready, then obviously it is also false that I
must not call Kready. But the latter uncon t rovers i a 1 1 y
implies that I can call Kready. However, "I can call
Kready" does not imply "it is not the case that I ought to
not call Kready". For it may be that I can call Kready
though it is morally preferable that I don’t. For example,
we need only suppose such things as: one vice of Kready’s
(compensated for by his many virtues), is that he tends to
babble and will be likely to keep me on the phone, I want
to run this morning and barely have enough time as it is,
etc. We can easily imagine such a situation where, pre-
theoret ical ly , we would all be disposed to say that whether
I called or not was up to me (optional — hence, I can),
but that I really ought to just go ahead and get my running
in while I’m still able (hence, I ought to skip calling).
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Similarly, to continue the parallel with the earlier
card-playing example, consider the proposed semantics for
the posited logical relationships between the following
sentences (governed by the same ethical context):
You must call Kready.
You ought to call Kready.
You can call Kready.
You can skip calling Kready.
I am maintaining that (i) the first and second imply the
third, (ii) although the second sentence is compatible with
the fourth, (iii) the first is not and (iv) the second does
not imply the first.
(i) The first two sentences imply the third because,
roughly, the third says that my calling Kready is included
in one of my acceptable alternatives, while the first says
that all of my acceptable alternatives include calling, and
the second sentence says that the best of my acceptable
alternatives include my calling. (Strictly, we must assume
that the first and second sentences have truth conditions
implying the existence of at least one acceptable
alternative. A defense of such a semantic constraint will
be launched in the next chapter.) (ii) The second sentence
is compatible with the fourth for the following reasons.
The fourth says that I have an acceptable alternative where
I don’t call Kready. The second sentence does not deny
this, it only asserts the moral preferability of calling.
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For it says that among my acceptable alternatives, the
highest ranked ones all include my calling Kready. Indeed,
on the proposed semantics, the two sentences jointly imply
that I have an acceptable sub-optimal alternative where I
don’t call. (cf. its preferable to call, but acceptable to
not call.) (iii) Seen this way, the contrasting
incompatibility of the first sentence and the fourth is
transparent: the fourth says that I have an acceptable
alternative that includes something (not calling) that the
first says is precluded by all of my acceptable
alternatives, (iv) Finally, it is easy to see why the
second does not imply the first. The second says only that
all of my optimal acceptable alternatives include my
calling. It leaves open the possibility that I have sub-
optimal alternatives that include my not calling which are
nonetheless acceptable. But the first sentence says that
all of ray acceptable alternatives, optimal or sub-optimal,
include my calling. Thus the first closes the door on a
possibility that the second leaves open.
So we should conclude that there is no significant
discontinuity between the uses of "must" and ought in
non-ethical contexts and ethical ones. Both the
conversational features and the logical implications seem
to be on a par in both sorts of contexts. Similarly for
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the associated modals, "can" and "can’t", and the way they
interact with "ought". Let’s return to the impact of all
this on BP
.
BP Again
Recall the Bipartisan Presupposition:
BP: A person is morally obligated to see to it that p
if and only if he morally ought to see to it that
P •
BP, I maintain, is one of the fundamental presuppositions
of Twentieth Century ethical theory. It has been
pervasively accepted, sometimes tacitly, by most people who
have worked in ethics in this century. It is a
presupposition that has cut across otherwise sharp
boundaries in normative ethics. Even the early deontic
logicians, despite there espoused neutrality on all
substantive issues, are often guilty of proffering the
assumption that BP is true. Though they usually made clear
that the deontic triad was meant to capture our concepts of
moral obligation, permissibility and forbiddeness
(impermissibility), we were often told that we can
interpret the obligation operator (in particular) as some
sort of "ought", and the examples utilized in illustrating
various logical principles are frequently " ought "-
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are
statements. On the other hand, "can" and "can’t"
routinely employed in the examples to express
permissibility and respectively. And with the twentieth
century preoccupation with impermissibility philosophically
significant language, the word "ought", with perhaps the
exception of good" has been the most prominently studied
ethical term. The study of "ought" (its ethical uses)
would not have loomed so large if it were not that it was
thought to express moral obligation. Thus, coupled with
the twentieth century methodological inclusion of the study
of philosophically significant language, this focus on
"ought" was taken to be quite continuous with traditional
ethical theory, in particular with the traditional concern
with the nature and ground of moral obligation. It is
because of this prominence of BP is contemporary ethical
theory that our examination of its soundness has been as
extensive as it has (albeit still quite limited). To
succeed in raising serious doubts about a major pervasive
presupposition requires more effort than attacks on a
presupposition that is not widely held to begin with, and
it is quite consonant with contemporary methodology to
consider the use of a term outside of the contexts that
constitute the primary concern in the hope that some
continuity of use will be observed that may shed light on
the terms use in the context of central and controversial
concern
.
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Now BP obviously decomposes into two implications: (i)
whatever one is morally obligated to do, one morally ought
to do, and (ii) whatever one morally ought to do, one is
morally obligated to do. It is the latter implication that
has been brought into focus in this chapter, and I have
been trying to mount evidence against it. We have observed
that there appears to be a broad pragmatic and semantic
continuity between the use of "ought", "must" "can and
"can’t" in various contexts, and I have suggested that this
continuity does not stop short of ethical contexts. On the
contrary, the basic pragmatic and semantic parallels appear
to be identical. In particular, as in the other contexts
we examined where "ought" can be used felicitously, "ought"
does not appear to imply "must" in ethical contexts.
Similarly, "ought not" does not appear to imply "can’t,
and, "not ought not" does not appear to be implied by "can"
in ethical contexts. But we have also seen that there is
every reason to believe that "can" and "can’t" in their
ethical uses express permissibility and impermissibility
respectively, and it is safe to say then that it is "must"
that is tied in the standard equivalences to "can" and
"can’t". But we have argued above that if, in ethical
contexts, "ought" does express a condition weaker than
"must", then it is "must" that expresses deontic necessity
or moral obligation. So the presumption seems to be
against BP, despite its prominence.
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Recall that in addition to arguing that "must" properly
implies "ought", in ethical and non-ethical contexts, I
have also claimed that a study of the their logical
relationships, along with the manner in which we attempt to
justify their semantic applicability, and the contexts in
which "must", but not "ought" is felicitous, together point
toward a structural semantic hypothesis. This links
"must", "can" and "can’t" to a set of homogeneous
acceptable alternatives and "ought" is then linked to a
ranking imposed on these alternatives. In particular,
"ought" is linked to invariance with respect to the highest
ranked acceptable alternatives. Since this has obvious
structural affinities to the utilitarian analysis of the
moral "ought", we return to utilitarianism.
BP and Utilitarianism
Recall that it was claimed that utilitarianism, at
least in its distinctively twentieth century versions, is
composed of two theses:
UT 1 : A person is morally obligated to see to it that
p if and only if the best he can do is see to it
that p;
UT2 : A person morally ought to see to it that p if
and only if the best he can do is see to it that
P-
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Our strategy at the outset of this chapter was to keep
our focus on utilitarianism and explore what would have to
be denied the utilitarian in order to countenance the
soundness of the two super erogat i on i s t ic arguments against
utilitarianism that were introduced in the last chapter.
In particular, we set out to engage in the minimal
mutilation of utilitarianism required by countenancing
these two objections. The hope was that if we identified
the problematic portion of utilitarian doctrine, then there
might be an unscathed remainder that could be incorporated
into a deontic scheme consistent with the classical
conception of supererogation. We saw that it was UT1, not
UT2 that was the source of the conflict with supererogation
and that only the former principle needed to be denied.
This offered us a ray of hope in exercising this minimal
mutilation strategy, but it quickly appeared to be short-
circuited. For we were led to a dilemma. BP, along with
UT2
,
implies the troublesome UT1. Yet BP is one of the
major bipartisan tenets of twentieth century ethics. So
either our minimal mutilation quickly resulted in a maximal
mutilation (a denial of both UTl and UT2) or we had to deny
BP, and this seemed, at first glance, less methodologically
conservative than denying either utilitarianism or
supererogation (for these at least have had their fair
share of advocates and opponents ) . But we have seen that,
despite BP’s prominence, there are reasons for denying it,
232
and these reasons are evidentially independent of the issue
of utilitarianism and supererogation. To deny this
bipartisan thesis merely in order to exercise a minimal
mutilation strategy toward utilitarianism would be
methodologically perverse. But if independent
considerations support its denial, well that’s another
story.
So we are now in a position where accepting the
soundness of the two supererogat ionist ic objections to
utilitarianism does not require a thorough rejection of
utilitarianism (i.e. both of its modern components) --
despite BP. But we are not merely back where we started
before our dilemma. For in dismissing BP, we have
uncovered some evidence for a general semantical-structural
account of "ought" and "must". Notice, first of all, that
our semantical hypothesis regarding "ought" has significant
structural affinities with the utilitarian analysis of
"ought" (i.e. UT2 ) . For on our analysis, "ought" is linked
to optimizing with respect to a class of ranked
alternatives. (Of course, there is also a prima facia
difference. For, on our account, the class of ranked
alternatives is not the class of all alternatives but a
"pre-selected" class of acceptables alternatives. More on
this later.) In this respect, our analysis tends to
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corroborate the utilitarian analysis of "ought". Secondly,
the troublesome UT1 can itself be decomposed:
UT 1 a : If a person is morally obligated to see to it
that p then the best he can do is see to it
that p
;
UTlb: If the best person can do is see to it that p
then he is morally obligated to see to it that
P-
Now UTla, does not need to be given up to countenance the
soundness of the two s upe r erogat i on i s t ic objections. Only
the denial of UTlb is strictly required. For if I’m
morally obligated to see to p, then it is not
supererogatory to see to p to begin with, so if it turns
out to be best to see to p, as it does by UTla, it is of no
matter here. Furthermore, aside from there being no need
to deny UTla from the super erogat i on i s t i c quarter, UTla is
independently defensible. For surely there is some
relevant sense of "best" where it is obviously true that if
I’m morally obligated to see to p then it is best that I
see to p. For, in the relevant sense, this will be
equivalent to "its best to do what you are strictly morally
obligated to do" -- and the latter must be true on some
reasonable interpretation of "best". But notice that our
analysis also bears out UTla. For we have argued that the
moral use of "must" expresses moral obligation and that
"must" implies "ought". Yet our structural hypothesis for
"ought" implies that what we ought to do is whatever is
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So our analysisbest per our acceptable alternatives,
yields the result that if we morally "must” see to p, then
we do see to p in our best acceptable alternatives. Hence
our analysis also tends to corroborate UTla.
So our examination indicates that only UTlb needs to be
given up by the ex-utilitarian who gives credence to the
two supererogationistic objections. Furthermore, and of
greater interest, (i) we have discovered independent
reasons for rejecting precisely that component of
utilitarianism that conflicts with the classical cases of
supererogation, (ii) in the process, we have discovered
independent evidence that tends to confirm the remaining
components of utilitarianism (UTla and UT2) and (iii) we
have gathered some evidence for the broad outlines of a
semantic structure that will accommodate "must" and "ought"
in a variety of contexts, including ethical ones.
C o n c 1 us i on
Recall that at the beginning of this chapter, I claimed
that, among other things, T would be providing motivation
for the deontic scheme presupposed by the classical
conception of supererogation -- a motivation that is
evidentially independent of supererogationistic
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considerations
.
I believe that this has been accomplished,
in part, in this chapter. For the semantic distinction
between "must" and "ought", the identification of moral
obligation with the ethical uses of the former, and the
structure consisting of a class of ranked acceptable
alternatives that we posited for "must" and "ought" will
lead us to a new and relatively rich deontic scheme that
tends to corroborate the case for supererogation. In Part
II, the structure uncovered will be articulated more
precisely and employed as a general semantic framework both
to guide us to and underpin this new deontic scheme. In
addition, this scheme, along with the semantics for "must"
and "ought", will be reinforced by consideration of
linguistic contexts that, unlike "must" (which was noticed
but dismissed as linguistically superfluous), have been
totally overlooked by ethical theorists. Yet these ignored
idioms lend credence to the supererogat ion ist ’ s case, and
to our new semantic framework, since they are "predicted"
by the semantic structure posited for "must" and "ought".
In this respect, Part II will not only provide an
articulation of a new deontic scheme and its semantics, but
it will also bring our attention ignored idioms, the
existence of which itself tend to corroborate the semantic
distinction between "must" and "ought", the semantic
structure we’ve posited for "must" and "ought" and the
classical picture of supererogation.
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Chapter 3 Notes
1. For a clear and readable statement of this framework
see Fred Feldman 1986, Chapter Two.
2. An additional question is: "What is the correct
substantive account of obligation if the utilitarian
account is incorrect?" This is of course the most
important question and perhaps the most formidable one,
but substantial constructive progress can be made by
answering the 1 og i ca 1 / s eman t i ca 1 questions first, and
this may provide us with some additional guidelines in
answering the more substantive question.
3. For example, we saw in the previous chapter that due to
a confusion between the morally indifferent and the
morally optional, many supererogationist thought that
the classical conception of supererogation required the
rejection of standard deontic logic, whether
interpreted a la utilitarianism or not. As we noted,
the classical conception requires the enrichment of
standard deontic logic, not its replacement .
4. Where "best" is typically either qualified as a best
with respect to so and so or taken to be short for
"best all things considered".
5. In Part II we will provide a precise specification of
the corresponding semantic framework, and then we will
turn to the question of the relationship between this
framework (presupposed by the classical conception of
supererogation) and the classical conception itself.
6. That is, in addition to the confusion which led many
supererogationists to think that the standard deontic
logic had to be scrapped. See note 3 above.
7. Perhaps subject to some qualifications regarding the
sense of "best". See note 4 above.
8. Provided we restrict ourselves to circumstances where
you exist.
9. I am not suggesting for a minute that the locutions
internal to each group are mutually interchangeable.
My primary concern is with the contrast between must
(and "have to") and "ought" (and "should"). I am using
the additional locutions as providing an environment
that helps to highlight the prima facia d ifference
between these two (pairs of) expressions.
10. "best" vis a vis some contextually relevant parameters.
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11. "Better" vis a vis some contextually relevant
paramet ers
.
12. That is, the content of "s must " in some context,
c, implies, but is not implied by, the content of "s
ought to " in c (where both sentences are subject to
the same parameters in c).
13. We might make these statements even if we cannot claim
to know that the frequency backing for them is sound.
We may only know of the respective correlations based
on reading about them in texts we trust.
14. For simplicity, I ignore here the view that some hold
to the effect that there is a still stronger notion of
necessity, namely logical necessity, and a weaker
notion of possibility, namely logical possibility.
15. For ease of exposition, I will continue to speak of
these generally as " mus t " -s t at emen t s and "can"-
statements. However, contrast these three with "It
must be the case that nothing is larger than itself",
"It could be the case that humans are not the only
people" and "It couldn 1 t be the case that something is
larger than itself", respectively. The latter three
seem more naturally tied to non-alethic modalities
(e.g. the ep i s t em i c/pr o j ec t i ve modalities). For
example, "It could be (or "might be") the case that
humans are not the only people" is quite naturally read
as roughly equivalent to " For all we (now) know
,
humans
are not (now) the only people", but it is not naturally
read as a statement of alethic modality. In contrast,
"It could have been the case that humans are not the
only people" can be naturally read as a statement of
alethic modality. (Notice also that if we replace
"are" with "were" the natural reading shifts back to an
epistemic one regarding what might have been so in the
past, for all we now know.) There are subtle
differences between various forms of the same modal
"root". Exploring these more subtle differences, and
in particular exploring which differences are
conversational, which are grammatical, and which are
genuinely semantical (with perhaps some overlap), is
beyond the scope of this study.
16. The analysis that I am offering for these "gambling
sentences" conflicts with the sort of analysis that A.
Kratzer offers for comparable sentences in her
impressively comprehensive paper, "The Notional
Category of Modality" [Kratzer 1981]. Kratzer endorses
a general optimality analysis for "must". Although
"ought" is somewhat conspicuously absent from her
paper, it is hard to see how she can avoid identifying
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"ought" with "must", provided the context (ethical or
not) is the same for each. Despite this blemish, a
minor one in the context of her ambitious project, this
is the best piece that T have seen on modal auxiliaries
— hands down
!
17. See, for example, Wertheimer 1972, White 1975 and
Kratzer 1981 .
18. The use of "field" here is by way of crediting Stephen
Toulmin’s informal work on the role of modals in
ordinary argumentation. See Toulmin 1958.
19. For example, suppose that in a given context there are
two different goals being discussed and courses of
action are being weighed with respect to their merits
as means to fulfilling the goals. Now the various
" ou g h t " - s t a t erne n t s and " mus t " -s t at emen t s used may be
made regarding either of the goals. In such a case a
" mus t " -s t at emen t might be of a fixed type (i.e goal-
achieving), but it may be nonetheless ambiguous.
Similarly for "ought-statements in such a context. In
such a case there may be readings of an "must" -
"ought" pair of statements which are of the same type
(i.e. goal-achieving), but which are nonetheless not
continuous because there are two different sets of
goal-achieving parameters. Roughly, potential
ambiguity in such a context can be taken as a mark of
either difference in type or difference in parameters
of the same type. Hence n on-amb i gu i t y of both "must"
and "ought" in a context where they are of the same
type is a rough criterion for what I call "continuity".
All this is loose, but I hope it is suggestive. The
imagined theoretical level is that of data collection
and organization, and as is often the case, precision
cannot be introduced until we have the theoretical
account of the organized data — in this case of
"continuity"
.
20. If we add to the example that the relationship between
the direction giver and the driver is one of superior
and subordinate, then the case of "ought" remains more
or less the same, but the case of "must" becomes even
stronger. With "must" I am now commanding you to turn,
I am giving you an order. However, this will not carry
over to ethical uses of "must", except perhaps
metaphorically ("Morality commands you to . . .").
239
PART II: THE DEONTIC QUADECAGON
240
CHAPTER 4
REFINEMENT OF OUR PICTURE FROM CHAPTER THREE
Introduction: The Unrefined Picture from Chapter 3
Recall our first example of CH3, the direct ion — giving
example. There, we supposed that the following were true:
(1) We must take either this turn or the next.
(2) It is not the case that we must take this turn.
(3) We ought to take this turn
(4) We shouldn’t take the next turn
(5) We can take this turn.
(6) We can take the next turn.
(7) We can’t skip both turns.
(8) It is not the case that we can’t take the next
turn
.
We said that the most natural picture to account for this
is one suggested by the following. Typically, there are
numerous alternative courses of action available to us at
the time. Among these courses of action are ones where we
take this turn, take the next, take one or the other, skip
both turns, try to take the next bend on two wheels,
continue on the highway until we run out of gas, etc. But
only alternatives including some of these actions are
acceptable in the circumstances. For example, consider an
alternative in which we miss both turns, lose a half hour
doubling back, are late for our meeting, our colleagues are
inconvenienced, etc. Although this is one of our
241
alternatives, it is not one of the acceptable ones.
Similarly, all those alternatives in which we take both
turns are unacceptable because either there are no such
alternatives (interpreted one way) or there are such
alternatives, but no acceptable ones (for the same reasons
that alternatives in which we miss both turns were
unacceptable)
. On the other hand, there are alternatives
in which we take this exit and there are alternatives in
which we take the next exit that are among the acceptable
alternatives available to us. However, although there are
acceptable alternatives in which we take this turn and
acceptable alternatives in which we take the next, these
alternatives need not be on a par. We imagined that taking
this turn was preferable to taking the next, despite the
fact that it was all right to do the latter. So some of
the alternatives in which I take this turn are better than
those in which I don’t in virtue of the contribution that
turning here makes to the value of these alternatives.
Furthermore, among the acceptable alternatives there will
be ones that are on a par, for example, ones in which we
take the first exit at 22 mph and ones where we take it at
23mph. That is there will be acceptable alternatives where
what differences there are in content make no moral
difference at all. So among our acceptable alternatives,
some are better, preferable or more desirable than others
and some are of equal worth.
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This scenario provides us with some insight into why
( 1
)
-
( 8 ) are true. (1) is true because we take one of the
two turns m all of the available alternatives that are
acceptable. (2) Is true because it is not the case that the
only alternatives that are acceptable are ones in which we
take this turn. (3) is true in because among the
alternatives that are acceptable, there are ones which we
take this turn that are better than any in which we do not
take this turn. Similarly, (4) is true because there are
acceptable alternatives in which we don’t take the next
turn that are better than any acceptable ones in which we
do. (5) and (6) are true because there are acceptable
alternatives in which we take this turn and there are
acceptable alternatives in which we take the next turn.
(7) is true because there are no acceptable alternatives in
which we skip both turns, and (8) is true because it is not
the case that there are no acceptable alternatives in which
we take the next turn. Thus, such a semantic structure
provides us with a natural explanation of the truth of (1)-
(8) in the imagined scenario.
More generally, the semantic picture emerging is one in
which we have a class of alternatives courses of action
available. Of these alternatives, a subclass of acceptable
ones is selected. This class of acceptable alternatives is
in turn ranked, so that some of the acceptable alternatives
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are superior in rank to others, and some of the acceptable
alternatives are tied in rank. Graphically, the picture
looks something like this:
Altern at ives : Acceptable Alternatives : Acceptables Ranked :
i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i j
\/
We begin on the left with a homogeneous set of alternative
courses of action that are available to the agent, or just
"alternatives". (Of course, this set would itself be
initially selected out of the set of all possible courses
of action — available or not — where the agent in
question is the agent of the course of action.) Of these
some are acceptable and some are not. In the middle, we
have just those alternatives available to the agent that
are acceptable. This subset of the available alternatives
is still a homogeneous set. Finally, on the right, a
ranking is imposed upon this homogeneous set of acceptable
alternatives.
The double lines under "Acceptables Ranked" are for the
purpose of stressing that we are allowing for the
possibility of ties in ranking among the acceptable
alternatives. In fact, we should interpret the vertical
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parallel lines as continuous bars to allow for the
possibility that there may be situations where there are
many, even infinitely many, alternatives at a given level.
These would be cases where the same "level" of moral value
could be generated in a variety of different ways.
Similarly, we allow for the possibility that there may be
cases where the ranking is at least dense: situations where
there are acceptable alternatives that lie between any two
levels of acceptable alternatives.
In broad strokes, this structure seems to be a natural
result of our reflections of the last chapter. For we saw
there that these two features, a selection of a homogeneous
class of alternatives, the acceptable ones, and then an
imposed ranking on these, appears to be both natural and
sufficient for generating the various entailment and non-
entailment relations for various uses, both ethical and
non-ethical, of "must" and "ought". In particular,
although, the middle homogeneous set gives us all we need
in order to interpreting, "must", "can" and "can’t", the
right hand ranking of this set is what appears to be
required if we are to represent "ought", while
distinguishing it from "must". In this chapter we will
refine and articulate this intuitive picture and apply the
ensuing semantic framework to "must" and "ought".
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The Framework Refined — the Acceptable
Accessible Worlds
Worlds and Courses of Action
Instead of talking loosely of available alternative
courses of action
, let’s speak of accessible worlds . Among
all the worlds that are possible only some can be
"accessed" by a given agent in a given circumstance.
Roughly, the worlds that are accessible to an agent are
those worlds that might come about if the agent were to
take certain courses of action that are currently open to
him. An accessible world will not only contain one of
one’s alternative courses of action but the circumstances
in which that action is taken -- indeed the total
circumstance in which that action is taken down to the last
detail. This may seem like overkill. If it is, it is
harmless and convenient overkill. Also, as we saw in
Chapter 1, talking of action, and a fortiori courses of
action, is itself insufficiently general. At the very
least, we need to include outcomes of my actions among the
things that can be obligatory for me. For there are things
that I am obligated to do and others things that I am
merely obligated to see to. Indeed, I can be obligated to
see to it that something is done that I am not myself
permitted to do. For example, I may be obligated to see to
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it that ray child receives a needed operation, despite the
fact that I am forbidden to perform it myself. I will
just talk about worlds ("total outcomes") here -- total
ways things could have turned out.
Our semantic structure will contain a set, W, to be
thought of as a set of possible worlds.
One’s accessible worlds will of course be a subset of
the set of all possible worlds. In turn, among these
accessible worlds only some will be acceptable for the
agent. It is this subset of the accessible worlds that is
of primary interest to us.
Acceptability for John Doe
If one of an agent’s currently accessible worlds is
acceptable, it is not acceptable per se, but acceptable
"for the agent" in the circumstances. For we are assessing
the agent’s performance in this world, not the world per
se. Even though the world may be unacceptable as a whole
for reasons that are beyond the agent’s control, the
agent’s performance may be acceptable in that world in
virtue of his contribution in the circumstances.
Intuitively, acceptable worlds are worlds where the course
of action that the agent engages in (henceforth) is morally
acceptable. However, when it is said that his performance
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in the world is acceptable, we are using "acceptable" in a
rather stringent sense. For no world will be acceptable
for an agent (as of a time) if the agent performs a single
impermissible action (at or after that time). Hence, the
ordinary connotation to the effect that an agent’s moral
performance can be acceptable on balance even if he does
perform some impermissible actions is to be divorced from
our use of the term.
Abstracting from the intermediate step in the march
from all the worlds to those that are acceptable, we will
just assume that in any given circumstance an agent finds
herself in, there is an associated subset of the possible
worlds: her acceptable worlds. We will assume that these
acceptables are also always accessible, but we will
abstract from the latter point, suppressing the appearance
of accessibility in our explicit semantic structure.
Suppressed Temporal Reference
We will also abstract from temporal reference.
Although what is obligatory for me today may not be
tomorrow, and may not have been yesterday, we will assume
that in a given semantic structure, we are provided with
various instantaneous snap-shots of an arbitrary agent’s
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current deontic situations. So that, loosely speaking, the
set of i-acceptable worlds for an agent, were we able to
look inside them, would be such that at some point in time,
they will all be past-wise indistinguishable (with respect
to hard facts) from the world i itself. The last point
from which the worlds are past-wise indistinguishable (with
respect to to hard facts) is the time at which we are
evaluating the acceptability of the agent’s alternatives
from i. So, for example all the worlds acceptable for me
as of now in this world will include everything that has
happened in the past of this world. It is only in their
futures that they will differ. We will assume that the
acceptability relation is taking care of all this in
selecting out the i-acceptable worlds. Despite the fact
that there is especially salient interplay between deontic
operators and temporal ones, we will suppress temporal
reference for the sake of putting the more indigenous
features of the system we are generating in relief.
The Circumstantiality of What’s Acceptable
Of course, which set of worlds is acceptable to an agent
will not only vary with the agent and with the agent’s
temporal location but also with circumstances in general —
both actual and possible. So a world acceptable for an
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agent in one possible circumstance (perhaps merely
possible) may prove to be unacceptable for an agent in
another possible circumstance — even if we imagine the
time to be constant. Indeed, one of these worlds might not
even be accessible in the second circumstance, much less
acceptable. But how should we think of these various
circumstances? Since we are abstracting from temporal
considerations, it is again harmless to think of these as
worlds. The circumstance that an agent finds herself in
can be thought of as the total circumstance that she is in:
the world that the agent is in. So it will be f rom a wor 1 d
that a world is accessible to an agent.
Suppressed Agent-Relat ivizat ion
Despite the stress we have been placing on the agent-
relativized interpretation of the deontic operators, we are
going to abstract from the agent in our semantic structure.
We will think of the structure as representing the
situation across worlds for some single arbitrary Jane Doe.
So that although we have this as our primary intended
interpretation, the acceptability of various worlds for an
arbitrary agent at a time in a world, no agent (or time)
will be explicitly represented in our semantic structure
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Acceptability as a Relation between Worlds
With these last abstractions, and with worlds replacing
both our earlier talk of "courses of action" and of
"circumstances", we can think of acceptability as a
relation relating entities of the same sort: worlds.
Intuitively, it will relate the world an agent is in to
other worlds that are acceptable for the agent from the
standpoint of that world as of the arbitrary moment we have
fixed on. So acceptability will simply be a two place
relation, A, relating worlds to worlds, where:
A is a subset of W 2 and Aji is to be read as "j is an
i-acceptable world" (or "j is morally acceptable from
i").
Agen t-Re 1 at i v i z at i on and Existential Import
Although the agent won’t be represented in our semantic
structure, the primary intended interpretation, that of
agent-relat ivizat ion
,
will nonetheless be reflected in this
structure. For recall our picture. We are imagining that
we have the set of all possible worlds before us and that
we have fixed on an arbitrary Jane Doe. From the various
worlds that we find Jane Doe in, there are associated
accessible worlds and it is among these associated
accessible worlds that the acceptable ones are to be found.
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But Jane Doe does not even exist in some worlds, and where
Jane Doe does not exist, Jane Doe has no accessible worlds
and a fortiori no accessible acceptable worlds. Hence,
unlike the standard versions of deontic logic, we will not
assume that the acceptability relation is defined on the
set of possible worlds. That is, we will not assume that
absolutely every world has some world accessible to it.
Indeed, we should think of the set of all worlds that have
some world acceptable to it as the set of worlds where our
arbitrary agent exists. That is,
On the intended interpretation, we take John Doe’s
existence at a world i to be semantically reflected
by (Ej)Aji (and hence the non-existence of John Doe
at i by ~(E j) Aji) ) .
There will be models with worlds, k, such that (Ej)Ajk will
not hold. This will be the sense in which although the
agent is absent from our structure the agent-relat ivizat ion
is nonetheless reflected in our structure.
The standard treatment postulates that the set of
worlds is non-empty and so will our treatment:
In every structure, there is at least one world:
W f 0.
As we noted in Chapter 1, the standard treatment also
implies that every world has a world acceptable to it. Our
primary intended interpretation forces us to reject this
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stronger assumption. Nonetheless, if we wish to model the
non-agent relative "ought to be", then (and only then?)
this standard assumption appears to be just the
characteristic assumption called for. For when the concern
is with this "ought", it is plausible to think that there
are some "ought to be" statements that are true from the
standpoint of every world. For example, I think that there
is one interpretation of "it ought to be that there is not,
never will be and never has been any injustice" that is
true from the standpoint of every world and time —
including worlds with no agents at all. So if we wish to
model this ought in our framework, we should restrict our
view to the set of models where for every world there is
some world that is acceptable to it. (Indeed, for this
"ought" we may want to explore restricting ourselves to
models where there is at least one world j that is
uniformly acceptable to each and every world in the model.)
In fact, on the intended interpretation, if a model is one
where every world has some world acceptable to it, this is
a sure sign that the model is either not agent-relative at
all or it is relative to a non-For if the worlds are
interpreted as all the possible worlds and contingent
agent. each has some world or other acceptable to it, then
we can’t take ourselves to be tracking the relative deontic
circumstances of any contingent agent. In this sense,
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although our primary target is modelling agent-relative
deontic expressions, our framework does not restrict us to
such interpretations.
Although we will not require that in all our deontic
structures, every world will have some world acceptable to
it, we will accept what this implies when conjoined with
non-emptiness for the set of worlds:
In every structure, there is some world that is
acceptable to some world: (Ei)(Ej)Aji.
So a constraint on our models is that there is at least one
world that has some world that is an acceptable alternative
to it. That is, none of our structures will consist
exclusively of dead-end worlds. Obviously, this makes the
previous assumption of non-emptiness redundant. For if in
every structure there is some world with a world acceptable
to it, then in every structure there is a world. As we
will see in a moment, the truth-conditions for the
statements the structure is employed in generating will
also reflect our primary agent-relat ivizat ion
interpretation, despite the absence of any overt
representation of the agent in the object language.
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The Standard Definitional Scheme Amended
As mentioned in Chapter 1, we will assume that must $
is true at a world i if and only if (i) there is an i-
acceptab le world to begin with and (ii) every such world is
a $-wor 1 d . Clause (i) reflects our primary intended
interpretation. Since it is Jane Doe that must see to it
that $, must $ can’t be true at worlds where Jane Doe does
not exist. Since these are to be thought of as the worlds
where some world is accessible, must $ can’t be true at a
world that has no acceptable accessibles. In particular,
the various positive statuses (deontic operators not
preceded by a ) are implicitly relativized to some John
Doe. So we assume that a statement whose main operator is
such a positive status holds at no world where John Doe
does not exist. So for example, we do not want it to be
impermissible for John Doe to see to it that $ at a world
(for any $, even A v ~A) unless he exists at that world.
Similarly for the remaining positive statuses. (However,
since there is always some world with a world acceptable to
it in any model, "Must($ -> $)" will be satisfiable in
every model, though not true at every world in every
model.
)
The reader is reminded that this requires a
definitional scheme for the five basic statuses (obligation
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plus the five below) that is slightly non-standard. For
example, we assume that although ~must will be true at
any world where John Doe does not exist, permissible $ will
be false at all such worlds. Since this conflicts with the
standard definition of Permissibility as "'Obligatory", we
must deny the standard definitional scheme. But on the
intended interpretation, being obligated to see to a
tautology at a world, i, is equivalent to there being an i-
acceptable world, and we assume that there is always such a
world if John Doe exists at i. So given the proposed truth
conditions for must $, whenever there is a world that is
acceptable from i, must ($ -> $) will be true at i and vice
versa. So our object language representation of John Doe’s
existence is must ($ -> $). Hence all that is required to
amend the traditional definitional scheme is that we append
must ($ -> $) to the standard definiens (where
appropriate)
.
The following slightly non-standard definitions will be
utilized (only the second matches the traditional
definition because the definiens is already "positive" ):
[ PE rm i s s i b i 1 i t y ] PE$ = d f MU $ & MU($ -> $)
[ IMpermi ss ib i 1 i ty ] IM$ ^df MU $
[GRatuitousness] GR$ <-> MU$ & MU($ -> $)
[ OPt ionality] 0P$ <-> ~MU~$ & ~MU$ & MU($ -> $)
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The Framework Refined -- Ordered Acceptable Worlds
The Acceptability Function
Note that the acceptability relation determines a set
for each world i: {j: Aji}. In this sense, it generates a
function, f, from worlds to sets of worlds, where F A ( i ) =
{j: Aji}. Indeed, in principle it is a matter of
indifference whether we take acceptability to be a function
that takes worlds to sets of worlds or as a binary relation
between worlds. For such a function would in turn
determine a binary acceptability relation: Aji iff j is an
element of F A ( i )
.
We follow the binary relation approach
because it lends itself to greater continuity with the
dominant approaches to the semantics for modal operators
generally and deontic operators in particular.
Nonetheless, with the binary relation, it is clear that
given a world i, we can always gather up the i -accept ab 1 es
into one set
:
For each i, the acceptability relation determines a
set, the i-acceptab les : {j: Aji}. Hence, the
acceptability relation determines an acceptability
function, f A
,
from worlds to sets of worlds, such
that j is in fA ( i ) iff Aji.
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The Ordering Relation: -
<
So far, things are relatively standard and MU looks
much like a familiar necessity operator (with the exception
that its truth at a world i presupposes that there is an i-
acceptable world). However, we want to impose an ordering
on all those worlds that are acceptable to some world i.
That is, for each world i that has i-acceptable worlds,
these i-acceptable worlds will be ordered. So that,
although all of the i-acceptable worlds will be worlds
where all that John Doe does in them after some shared
point in time, t, is morally permissible, some of John
Doe’s t-subsequent performances in these worlds will be
superior to others and some will be on a par with others.
When speaking informally, if John Doe’s performance in j is
superior to his performance in k, we will say that j is
superior to k for John Doe. Similarly, for the two
remaining cases, we will say that j is at least as good as
k for John Doe and j is inferior to k for John Doe.
Strictly speaking, because the ordering is an ordering
of the i-acceptab les for a given world, i, the pair-wise
comparison between worlds will itself be relative to a
world, i. Hence we really have a three-place relation
disguised as a two— place relation when we orient
ourselves from the standpoint of a given world:
258
=< is a subset of and "k =<i j" is to be read as
"the i-acceptable world, j, is at least as good as
the i-acceptable world, k, from the standpoint of i"(or simply "j is at least as i-acceptable as k").
This is a bit of a mouthful! But it is meant to stress two
features of this ordering:
(i) that the comparison between any pair of worlds
is itself relative to a world i
and
(ii) that the worlds compared are restricted to the
worlds acceptable from i.
The question that naturally arises is why should we
have these constraints -- what is their rationale? We
could give a relatively quick answer to this question: this
is all we need to model the targeted expressions. But let
me instead explore two possible background theories that
might be called upon to provide us with a deeper
understanding of where each wo r 1 d~ r e 1 a t i ve comparison
restricted to each set of world-relative acceptables might
be thought to come from. Doing so will point the way
toward possible elaborations of the framework that we are
constructing and it will indicate at what point such
elaborations are likely to touch upon one of the "hottest"
substantive debates currently taking place in ethics: the
debate about agen t - r e 1 at i v i sm . 1
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The Rationale for the First Constraint on =<
One Rationale: Absolutism :
Consider one way we might proceed. We might assume
that in any model, the set of all possible worlds are
ordered from an impersonal absolutely non-relative
standpoint. That is, we might assume that the set of all
possible worlds are absolutely ranked once and for all.
One obvious candidate for this ranking source is the good
old "all things considered, j is at least as good as i"
relation . 2 We would simply stipulate that this relation
holds, one way or the other, between any two worlds -- that
all pairs of worlds are related (connected) by this
relation.
We could then generate the required world-relative
orderings as derivative sub-orderings of this absolute
ordering relation restricted to a world’s acceptables:
,j is at least as i-acceptable as k iff j is at least
as good as k from the absolute standpoint & j and k
are i-acceptable worlds to begin with.
We thus simply generate a sub-ordering relative to each
i by selecting out just those ordered pairs <j,k> from the
absolute impersonal ordering of all worlds such that j and
k are also each i-acceptable. The resulting subset of the
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absolute ordering relation would then be taken to be the
relevant ordering of the i-acceptables. Letting, "Gkj"
stand for the non-relative impersonal ordering relation, k
at least as good as
,j , we can succinctly state the
background hypothesis (BH1) as follows:
BH1
: j =<i k, iff (Gkj & Aji & Aki)
D iagramraat ical ly
:
Worlds Impersonally Ranked :
/\
\: :/
\/
\
/
Sub-Ranking of
the i-Accept ab les :
/\
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
\/
In a nutshell, any i-relative ordering, must preserve
the non-relative ordering between any pair of worlds that
are i-acceptable. So although many pair-wise comparisons
at the abstract level might fail to resurface in some
world-relative ordering, this can only happen when one of
the pair is not acceptable, and hence doesn’t even appear
in the ordering. But no pair-wise abstract comparison can
ever be reversed at the level of a world— relative ordering
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It is also important to point out that what makes the
abstract ordering of all possible worlds impersonal is a
consequence of the fact that, by supposition, this ordering
is based on the overall comparative value of the worlds.
Hence in generating this abstract ordering, no special
attention is paid to any individual that exists (nor to
his/her performance) in any of the worlds. This should be
obvious since some pairs of compared worlds will have no
agents at all (or no contingent ones anyway), others will
have agents in one but no agents in the other, and still
others will have agents in both, but no single agent in
both. Clearly, we are not tracking the performance of any
person/s in generating this ordering.
A further question naturally arises about this
background theory. From this absolutist standpoint, would
we want to allow for the possibility that k and j are both
i-accessible and k is at least as good as j from the
abstract standpoint, yet j, but not k is morally
acceptable? As things stand, the picture we’ve just
sketched does allow for this. For suppose j is at least as
good as k (or that j is better than k) from the abstract
standpoint. All this requires, given what we have said so
far, is that _ijf j and k are both i -accep t ab 1 es then j is at
least as i-acceptable as k (or j is more i-acceptable than
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k). But there is nothing said so far to prevent it from
being the case that j, but not k might be i-acceptable —
even though (i) j and k are both equally accessible from i
and (ii) k is as good as, or downright better than, j.
Let’s consider eliminating this possibility by
strengthening this background theory with the addition of a
second background hypothesis (BH2). The following will do
the trick, where we use "C" for accessibilty ("can be
accessed from"):
BH2 : If Cki & Cji & Gkj & Aji then Aki.
So that whenever two worlds are accessible to a third and
the first is as good as the second from the abstract
standpoint, then either the second is not acceptable or
both the first and the second are jointly acceptable.
Suppressing the reference to i, this amounts to saying: a
world is acceptable only if its jointly accessible equals
and superiors are likewise acceptab le .
This, coupled with our previous constraint entails
something further about the relationship between the sub-
ordering of the i-acceptab les and the worlds impersonally
ranked — something which is perhaps easiest to convey with
a diagrammatical aid:
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W Ranked
:
Sub-Rank of
i-Acces s i b 1 e s
:
Sub-Rank of
i-Acceptables :
/\
/ \
\ /
\/
/\ /\
\
all
i i
i i
i i
i i
acceptable i ii i
J \f
\
all
unacceptable
\//
The idea is that we first rank all the possible worlds (W)
according to the "is at least as good as" relation. We
then do for the i-accessibles what we initially did for the
i-acce ptab les . That is, we generate a sub-ordering
relative to i by selecting out just those ordered pairs
<j,k> from the absolute impersonal ordering of W such that
j and k are also each i-accessible. This constitutes an
intermediate sub-ordering of W. Now recall our two
background hypotheses:
BH1
: j =<i k, iff (Gkj & Aji & Aki)
BH2: If Cki & Cji & Gkj & Aji then Aki
BH1 says that k is at least as i-acceptable as j iff k is
at least as good simpliciter as j and j and k are both i~
acceptab le ; and BH2 says that if k and j are both i—
accessible and k is at least as good as j then j is i-
acceptable only if k is. Also recall that we have been
assuming all along that a world is acceptable relative to i
only if it is accessible relative to i (i.e. Aji only if
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Cji). We now generate the i- acceptable sub-ordering from
these ordered i-access ib les
,
by selecting out just those
ordered pairs ^j,k> from this intermediate sub — ordering of
the i- access ib les such that j and k are also each i-
acceptab le .
The impact of our new constraint, BH2
,
is reflected by
the dividing line stemming from the ranked accessibles to
the ranked acceptables. For BH2 now yields the result that
the i-relative ordering of the i -accep t ab 1 es essentially
results from dividing the i-relative ordering of the i-
accessible into two parts. The upper part of the ordering
of the i -acces s i b 1 es s imp 1 y is the relevant ordering of the
i -accep t ab 1 es . The lower part consists of the abstract
sub-ordering of the i-ujnacceptables that are also i-
accessible. For, BH2 coupled with the i-access ib i 1 i t y of
the i-acceptables entails that if j is i-acceptable and k
is both i-accessible and ranked at least as high as j, then
k must be i-acceptable also. But BH1, coupled with the i-
accessibility of all i-acceptables, entails that whatever
relationship j bears to k in the final ordering must
duplicate that which it had in the intermediate ordering
(since this is just a sub-ordering of the abstract initial
ordering). Hence, for example, suppose that there is a
lowest ranked i— acceptable i-accessible world, j (i.e. an
i-accessible world that is i-acceptable and ranked at lea st
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ow §s. any other i-accessible world that is i -
acceptable). Then by BH2, all i-accessible worlds ranked
at least as high as j must also be i-acceptab le
,
and all i-
accessible worlds ranked lower than j must also be i—
u_naccep t able. Furthermore, by BH1, these i — accessible
accept ables must retain the same pair-wise relationship
they had in the ordering of the i -access ib 1 es (since the
ordering of the i — accessibles itself is just a sub — ordering
of the initial ordering of W. Hence, the i-acceptab les are
generated by slicing off the specified upper-half from the
ordered i-access ib les
.
Perhaps a comparison will help. Consider the set of
all integers, call it "W", and the natural ordering of the
integers by the "is greater than or equal to" relation (cf
the abstract ordering of W). Think of this relation as a
set of pairs of integers, call it "G". Now consider the
subset of integers, C 1
,
relative to some integer, i, such
that the members of C 1 are defined by the condition: x is a
member of C* iff x is no more than, say, 5 integers
distance from i. Call these numbers "i- accessible ". For
example, if i = 0, then C* , the i-access ib les , consists of
precisely those integers from -5 to +5. Now consider the
sub -or dering of such a C' that is generated by the initial
ordering, G. For example, if i = 0, then G restricted to
C 1 is the set of all pairs of integers <x, y> in G such
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that x and y are integers drawn from the range -5 to +5.
(cf. the ranked i -access ib les ) . Finally consider what the
analogue here to the i-acceptables might look like with a
constraint analogous to BH1 and the i-access ib i 1 ty of i-
acceptab les operating, but without a constraint analogous
to BH2 operating. Here the i-acceptables might be the set:
{-2, 3, 4}. Note the gaps! Then the analogue to BH1 would
require that the generated sub-ordering analogous to the
ordering of the i-acceptables would mirror that in the
original ordering, G. To wit: { , < — 2 , — 2 > , < — 2 , 3 > , <-2,4>,
<3,3>, <3,4>, <4,4>}. Note the derivative gaps. With the
analogue to BH2 operating, the ordering of the i-
acceptables could not look like this. For with such a
constraint operating, -2 could not be i-acceptable unless,
-1 and 0 through 5 were also i-acceptable. And with the
analogue to BH2 operating, if -2 were i-acceptable, then
the ranking of the i-acceptables would have to contain all
those pairs <x,y> that reflect the natural ordering of all
those integers drawn from -2 through 5. In a word, the i-
accessibles, for any i, would have to be such that they
contained all those i-accessible numbers that are larger
than (or equal to) some i-accessible integer (i.e its least
member) and there would have to be some i- acceptable number
(again its least member) such that all i-access ib le numbers
less than it would not be in the set (would be i-
uriacceptab le ) .
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One final note on BH2 and this background theory.
Without BH2, we cannot take our conditions for "ought" to
be those a utilitarian might offer. For the utilitarian
will parse "ought" via the abstract non-relative ordering
of W restricted to the accessibles of a given world,
roughly ("UOU", for utilitarian "ought"):
[UOU] UOU$ at i iff all the best i-access ib les are
$-wor 1 ds
.
Without BH2, there is no guarantee that all the best i-
accessibles will be best i -accep t ab 1 es
,
since there is no
guarantee that they will be i-acceptable at all. Perhaps
only some of the best i-access ib les will be i-acceptable,
and perhaps none will. If only s ome will, then UOU$ will
imply our 0U$, for BH1 will then guarantee that the best
acceptables are a subset of the best accessibles. But the
converse implication will not hold because BH1 will not
guarantee that the best acceptables are not a proper subset
of the best accessibles. So it will not preclude that some
$ may hold in all the best i-acceptab les , despite the fact
that it does not hold in some of those best i-access ib les
that have been left out. Furthermore, if none of the best
i-access ib les are i-acceptable, then even this one-way
implication will not hold. For suppose that (i) $ holds in
the best i-access ib les , (ii) but fails to hold in some next
to best i-accessible and (iii) the best i-accept ab 1 es are
the next to best i-access ib les . Then UOU$ will hold, but
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0U$ will not
.
Hence, if we wish to retain, at least in the
background, the utilitarian analysis of "ought", we need to
have both BH1 and BH2. That is one thing that adding BH2
to the background theory accomplishes.
So, supposing that this was the philosophical
background theory that is generat ing the wor 1 d- r e 1 at i ve
orderings we need, the rationale for our restriction above
would be mere formal convenience: all that we really need
to represent the logic of the targeted expressions is this
sub-ordering. If we wished to enrich the semantics to
reflect more of this background theory, the needed
additions are reasonably clear.
A Second Rationale: Agent-Relativism :
The only hesitation that I have with the above approach
is the joint assumption that there is an abstract ordering
of worlds that is absolute and impersonal and that this
ordering of worlds is the one that is ultimately relevant
for assessing the relative moral worth of any agent’s
alternat ives . There are many contemporary ethicists that
think that even if there is a single non-agent-relative
ordering of alternatives from better to worse, this
ordering does not constitute an ordering relevant to
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determining the comparative mo ral wo rth of each pair of
each agent’s alternatives. We might tailor their point to
our current concern as follows. There may be an abstract
impersonal perspective from which we can say that all
things considered, a given alternative is superior to
another, but this perspective is not one that is relevant
for determining which of an agent’s potential actions are
permissible or are ones that she ought to take. For in
such an abstract ordering, we are comparing alternatives
with only an incidental concern with the performances of
the many agents in the worlds of the alternatives in
question. But if we seek to compare the relative moral
worth of a given agent’s potential actions with an eye to
assessing the moral status of these actions, then we are
primarily concerned with comparing the per form a nce of that
very agent in the two alternatives. Any morally relevant
rank ing of the alternatives is then agent-relative in the
sense that:
alternative j is superior to alternative k for John
Doe only in virtue of the fact that John Doe’s
performance in j is superior to his performance in k.
Of course, it might be maintained that when we restrict
ourselves to those worlds that are acceptable to John Doe
and then mirror the universal abstract impersonal ordering
in the Doe-relative ordering of Doe’s acceptable worlds,
what we are doing does result in ranking Doe’s worlds in
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virtue of his performance in them. For the acceptable
worlds must be those accessible to Doe and any abstract
difference in value between them must, after all, be due to
a difference that his performance makes in those worlds.
Thus we are back where we started and the absolutist can
accept the above wholeheartedly as already incorporated in
the background theory sketched in the previous section. I
think that this is less plausible than it might at first
seem. Let me explain.
Consider the following situations:
You find out that a certain innocent person is about
to be robbed and killed. There is no way that you
can prevent this from happening. But what you can do
is prevent it from being done by those whose plans
you have discovered: you can beat them to the punch
by doing the deed yourself. Either way the guy is
robbed and killed.
You are a doctor in Auschwitz and you are considering
volunteering to perform certain experiments on your
fellow prisoners. These experiments amount to
sustained torture for the subjects. If you do
volunteer, you will earn certain privileges. On the
other hand, if you don’t then someone else will
volunteer and they will earn the privileges. Either
way, the prisoners will be the subjects of the same
gruesome experiments and the distribution of benefits
stemming from privileges gained by volunteering will
be the same whether it is you or the other doctor.
Consider the first case. Here, I have worlds
accessible to me where I don’t kill and rob the victim
but they are all worlds where the victim is nonetheless
killed and robbed. And I have worlds accessible to me
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where I do kill and rob the victim. So I have no worlds
accessible to me where the victim is not killed and robbed.
Now let’s suppose further that if I do the deed, the victim
is no worse off, I am better off, but no better or worse
off than the "standby" will be if I don’t do the deed, etc.
In a nutshell, let’s imagine the situation to be such that
from the abstract standpoint, it is a matter of
indifference whether I do the deed or the other potential
criminal does the deed. From the abstract standpoint, the
difference is about as significant as whether the guy who
wears a 9D Hushpuppy does the deed or the one who wears a
9D Nike does it. Hence from the abstract standpoint, it is
a matter of indifference whether I do it or not. In
particular, I can access the best of my available worlds
whether I do it or I leave it to be done by someone else.
So it would not be wrong for me to do it, for it would not
even be something that I ought to refrain from doing on the
current proposal.
To elaborate, imagine that you have Bill at gunpoint
and provide him with the following defense:
Look, Bill, I know you’re a nice guy and that you
have done a lot for the community, but they’re going
to kill you and rob you anyway. So it won’t make any
morally relevant difference at all if I kill you or
leave it to them. The overall outcome is the same
from the abstract standpoint. So I ’
m
not doing
anything wrong, don’t you see?. I wouldn’t even be
considering this if you weren’t essentially dead
already Bill. It’s those damn rotten other guys who
decided to kill you. But like the others, I want the.
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money, so I’m going to kill you myself and take the
money for myself. Nothing personal Bill — Bang!
Bang !
Nothing personal indeed!
This seems to be the height of immorality and the
reasoning strikes us as pre-theoretically preposterous!
The mere fact that it is true that someone else is going to
do something wrong unless you do it yourself, and it just
so happens that the overall outcome is the same whether you
do it or the other person does it, does not make it
permissible for you t o comm ittheoffense.
Although we can quibble about the case, this just
postpones the inevitable. For it is virtually definitive
of the abstract impersonal standpoint that if a wrong is
inevitable from the standpoint of a given agent then, all
other things being equal, it doesn’t matter a hoot whether
the agent does it or leaves it to someone else. For it is
characteristic of the abstract impersonal standpoint that
if the values of the outcomes are the same, then the
performance (or non-performance) of the agent has the same
value either way.
But matters get even worse, I think. For the following
principle seems very plausible:
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If S’s seeing to $ is a matter of moral indifference
and it is prudent for S to see to $, then S ought to.
all things considered
,
see to $
.
That is, if something doesn’t matter one way or another
morally speaking, but it is best for me, then, all things
considered, I ought to do that thing. This seems a
reasonable principle of rationality.
But notice what this implies. First of all, it implies
immediately that the abstract impersonal standpoint cannot
gi ve us an all things considered ought". For in any case
where I have a prudent option available to me that is also
available to someone else who will take it if I don’t and
the overall available outcomes from the abstract impersonal
standpoint are on a par whether I do the thing or she does,
it will follow immediately that it is both false that UOU(I
don’t take the option) and false that UOU(I take the
option). But if these "ought"’s were "all things
considered ought"’s, then it would follow automatically
that in all such situations it is false that I ought to,
all things considered, take the option. Clearly, this is
wrong
.
So the ought, on the current proposal must be an
"ought" other than the "all things considered ought".
Perhaps this is just as well. So let’s assume that it is
intended to give us a moral "ought" and that it is not
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maintained that this is the same as an "all things
considered ought". For as we have .just seen, the all
things considered ought is, at least in cases of moral
indifference, insufficiently sensitive to what is prudent
for an individual in the situation. But then this "all
things considered ought" is clearly an agen t - r e 1 at i ve
ought. For I can have two worlds available to me that are
of equal value from the abstract impersonal standpoint,
while one is nonetheless superior for me all things
considered and it can be for this reason that I ought to,
all things considered, do the thing that occurs in the one
world but not in the other.
But now comes a further rub. If in the case above it
is a matter of indifference from the abstract standpoint
that I kill Bill, then by the just cited principle, it will
follow that, all things considered, I positively ought to
kill Bill. For by stipulation, it is prudent for me to do
so. Hence not only do we fail to get the result that I
morally ought to refrain from killing Bill, but we appear
to get the positive result that, all things considered, I
ought to kill and rob Bill!
Similar remarks pertain to the second case. Here, we
imagine that if you don’t conduct the experiments then
someone else will. It seems easy to imagine that in this
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ugly situation the outcome from the abstract standpoint
might be indifferent between whether you volunteer or the
next doctor does. After all, from the abstract perspective
it may be no more than a matter of the brown haired versus
the black haired doctor doing it.
In both cases, we want to say that one of the options
is such that the agent should not perform it — regardless
of its inevitability. Indeed, we want to say that not only
shouldn’t the agent perform it, but it would be wrong for
the agent to do so. In the first case, we are virtually
all pre- theoret ical ly disposed to say that, morally
speaking, no one should kill Bill and that in particular,
you should not kill Bill for it would be wrong for you to
do so. The fact that someone is going to kill Bill no
matter what you do, does not provide us with a convincing
reason for thinking that it would be all right for you to
do so. Furthermore, we would be disposed to claim that
your performance is clearly superior if you don’t kill Bill
than if you do -- even if, in the same breath we
acknowledge that in the overall outcome there is no overall
difference of value. Similarly, in the case of the
doctors, we would claim that no doctor should volunteer and
that in particular, you should not — regardless of what
the other doctors do. And again, we would virtually all be
disposed to say that you have done better from the moral
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perspective if you don’t volunteer than if you do (i.e.
that your performance is superior if you don’t than if you
do) again, despite the fact that we recognize that the
experiments are inevitable and that there is no difference
in the overall value of the resulting worlds in either
case.
It should be plain that we can set up variant cases
where if x doesn’t do the evil deed then y will and if y
doesn’t then x will. In such cases we will be again
disposed to think not only that the twosome, as a group,
should not do the deed, but that each, taken individually,
should not do the deed. Furthermore, we would be disposed
to judge that if either one were to refrain from doing the
deed, then his performance would be superior to that of the
other (and to that possible performance in which he does do
it) -- all other things being equal. In particular, we
would not be disposed to think that the inevitability of
some one of us doing the deed gets either of us off the
hook morally. One need only consider how we all react pre-
theoret ical ly to the defense of a drug dealer who claims
that had he not dealt the drugs to the children, someone
else would have.
So the sort of view I am trying to illustrate would
maintain that in each of these cases, the relative merits
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of an agent’s alternative worlds viewed from the abstract
impersonal standpoint does not match the morally relevant
ranking of the agent’s alternatives in the situations.
That is, it does not reflect the ranking that is operative
in our judgments of the relative moral worth of an agent’s
options. In each case the agen t - r e 1 a t i v i s t might maintain
that from the abstract perspective, the first option i^s on
a par with the second. For example, he can maintain that a
super-intelligent alien race assessing the performance of
humanity as a whole and our contribution to the overall
value of the universe, wouldn’t detect any difference of
value between the two alternatives. But the agent-
relativist will maintain that this abstract standpoint is
not the relevant one for judging an agent’s performance.
So even though the first outcome might be on a par with the
second outcome in abstraction from the perspective of any
agent, and hence in abstraction from any agent’s
performance, it might nonetheless be the case that the
performance of the agent in bringing about the one outcome
is inferior to the performance of the agent in bringing
about the other outcome.
Let me note also, that if we dropped BH2 from the
background theory, the matter would not ultimately be
resolved. For even though dropping BH2 might suffice for
ruling out the acceptability of the worlds where you do the
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deed in the above cases, while retaining those in which
someone else does, we can engender what looks like
essentially the same problem via B HI alone. Consider a
case of supererogation, where once again a child is caught
in a burning building. Now suppose that you and I are
disposed to go in if and only if the other doesn’t. Here,
unlike in the preceding cases, whether I go or don’t, I
have done nothing wrong — so we want there to be
acceptable worlds where I do go in and acceptable worlds
where I don’t. Furthermore, suppose that whether I go in
or not, the overall value is the same. Then roughly, pairs
of worlds that are acceptable and as much alike as they can
be while differing with respect to whether I go in or don’t
go in are on a par from the abstract standpoint. Hence
they will be equally acceptable relative to the
circumstances, by BH1 alone. Now imagine that I push you
as ide and go in
.
We are all disposed to say that what I have done is
morally superior to what I would have done had I let you go
in — my performance, if I go in, is superior to my
performance, if I don’t. But even without BH2, we can’t
maintain this from the standpoint of the previous
background theory. For, since the two worlds imagined are
both acceptable, by BH1 the one can’t be deemed more
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acceptable than the other (relative to me) since they are
on a par from the abstract standpoint. So even if we
assume that the two initial cases above require that t. he
previous background theory drop BH2
,
we don’t really seem
to get at the heart of the problem. For the essential
problem appears to be that this background theory is
insufficiently sensitive to the agent’s performance in
assessing the relative moral merits of his alternatives.
And this will be the case even when there is essentially no
motivation at all to cast out one of two worlds as
unacceptable. For even when we have good pre-theoret ical
reason to think that two worlds are both acceptable, BH1
will suffice to make this weakened background theory still
appear insufficiently sensitive to the relative merits of
the agent’s performance in each. But after all, isn’t it
the agent’s available performances that should be relevant
to assessing the normative status of the parts of these
available performances?
It should be clear that for absolutely any subset of
worlds, we can generate a sub-ordering by having the
comparative rank of all pairs in the subset mimic their
comparative rank in the set of all worlds ranked according
to overall value. This, after all, is a mere consequence
of any reasonable set theory. Now, even though some of
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these subsets will correspond to the set of worlds
accessible to an agent in a circumstance, this fact is
absolutely extraneous to the resulting sub-ordering. We
are, so to speak, still paying no attention to the
performance of the agent in the worlds. All we are doing
is looking at the abstract sub-ranking of a subset of all
the worlds -- a subset that happens in this case to be
united by the property of being a set containing all those
and only those worlds accessible to some agent, Doe, in
some particular circumstance. The agent’s performance has
no more pertinence in generating the ranking than does that
of a squirrel’s scurrying up a certain tree to the sub-
ranking of all those worlds in which this squirrel does its
thing with this tree. But this is not as it should be,
since we begin with a concern with assessing the normative
status of an agent’s options and with comparing the
relative merits of the agent’s potential performances. In
a word, when comparing an agent’s alternatives, from the
moral perspective, we are not interested in how the
alternatives compare abstractly in and of themselves. We
are not merely comparing worlds per se , but the agen t—
s
performance in those worlds . On the face of it, these are
not the same — even in the case where the alternatives
compared happen to be precisely those that are accessible
to some agent in some circumstance.
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Although I am not convinced that a substantive
philosophical background theory that endorses an agent-
relative ordering relation will ultimately pan out, I am
sympathetic. In particular, the sort of case I have
described strikes me as the strongest case I have seen
against an impersonal ranking and in favor of an agent-
relative ranking. It constitutes a strong prima facia case
against the sort of philosophical background theory
sketched in the previous section. For it appears
definitive of the abstract impersonal non-relative
perspective that, among other things, if an equal wrong is
going to be committed by x or by y then, ceteris paribus,
it is a matter of moral indifference as to who does it.
Furthermore, if the only way that x or y can prevent the
other from doing the dirty deed is by doing it themselves,
then the deed’s being done is unalterable for each of them.
So among the alternatives accessible to x, when evaluated
from the impersonal standpoint, whether he does it or
leaves it to y is "half a dozen of one, six of another".
But surely on the face of it something counterintuitive is
going on when the inevitability of a wrong tends to make it
all right for whoever does it! Similarly for the case
where the inevitability of a good thing tends to make the
agent’s doing it a matter of indifference. One diagnosis
of what goes wrong here is precisely the one that I have
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been exploring: that from the abstract impersonal
perspective, we are not really evaluating an agent ’
s
performance in a world, but we are from the moral
perspective -- hence the divergence.
Our Rat i onale: Caution
Of course the absolutist will try to reconcile this
intuition or explain it away. I wish to sidestep the issue
here by simply claiming that the agent-relativist case is
tenable enough to warrant the safe course of opting for a
deontic framework that can accommodate both approaches.
Such a quest for a degree of generality sufficiently
flexible to accommodate the live options strikes me as
wise. This is my course and its rationale. Hence = < is a
three-place relation reflecting the possibility of an
agent-relative order i n g of alternatives (here expressed as
a world-relative ordering given our suppression of the
agent). We have seen how our framework can accommodate
either view. For each can see the sub-ordering of the
acceptables as generated in her way. The absolutist can
just think of the world-relative-ordering as a sub-ordering
drawn from the absolute ordering, but restricted to pairs
of i-acceptables and thus never conflicting with any non-
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agent-relative pair-wise comparison nor ruling out as
unacceptable any accessible world abstractly ranked at
least as high as some acceptable world. Whereas, the
agent relativist can conceive of things in such a way that
there would be a pair-wise conflict in some models if we
incorporated an absolute ordering in addition to the world-
relative ones. As usual the agnostic can just straddle the
fence
.
The Rationale for the Second Constraint on =<
Of course, comparisons among pairs of worlds that
include worlds not acceptable for John Doe in i make sense
from either perspective. For the absolutist, there is a
single morally fundamental ordering relation on all
possible worlds. Hence, a fortiori, there is a derivative
comparison of all pairs of possible worlds that include at
least one that is unacceptable for John Doe in i. For the
agent-relativist, there is no such morally fundamental
ordering relation for all possible worlds. Nonetheless,
surely it makes sense for the agent-relativist to rank John
Doe’s performance (relative to circumstance i) in all
worlds accessible to John Doe in i. Hence, a fortiori,
there is a derivative comparison of all those accessibles
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that include at least one world unacceptable for John Doe
(relative to circumstance i). indeed it is hard to see why
there would not be a single agent-relative ordering for
each agent that ordered all worlds in which that agent
exists according to his /her performance in the worlds. In
our framework, since we are imagining our models to fix on
some arbitrary agent whose existence at a world is deemed
to be equivalent to that worlds having a world acceptable
to it, the relevant set of worlds in a model is the set of
i s such that some i-acceptable world exists: (i: (Ej)Aji}.
Let E M stand for any such set, given any model M. Hence,
for any contingent agent, E M would be a proper subset of
the set of all worlds, but it would not be a set relative
to any particular world. If we were not going to suppress
accessibility, then we would have an ordering first imposed
on E M
,
the worlds where John Doe exists, then a derivative
sub-ordering restricted to John Doe’s accessible worlds and
finally our ordering of the i-acceptables would be derived
from this intermediate sub-ordering by restricting its
ordering to those i-accessible worlds that are also i-
acceptable. We would also presumably endorse the analogues
here to BH1 and BH2, but G would now be implicitly a
performance-relative ordering of all those possible worlds
in which our implicit agent exists: to wit an ordering of
E M .
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D iagrammat ical ly
,
E M Ranked : Sub-Rank of
i-Access ib 1 es
:
Sub-Rank of
i-Acceptab les :
/\
/ \
\ /
\/
/\ /\
\ i ii t
all i ii i
\ acceptable i ii i
/ / \/
\
all
unacceptab le
\//
With one exception
,
and its consequences, we read this
diagram as we did the earlier one. The one exception is
that the initial ordering, rather than being an ordering
imposed on all the worlds in the model, is instead an
ordering of a subset of these worlds. The subset is the
set of all non-dead-end worlds in the associated model --
which, on the intended interpretation, is the set of all
worlds where our arbitrary agent exists. Hence the ranking
relation on E M is to be thought of as the "Doe’s
performance in j is at least as good as Doe’s performance
in k" relation. As a consequence, the world-relative
ranking of the i-access ib les is now to be thought of as a
world-relative sub-ranking of this performance ranking
one simply- restricted to the i-access ib les . We then take
the ranking of the i -accept ab 1 es to be once again generated
by slicing off the associated upper-half of these so ranked
access ib les . For I can see no good reason not to endorse
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the current analogues of RH1 and BH2 — along with the i-
accessibilty of the i-acceptables, of course. So that if
we let, "P" stand for the performance ranking relation on
E M
,
"j is at least as performance worthy as k", we get:
BHO: P is an relation in E M x E M that and imposes
a weak ordering on E M
;
BHl
: j =<i k, iff (Pkj & Aji & Aki);
BH2: If Cki & Cji & Pkj & Aji then Aki;
BH3: Aji only if Cji.
BHO just indicates that Pkj only if k and j are in E M , P
is a reflexive and transitive relation and it is connected
on E M — for every j,k in E M
,
either Pkj or Pjk. BHl now
says that the three-place relation, k is at least as i-
acceptable as j, holds iff j and k are both i-acceptable
and the two-place relation, k is at least as performance
worthy as j holds. BH2 now says that if k and j are both
i-accessible and k is at least as performance worthy as j
then j is i-acceptable only if k is. Finally, BH3 just
reminds us explicitly that the i-acceptables must be i-
access ib le
.
So this is the philosophical background theory that we
will endorse. It should be clear that it steers clear of
the debate about the agent-relative ordering. Indeed, it
helps to identify just where the debate would come in. Fo
the issue would now be cast by asking whether the initial
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ordering of E M via P above is derivative upon an abstract
impersonal ordering of all the worlds or not. Presumably,
the agent-relativist would say that here we hit rock
bottom, whereas the "impersonalist" would say that this
ordering of E M is itself derivative from an ordering on W
as a whole. The background theory just sketched can
accommodate either view.
We have chosen to suppress the reference to
accessibility in our official structure and have assumed
only implicitly that Doe’s acceptable worlds are drawn from
the accessibles which are in turn drawn from the possibles.
But even with accessibility thus suppressed, it is clear
that we could go directly from the ordering of E M by P to a
derivative ordering of the i-acceptab les
,
while still
suppressing accessibilty in our structure. So why not just
stipulate an ordering on E M and then given truth-conditions
for "must” and "ought" by way of the acceptability relation
and this ordering alone? The answer to this question is
simple: generality.
Recall that in Chapter Three, we saw at length that
there are many non-ethical uses of "ought" and "must" (and
their close kin) that seem susceptible to the sort of
framework we have endorsed. But it is not at all clear
that E M and P would make any sense for all these
288
interpretations. Consider our card playing example, where
we can speak of what the next card "ought to be", "must
be", "could be", etc. Surely the truth-conditions of these
remarks are circumstance-relative. The picture is one
where the circumstances are such that certain possibilities
remain open and others are closed. Of those still open,
some are more likely than others, some are remote
possibilities, some are most likely possibilities, etc.
But it is not clear that there is any reasonable analogue
here to E M . For here, by analogy, E M would have to be the
set of all circumstances that have some circumstances that
are still acceptable (possible) relative to them. But what
non-circumstance relative ordering on these could be seen
as providing us with an ordering from which we could derive
the relevant ordering of the i-acceptables? I can not
think of any, and I suspect that any we might come up with
would be quite feigned.
So with an eye to generality, I have taken the option
of introducing the three-place relation: j =< l k. It does
not appear that there will be any need to make reference to
an ordering of worlds outside the range of acceptables in
order to model "must" or "ought". So no harm is done if
the ordering of John Doe’s worlds from i is restricted to
those that are acceptable from i. At worst, it is a bit
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awkward -- a price I’m willing to pay for the potential, I
would submit, rather rich, alternative applications of the
proposed framework.
Some Formal Properties of the =<
Given our intended interpretation of =<, there are
various formal constraints we should make explicit. As we
indicated above =< is a three-place relation in W 3 . When
we have spoken informally here of an ordering imposed on
the accept ab 1 es we really had the following in mind. From
the three-place relation we can tease out a binary relation
for each world i that orders the set of i -accept ab 1 es . If
we fix on any world i, we can select out just those ordered
triples that have i as their second element (i.e. < j , i , k >
where j =<i k) ). We can then drop the middle i in each
triple and the resulting pairs of i-acceptab les represents
a derivative binary relation on the i — acceptables and hence
a relation that it makes sense to talk about as ordering a
given set. In fact the ternary relation = < determines a
function, from the set of worlds to the set of pairs of
worlds. In particular it determines a function, f
A
,
such
that f A operating on any world, i, yields that binary
relation on the i-acceptables that we have just mentioned
above
.
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Given the ternary relation - <
,
we can generate a
derivative collection of binary relations, =<i, one
for each world i, as follows: <j,k> is in =<
, iff
<j,i,k> is in = < . Hence - < can be thought of as
determining a function f A such that for any world i:
fA (i) = { <j,k>: <j,i,k> is in = < }.
In what follows, I will treat -< as just such a function
and I will denote the binary relation that it yields for
any argument i as =<i .
Our first restriction is, as indicated above, that for each
i, the binary relation =<i is restricted to the i-
accept ab 1 es
:
PI: For any i,j and k: j =<i k only if j and k are
i-acceptable worlds.
Secondly, I will assume that for each i, the =<i are not
only restricted to the i -accept ab 1 es but exhaustively
defined on them. That is, each =<i is connected on the i-
acceptables
:
P2: For any i
, j and k: if j and k are i-acceptable
worlds, then either j = < i k or k = <i j.
Thirdly, we will assume that for each j, if j is an i-
acceptable then j =<i j. That is each of the =<i are
reflexive on the their associated set of i-acceptab les
:
P3 ; For any i and j: if j is i-acceptable then
j =<i j
•
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Finally, we will assume that each of the =<i is a
transitive relation on the i-acceptab les
:
P4: For any i,j,k and 1, if j = < i k and k = <> 1 then
j = < i 1 .
In a nutshell, the =<i relations are restricted to the
associated i-acceptab les and they weakly order their i-
acceptables
.
A Simplification
We can simplify the above postulates regarding the =<i
as foil ows
:
[=<] In each model there is a function, =<, from
worlds to binary relations on worlds satisfying
the following two constraints:
(1) j =<i k or k =<i j iff j and k are
i-access ib les -- for any i,j,k;
(2) if j =<i k and k =<i 1 then j = < i 1
— for any i
, j , k
.
It is easily confirmed that these two conditions suffice to
imply P1-P4 . For (1) entails PI since by simple
substitution it obviously implies that if j = < i k or j =< i
k then j and k are i-acceptables -- which is just PI in
disguise. (1) obviously implies (P2), since P2 is just
( 1
)
•
s
right- to-left implication. Furthermore (1) entails
P3
,
since it obviously implies by simple substitution that
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if j and j are i-acceptables then j =<i j or j = < ; j, and
this is just P3 in disguise. Finally, (2), transitivity,
is P 4 , so there is nothing to verify here beyond just that
For the converse, that P1-P4 entail (1) and (2), we noted
above that P2 is the right-to-left implication of (1) and
P3 is (2). So all that remains to be noticed is that the
lef t-to-r ight implication of (1) is implied. But this
follows readily from the stronger PI. So P1-P4 is
equivalent to [-<].
The New Picture
So if we present what is sometimes called a "fixed-
point" graphic representation of the framework — a picture
from the standpoint of an arbitrarily selected world -- we
get the following refinement on our earlier initial picture
from Chapter Three:
W : i-Accept ab 1 es : i-Acceptab les Ranked :
i i i i i i i i • i / \
i i i i i i I l i i
/ \
I i I i i i i i i I
i i i i i i i i l i
i i i i i i i i i i \
i i i i i l i i i I \
i i i i i i i i i i / iiiiiiiiii — \
i i i i i i i i i i / iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
IIIIIIIIII \ /
The main change is brought out by the dual replacement of
293
an agent’s c ircums t ances with worlds and an agent’s
alternat ives with worlds. Here we have a set of worlds, W.
From these a subset, the set of worlds that are acceptable
from the standpoint of i are selected out. Both of these
sets are homogeneous. We now impose a weak ordering on the
latter homogeneous set. This, a simple as it is, is our
f ramework
.
Of course a full-fledged structure or frame will not be
a fixed-point structure, so there will be numerous worlds
that have associated sets of acceptable worlds and
associated weak orderings of these acceptables. On the
other hand there will also be some frames where there will
be at least one world, i, such that there are no i-
acceptable worlds and hence no i-ranked acceptable worlds.
However, as noted above, we will assume that every proper
frame will have some world that has a non-empty set of
worlds acceptable to it. So the picture above will be
repeated for many of the worlds in many frames. This
constitutes the sort of semantic structures that we will be
employing. Let’s turn now to the way they are to be
employed for representing the logic of our five fundamental
deontic operators -- along with "ought".
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Must” and "Ought" Revisited
"Must"
1 = MU$
Given the above framework and our earlier remarks
about "must", the following constitutes the refined truth-
condition for "must" (abbreviated "MU"):
[MU] MU$ is true at a world, i: iff (i) there is an
i-acceptable world and (ii) all i-acceptable
worlds are $-wor Ids
.
Recall that clause (i) reflects our desire to be able to
represent agent-relativized interpretations where the
existence of the arbitrary agent at a world, i, is
elliptically interpreted as the presence of a world that is
acceptable from i. Clause (ii) simply represents the
standard ploy of interpreting a necessity operator via
truth throughout a class of relevant worlds. Together the
two clauses might be thought of as representing deontic
necessity as a medieval universal quantifier one with
existential import. Let’s see what derivative import this
clause for "Must" has for the remaining four fundamental
statuses
.
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Derived Semantics for the Remaining Fundamental Statuses
Recall the proposed modification of the traditional
definitional scheme:
IM$ -df MU~$
GR$ =df ~MU$ & MU ( $ -> $)
PE $ =df ~MU~$ & MU ( $ -> $)
0P$ =df ~MU~$ & ~MU$ & MU ( $ -> $)
We can then derive the truth-conditions for these
operators. But first let’s note that the derived truth-
conditions for ”MU($ -> $)" are:
MU ( $ -> $) is true at a world i iff (i) there is an
i-acceptable world and (ii) all i-acceptable worlds
are ($ -> $)-worlds.
But since every world is a ($ -> $)-world, then in
particular, every i-acceptable world will be a ($ -> $)-
world — for every world, i, (vacuously for those i’s where
there is no i—acceptable world). So in this special case,
the second clause is redundant. The following will do just
as we 1 1
:
MU($ -> $) is true at a world i iff there is an
i-acceptable world.
Hence the effect of the additional clause, "MU($ -> $)" in
the 1st, 3rd and 4th definiens is to assure us that the
definiendum holds only in those circumstances where there
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is an i-acceptable world. (Recall that "MU($ -> $)" is not
necessary in the first case because the traditional
definiens for IM$
,
namely MlT$, is already positive and
hence is true at i only if there is an i-acceptable world.
Note also that the derived truth-conditions for the
initial conjuncts of the first three definiens are
respectively:
MU ~$ is true at a world, i: iff (i) there is an
i-acceptable world and (ii) all i-acceptable worlds
are ~$-wor 1 ds
.
~MU$ is true at a world, i: iff either (i) there
is no i-acceptable world or (ii) not all i-acceptable
worlds are $-worlds.
~MU is true at a world, i: iff either (i) there
is no i-acceptable world or (ii) not all the
i-acceptable worlds are ~$-worlds.
With this in mind, we then derived the following truth-
conditions for the definiens of the remaining 4 fundamental
statuses (utilizing the simplification regarding
MU ( $ -> $) )
:
MU ~$ is true at a world i iff (i) there is an
i-acceptable world and (ii) all i-acceptable worlds
are ~$-wor Ids
.
~MU$ & MU ($ -> $) is true at a world i iff either
(i) there is no i-acceptable world or (ii) not all
i-acceptable worlds are $-wor Ids , and, there is an
i-acceptable world.
~MU~$ & MU ($ -> $) is true at a world i iff either
(i) there is no i — acceptable world or (ii) not a 1
1
the i-acceptable worlds are ~$-worlds, and, there is
an i-acceptable world.
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0P$ <-> ''MU~$ & ~MU$ & MU($ -> $) is true at a world
i iff either (i) there is no i-acceptable world or
(ii) not all the i-acceptable worlds are "^-worlds,
and, either (i) there is no i-acceptable world or
(ii) not all i-acceptable worlds are $-worlds, and,
there is an i-acceptable world.
It is now easily seen that these yield the following
equivalent and more manageable truth-conditions:
MU is true at a world i iff there is an i
-
acceptable world, but there is no i-acceptable
$-wor Id.
~MU$ & MU($ -> $) is true at a world i iff there is
an i-acceptable ~$-world.
~MU~$ & MU($ -> $) is true at a world i iff there
is an i-acceptable $-wor Id.
~MU~$ & ~MU$ & MU($ -> $) is true at a world i
iff there is an i-acceptable $-wor Id and there is an
i-acceptable "$-wor Id.
The change for MU~$ is obvious. The previous clause for
~MU$ & MU ($ -> $), has the form either ( i ) not $ or ( i i
)
not all the i- acceptable worlds are ~'$-worlds, and, $ ,
which is logically equivalent to (ii) alone -- and the
latter is obviously equivalent to "there is an i-acceptable
$-world". Similarly, the previous clause for definiens for
~MU~$ & MU ($ -> $) reduces to "not all the i-acceptable
worlds are "$-worlds — which is obviously equivalent to
"there is an i-acceptable $-world". The reduction involved
in the final case just follows that of the last two cases.
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Hence our official derived t ru t h- con d i t i ons for the
remaining four fundamental statuses are:
[IM] IM$ is true at a world i iff there is an
i-acceptable world, but no i-acceptable $-world.
[GR] GPS is true at a world i iff there is an
i-acceptable ~'$-world.
[PE] PE$ is true at a world i iff there is an
i-acceptable $-world.
[OP] OP$ is true at a world i iff there is an
i-acceptable $-wor Id and there is an i-acceptable
~$-wor 1 d
.
Utilizing the diagrams previously introduced to
represent the semantic framework, we can use them to
di agrammat ically represent the truth-conditions for the 5
fundamental statuses. All diagrams that follow are to be
read as follows. The diagrams will represent the truth-
conditions for various operators at an arbitrary selected
world, i. The vertical "bar" represents the ordering of the
i-acceptable worlds. An asterisk on a line indicates there
is an i-acceptable world. An asterisk with an adjacent
propositional variable, $, (e.g. "* -- $") indicates that
there is an i-acceptable world that is an $-world. "All $"
indicates all the associated worlds are $-worlds. The
"bars" should be interpreted as "compressed bars", since the
ordering is a weak rather than linear ordering (i.e. there
may be an indefinite number of worlds tied for rank). An
asterisk above an operator symbol indicates a primitive
operator.
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PE $ : IM$ : GR$ : 0P$ :
*
MU$ :
/\ /\ /\ /\ /\
: \
i
•
: \ J
* all $
i
i
-
*
-
* no $
i
* -
: / i : / ;
*
*
\/ \/ \/ \/ \/
$ (~$)
($)
[Note that in the last case, (i) $ and may occur at
worlds respectively at the same level or (ii) respectively
at different levels and (iii) if at different levels there
is no requirement that $ be above ~$.]
Some Valid Principles
Note that the main difference that the first clause of
[MU] makes with respect to deontological truths is the
absence of MU($ v ~$). For there will be a model with a
world i, where no world is i-acceptab le . But then, by
clause (i) of [MU], MU($ v $), will be false at i
despite the truth of ($ v $) at all worlds in the model.
This recall, was crucial to representing Von Wright’s logic
(VW) for deontic necessity as basic and then taking SDL as
a stronger logic built on VW . Similarly, the inference
rule "necessitation" , If $ is a thesis then MU$ is, _a
thesis
,
will not be validity-preserving. However, the
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following two theses and one derivation rule of Chi will
hold in all models (as usual, a wff following the double
turnstile or "semantic turnstile", "]= $", is to be read as
"$ is true at every world in every model and "]?/%" as the
den ial of ] = $ ) :
K: ]= MU ( $ -> $’) -> ( MU$ -> MU$ ’
)
SNC
:
]= "PE ( $ & "$) [i.e. MU"($ & "$) v "MU($ -> $)]
RM : If ]= $ --> $’ then ]= (MU$ -> MU$ ’ )
K holds at all worlds in all models. For MU ( $ -> $’) and
MU$ hold at a world i if only if there is an i-acceptable
world and all i-acceptable worlds are both $ worlds and $ -
> $’ worlds, hence only if there is an i-acceptable world
and all such i-acceptable worlds are $’ worlds. But the
latter condition is precisely the condition under which
MU$ ’ holds at i. SNC ("Strong No Conflicts") holds at all
worlds in all models. For generally, PE($ & $’) holds at a
world in a model only if there is an i-acceptable ($ & $’)-
world. But there simply is no ($ & "$)-world, acceptable
or not. Hence there is no world where PE($ & "$) holds, so
"PE ( $ & "$) holds at all worlds. Finally, RM is validity
preserving. For suppose $ -> $’ is valid and hence $ $
holds at every world in every model. Then MU$ -> MU$’ must
also be valid. For if MU$ holds at any world, i, in any
model, then there is an i-acceptable world and every such
world is an $ world. But then every such world must also
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be an $’-world. Hence MU$’ must hold at any world i, in
any world where MU$ holds. So $ -> $’ is validity-
preserving only if MU$ -> MU$ ’ is also. We now turn to the
semantics for "ought".
Ought"
1 = 0U$
So far, things are relatively standard and MU looks
like a familiar necessity operator -- with the exception
that its truth at a world i presupposes that there is an i
-
acceptable world. However we impose additional structure
by generating a wor 1 d- re 1 a t i ve ordering on all those worlds
that have acceptable worlds. That is, for each world i
that has i-acceptable worlds, these i-accep table worlds
will be ordered relative to i. In particular, the i-
acceptables will be weakly ordered. So that, on the
intended interpretation, although each of these will be a
world where all that John Doe does (henceforth) is morally
acceptable, in some of them his performance will be better
than his performance in others. First and foremost, this
will allow us to represent the moral "ought" and to
distinguish it from the moral "must".
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Recall that our informal interpretation of "ought" is
truth at the top of the heap of acceptables
- provided
that there are acceptables to be heaped. So on the refined
framework, the truth-condition for "ought" is:
[OU] OU$ is true at a world, i iff there is ani acceptable world such that all i-acceptable
$-worlds
ranked 3t 16384 38 hlgh 33 this are
D iagrammat ical ly , we have:
*
0U$ :
/\
!
! \ all $
:
: /
: *
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
\/
As the upper asterisk indicates, OU is a primitive operator
for our system. 0U$ holds at a world i provided that there
are some worlds acceptable to i to begin with and among
these, from some point on up, there are nothing but $-
worlds. So on the intended interpretation, as the lower
asterisk indicates, OU, like the other positive statuses,
has existential import. In particular, 0U$ will be false,
for any $, even tautological ones, at all dead end worlds
in all models.
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So in particular, 0U($ -> $), like MU($ -> $), i s not
logically valid. For there will be models with a world i
where there is no i-acceptable world and hence no such
world such that from there on up ($ -> $) holds.
Similarly, the ought"— analog of the rule of deontic
necessitat ion : If $ is a thesis then 0U$ is a thesis
,
will
not be validity-preserving. For if $ is universally valid,
even though it will be true at all worlds in all models,
0U$ will nonetheless be false at all dead-end worlds in all
models.
Some Valid Principles
On the positive side, the OU-analogues for K, SNC, and
RM are sol id
:
K°
:
]= 0U($ -> $’) -> (0U$ -> 0U$’)
SNC 0 : ]= 01T($ & ~$) v ~0U($ -> $)
RM° : If ]= $ -> $’ then ]= (0U$ -> 0U$ ’ ) 3
K° holds at all worlds in all models. For 0U($ -> $’) and
0U$ hold at a world i only if there is an i-acceptable
world such that all i-acceptable worlds ranked at least as
high as this one are ($ — > $’ )-wor Ids and there is an i
-
acceptable world such that all i-acceptable worlds ranked
304
at least as high as this one are $-worlds. Hence 0U($ ->
$’) and 0U$ hold at a world i only if there is a single i-
acceptable world such that all i-acceptable worlds ranked
at least as high as this one are both ($ -> $’)-worlds and
$-worlds. But in all such cases there will thereby be an
i-acceptable world such that all i-acceptable worlds ranked
at least as high as this one are $ ’ -worlds . But this is
precisely the condition under which 0 U $ ’ holds. SNC°
("Strong No OU Conflicts") holds at all worlds in all
models. For pick any world i in any model. Either there
is an i-acceptable world or there isn’t. If there is,
since ~($ & ~$) holds at every world in every model then in
particular, it holds at all points from some i-acceptable
world on up. On the other hand, if there is no i-
acceptable world then 0U$ is false at i for all wffs $. So
in particular 0U($ — > $) will be false at any such i and
hence ~0U($ -> $) will be true at any such i. Therefore,
since one of the disjuncts holds at any world in any model,
the disjunction itself holds at all worlds in all models.
Finally, RM° is validity-preserving. For suppose $ -> $’
is universally valid and hence $ -> $’ holds at every world
in every model. Then 0U$ -> 0U$’ must also be universally
valid. For suppose 0U$ holds at a world, i, in any model,
then there is an i-acceptable world such that all the i
accept ables from there on up are $ worlds. But then these
worlds must also be $’ worlds, since $ -> $’ holds at all
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worlds. Hence 0U$ ’ must hold at any world i, in any world
where 0U$ holds, provided that $ -> $’ is universally
valid.
Some Theses Involving "Must” & "Ought”
Let’s turn to the interaction between MU and OU. We
have argued previously that although "must" is not
equivalent to "ought", "must" surely does entail "ought".
So we have the following two principles:
MO: ]= MU$ -> 0U$
0M : If 0U$ -> MU$
MO is universally valid. For suppose MU$ holds any world i
in any model. Then there is an i-acceptable world and all
such worlds are $-worlds. But then, in particular, there is
an i-acceptable world such that all i-acceptable worlds from
on up are $-worlds. Hence every world in every model is an
(MU$ -> 0U$ ) -wor 1 d . However, this is not the case for 0U$ -
> MU$ and hence the latter is not universally valid. For
there will be a model with a world i such that there is some
i-acceptable world such that from there on up all i-
acceptable worlds are $ worlds, despite the fact that there
is also an acceptable world beneath this one where holds
-- in which case MU$ does not hold.
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Diagrammatically:
0U$ & ~MU$
:
/\
!
! \ all $
:
: /
: *
: * — ~$
\/
Some Theses Involving "Ought” and the 4 Remaining Statuses
The remaining fundamental connection ought to come as
no surprise: it is permissible to do the things that we
ought to do
:
OP: ]= 0U$ -> PE $
For suppose that OUp holds at a world i in a model. Then
PEp must also hold. For OUp holds at i only if there is an
i-acceptable world, j, such that from j on up all the i-
acceptables are $-worlds. But then plainly it follows that
j must itself be an $-world -- and its i-acceptable. But
this condition is precisely what is required for PE$ to
hold at i. For $ is permissible just in case there is an
acceptable $-world.
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D iagrammat ical ly
,
0U$ : PE $ :
/\ /\
\ all $
/
* -- $
\/ \/
As one further illustration, consider the claim that if
0U$ holds and $ deontically implies $ ’ then OU$’holds:
This is universally valid. For suppose 0U$ holds at a
world, i, in a model. Then there is an i-acceptable world,
j, such that all i-acceptab les from j on up are $-worlds.
But MU ( $ -> $’) holds at i only if all i-acceptable worlds
are ($ -> $’)-worlds. So, in particular, all of the worlds
from j on up are ($ -> $*)-worlds. But they are also $-
worlds by hypothesis. So from j on up all i-accessible
worlds are $’ -worlds. Hence there is an i-acceptable such
that all i-acceptab les from there on up are $’-worlds.
Hence 0U$ ’ must hold at i also. Therefore, 0U$ & MU ( $ ->
$») .->. 0U$ ’ holds in every world in every model.
It is easy to see that some expected remaining
derivative connections also hold:
]= 0U$ & MU ( $ -> $’) .->. 0U$’.
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]= IMS -> ~0U$
]= 0U~$ -> GR$
]= ou($ -> $) & ~ou$ & "''oirs . ->. ops
Briefly, if IMS holds at a world, then there is no i-
acceptable $-world at all. Hence in particular there will
be no i-accessible world such that from there on up all i-
accessible worlds are $-worlds. So ~0U$ must hold at i
also. Next, if OU~S holds at i then there is an i-
acceptable j such that all i -accept ab 1 es from there on up
are "$-worlds . Hence in particular, j is an i-acceptable
"$-world. But then GR$ holds at i. Finally, suppose 0U($
-> $) holds at i. Then there is an i-acceptable world.
But if ~'0U$ holds at i then, since there is an i-acceptable
world, there must be an i-acceptable '$-world. Similarly,
if 0U~$ holds at i, there must be an i-acceptable
world, which will of course be an $-world also. So if
~0U$
,
~0U~$ and 0U($ -> $) hold at any world i, then there
must be an i-acceptable $-world and an i-acceptable $
world. So 0P$ must hold at i also.
Supererogation & Our New Picture
Let us note in passing that we have provided motivation
for [OU], [MU], MU$ -> 0U$ , U 0U$ -> MU$ and for
identifying MU with deontic necessity or moral
obligatoriness and that this motivation has been
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independent of the s uper e r o ga t i on i s t ’ s objection. Notice,
however, how well these items fit with the
supererogationist ’ s objections! The utilitarian endorses
UT1: to do what you ought is to do your best. This we’ve
said is at least plausible and [OU] can be seen as
endorsing this thesis (or at least to have in common with
it the claim that "ought" is to be parsed as optimific with
respect to some class of relevant alternatives). The
supererogationist objects to UT2 : to do what is best is to
do what you are obligated to do. She objects on the
grounds that there are morally ideal actions that it is
permissible to refrain from performing. She claims that we
can do the best we can without being morally obliged to do
so -- that is, without being such that we must do so. But
then the supererogationist can be seen as claiming that
what we must do is not equivalent to what we ought to do
(even if the latter is equivalent to what it is morally
ideal to do) because sometimes we are permitted to do less
than the best. This is precisely the position that has
just been articulated and was previously motivated by our
reflections on "must" and "ought". Hence these
reflections provide a distinct line of evidential support
for the classical supererogat ionist ic objections to
ut i 1 i tarianism
.
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In Chapter Six we will return to supererogation. But
before turning to exceeding the minimum, we will make a
quick stop at that which is to be exceeded: the minimum
itself. As it turns out, in addition to providing a
natural transition to the topic of supererogation, we will
uncover some additional independent linguistic confirmation
along the way of just the structure we have posited for
handling "must" and "ought". This will be done in the next
chap ter.
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Chapter 4 Notes
1. See [Scheffler 1982] and [Scheffler 1988]. The former is
a highly acclaimed essay of Schef f ler ’ s
;
J
the latter is a
recent volume in The Oxford R eadings in PhilosoDhv
contemporary issues anthology series.
2. We could say this world is at least as good
intrinsically as that world, but this would be
redundant. When it comes to things as big as worlds,
there is nothing that a worlds extrinsic goodness is
good for and hence there is no real distinction between
the extrinsic and the intrinsic goodness of a world.
For worlds, intrinsic and extrinsic goodness,
betterness, etc. collapse into generic goodness,
bet terness
,
etc
.
3. Recall that ~PE ( $ & ~$) is just MU~($ & ~$) v
''MU($ -> $) in disguise, hence SNC° really is the 0U-
analog of PE($ & '$). We could introduce a new defined
operator, it is weakly optimal that
,
and then express
S N C 0 as '".it is weakly optimal that ($ & ~ $ ) . But once
we’ve rejected the identification of ought with deontic
necessity, and hence permissibility with not ought not
,
the motivation for introducing this operator diminishes
significantly.
312
CHAPTER 5
DOING THE MINIMUM
In t roduct ion
In Chapter Two we examined the tension between the
classical conception of supererogation and utilitarianism.
The sources of tension were two: the possibility of having
an available option that was best but not obligatory, and
the possibility of having an available option that was less
than best though permissible. As we have saw in Chapter
Three, and in greater detail in the last chapter, our
reflections on "must” and "ought" have naturally led to a
structure wherein just these possibilities obtain. For
there we saw that (0U$ & ~MU$) and (0U~$ & PE$) are both
intuitively plausible, and semantically satisfiable in our
proposed framework. But their satisfaction-conditions are
essentially ones where someone has a best option that is
non-ob 1 igatory and someone has a less than best option that
is permissible. Hence precisely the points where the
classical conception and utilitarianism conflict, are
points that have emerged quite naturally from a completely
independent source of investigation. Hence our reflections
on "must" and "ought" have led us to a structure that
corroborates the case against utilitarianism from the
supererogat ionist ’ s quarter.
313
One additional thing to notice is that we also saw in
Chapter Two that, independent of the issue of the interface
of supererogation and utilitarianism, the classical
conception seems to call for the possibility of a ranked
range of permissible alternatives containing numerous
levels . 1 For if there are ten Tiny Tims in a burning
building it is perfectly consistent with the classical
conception that it is supererogatory to save any one of
them and permissible to save any number of them. But
surely the more I save the better — all other things being
equal. Our proposed framework for "must" and "ought"
appear perfectly consistent with this picture. For it
allows for the possibility of indefinitely many levels of
permissible alternatives of successively increasing value.
Hence this is yet another point at which our two separate
investigations corroborate one another. More importantly,
the two sources of investigation appear in many respects to
converge structurally.
Given this convergence, the question that naturally
arises is this: "Is it a mere coincidence or is there a
deeper bond between the structure we have been led to by
our linguistic reflections and that which appears to bo
presupposed by the classical conception of supererogation"?
In particular, can we generate any analogue to
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supererogation in our semantic framework and is there any
independent linguistic confirmation that such an analogue
is operating pre-theoret ical ly? I will argue in the next
chapter that affirmative answers to all these questions are
in order.
We will however first turn in this chapter to some
additional independent linguistic support for our proposed
framework for "must" and "ought". For it appears that the
same framework can be independently motivated from
reflections on an idiom that seems to have been uniformly
overlooked by ethicists generally — even linguistically-
oriented ethicists. As it turns out, this idiom will not
only provide additional support for the framework that we
motivated and articulated in the last two chapters, but it
to will tend to corroborate the classical conception of
supererogation. In addition it will prove to be intimately
related to the colloquial analogues for "supererogation" (a
term rarely used, and virtually never used outside
philosophical and religious circles) that we will propose
in the next chapter. Hence this chapter provides a
fruitful (though relatively brief) stepping stone to the
investigations of the next chapter.
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A n Overlooked Deontic Operator
We noted previously that it has been a pervasive
bipartisan presupposition that "must" is a mere stylistic
variant for "ought" and that the latter expresses moral
obligation par excellence. Thus ethicists and deontic
logicians, although they were well aware of the ethical
uses of "must", have by and large tended to ignore it.
What is ignored has at least been noticed. In this section
we will turn to a moral idiom that, rather than having been
ignored, has apparently gone unnoticed altogether. Yet the
most natural semantic structure for this latter idiom
"predicts" the semantics framework we’ve settled on for
must and ought. In turn, the most natural semantic
structure for must and ought "predicts" the semantics
resources needed for the idiom in question. Thus these
three idioms, of what is coming to be called "common-sense
morality" 2
,
are part of a continuous deontic scheme, and in
this respect, the juxtaposition of these three idioms in a
simple semantic structure, tends to provide an internal
corroboration of the semantic structure proposed for each
individually. Furthermore, we will see later that this
idiom is also significant in the context of supererogation
and that in particular, it tends to support the
supererogationist ' s case against utilitarianism. Hence
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this idiom is an ally to the friends of supererogation
one whose assistance they have unwisely never bothered to
call on
.
The Bottom-End Mirror-Image of "Ought"
Recall the truth-condition for "ought $" at a world, i
there is an i-acceptable world such that from there on up,
all such i-acceptable worlds are $-worlds. Given the
semantic structure suggested at the end of the last
section, it is obvious that we have the semantic resources
to introduce an operator analogous to "Ought $", but where
the reference is to what is happening at the bottom-end of
the i-acceptab 1 es . Just as "Ought $" is to be valuated in
terms of what happens at the upper end of the range of
morally acceptable alternatives, we could introduce an
operator which would be evaluated in terms of what happens
at the lower end of this same range. The truth-condition
for this bottom-end mirror-image of "ought $" would then
be: there is an i-acceptable world such that from there on
down, all such i-acceptable worlds are $-worlds. More
precisely, the condition $ would have to meet at a world i
would be:
there is an i-acceptable world, j, such that every
i-acceptable world that j is ranked at least as high
as is an $-world.
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D i agrammat ica 1 1 y
,
/\
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
t i
i i
: *
:
: \ ail
\/ / $
Since the ordered worlds here are all i-acceptable and
those higher are to be thought of as morally superior to
those lower, those lower are to be thought of as morally
inferior to those higher. But, since all these worlds are
i -acceptab le
,
these inferior worlds are nonetheless worlds
where nothing impermissible occurs (as of the imagined time
we’ve fixed on). So the lower worlds represent courses of
action in which we do discharge all our duties -- albeit in
a more minimal way than those ranked higher. Let’s
simplify for a moment by assuming that there is a highest
and a lowest level of i-acceptable worlds. Then, when
"ought $" holds at a world i, all the optimal ways of
discharging our obligations entail seeing to $, so that
choosing any of our optimal ways of doing only what is
permissible entails seeing to $. In direct contrast, when
$ meets the new condition in question, all the minimal ways
of discharging our obligations involve seeing to $, so that
choosing any of our minimal ways of doing only what is
permissible involves seeing to $. So once we posit the
semantic resources that we have posited for representing
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must" and "ought", having the semantic resources for the
condition in question a fait accompli.
The Idiom
The question naturally arises: Is there any idiom in
English which such a truth - condition might represent? I
think the answer is definitely "yes", although to the best
of ray knowledge the idiom in question has gone totally
unnoticed, despite the linguistic turn in Twentieth-Century
Anglo-American Ethics.
Consider the following three cases:
Cl: You have helped me out on a number of occasions.
You have been a good friend. One day while we’re
eating at a restaurant, you discover that you
have forgotten your wallet. Lending you $20 for
your dinner, I say, " It’s the least I can do ."
C2: A good Samaritan pulls over to help me with a
flat. As she leaves, I say "Thank you! It was
very nice of you to stop and help me." She
responds with "Not at all, it was the least I
c ould have done .
"
C3: I’m 15 years old. My father informs me that he
bumped into my old grammar school teacher who had
been very good to me. I haven’t seen her in two
years and she, having been fond of me, expresses
an interest in seeing me again. He suggests that
I go see her and sensing my discomfort with this
he says: "Look son, she was good to you. You
must get in touch with her. The least you can do
is write her a brief note. Anything less would
be wrong. However, it would be better if you
called her and even nicer if you paid her a
visit. "
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None of these cases is unusual and there is nothing
inappropriate about the use of the stressed idiom. Let me
refer to this idiom as the "Least-Can-Do idiom". Having
been sensitized to the presence of this idiom over the past
few years, I’ve been surprised at the frequency with which
it is in fact used. Let’s pause to reflect on this idiom a
bit.
Interpreting the Least-Can-Do Idiom
How should we interpret this idiom? In particular, how
should we interpret the occurrences of "least” and "can" in
this idiom? As I see it the "least" in "the least one can
do" functions, roughly, the way one would expect: to refer
to the lowest ranked of some relevant class of items. But
which class of items is the relevant class? We answer this
when we answer the question about "can". As I see it, the
"can" in "The least you can do..." is the "can" of
permissibility. No other interpretation of "can" seems to
fit the data. So I am suggesting that to say "The least S
can do is see to $" is to say, roughly, the leas t valuable
wavs of S’s doing only what is permissible call for $_ .
The only obvious alternative to my interpretation of
"can" is to take it to be a "can" of ability, so that "the
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least S can do is see to $" would be equivalent to "the
least S is able to do is see to $" — that is, "the least
valuable ways of S’s doing only what S is able to do call
for $". But surely this is incorrect. For in many cases
where this idiom is used correctly, there is transparently
some way of S’s doing only what S is able to do which is of
less value than any which include that which is said to be
the least. For example, consider the first case above
again. If we assume that the "can" here is the "can" of
ability, then surely the claim is wildly false. For there
are numerous courses of action accessible to me which
preclude paying for my friend’s dinner and are of less
value than any accessible alternatives in which I do pay
for my friend’s dinner. Consider those in which I am
blithely unresponsive to his plight or, worse still, those
in which I go out of my way to embarrass my friend even
more, by telling the waiter "He does this all the time!",
or, to "top" this, those in which I reassure him that I’m
going to pay and exit the restaurant under the guise of
getting something from my car -- thus leaving him there to
wash dishes for my meal also, or . . .
Of course, it might be granted that although "can"
cannot be interpreted as a "can" of ability, nonetheless,
"the least S can do is see to $" is just a strangely
idiomatic way of saying that "S must see to $". Again, I
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think this is clearly false. For example, in the first
case, we can easily imagine the case to be such that it is
permissible for me to just give him $20 rather than lend it
to him. But it can’t be the case that I must lend him $20,
if it is permissible to merely give it to him. So although
the least I can do is lend him the $20 for dinner, it is
not morally mandatory that I do so — since it permissible
that I give him the $20 instead. Of course the converse
implication does hold. For example, if I must save my
friend from embarrassment then, among other things, saving
him from embarrassment is the least I can do.
Consider the second case. The case is typical and more
revealing than it might seem at first glance. The good
Samaritan in this case, takes me to be suggesting by my
remark that she has done something especially good, that
she has gone beyond anything that was required of her.
("That was very nice of you" is often used this way.) She
is made slightly uncomfortable by this suggestion -- as
people who are disposed to such excesses so often are (just
as those who are disposed to operate at the minimum often
see themselves as already doing so much more than
required). Accordingly, she responds by asserting
something which entails the falsity of what I have
suggested. For if it was the least she could do then she
has not done anything beyond the minimum that morality
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required of her. But I think that she is indirectly and
cleverly suggesting something else: that she was obligated
to stop and help. She is playing on the fact that "must"
implies "least". The pragmatic implication in such
"dismissal" uses of the idiom is often that the action
taken was obligatory and that is why it was the least that
could be done. Frequently in such cases we are hard-
pressed to even think of anything more that the person
engaged in the dismissal could have done beyond what they
did. But then, on the face of it, the use of "It was the
least I could have done" is transparent ly inappropriate
pragmatically. So conversational conventions forced us to
interpret the remark as hyperbolic. For we can safely
assume that in the case in question the good Samaritan was
not suggesting that there was more that she could have done
beyond what she did do in this case and she is certainly
not suggesting that what she did do was wrong. (Compare
Hillary on Everest’s peak saying "Its a bit cold.")
Finally, consider the third case. In this case, my
father asserts that I must get in touch with my teacher —
this much is taken to be morally mandatory. But he also
indicates that there are a number of ways that I can
fulfill this obligation, not all of which are on par. In
particular, he is clearly asserting that the minimal way in
which I can discharge this obligation is by writing the
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teacher. But he is also suggesting that there are two
other ways in which I can discharge this obligation that
are better than the minimal way, and one of these is better
than the other two. But then clearly the suggestion is
that each of the ways mentioned in individually optional:
its permissible for me to do anyone of the three to the
exclusion of the other two. Notice that it is also clear
that he thinks that the best way to discharge this
obligation, by visiting, is the way I ought to discharge
i t .
This is all quite typical of our pre-theoret ic moral
thinking. There are things we simply must do, but there
are often many permissible ways to do the thing in
question, not all of which are on a par despite their all
being permissible. In particular, some of these are the
optimal ways to get the thing done, and these are the ways
we think we should get the thing done. Others are the
minimal ways to get the thing done and discharging our
obligation this way is the least we can do. Finally there
are other ways that are in between they are neither the
optimal way nor the minimal way to discharge the
obligation. Rightly or wrongly, this is the way we all
seem to think pre-theoret ical ly
.
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Some Further Pragmatic Features
When I have mentioned this idiom to others in
conversation, in addition to encountering the tendency to
think that it is equivalent to stating a moral obligation,
there has often been an initial tendency to think just the
opposite: that "the least you can do is see to $" implies
"$ is wrong". This mistaken impression reflects the
special pragmatic role this idiom plays in chastising
someone for doing something wrong. When the "can do" of
this idiom is transformed to the past participle, "have
done", and preceded by the auxiliary "could", the typical
conversational implication is that the subject addressed
did do something wrong. For example, consider the
following case:
A: You were supposed to be here an hour ago!
B: Sorry! I wanted to run a couple of errands.
A: You should have run them later! The least you
could have done was called to inform me that you
were going to be late — but I guess even that
would have been asking too much of you!
Here, the implication is clearly that what A did end up
doing, running the errands w/o calling, was wrong. Indeed,
the whole point of using the least-can-do idiom here is to
stress that A had permissible options of varying degrees of
merit and didn’t even do the least valuable of these. For
the claim is that what he should have done was arrive on
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time (this is the best he could have done) and the least
that he could have been done was called. But the
presupposition in the context is that A did neither of
these, nor anything else that was acceptable and perhaps
fell somewhere in between these two alternatives. So A did
even less than the least of the things that were
permissible for A. Thus, to merely say to A that "what you
did was wrong", lacks the rough edge that we can get from
the above sort of use of the least-can-do idiom.
Note, however, that even this use, "the least you could
have done was seen to $", does not entail that $ itself was
impermissible. Quite to the contrary, the whole point is
that $ was a non- vacuous ly minimal, but permissible way of
conducting oneself and the agent fell short of even doing
this much. Doing $ was a non-vacuously minimal way of
conducting oneself, because there were alternatives that
were better than $ and, furthermore, what the agent should
have done precluded his/her doing $. This is yet another
way in which "the least you can do is $" might be thought
to imply "$ is wrong". For when "the least you could have
done was $" is typically used, the conversational
implication is not only that whatever the chastised agent
did do was wrong, but also that $ itself falls short of
what was optimal — it is precluded by what the agent
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should have done. But then it is not surprising that those
who identify what one ought to do with what one must do --
and that means just about every ethicist — might quickly
conclude from this pragmatic feature that "the least you
can do is see to $" implies "$ is impermissibile"
.
That these pragmatic feature are indeed typical is born
out by considering an alteration in the preceding dialogue.
In particular, consider the following alteration of A"s
final response above:
A: The least you could have done was called to inform
me that you were going to be late.
Here we have dropped the preceding remark about what should
have been done and the subsequent remark about B’s having
not even done as much as the least. Yet it is still
natural to interpret A as believing, and conversationally
implying, what both dropped remarks made clear. For
ordinarily, the suggestions would still be operating: B
shouldn’t have called to inform A that B was going to be
late because B should have done something that would have
made the call pointless, namely arriving on time, and,
whatever B did do fell short of the least of the
permissible alternatives and hence was impermissible.
However, all of this is merely typically the case.
Even the auxiliary past particle version of "the least caji
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be used, even if it is rarely so used, w/o the slightest
suggestion of chastisement. For consider the not wholly
unfamiliar case of a person who tends to be superior
morally and to be more keenly conscientious than most.
Such a person might think that he/she has done something
wrong/ impermissible when they have in fact done something
that exceeded the minimum that morality really required of
them. Indeed we often see this in cases where a valiant
heroic rescue-like effort succeeds in saving some, but not
all, of the candidates. Frequently, the heroin will feel
more quilty about not having saved the others than pleased
and justifiably proud at having saved those she did under
the circumstances. Here it would be quite natural for
someone to respond to her as follows:
Your distorting the circumstances. You didn’t do
anything wrong. On the contrary you exceeded the
minimum that would have been acceptable. Had you
done The least you (or one) could have done in the
circumstances, you would have just tried to get a
call to the police as soon possible. But you didn’t
do that — because you were busy doing so much more
than the least! The fact that you rescued one of
those children at great risk to yourself was already
more than the minimum that would have been morally
acceptable. You should not be chastising yourself
for not going back in a second time. We’re all proud
of you for having gone in at all.
Here there is no suggestion that the agent fell short
of the least valuable of the permissible alternatives. On
the contrary, here the whole point is to stress that the
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agent exceeded the minimum that was permissible. Of course
one thing that both uses have in common is to stress that
the agent failed to do the least that they could have done
in the circumstances. But in the second case, the
"failure" to do the least reflects the person’s having
exceeded the least, not having fallen short of it.
Official Interpretation
So we have found an idiom, frequently used, albeit
never mentioned in philosophical circles, that is plausibly
interpreted via the aforementioned condition. Just as our
informal interpretation of the truth-condition for "ought"
at a world, i, is truth at the t op of the heap of
acceptables (provided that there are acceptables to be
heaped), our informal interpretation of the truth-condition
for the Least-Can-Do idiom at a world, i, is the bottom-end
mirror-image condition that simply fell out of our proposed
semantic structure for "must" and "ought". To wit: truth
at the bottom of the heap of acceptables (provided that
there are acceptables to be heaped). More precisely,
[LE] LE$ is true at a world, i if and only if there
is an i-acceptable world, j, such that every
i-acceptable world that j is ranked at least as
high as is an $-world.
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D iagramraat ical ly , we have:
LE$ :
/\
I i
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
: *
:
: \ ail
\/ / $
As the upper asterisk indicates, LE is taken to be a
primitive operator for our system. LE$ holds at a world i
provided that there is some i-acceptable world to begin
with and among these, from some point on down, there are
nothing but $—worlds. So on the intended interpretation,
as the lower asterisk indicates, LE
,
like the other
positive statuses, has existential import. In particular,
LK$ will be false, for any $, even tautological ones, at
all dead end worlds in all models.
The Formal Parallel Between "Least" & "Ought"
It should be fairly obvious that the following
metatheorem, call it Least-Ought Interchange, holds:
LOI: Let A be any set of wffs where the only deontic
operators that occur in any wff in A are "OU"
and/or "MU" let $’ be any wff whose only deontic
operators are occurrences of "OU" and/or "MU".
Then A ]= $’ holds if and only if the result of
substituting "LE" for all occurrences of "OU" in
any both $’ and all wffs in A also holds.
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( Sketch of proof : Specify a reflexive relation between
two models M and M’
,
M is a reverse of M 1 . which holdsjust in case the domain of both models is the same, the
same acceptability relations hold for each i in each
model, but the ordering of the i-acceptable for each
set of such is precisely reversed: j =<i k for i in M
if and only if k
-<i j for i in M’ . We would then show
(i) that for any model M there is a (in fact exactly 1)
model M’ such that M is a reverse of M* and (ii) for
any two such models, M and M’, a wff $ composed of only
the deontic "OU" and/or "MU" (if any) is true in M if
and only if its LE-analog is true in M*
. )
In the case where A is empty, this just says that an
exclusively OU/MU-deon t i c wff is universally valid if and
only if its LE-analog is also. Furthermore, the semantic
proof of the LE-analog of any such A ]= $ will itself be
precisely parallel. In particular, the following items,
which are simply LE-analogues of the items noted for
exclusively OU/MU-deont ic wffs in the previous section
hold:
27 le($ -> $)
Not if ]= $ then ]= LE$
K L : ]= LE ( $ -> $’) -> ( LE$ -> LE$ ’
)
SNC L : ]= LE ~ ( $ & ~$) v ~LE(p -> p)
RM L : ]= If ]= $ -> $’ then ]= ( LE$ -> LE$ ’ )
[LP]
:
] = LE$ -> PE$
]= IM$ -> ~ LE $
]= LE~$ -> GR$
]= ~LE$ & ~LE~$ & LE ( $ -> $) . ->. 0P$
]= LE$ & MU ( $ -> $’) .->. LE$ ’
.
ML: ]= MU$ -> LE$
JEM : It LE$ -> MU$
As an illustration of the parallel at not only the
level of theorems, but that of proofs, we repeat the
following proof of RM°
,
and MO with the needed
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substitutions in brackets for generating the LE-analogues
,
RM L and ML:
RM° [ RM L ] is validity preserving. For suppose
$ -> $’ is universally valid and hence $ -> $’ holds
at every world in every model. Then 0U$ -> 0U$ ’
[LE$ -> LE$’] must also be universally valid. For
suppose 0U$ [ L E $ ] holds at a world, i, in any model,
then there is an i-acceptable world such that all the
i-acceptab les from there on up [down] are $-worlds.
But then these worlds must also be $’ worlds, since
$ -> $’ holds at absolutely all worlds. Hence 0U$
’
[ LE $ ’ ] must hold at any world i, in any world where
0U$ [ LE $ ] holds, provided that $ -> $’ is universally
valid.
MO [ML] is universally valid. For suppose MU$ holds
at a world i in a model. Then there is an
i-acceptable worlds and all such worlds are $-worlds.
But then, in particular, there is an i-acceptable
world such that all i-acceptable worlds from on up
[down] are $-wor Ids . Hence every world in every
model is an (MU$ -> OU$)-world [ (MU$ -> LE$)-world].
Some Theses Involving "Least" & "Ought"
Here are some additional positive and negative
principles involving both OU and LE:
a) 27 0U$ -> ~LE$
b) 27 LE$ -> ~0U$
c) 27 ( LE$ & 0U$) -> MU$
d) 27 PE $ & LE ( $ -> $ ’ ) . ->
.
PE $ ’
e) ] = ( LE$ & 0IT$) -> 0P$
f) ] = (0U$ & LE~$ ) -> 0P$
g) ] = ( LE$ v 0U$) -> MU ( $ -> $)
Regarding a ) /b )
,
we need only observe that both 0U$ and LE$
will be true at any world in any model where MU$ is true.
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Hence the truth of one cannot automatically preclude the
truth of the other. On the other hand, regarding c), there
will be models with a world i such that both doing the
minimum and doing the maximum both entail doing $ —
despite the fact that there are acceptable alternatives
where $ is not done that are of more value than the minimal
ones but less valuable than maximal ones. For example, it
may be that the least I can do is give to just Charity l
and the best I can do, what I ought to do, is give to both
Charity 1 and Charity 2, while it is nonetheless
permissible to give to just Charity 2 (suppose this is
better than giving to just Charity 1). For d) consider a
model with a world in which doing the bare minimum
precludes doing $ (i.e. none of ray minimal worlds are
$-worlds), yet one of my better than minimal worlds is an
$-world. In this case, $ -> $* will be true at all ray
minimal worlds (by default), no matter how bad $’ is.
e) and f) hold because LE$ and OlP$ hold jointly at i only
if there is an i-acceptable $-world and an i-acceptable
~$-world. But this is just the condition for 0P$.
g) holds because for LE$ or 0U$ to be true at a world, i,
in a model, there must be an i-acceptable world j but then
since there is such a world acceptable to j and since all
such worlds must be ($ -> $’)-worlds, MU($ -> $’) must be
true at i also.
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Internal and External Mutual Corroboration
So the Least-Can-Do idiom does appear to be an operator
in English that has the bottom-end mirror-image conditions
that we posited for "ought”. (Of course, there are also
less concise roughly equivalent idioms. We have already
made use of "the bare minimum that duty allows entails
to $ and the minimally valuable available courses
of action involve $".) It should be reasonably clear, I
think, that our reflections on this idiom, along with its
pragmatic features, tend to confirm our proposed semantic
account of the idiom. In particular, the account helps us
to make sense of some of the familiar pragmatic powers of
this idiom
.
But more has been implicitly accomplished. Consider
that these reflections, in isolation from our proposed
semantic structure and its account of "must" and "ought",
tend to converge on just such a structure. For our
reflections on the Least-Can-Do idiom naturally lead to a
picture involving a collection of acceptable alternative
courses of action that are ranked . For it naturally leads
us to a picture to the effect that "the least one can do is
see to $" implies that there is a class of permissible
alternatives and the lowest ranked of these all involve $.
This in turn naturally suggests a top-end mirror-image of
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this bottom end condition, and hence naturally would lead
us to search the language to see if this semantic resource
were commonly utilized. Furthermore, we are led to
identify what is obligatory with whatever is required by
all minimal and better permissible alternatives. For if it
is permissible to do what is entailed by our minimally
acceptable options then we naturally expect that options
that are superior to these minimal ones are also acceptable
and that some of these will surely sometimes preclude doing
things that pervade our minimal options. But then,
whatever is an invariant feature of all these minimal or
better acceptable alternatives must surely be something we
cannot permissibly avoid -- and that which we cannot
permissibly avoid we simply must do. So reflection on the
Least-can-do idiom alone naturally leads to positing the
same semantic structure that our earlier reflections on
’’ought" and "must" led us to: namely one in which we have a
ranked class of courses of action, where each course is one
in which everything done is permissible. Thus we have two,
in principle separate, 1 inguist ic sources of evidence that
each tend to converge on the same semantic structure. So
our reflection on these idioms provide a kind of internal
mutual corroboration of our proposed framework one that
boosts the evidence for the proposed structure beyond the
mere additive sum of evidence that each linguistic path
provides separately.
335
But now notice how well our reflections on the Least
Can-Do idiom fit with the supererogationst’s objections to
utilitarianism. For if it is the least of a class of
permissible alternatives that is the crucial condition for
this idiom then doing the least isn’t equivalent to
permissibility. For it must be permissible to do anything
occurring m any of the relevant alternatives, minimal ones
or better or best. Hence the possibility of doing the
minimum immediately suggests that it can be permissible to
do what is sup— optimal and hence to forego doing what is
optimal. So reflection on this idiom naturally leads us to
posit the possibility of permissible sub-optimal courses of
action and hence to sever the utilitarian identification of
optimizing with moral obligatoriness. Furthermore, if
there are to be ways of exceeding the demands of morality,
then the supererogat i on i s t must assume that there are
minimal ways to discharge our obligations. For unless
supererogation is pervasive, it must be possible to meet
the demands of morality w/o doing more than the minimum.
But if there are minimal ways of discharging our
obligations, then there will be features that are invariant
with respect to these minimal ways. It will then be the
case that the minimum that our duties allow is to do these
things that pervade all our acceptable minimal
alternatives. Hence our reflections on this "Least Can Do"
idiom seem to be converging on a picture that our earlier
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reflections on the classical conception of supererogation
suggested. Thus the case of the supererogat ion is t against
utilitarianism tends to provide external corroboration of
the structure that naturally emerges from reflections on
this Least Can Do" idiom. In turn, our reflections on this
idiom tends to provide external corroboration of both the
case of the supererogationist against utilitarianism and
the classical conception of supererogation itself. Hence,
as with the case of must' and "ought", our reflections on
this new idiom and the classical conception tend to provide
mutual external corroboration of one another.
It is time to tie our linguistic reflections and the
derivative semantic framework to our earlier reflections on
supererogation. We will see whether, as a bonus, our
framework might be able to represent it.
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Chapter 5 Notes
1 ' “ 1S to
,
" oted th ^t the non-ob ligatory bests and thepermissible less than bests cases don’t call for morethan a two-leveled range of acceptable alternatives. Forthe less than bests could all be at the same level andjust one level below the bests.
2. See, for example, Scheffler 1988 and Slote 1985.
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CHAPTER 6
EXCEEDING THE MINIMUM
Introduct ion
In this chapter, we will turn to the problem of
representing a prima facia plausible candidate for
supererogation in our framework. Our working hypothesis
(WH) for this section will be:
"It is supererogatory for Doe to see to $" is
equivalent to Doe’s seeing to $ is more than Doe
must do "
.
Of course, it is our intention that the "must" here is the
moral "must". It is perhaps more idiomatic here to shift
to must s kin: has to". So that, it would perhaps roll
off our tongues more readily to say that we will be
assuming that it is supererogatory for Doe to see to $ is
equivalent to Doe’s seeing to $ is more than Doe has to
do" .
It should be plain that the latter idiom is a part of
our normal moral corpus. For example, it is plain, isn’t
it, that it is a logical truth that if Doe’s doing x is
more than he has to do (read the "has to" as the moral "has
to" throughout), then Doe’s doing x is permissible and
Doe’s not doing x is permissible? That is, that Doe’s
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doing x is more than he has to do implies that Doe’s doing
x is morally optional. Yet, it is also intuitively
plausible that if Doe’s doing x is more than he has to do,
then Doe’s doing x is not morally indifferent. Combining
the two suggested implication relations yields that doing
more than you have to entails doing something that is
morally optional but not morally indifferent — a key mark
of supererogation, as we saw in Chapter 2. Furthermore,
isn’t it also plain that if Doe’s doing x is more than he
has to do then Doe’s doing x is not the least Doe can do?
That is, in some sense, Doe’s action must be an excess over
the minimum if it was more than he had to do. Finally,
isn t it plausible to think that, in the ten- t rapped-T iny—
Tims case, that if Doe’s going in for any of the kids is
more than he has to do and it is permissible to save any
number of them, then, ceteris paribus, he’s done more, the
more Tims he saves? So that this idiom also suggests the
possibility of an indefinite range of increasingly more
valuable permissible alternatives. These affinities alone
make this idiom a prima facia plausible candidate for a
natural expression of the supererogatory -- a term which
is, after all, quas i-technical coinage.
So here we have an idiom that obviously ties in with
our reflections on the moral "must" and is part and parcel
of ordinary ethical discourse. Indeed, just as in the case
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of "must" and "ought", I think that what this phrase
expresses is deeply embedded in our pr e- t heo r e t i c deontic
conceptual scheme. Perhaps, there is some subtle
difference between this expression and what philosophers
have intended by the technical term "supererogation". We
will ignore this possibility. Here we will just assume
that "supererogation" is convenient shorthand for this more
linguistically fundamental compound expression. But let me
stress that even if there is some subtle difference, this
"more to this essay. But let me stress that even if there
is some such than you had to" idiom, is a part of our
ordinary ethical discourse, unlike the word
"supererogation". Hence, it is likely to reflect a deep
implicit conceptual commitment -- one central enough to
have found its way into the most ordinary non-technical
discourse. So even if they diverge, I will be happy to
settle for the thesis that what I say herein using
"supererogation" holds for what this compound idiom
expresses. For I am more interested in achieving greater
clarity about the central conceptual schemes that we
employed un re f 1 ec t i ve 1 y before becoming philosophers and
continue to employ unreflect ively when we are not donning
our philosopher’s caps. I submit that this compound
expression expresses something that is part of such a
fundamental conceptual scheme that we all unreflect ively
endorse
.
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Two Problematic Candidate Conditions
for Supererogation
Let’s consider some candidate conditions, specifiable
in our framework, for modeling the "classical conception"
of supererogation discussed in ch2. As a first try, we
might say that it is supererogatory that $ just in case X
can do better seeing to $ (in some permissible way) than I
c an seeing to ~~ $ (in some permissible way)
. More
precisely,
[SU1] SU$ is true at a world i iff (i) there is an
i-acceptable $-wor Id ranked higher than some
i-acceptable ~$-world.
Diagrammatically,
SU$ :
/\
i i
i i
: *
i i
t i
! *
\/
In its favor, [SUl] would ratify a principle that we found
to be essential to the classical conception, namely the
Optionality Of Supererogation:
(SU$ -> 0P$)
.
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For [SU1] implies that SU$ is true at i only if both $ and
$ occur among the acceptables and hence that SU$ -> 0P$ is
universally valid.
It also guarantees the truth of the major premise of
the Supererogatory Bests argument, namely that there are
supererogatory alternatives that are optimific.
M ]=i SU$ & 0U$, for some world in some model.
For there clearly are models where [SUl]’s defining
condition holds and it is also the case that there is an
acceptable world such that from there on up we have only
acceptable $-wor Ids . D i agr amma t i ca 1 1 y
,
SU$ :
/\ \ all
: / $
: * — $
• i
i t
! *
-- ~$
i i
i i
\/
So [SU1] will yield M ]=i SU$ & 0U$, for some i of some M.
However, as the reader might already suspect, this about
exhausts [SUlJ’s virtues: [SU1] is highly problematic and
it will be instructive to see why.
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[SU1] is much too weak: it becomes too easy to do
something supererogatory. For imagine the following
variation on our earlier two children case. Suppose that
there are three children one boy and two girls and that the
boy and girls (and I) are so situated that even if I do the
minimum that duty allows, I will rescue the boy, but
neither girl. (The girls are located together in one part
of the building and the boy in another, etc.) Furthermore
suppose that it would be supererogatory to rescue the girls
and "super-supererogatory" to rescue both the boy and the
girls. D iagrammat ical ly , I envision the following
s i tuat ion
:
SU$ :
/\ \ all (save the ch i 1 dren ) -wor 1 ds
:
: /
: * \
!* all (save just the g i r 1 s ) -wor 1 ds
: * /
: : \
\/ / all (save just the boy)-worlds
Since, in the best acceptable worlds I save (all) the
children, a fortiori, the best acceptable worlds are ones
where I save the boy. But the acceptable worlds where I
save just the girls — and hence don’t save the boys — are
ranked lower then these best acceptable worlds. So there is
one world where I save the boy that is ranked higher than
some world where I don’t save the boy. Hence by [SUl] it
is supererogatory to save the boy. But all the minimal
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acceptable worlds are worlds where I save the boy. Hence
saving the boy is surely not supererogatory -- [SU1] to the
contrary. [ S U 1 ] is too weak because it allows it to be the
case that SU$, even when doing the bare minimum that duty
allows entails doing $.
Furthermore, suppose that every acceptable level of
value that I can achieve, can be achieved with or without
$. Then, supposing that there are at least two distinct
acceptable levels of value, there must be an acceptable $-
world and an acceptable ~$-world at each of these two
levels (hence at least four acceptable worlds). This
condition is sufficient for the proposed defining condition
of [ S U 1 ] . D iagrammat ical ly
:
$
/\
i i
i i
** -- $
i i
i i
** — ~$
i i
\/
all
levels
: $
:
= >
/\
• i
i i
i * — $
i i
i i
; *
—
i i
i i
\/
Surely, $ is no candidate for supererogation in such a
case. For clearly, in such a case, ray performance cannot
be made superior in virtue of doing $ (nor inferior in
virtue of not doing $), for our stipulation is tantamount
to saying that $ has nothing essential to contribute.
Worse still, it follows by [SU1] that SU$ and SU~$ can
both be true and hence [SU1] fails to ratify:
~(su$ & sir$)
Intuitively, the fact that I can do better seeing to $ (in
some permissible way) than I can seeing to ~$ (in some
permissible way) does not preclude the possibility that I
can also do better seeing to (in some permissible way)
than I can seeing to $ (in some permissible way). For in
the situation just sketched, not only does $ satisfy
[SUl]’s proposed conditions for supererogation, but so does
For by hypothesis, there are at least two levels of
worlds and each such level contains an $-world and a
"$-world. So there is an $ -world better than some ~~$-world
and a "S-world better than some $-world. Hence by [SU1],
we have (SU$ & SlT$). This is plainly untenable.
These reflections might suggest the following
strengthening of [ SU 1 ] : we might say that something is
supererogatory just in case it consists in gratuitous^
opt imiz ing : just in case it is done throughout the upper
range of acceptable worlds, but it is not done in lower-
ranked acceptable worlds. More precisely.
[SU2] SU$ is true at a world i iff (i) there is an
i-acceptable $-world ranked higher than anx
i- acceptable $—world and (ii) there is an
i-acceptable ~$-world.
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Condition (i) guarantees that from some point on up, there
is nothing but $-worlds among the i-acceptab les — and
hence that any i-acceptable "$-worlds there are must be
lower ranked. Condition (ii) just guarantees that
condition (i) is not trivially satisfied in virtue of "S’s
being altogether impermissible.
Diagrammatically,
SU$ :
/\ \ all
:
: / $
:
*
• i
i i
! *
--
i l
i i
\/
Notice first off that [ SU2 ] doesn’t allow for the
possibility that every level of acceptable worlds contains
an $-world and a ~$-world. For clause (i) entails that SU$
is true only if from some level on up, all the acceptables
are $-worlds and hence none are ~$-worlds.
Furthermore, [ SU2 ] doesn’t fall prey to the most salient
logical problem that [SU1] had: failing to ratify ~(SU$ &
SU~$). In [ SU2 ] ’ s favor, this is universally valid. For
suppose that SU$ and SlT$. Then by clause (i) of [SU2],
(a) there is some acceptable world, j, such that from
there
on up all the acceptable worlds are $-worlds and (b) there
347
is also some acceptable world, k, such that from there on
up all the acceptable worlds are ~$-worlds. But then
either j is on the same level as k or it is not. If it is,
then by clause (a), j is an $-world and by (b), it is also
a "$-world. On the other hand if j is not on the same
level as k, then one is ranked higher than the other.
Suppose it is k — it doesn’t matter. Then by (a) again, k
is a ~$-world and by (b) again it is a "$-world. Hence,
either way, one of these worlds is impossible — contrary
to hypothesis.
Also [SU2], like [SU1], clearly ratifies the Optionality
Of Supererogation. For condition (i) implies that there is
an acceptable world, j, such that from there on up there
are only acceptable $-worlds. So j itself must be such an
$-wor Id
,
and clause (ii) implies that there is also an
acceptable ~$-world. It also guarantees that the major
premise of the Supererogatory Best argument is true. For
inasmuch as there clearly are models where [ S U 2 ] ’
s
defining condition holds and its first defining condition,
(i), is the defining condition for 0U$ itself, [SU2] will
clearly yield M ]=i SU$ & 0U$, for some i of some M.
But alas, the latter point reveals that identifying
supererogation with gratuitous optimizing is too strong.
The two defining conditions are precisely the conditions
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for 0U$ and GR$ respectively. So [ SU2 ] ratifies SU$ <->
( 0U$ & GR$) and hence the universal validity of the thesis:
SU$ -> 0U$ . But we saw in Ch2 that this is not part of the
classical conception. Indeed this is just the "Optimific
Thesis" that we were led to deny in the section, "A
Misconception About the Supererogatory", of Chapter 2. For
I might do something supererogatory even though I could
have done more than I did do. More precisely, $ could be
supererogatory even though there is an acceptable
alternative available to me that precludes $ and is
superior to any acceptable $-alternat ive . It may still be
supererogatory to have saved exactly one child, even though
it would have been best (and also supererogatory) to have
saved both children, (or, it may have been supererogatory
to call, even though a surprise visit would have been
best). D i agrammat i ca 1 1 y
,
SU$ :
/\ \ all (save both chi 1 dr en ) -wor 1 ds
: : /
! *
!* — (save just one child)-world
: *
!
I \ all (save no ch i 1 d ) -wor 1 ds
\/ /
Saving even just one child is supererogatory here, although
saving both, and hence not .j us t one, is optimal here. So
[SU2] is too strong. One can supererogate without
optimizing -- even while sub-optimizing, as in this case.
349
It might be thought that although [ SU2 ] is too strong,
it is not too weak. That is, at first glance, gratuitous
optimizing might appear to be at least a sufficient
condition for supererogation. However, this is an
illusion: (0U$ & GR$) -> SU$ is not valid. Suppose that
I’m obligated to give to at least one of two charities, Cl
and C 2 , but I am not obligated to give to either one in
particular. Furthermore, let’s suppose that it is better
to give to C2 than to Cl, but better still -- in fact best
to give to both Cl & C2. Hence if I do the maximum, I
give to both Cl & C2. But then it follows that OU(I give
to Cl). But it is also permissible for me to give to
either one alone. So GR(I give to Cl). Hence, OU(I give
to Cl) & GR(I give to Cl). Nonetheless, although it is
supererogatory for me to see to it that I give to both Cl
and C2, SU(I give to Cl & I give to C2), it is not
supererogatory to give to Cl, ~SU(I give to Cl). For I
give to Cl even when I only do the minimum that duty
all ows
.
Diagrammatical ly,
/\ \ all (Cl & C2)-worlds
: : /
: : \
! ! all (C2 & ~Cl)-worlds
: : /
: : \
\/ / all (Cl & ~C2 ) -worlds
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So (0U$ & GR$) -> SU$ is not universally valid. The reason
is that gratuitous optimizing can involve, among other
things, doing something that I would also do if I did the
minimum, but wouldn’t do if I chose some better than
minimal, but less than maximal, acceptable course of
action.
The fact that [SU2] provides a truth-condition for
supererogation that is neither necessary nor sufficient is
a consequence of our observation in Chapter 2 that one can
have a a situation of the following sort:
There is a collection of mutually exclusive
permissible actions, $ 1 , . . . , $n , such that (a) each
$i is better than any of its predecessors, (b) 0U$ n
holds, (c) all the minimally acceptable alternative
courses of action include $1 (i.e. LE$i ) and
(d) each of $2 , . . . , $n is supererogatory.
Since the actions are exclusive, for each i, if 1 < i < n,
we have (SU$i & ~OU$i), and since the ascending sequence
can easily be of the form ( $ & $’), ($’ & $) and
($ & $’), we can easily have (0U$ & GR$ & SU$) true.
A Tentative Diagnosis
So we want a condition that does not ratify SU$ -> 0U$
and hence allows for the possibility that SU$ & ~0U$.
But
more than this, we want it to be possible that a
person can
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do that which is supererogatory even though what they do is
sub-optimal (i.e (SU$ & 0U~$)). Furthermore, we want the
condition to entail that gratuitous optimizing is not
automatically sufficient for supererogation and hence to
allow for the possibility that 0U$ & GR$ & ~SU$). And we
want a condition that entails that SU$ & SU~$ can never be
satisfied.
Despite the defects of [SU1] and [SU2], they do have
something in common which does seem essential to
supererogation:
If $ is supererogatory, then there must be an
acceptable $-world that is superior to some
acceptable $—world.
Hut why is this essential — why does there have to be some
$-world that is superior to some ''$-world? Because doing $
must somehow exceed the minimum that is required and there
plainly couldn’t be any excess in $ if $ always yielded
more value than $. But we have seen that this, though a
plausible necessary condition, can’t be sufficient because
$’s exceeding some case of ~$ does not preclude $ s
contributing no more value than Something stronger is
needed, but not something so strong as to guarantee that
supererogation entails optimizing.
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A Third Candidate on the Right Track
Let me suggest that one reason that these candidates
have failed is that they have made no reference to the
bottom end of the range of alternatives. After all,
supererogation involves an excess. But an excess over
what? Presumably, it must be an excess over something
what’s happening at the lower end of the range of
acceptable alternatives. In particular, surely the
following principle is to be endorsed:
LE$ -> ~SU$
If seeing to $ is the least I can do, then seeing to $
can’t be supererogatory, or conversely, if seeing to $ is
supererogatory then it is not the case that it is the least
1 could have done: SU$ -> ~LE$. So these express
equivalent necessary conditions for supererogation.
Recall that it is also the case that what is
supererogatory must be permissible. So the conjunctive
condition, (~LE$ & PE$) is necessary for SU$. This might
lead to the suggestion that this conjunctive necessary
condition is also sufficient and hence that we can identify
the supererogatory with that which is permissib le but n ot_
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entailed by doing the minimum that duty allows
. With this
in mind let’s consider the following condition:
[ SU3 ] SU$ is true at a world i iff (i) for every
i-acceptable world, j, there is an i-acceptable
"$-world that j is ranked at least as high as &
(ii) there is an i-acceptable $-world.
The first condition, (i) amounts to the truth-condition for
~LE$ . It guarantees that $ is not a necessary condition of
opting for a minimally acceptable alternative. The second
condition, (ii) is equivalent to the permissibility of $.
D i agr amma t i ca 1 1 y , [SU3] comes to
SU$ :
/\
i i
i i
: * — $
i i
i i
; * \ not
: : / all
\/ $
This is a step in the right direction, since it now makes
reference to the bottom end of the range of acceptable
alternatives. It avoids the first pitfall of [ SU2 ] : it
allows for the possibility that SU$ & 0U$. In fact it
allows for the stronger possibility: SU$ & OU $. Consider
the model suggested by the previous boy-girl rescue case,
and, for simplicity, suppose that there is both a lowest
level and a highest level of acceptable worlds and that it
is not the case that the least I can do is save only the
female child. So it is not the case that all the lowest
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level acceptable worlds are ones where I save only the
female child. Furthermore, we may suppose that there is a
non- 1 owes t ranked acceptable world where I do save only the
female child. Hence, by [ SU3 ] , SU(I save only the female
child). But all this is compatible with adding that in all
the best acceptable worlds I save both the female child and
the male child. Hence it is compatible with OLT(I save
only the female child), which implies ~OU(I save only the
female child). So [ SU3 ] is compatible with the possibility
that something supererogatory is sub-optimal and, a
fortiori, with the denial of the claim that what is
supererogatory is what one ought to do.
However, as with [SUl] and [SU2], [ SU3 ] is still too
weak. For it should be plain that no matter how I
discharge ray obligations, if I do it in one of the minimal
ways, I won’t do anything supererogatory. But now suppose
that the situation is one in which the least I can do is
save exactly one of the children although it is
supererogatory to save both of them. Furthermore, suppose
that if I am going to save only one, it doesn’t matter
which, so that one of the ways in which I might do the bare
minimum involves saving the male child and another way of
doing the bare minimum involves saving the female child.
We can represent this situation diagrammat ical ly as
f o 1 lows
:
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:
: \
!! all (save both)-worlds
; * /
: *
:
: x
> all (save just one)-worlds
*A /
/ \
(save girl)-world (save boy)-world
It follows that it is not the case that the least I can do
is save the male child and that it is permissible to save
the male child. Hence on this proposal it would be
supererogatory for me to save the male child. But this is
surely incorrect. Though it might be supererogatory to see
to both $ and some $’
,
if I can see to $ by opting for one
of ray minimal ways of discharging ray duties, then seeing to
$ can’t be supererogatory.
Diagnosis of the Previous Failure
It is clear what has gone wrong here. The least I can
do is $ just in case no matter how I might discharge my
obligations in a minimal way, I will see to $. Hence, for
it to be true that "Least $, for some $, it is sufficient
that there be some way that I can do the bare minimum in
which $ is false. But this is compatible with there being
ways in which I also do the minimum in which $ is true. It
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is the fact that this latter possibility is allowed by the
proposed definiens that makes it inadequate.
So we still need a much stronger condition than this
one. Having seen why this condition failed, it is not hard
to see what is needed. Clearly it is essential to the
classical conception, that it is possible for someone to
fail to do anything supererogatory while at the same time
doing nothing impermissible. So lets ask a new question:
what would someone have to do to guarantee that he did not
supererogate nor fail to discharge any of his obligations?
The answer is plain: He must opt for one of the minimal
ways of discharging his obligations. It is not possible
for someone to discharge their obligations in a minimal way
while doing something supererogatory. So we need to be
assured that no matter how I discharge my duties, if I do
it in one of the minimal ways, then I do not do anything
more than I had to do. Hence it is not merely that there
must be some minimal way of discharging my obligations that
precludes doing $ if doing $ is to be supererogatory. For
$ to be supererogatory, all minimal ways of discharging ray
obligations must preclude $. Supererogation must be an
excess over anything that happens at the lower range of
one’s acceptable alternatives. So our candidate is at
hand
.
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A Promising Candidate:
The candidate that emerges is that an action is
supererogatory just in case it occurs in the range of
acceptable alternatives but not in the lower end of the
range. More precisely,
[SU] SU$ is true at a world i if and only if
(i) there is an i-acceptable ""$-world ranked
lower than any i-acceptable $-world & (ii) there
is an i-acceptable $-world.
Condition (i) guarantees that there is an i-acceptable
world such that all worlds ranked at least a low as this
one preclude $ — Condition (ii) guarantees that this is
not trivially true in virtue of ~$’s being forbidden
altogether, and hence that $ is permissible.
Diagrammatically,
SU$ :
/\
t i
i i
: * — $
i i
i i
: *
: : \ no
\/ / $
Notice that since by (i) there is no $ at the bottom end of
the range of acceptable alternatives, and by (ii) there is
some acceptable $-world, any such $-worlds must occur
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exclusively "beyond” the lower end of the range of
acceptables. Hence, one cannot supererogate in seeing to $
unless all acceptable $-alternat ives $ are beyond the
minimum range of acceptable alternatives.
We will see that this candidate has all the virtues
that our previous candidates had and that it also lacks any
of their vices. Furthermore, it fits well with the
classical conception of supererogation sketched in ch2.
Finally, it has some distinguishing logical features in its
own right -- when compared to the more familiar traditional
operators. Let’s confirm this by exploring the logic of
this operator a bit.
r S U ] & the Problems of [SU1-3]
First of all, clearly our definition immediately
implies that it can’t be supererogatory to see to $ if it
is also possible to see to $ while doing the bare minimum
that is acceptable. For clause (i) tells us that all our
minimal must alternatives exclude $ for $ to be
supererogatory. It should also be plain that [SU] rules
out the possibility that both $ and ~$ occur at every level
of acceptable worlds. For clause (i) of [SU] entails that
SU$ is true only if there is an i-acceptable $-world, say
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j, ranked lower than any i-acceptable $-world. But then
such an '$-world j must itself be on a level of acceptable
worlds consisting exclusively of ~$-worlds.
Secondly, the supererogationistic analogue to No
Conf licts
,
"No Supererogationistic Conflicts", holds:
For suppose, for reductio, that SU$ and SlP$ do both hold
at i. Then according to clause (i) of [SU], there must be
both an i-acceptable ~$-world ranked lower than any i-
acceptable $-world and there must also be an i-acceptable
~~$-world ranked lower than any i-acceptable '“$-world. But
clearly this is impossible. For suppose j is a '“$-world of
the first sort and k is a $-world of the second sort.
Then j must be ranked lower than k and k must be ranked
lower than j. But there can be no such ranking.
Diagrammat ical ly
,
(NSC) ~(SU$ & SlT$)
SU$ : SU~$ :
/\ /\
* — $ *
— ~$
*
—
~$-world * — $-wor 1
d
: : \
\/ / all $-wor 1 ds here
: : \
\/ / no $-wor 1 ds here
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Thirdly, the following theses hold:
]= SU$ -> PE $
]= SU$ -> GR$
]= SU$ -> 0P$
For, by clause (ii) of [ S U ] , there roust be an i-acceptable
$-world -- which is the condition for the truth of PE$. On
the other hand, by clause (i), SU$ is true only if there is
an i-acceptable ^$-world -- which is the truth-condition
for GR$. These two conditions are jointly those for 0P$.
These three principles correspond to those of ch2, there
called "CL1" & "CL2" and "The Optionality of the
Supererogatory", respectively. The following trivial
variations on these three principles also obviously hold:
]= SU$ -> ~MU$,
]= SU$ -> ~ IM$
]= SU$ -> ~MU~$
]= SU$ -> PE~$
Since, as we saw earlier, ]= PE$ -> MU($ -> $), we also get
the following principles:
]= SU$ -> (GR$’<-> ~MU$ ’
)
]= SU$ -> ( PE $ ’ <-> ~MU~$)
] = SU$ -> ( IM$ <-> MU~$ ’
]= SU$ -> (0P$ <-> ~ IM$ & ~IM$')
That is, since the standard definitional equivalences fail
only from dead-end worlds (worlds with no worlds acceptable
to them), and SU$ holds only at worlds that are not dead
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end worlds, if it holds at a world, then so do the
equivalences
.
Fourthly, it can easily be shown that although [SU]
allows for models where what is supererogatory is optimific
(thus granting the truth of the major premise of
Supererogatory Bests), it does not require that all models
in which something is supererogatory are like this. In
fact, [SU] allows for supererogatory sub-optimal actions.
The following two diagrams suggest relevant models:
SU$ & 0U$ : SU( $ & ) & 0U~($ & :
/\ \
!
I
/all $-wor Ids
! * — $-wor Id
; *
— " $
-wo r 1
d
!
! \ no $-worlds
\/ /
/\ \ all ($ & $’)-worlds
:
: /
: *
:: \ all ($ & ~$ ’ ) -worlds
:
: /
: *
: : \
\/ / all (~$ & $ ’ ) -wor Ids
For the first case, we might imagine that $ = "saving
the child". Then in all the best acceptables worlds $
holds, so that 0U$. But in the all the minimal worlds, the
potential rescuer runs down the street, pulls the fire
alarm and waits for the fireman to come to that
intersection so that she may then direct them to the fire.
Hence doing the minimum that is permissible involves, among
other things, failing to save the child. Hence SU$. For
the second case, we imagine that there is a child and a dog
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saveto be rescued, so that $ = "save the child” and $’ = "
the dog and that the situation is such that the minimum
for the potential rescuer here is to save just the dog. So
all the minimal worlds are ones where the dog, but not the
child are rescued. However, in this case the rescuer may
save just the child. Hence SU($ & However, she may
also save both the child and the dog, and doing so is best.
Hence saving just the child is sub-optimal. So
oir [ ($ & ~$* )
.
Fifthly, that gratuitous sub-optimizing is not a
sufficient condition for supererogation is conveyed by our
earlier charity case diagram:
0U(C1) & GR(Cl) & ~SU(C1) :
/\ \ all (Cl & C2)-worlds
: : /
: : \
!
! / all (C2 & ~Cl)-worlds
:
: \
\/ / all (Cl & ~C2 ) -worlds
Recall that here the agent just gives to Charity One in all
the minimally acceptable worlds. But since giving to
Charity Two is better than giving to Charity One, it is
permissible to fail to give to Charity One and hence
gratuitous to give to Charity One. Furthermore, it is best
to give to both, so the agent ought to give to both. A
fortiori, the agent ought to give to Charity One.
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Nonetheless, although giving to both charities is
supererogatory, as is giving to Charity Two w/o giving to
Charity One, giving to Charity One is not. For giving to
Charity One is done even if only the minimum is done.
It should also be reasonably clear that [SU] allows for
the possibility of the sort of situation mentioned earlier
and presented in Chapter 2 as essential to the classical
conception of supererogation:
There is a collection of mutually exclusive
permissible actions, $i,...,$ n
,
such that (a) each
$i is better than any of its predecessors, (b) 0 U$ n
holds, (c) all the minimally acceptable alternative
courses of action include $1 (i.e. LE$i) and
(d) each of $2 , . .
.
,
$
n is supererogatory.
Here’s one such [SU] scenario:
LE $ 1 & 0 U$ n & SU $ 2 & ... SU$ n &
the $j ’s are Mutually Exclusive :
/\
: : \
;
: / all $n, no $1 - $n-i
: *
!
! \ all $3, no $1 - $2 , and no $4 - $n
: : /
: *
i
! \ all $2, no $1 and no $3 - $n
: : /
: *
: : \
\/ / all $1 and no $2 - $n
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Hence, [SU] possesses the virtues and lacks the vices
of the previous three candidates. It should also be fairly
plain that, so far, [SU] fits rather well with the
classical conception. We will see more evidence for this
"fit" in the next section of this chapter. But for the
moment, let’s stop to look at some additional logical
features of this operator.
S ome Logical Principles Involving SU Alone
Prel iminar ies
We begin by listing some of the immediately previous
results
:
]= ~(SU$ & SU~$)
]= SU$ -> 0P$
su$ -> ou$
su$ -> ~ou~$
]? (0U$ & GR$ ) -> SU$
We now briefly prove the val idity-preservingness of the
following two rules of inference:
(AN) If ]= $ then ]= ~SU$
( RE S ) If ] = $ <-> $’ then ]= SU$ <-> SU$’
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The first, " An t i-Necess i t at ion"
,
is simple. Suppose $ is
universally valid. Then $ holds at all worlds in all
models. But then there can be no model where SU$ holds.
For by condition (i) of [SU], SU$ holds only if there is a
$-world. Regarding RE S
,
suppose that $ <-> $’ i s
universally valid. That is, suppose that $ and $’ match in
value at every world in every model. Now assume that SU$
is true at i in any model. Then by [ SU ] ( i ) , there is an
i-acceptable $-world ranked lower than any i-acceptable
$ world. But by hypothesis, all "$-worlds are ~$’-worlds
and all $-wor Ids are $ ’
-worlds
. Hence there is an i—
acceptable $ ’
-wor Id ranked lower than any i-acceptable
$ * -wor Id . So condition (i) holds for SU$’. Similarly,
since by [SU](ii), SU$ holds only if there is an
i-acceptable $-wor Id, then by hypothesis, there must also
be an i-acceptable $’-world — which means that [SU] (ii)
must also hold for SU$’ . So SU$’ holds in any model in
which SU$ holds — provided that ]= $ <-> $’. Hence
]= SU$ -> SU$’, if ]= $ <-> The argument for
]= SU$’ -> SU$, given ] = $ <-> $’ is precisely analogous.
Let me turn to some principles that involve SU
operating on conjunctions.
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SU & Conjunctions
Unlike our other operators, SU does not distribute over
conjunction. It will suffice to display the truth of:
]
f
SU($ & $’ ) -> su$
There are clearly models in which there is a world i such
that the following three conditions hold: (i) there is an
i -acceptab le ($ & $’ )-worlds, (ii) there is an i-acceptable
~
( $ & $’)-world ranked lower than any acceptable
($ & $ ’ )-world, and (iii) it is not the case that there is
an i-acceptable world ranked lower than any i-acceptable
$-world. In fact our previous diagram displays just such a
scenario. Saving both children is supererogatory, so
condition (i) and (ii) hold. But saving either child alone
is what I do if I do the minimum. Hence saving the girl is
not supererogatory, since I do that in half of my minimally
acceptable worlds. What may be supererogatory is precisely
seeing to both $ and $’
.
It follows at once that distribution fails:
SU($ & $’ ) -> (su$ & SU$’ ) ]
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The preceding case also suffices for showing that:
SU($ & $’) -> (SU$ V SU$
’ )
]
lor neither saving the boy nor saving the girl is
supererogatory, even though saving both is.
The following also holds:
)f (SU$ & SU$’ ) -> SU( $ & $’ )
For it may be supererogatory to give x dollars to charity 1
and supererogatory to give x dollars to charity two, but it
need not be supererogatory to give to both -- not unless it
is permissible to let my children starve:
/\
/ : :
no ( give to ! !
both) -worlds 1 I
: *
\ : :
\/
\
all (give to just one)-worlds
/
\
/ all (give to none)-worlds
Here all my acceptable worlds are worlds where I give to no
more than one charity. So it is wrong to give to both.
Nonetheless, giving to the first is supererogatory, as is
giving to the second.
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This suggests the following modification:
]= PE ($ & $’) ~> [ ( SU$ & SU$
’ ) -> SU($ & $’)]
This is correct. For suppose that SU$ & SU$’ hold. Then
there is some $-world ranked lower than any $-world and
there is some "$’-world ranked lower than any $’-world.
But then there must be some single (~$ 8, ~$ , )-world
ranked lower than all $-worlds and all $’-worlds and, a
fortiori, lower than all ($ & $’ )-worlds. But by
propositional logic, any such lower ranked (~$ & ~$’)-world
must also be a ~($ & $’)-world. So condition (i) of [SU]
is satisfied by SU($ & $’). But so is condition (ii). For
this condition is just the condition under which PE($ & $’)
is satisfied. So the only circumstance under which two
things can be individually supererogatory, but not jointly
so, is when the two things are jointly impermissible.
Indeed a stronger principle holds. The only condition
under which two things fail to be jointly supererogatory
when one of them is supererogatory is when they are jointly
impermissible. In other words, the SU$’ in the middle
conjunction above is redundant:
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] = SU$ -> ( PE ( $ & $’ ) > SU($ & $* )
)
For suppose that SU$ holds. Then there is a ~$-world
ranked lower than any $-world. But every ($ & $’)-world is
an $-wor Id. Hence there is a ~$-world ranked lower than
any ($ & $’)-world. So if PE($ & $’) holds — and hence
there is an acceptable ($ & $’)-world — [ SU ] ( i ) and (ii)
are satisfied for SU($ & $’). So if it is supererogatory
to give to Charity 1, then it is supererogatory to both
give to Charity 1 and watch the Celtics — provide it is at
least permissible to do both. (Of course, any pragmatic
suggestion that watching the Celtics is adding anything is
to be ignored -- watching the game just comes along for the
ride.
Clearly the following rule of inference is immediately
forthcoming
:
If ]= $ , then ]= SU$’ -> SU($ & $’)
For if $ is universally valid and $ is supererogatory then
($ & $’) must be permissible. Hence, by the previous
result, so must ($ & $’) be.
370
SU and Disjunctions
1 turn now to disjunctions in the scope of SU. Clearly
SU-addition fails:
SU$ -> SU($ v $’
)
lor one thing, we have already seen Ant i — Necess i tat ion
holds. Hence, if $’ is just ~$, then ]= ($ v $’), which
implies that ]= ~SU($ v $’). But even if we added that
]/ ($ v $’), the resulting principle wouldn’t hold.
Intuitively, suppose it is supererog-atory for me to see to
it that I save both children ($), but obligatory to see to
it that I save at least one ($’). Then all my minimal
worlds are (save at least one chi Id) -worlds . Hence none of
my minimal worlds are (neither save both nor save at least
one)-worlds (i.e. none are ~ ( $ v $’)-worlds). But in that
case, ~SU($ v $’). For the same reasons,
]
f
(SU$ v SU$
’ ) -> SU($ v $ ’
)
For it may be either supererogatory to save both or
supererogatory to save either w/o it being supererogatory
to see to it that I either save both or save at least one.
For if the latter is obligatory, then I do see to it that I
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save at least one in all my acceptable worlds, no matter
how low in rank.
What about the converse: that a disjunction is
supererogatory only if one of its disjuncts is? This is
one SU-distr ibut ion principle that is universally valid:
] = SU( $ v $
’ ) -> (SU$ v SU$
’
)
For suppose that SU($ v $’). Then there is an i-acceptable
~
( $ v $’)-world ranked lower than any i-acceptable
($ v $’)-world. Suppose j is such a ~ ( $ v $’)-world.
Since every $-world and every $’-world is an
($ v $’)-world, it follows that j is an i-acceptable
~
( $ v $’)-world ranked lower than all i-acceptable $-worlds
and all i-acceptable $’-world. Then, by propositional
logic, if j is a ~($ v $’)-world, it must also be both a
"$-world and a ~$’-world. Hence there is an i-acceptable
~$-world (namely j ) ranked lower than any i-acceptable
$-world, and there is an i-acceptable ''S’-world (namely j
again) ranked lower than any $’-world. These are the
respective versions of condition (i) for SU$ and for SU$’.
So it remains to be shown that either there is an
acceptable $-world or there is an acceptable $’-world. By
condition (ii), SU($ v $’) is true only if there is an
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i acceptable ($ v $’)-world. But any ($ v $’)-world is
either an $-world or an $’-world. So either SU$ or SU$ ’
holds.
The proof just sketched might suggest that the
consequent of the previous principle could be strengthened.
However, this does not turn out to be so:
]/ SU($ v $
’ ) -> (SU$ & SU$
’
)
.
Obviously, by RE S
,
SU($ v $’) is equivalent to SU($’v $).
So, SU($ v $’) -> ( SU$ & SU$
’ ) is equivalent to
SU($ v $’) -> SU$. Hence the above principle is equivalent
t o
:
]t SU($ v $ ’ ) -> SU$.
So let’s focus on this principle. As we saw above, if
SU($ v $’) is true at i then condition (i) for SU$ must be
satisfied at i. However, all this requires is that there
is an i-acceptable ^$-world ranked lower than any i-
acceptable $-world. But this may be true vacuously. For
there may simply be no i-acceptable $-worlds, so that all
i-acceptable worlds satisfy condition (i) trivially. But
then condition (ii) will fail for SU$ at i.
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This is an odd result, since one would expect that if
it is supererogatory to see to it that either $ or $’ then
this must be so in virtue of the fact that it is both
supererogatory that $ and supererogatory that $’. I will
return to this odd result in the eighth chapter.
I will make a few brief remarks about the behavior of
SU vis a vis and Let me first note that the
supererogat ion ist ic analogue of RM is not validity-
preserving:
Perhaps, this is already obvious given An t i -Neces s i t at i on .
For suppose that SU$, for some $ at some world in some
model. Now let $’ be any tautology. Then ]= $’ and hence
]= $ -> $’. But then by AN ~'SU$’. So SU$ -> SU$’ will be
false in any such model. However, a less trivial
falsifying model is suggested by the following:
SU & Conditionals and Bi-Conditionals
]= $ -> $’ /> ]= SU$ -> SU$’
/\
/ \
all (save
someone)-worlds
* all (save both)-worlds
: /
*
\ \
\/ / all (save just one)-worlds
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Suppose that in all my minimal worlds, I save just one
child and in all my better than minimal worlds I save both
children. Then it is supererogatory to save two children,
though not to save just one. Now logic alone yields that
if I save both children then I have saved a child. (More
accurately: modulo a propositional language, if I have
saved both the first and the second then I have saved
either the first or the second.) Nonetheless, saving a
child isn’t supererogatory since I do this even if I do the
minimum. That is, saving a child is not supererogatory in
such a situation even though it is entailed by doing
something that is. So even a state of affairs that is
itself contingent though nonetheless a logically necessary
condition of something supererogatory may be unavoidable if
I do only the minimum.
Unlike the previous modal operators, MU, OU and LE,
the SU-analog of K holds -- trivially. That is,
]= SU($ -> $’) -> (SU$ -> SU$’)
For the SU-analog of K holds in virtue of the following
fact
:
]= SU($ -> $’) -> ~su$
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For since ]= ($ -> $’) <-> r$ v r)> by RE s
^
the above ig
equivalent to SUr$ v $’) -> ~SU$. But we noted above that
the only time a disjunction can be supererogatory while one
of its disjuncts fails to be supererogatory is when that
disjuncts is forbidden. So our earlier results plainly
yield ]- SU( $ v $’) -> (SU $ v IM$). But we’ve already
seen that ]= SlT$ -> ~SU$, and ]= ~IM$ -> ~SU$. So
]= SU(~$ v $’) -> ~SU$
.
Hence, since all models falsify ] = SU($ -> $’) & SU$,
all models verify K s .
Hence once we’ve noted that ]= SU($ -> $’) <->
SU( $ v $), our previous reflections readily generate the
following:
]
= SU($ -> $’ ) -> ~SIT$’)
]t SU"$ -> SU($ -> $’)
]
= SU($ -> $’
)
-> (~su~$ -> su$
’
)
]
= SU($ -> $’ -> (~SU$’ -> SU~$)]
u SU($ -> $’ -> sir$
]
= SU($ -> $’ & pe~$ . -> . sir$
]
= SU($ -> $’ & PE $ ’ . . SU$ ’
)
]
= SU($ -> $’ & ~su$’ . -> . sir$
]
= SU($ -> $’ & PE~$ & PE $ ’ . -> . SU~$ & SU$ ’
]
= SU($ -> $’ & ~sir$ . -> . im~$ & SU$’
Regarding <- >
,
we have already noted that RE S holds
( RE S ) If ] = $ <-> $’ then ]= SU$ <-> SU$ ’
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Note that since ]= ($ <-> $’) <-> [$ & $’) v (~ $ & ~$
> ) ]
^
RE S yields that ]= SU($ <-> $’) <-> SU[$ & $’) v ($ & $’)]
and the latter is a disjunction in the scope of SU.
Hence, our previous reflections on the behavior of SU and
"v" generate the following:
]= SU($ <-> $’) SU($ & $’) v SU (
~$ & ~$*)
]= SU($ <-> $’) PE ( $ & $’) -> SU ( $ & $’)
] = SU($ <-> $’) PE(~$ & -> SU ( ~$ & ~$’)
We will now turn to the behavior of SU vis a vis OU and LE.
Some Theses Involving "SU” & "OU" & LE"
SU and LE
Is there any interesting intuitive relation between
the supererogatory and the least? The following seems
obviously desirable: SU$ — > ~LE$. For example, if it is
supererogatory for me to help my neighbor with his car,
then it is not the case that the least I can do is help him
with his car. For if it was the least I could do, then
there wouldn’t be anything supererogatory about helping
her
.
It is easy to see that [SU] ratifies this intuitive
principle
:
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]= su$ -> ~LE$
For, suppose that SU$ at i. Then by [SU] ( i ) , there is an
i acceptable $-wor Id, j, ranked lower than any i-
acceptable $-world. But, in contrast, for it to be the
case LE $ at i, there would have to be an i-acceptable $-
world, k, ranked lower than any i-acceptable ~$-world. So,
per impossible, since j is a "$-world and k is an $-world,
j would have to be ranked lower than k while k is ranked
lower than j .
Notice that the permissibility of the supererogatory,
yields the intuitive principle: SU$ -> ~LE$ & PE$. This
might lead to the suggestion that the consequent is not
only a necessary condition for supererogation but that it
ought to be taken as a sufficient one. If it were, then
supererogation could be defined as follows:
7
SU$ =df ~LE$ & PE$
But this won’t do. For no matter how I discharge my
obligations, if I do it in one of the minimal ways, I won’t
do anything supererogatory. For example, one of the ways
in which I might do the bare minimum might involve my
scratching my back lefty at t and another might involve
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scratching it righty at t. (Assume I can only do one of
these at a time and nothing hinges on which I do.) Then,
in particular, it is both true that it is not the case that
the least I can do is scratch ray back lefty and it is
permissible that I do so. Hence on this proposal it would
be supererogatory for me to scratch my back lefty in such a
case—which is clearly wrong. So, although being
permissible but not the least is a necessary condition of
supererogation, it is not sufficient. [SU] plainly bears
this out
:
( ~LE $ & PE $ ) -> SU$
The following diagram, based on the intuitive case just
mentioned suggests a falsifying model:
/\
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
(scratch lefty)-world -- ** -- (scratch r i ght y ) -wor 1
d
\/
Here in one of my minimal worlds, I scratch lefty (but not
righty), whereas in another, I scratch righty (but not
lefty). In virtue of the fact that I don’t scratch lefty
in one of my minimal worlds, it is not the case that the
least I can do is scratch lefty. On the other hand, in
virtue of the fact that I do scratch lefty in one of my
minimal worlds, scratching lefty is permissible. So
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' lE(1 SCratCh 1Sfty) & PE ” •"•tch lefty). But in „ irtue
of the fact that I do scratch lefty in one of my miniaal
worlds, it is not supererogatory to do so and hence
'
SU( I SCratCh lefty >' ^dels of this sort a readily
available.
bo, since ~LE $ * PE$ is too weak, a stronger condition
than this one is needed. Reflecting on why this condition
failed, it is not hard to see what is needed. For the
least I can do is $ just in case no matter how i mi g ht
discharge my obligations in the minimal way, I will do $.
Hence, for it to be true that 'Least $, for some p, it is
sufficient that there be some way that I can do the bare
minimum that duty demands in which $ is false. But this is
compatible with there being ways in which I do the minimum
in which $ is true. It is the fact that this latter
possibility is allowed by the proposed definiens that makes
it inadequate. We need to be assured that no matter how I
discharge my duties, if I do it in one of the minimal ways,
then I do not do anything supererogatory. Or, conversely,
if I do something supererogatory, then I don’t do this
thing in any of my minimal acceptable worlds. Given our
semantic condition for SU and for LE
,
the following appears
to be just what is needed:
]= SU$ -> LE '$
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In fact the reader may have already realized that this
principle holds. For by SU(i), SU$ only if there is an i-
acceptable $-world, j, ranked lower than any i-acceptable
$-world. But a moments reflection will reveal that this
condition is equivalent to the condition that [LE] provides
for LE $ : there is an i-acceptable world, j, such that
every i-acceptable world that j is ranked at least as high
as is an ~$-world. For suppose that j is ranked lower than
any i acceptable $—world. Then not only is j an ~$—world
t*nt every i acceptable world ranked at this level or lower
must also be a $-world. Hence every i-acceptable world
that j is ranked at least as high as is an ~$-world.
Similarly, if the latter condition holds for j then since j
is ranked at least as high as itself, j must be a "$-world.
Furthermore, since j is ranked at least as high as any i-
acceptable ~$-world, any i-acceptable world ranked higher
than j must be a $-world. So j is an i-acceptable ~$-world
ranked lower than any i-acceptable $-world. Hence, [ S U ] ( i
)
holds for $ if and only if LE~$ holds by [LE].
Furthermore, since [SU] (ii) is just the condition for
permissibility, [SU] (ii) holds for $ if and only if PE$
holds. Hence our semantic clause for [SU] and [LE] entail
the following equivalence:
]= SU$ <-> LE~$ & PE $
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So [SU] and [LE] justifies:
SU$ =df LE~$ & PE$
That is, the defining condition for SU$ is just the
conjunction of the defining conditions for LE'"$ and PE$.
Clearly, this is not an expected result. For if we
thought that it was supererogatory for Doe to see to it
that the children are saved, although we would ordinarily
be disposed to say that Doe’s saving the children was
permissible and that it is not the case that his saving the
children is the least he can do, we would not ordinarily be
disposed to say "the least Doe could do was not save the
children". So SU$ -> LE~$ is certainly odd.
Either the oddity indicates that [SU] is wrong or that
[LE] is wrong or the oddity is pragmatic. I will ask the
reader to suspend judgement on the significance of this
oddity until we return to it in the eighth chapter. I only
note here that the semantics for SU and LE seem intuitively
plausible when considered independently. The idea that
what is supererogatory is what is permissible but precluded
by what I do if I operate at the minimal end of my
acceptable alternatives and that the least I can do is
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whatever I do in all my minimally acceptable alternatives
are each intuitively plausible.
SU and OU
Recall that we have already noted that [SU] does not
run into the problems of its predecessors, [SU1-3] and some
of these pertain to SU vis a vis OU. In particular, there
are models where there are supererogatory bests. That is,
]? su$ -> ~ou$,
although ]= SU$ -> MU$. On the other hand, there are also
models where what is supererogatory is not what I ought to
see to:
su$ -> ou$
Neither does optimizing entail supererogation:
]? ou$ -> su$.
For if I simply must see to $, then I ought to see to $
even though it is not supererogatory to do so. This might
suggest that what we ought to do, provided that it is
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gratuitous, is after all supererogatory. However, we saw
above that gratuitous optimizing is not intuitively
sufficient for supererogation (and we saw that [SU] bears
this out )
:
]t (0U$ & GR$ ) -> SU$
These technical results are all things that pre-theoret ic
intuition leads one to expect.
Suppose however that I ought to see to $, but it is not
the least I can do. Is it then supererogatory to see to $?
Not quite:
]f (0U$ & ~LE$ ) -> SU$
For suppose that I ought to see to $, but I can operate at
the minimal range whether I see to $ or don’t see to $.
Then although 0U$ holds, LE$ does not. But if ~LE$, then
~SU$. For doing $ can’t be supererogatory if I can see to
$ while doing no more than the minimum. An intuitively
plausible falsifying model is suggested by the following:
/\ \
!
! / (Save them both)-worlds
: *
i i
i i
(save the boy)-world — ** — (save the girl)-world
\/
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Here doing the minimum entails saving (just) one of the
children and doing the maximum entails saving both. Hence,
in particular, doing the maximum entails saving the boy.
But I also do this in one of the minimal acceptables.
Hence it is not supererogatory to save the boy. For
although the least I can do is save one of them, it is not
the case that the least I can do is save the boy in
particular. Clearly there are just such models given our
analysis.
Is there then no interesting link then between OU and
SU? That is, is there no interesting way we can strengthen
the antecedent of "0U$ -> SU$" that is sound? There is:
]= (0U$ & LE~$ ) -> SU$
For suppose that 0U$ & LE~$ hold. Then all my best
acceptable worlds are $-worlds and no minimal acceptable
worlds are $ — that is, they are all ~$-worlds. By 0U$,
there is an acceptable $- world. So there is an acceptable
$-world and there is an acceptable ~$-world ranked lower
than any acceptable $-world. Hence SU$ holds.
Having noted the equivalence, on our semantics, between
SU$ and (PE$ & LE~$), this result is not surprising. For
we have already seen that 0U$ holds only if PE$ holds,
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hence ]= (0U$ & LE~$) -> ( PE$ & L E ~$). As we sa „ ab()ve thfi
consequent of the latter principle is equivalent to SU$.
Conclus ion
Something puzzling about the notion of supererogation
is how does one do more than what one is obligated to do?
Just what is supererogation an excess over? The answer is
now clear. The excess is a permissible excess over the
minimum that morality allows of us. To do more than one
has to do is to do something that one is permitted to do
but is precluded by doing the least one can do. Since it
is permissible, but excluded by doing the least, it must be
something that we do only in some acceptable alternatives
that lie beyond our minimally acceptable ones. In a word,
to do more than one has to do is to do more than the least
one can do.
It should also be clear that independent reflection on
this "More Than You Had To Do" idiom provides the same sort
of internal corroboration of our structure that we saw
stemmed from both our reflections on the "must "-"ought"
pair, and our reflections on the "Least Can Do" idiom. For
had we stumbled on this idiom first, we would have been
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led, upon reflection, to just the structure that we would
have been led to by reflecting either on the "must"~"ought"
pair or on the Least Can Do idiom. Hence each of these
three linguistic phenomena tend to converge quite naturally
on the single semantic framework that we have proposed to
account for them. Similarly, the classical conception
itself and the pre- theoret ic embeddedness of this idiom in
our most ordinary discourse provide an external
corroboration of one another — the one stemming from
linguistic intuitions, the other stemming from intuitions
about ethical cases.
We return next to the question of moral indifference
and its place in our framework.
*
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CHAPTER 7
THE GRADES OF MORAL INDIFFERENCE
Int roduct ion
In this chapter we return to the concept of moral
indifference. As it turns out, there are a number of
concepts or grades of indifference that are expressible in
our framework. We will examine these on our way to
submitting a plausible candidate for ordinary moral
indifference. We will of course be occupying ourselves
with the connection between supererogation, moral
indifference, and moral optionality. We will confirm that
our proposed candidate has all the virtues that we were led
to anticipate that moral indifference would have, and that
in particular, our candidate for ordinary indifference,
optionality and supererogation will be interrelated in all
the ways that our reflections in Chapter Two led us to
expect. In addition, there will be some connections
between these three concepts that our reflections there did
not provide us with. In addition, since we are now in
possession of a number of deontic operators that we lacked
in Chapter Two, there will be additional connections that
could not have been uncovered there because we lacked the
additional resources that we have since marshalled. This
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will bring to a halt the development of our deontic
applications of the proposed semantic framework in this
essay
.
Optionality, Indifference and Supererogation Again
Recall our definition of optionality:
0P$ = df ~MU~$ & ~"MU$ & MU ( $ -> $).
The last clause is to guarantee that something is optional
at i only if there is some i-acceptable world in the first
place. With this "existential presupposition already built
into the truth-conditions for our analysis of
permissibility, we could just a well define 0P$ as follows:
0P$ =df PE $ & PE ~$
Since existential presupposition is a subtlety that need
not concern us here, we will hide it by relying on the
latter formulation.
Recall what optionality amounts to semantically:
[OP] 0P$ is true at i if and only if (i) there is an
i-acceptable $-world and (ii) there is an i—
acceptable ~$-world.
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That is, something is optional just in case it occurs
somewhere among the acceptables and so does it’s negation
Unlike the various No Conflicts principles for MU, OU,
LE and SU, here we want to guarantee for optionality what
the No Conflict principles deny for MU, OU, LE and SU.
That is, optionality should and does satisfy an
"Indifference to Negation" principle:
]= 0P$ <-> 0P~$.
For having Wheaties for breakfast is optional exactly when
not having Wheaties is, and, saving both children is
optional exactly when not saving both children is. [OP]
bears this out. For it is optional to see to $ just in
case there is an acceptable $ world and an acceptable
world. But it is optional to see to it that "$ just in
case there is an acceptable ~$ -world and an acceptable
~$-world, which is to say an acceptable $-world.
Recall now that Urmson’s objection to the traditional
scheme is, in essence, that this scheme lacks a sufficient
basis for characterizing either the morally indifferent or
the supererogatory. For the traditional scheme partitions
all actions into those that are either obligatory,
forbidden or optional -- and of those that are optional, it
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can provide no further divisions. However, although
supererogatory actions are optional, they are not morally
indifferent. Hence, the traditional triad cannot
represent either of these two proper and exclusive subsets
of the optional.
If we think of the traditional tripartite scheme as
having only three possible categories: that which is
obligatory, that which is forbidden and that which is
neither, then it is no surprise that the closest this
scheme could come to defining indifference is to identify
it with optionality. That is, the best they could do was
say the indifferent was whatever was neither obligatory nor
forbidden. Half of the resulting equivalence is surely
correct
,
namely
:
Indi f ferent ( $ ) -> ~MU$ & ~IM$
It is the implication in the other direction that can’t be
plausibly maintained: though being neither obligatory nor
permissible is a necessary condition for moral
indifference, it is not sufficient.
We have found no reason to deny the partitioning that
is characteristic of the classical scheme. But neither
have we carelessly identified the morally indifferent with
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the morally optional. Indeed, when we were examining the
debate between the classical conception of supererogation
and utilitarianism in Chapter Two, we laid down the
following constraints on any deontic scheme that took
supererogation seriously:
Opt ional ity With a Difference ( OWD
)
: It is possible
that there are alternatives for an agent which are
morally optional, but not morally indifferent.
Classical Criterion of Adequacy (CA) : The morally
indifferent must be represented as a proper subclass
of the morally optional (i.e. indifference properly
implies the opt i onal i ty )
.
Optimality Indifference
Notice that since we have rejected the utilitarian
identification of what we ought to do with what is
obligatory, utilitarian optionality is not equivalent to
our optionality. For utilitarian optionality amounts
roughly to our (~0U$ & ~OlT$ & 0U($ -> $)), and the latter
is clearly not equivalent to our (PE$ & PE~$). Ignoring
the possibility of no upper bound on the value that one can
produce, utilitarian optionality would amount to
indifference regarding the bests. 1 D i agr ammat ical 1 y
:
~0U$ & ~0U~$ :
~$-wor Id — ** — $-wor Id
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
\/
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That is, $ is optional modulo utilitarianism just in case
we can yield the maximal level of available value whether
or not we see to $ that is, just in case neither $ nor
$ is essential to optimizing. Let’s refer to this as
"optimality indifference" and introduce the barbarism, "It
is Optimality Indifferent that" as a defined operator:
01$ -df ~ou$ & ~oir$ & mu ( $ -> $)
(Roughly, we can read this as a conditional indifference:
if your going to do the best you can, then $ is a matter of
indifference. Cf. If your going to stay home then it
doesn’t matter whether you get cleaned up. )
01 & The Constraints
Now optimality indifference properly implies moral
optionality. For the third conjunct is true only if there
is some i-acceptable world and given that this is so, the
first and second conjuncts are true only if there is an i-
acceptable ~$-world and an i-acceptable $-world,
respectively. Hence 01$ holds at i only if (PE$ & PE $)
also holds at i. So we have:
]= 01$ -> 0P$
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Fur t hermore
,
the implication is proper:
0P$ -> 01$.
For there will be models with worlds, i, where all the
optimal i -accep t ab 1 es are $-worlds, even though there are
sub-optimal i-acceptable ^-worlds. All such worlds will
be (0P$ & ~0 1 $ ) -wo r 1 ds
:
0P$ & "01$ :
/\
!
! \ all $-wor Ids
:
: /
! *
i i
i i
! * -- some ~$-world
i f
i i
\/
So optimality indifference does carve out a proper
fragment of the morally optional and there will be models
where something is optional but not optimality indifferent.
Hence optimality indifference satisfies both the Classical
Criterion of Adequacy and the Principle of Optionality with
a Difference. It is also plain that is satisfies one
fundamental principle for any indifference operator: The
Indifference to Negation to Moral Optionality:
INMO: ]= 01$ <-> 0I~$.
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01 & Moral Indifference
However, despite these virtues, optimality indifference
cannot be identified with ordinary moral indifference. For
suppose that I am so situated that it is supererogatory to
see to it that I save either the boy or the girl and doing
each is permissible. Then, as we saw, it will be
supererogatory to save the boy and supererogatory to save
the girl. But we can also add that I simply can’t save
both and that if I’m going to save either it is a matter of
indifference as to which I save. Furthermore, add that
doing the best, and only doing the best, entails saving one
of them. Then it is optimality indifferent that I save the
boy. But it is not a matter of moral indifference that I
do so, for I only do so if I opt for one of my best
acceptable alternatives. D iagr ammat i ca 1 1 y ,
01 $ :
(save just the ** -- (save just the girl)-world
boy) -world — !
*
:
: \
! ! all (save ne i t her ) -wor 1 ds
: : /
\/
Here it is optimality indifferent that I save the boy. But
it is not a matter of moral indifference to do so -- for if
I do anything less than the best I don’t save either and it
is permissible to do less than the best.
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Notice also that the identification of optimality
indifference would violate one of the other constraints of
Chapter Two. The constraint in question is one on both
supererogation and indifference:
The Non Indifference o f Supererogation
: An alternat-ive is supererogatory for an agent only if it is notmorally indifferent for the agent.
Recall that this is this constraint that led Urmson to
think that the traditional scheme unreflect ively ruled out
the possibility of supererogation. We have seen that he
was mistaken -- a mistake engendered by the fact that
Urmson, along with most deontic logician and ethicists
conflated moral optionality with moral indifference. Hence
he was mistaken about the implication of this principle for
the traditional scheme. The scheme is incomplete, not
defective.
Nonetheless, the Non- Ind i f ference of Supererogation is
itself a patently plausible constraint and it is one that
01 violates. That is,
]f SU$ -> ~0I$
For something can be supererogatory in virtue of the fact
that it is permissible but precluded by doing the minimum,
even though if we do the best we can, it no longer matters
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whether we do this thing or not. To see this we need only
consider the previous case. For in this case, saving
either one of the children is supererogatory. For saving
each is permissible and I save neither if I do the least I
can. So in particular, saving the boy is supererogatory.
But we have already seen that saving the boy is optimality
indifferent. Hence if we identified ordinary moral
indifference with optimality indifference, then, granting
our analysis of supererogation, we would allow for the
possibility of indifferent supererogatory action — in
violation of this plausible constraint. Since we can
easily imagine cases of this sort where saving the boy is
intuitively supererogatory, our analysis of supererogation
is not brought into question by this result. Hence this
result must reflect the fact that optimality indifference
is simply not an eligible candidate for moral indifference.
Minimality Indifference
Clearly our semantic structure allows us to generate a
bottom-end mirror image of optimality indifference. Let’s
call this ’’minimality indifference’’ while introducing
another barbarism, "it is Minimality Indifferent that as
follows
:
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MIS
-df ^ LE $ & ^LE^S & MU ( $ -> $)
(We can also read this as a conditional indifference: if
your going to do the least you can, then $ is a matter of
indifference.
)
Minimality indifference has the same virtues as
optimality indifference: it carves out a proper subclass of
the morally optional and there will be models where
something is morally optional, but not minimality
indifferent and something will be minimality indifferent if
and only if its negation is also. So we have:
]= MI $ -> 0P$
]t 0P$ -> M I $
]= MI$ <-> MI
~$
The reasoning is precisely analogous to that for the
corresponding optimality indifference principles.
Furthermore, unlike optimality indifference,
identifying minimality indifference with moral
indifference, given our analysis of supererogation, does
not violate the Non— Indifference of Supererogation. For
clearly if something, $, is minimality indifferent, then ~$
does not occur throughout the lower end of the range of
acceptable alternatives. But then, by our analysis of
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supererogation, $ cannot be supererogatory (nor can '$
by parity of reasoning). Hence we get the following
principle:
]= SU$ -> I $
As we have seen, it is intuitively plausible to think
that if something $ could be done while doing the minimum
that is acceptable, then $ can’t be supererogatory. If one
of the minimal ways in which I can discharge all of my
obligations includes seeing to $, surely seeing to $ is not
supererogatory. Hence, the fact that our analysis of
supererogation yields the result that nothing that is
supererogatory can be minimality indifferent tends to
confirm the adequacy of our analysis of supererogation.
Nonetheless, as the reader probably already suspects,
the same sort of initial considerations that blocked
identifying optimality indifference with ordinary moral
indifference also blocks identifying minimality
indifference with moral indifference. For suppose the
following. If I’m going to do the minimum that is
permissible, it is a matter of indifference whether I give
to Charity 1 or Charity 2. Hence it is minimality
indifferent that I give to Charity 1. Furthermore, my
doing the minimum precludes my giving to more than one
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However, if I do any better than the minimum, I
give to both charities. Surely then it is not a matter of
indifference that I give to Charity 1, for I can do the
best I can only if I do so. D i agr amma t i ca 1 1 y
,
M I $ :
/\
:
: \
1 • all (Cl & C2)-worlds
•'
: /
: *
(Cl & ~C2)-world -- ** -- (C2 & ~Cl)-world
So despite this advantage over optimality indifference,
minimality indifference also cannot be identified with
ordinary moral indifference.
Optionality Again
Although these attempts fail to characterize moral
indifference, they are not without interest. For they
demonstrate some of the additional resources available to
us given our semantic framework. But they reflect more
than this. For from our framework, we can think of
Urmson’s point as that something can have a morally
"significant" status even though it is optional. Our
framework certainly bears this out and it is easy to see
why this is so. Consider how we might try to provide a
characteristic diagram for optionality. There are so many
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ways that something can be optional on our framework, that
it is hard to know what single diagram to settle on.
Consider the following diagrams and the distinct ways that
$ is optional according to them:
/\
i i
i i
I * -- $
:*
—
~$
i i
i i
\/
'$ —
/\ /\
** —
$
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
-- **
\/ \/
— $
/\
: * — $
i i
i i
i i
: * — ~$
\/
In each case we have an i-acceptable $-world and an i-
accept able $-world. Note in particular that there is no
requirement at all regarding where one or the other world
occurs among the i-acceptab les — just as long as each does
occur somewhere. But then something can be optional on our
framework while having a significant status. In a
nutshell, all that moral optionality requires is the
fol lowing:
/\
:
: \
i i
i i
:
: /
\/
an $-world & a ~$-world
somewhere in here.
OP, OU and LE
In particular, $ can clearly be optional even if we
ought to see to $ and even if we ought to see to "$. The
following diagrams suggest two such models:
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0P$ & 0U$ : 0P$ & 0 U
~
:
/\ \ all $-worlds
:
: /
: *
' * -- "$-world
i i
i i
\/
/\ \ all $-worlds
:
: /
: *
' * — $-world
l i
\/
Intuitively, it may be optional to visit a sick friend ($)
(for I may call instead) even though doing the best entails
visiting. Similarly, it may be optional to call ray sick
friend ($), even though doing the best entails not calling
(e.g. it entails paying a surprise visit).
Obviously, the bottom-end mirror image of these models
will yield a model where (0P$ & LE$ ) holds and a model
where (0P$ & LE~$) holds.
An Additional Constraint on Moral Indifference
So in light of the current framework: something, $, can
be optional while it is also the case that any of the
following holds: (i) I ought to see to $ or (ii) I ought to
see to or (iii) the least I can do is see to $ or (iv)
the least I can do is see to ~$ . But surely if any of (i)
- (iv) hold then $ is not morally indifferent. So our
framework provides us with some additional non- t rad i t i ona
1
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constraints on any adequate analysis of moral indifference:
0U$ ->
~ I nd i f fer en t ( $
)
OU $ -> " I nd i f f e ren t ( $
)
LE$ -> ~Indi f ferent ( $
LE $ -> ' Ind i f feren t ( $
Hence any adequate analysis of moral indifference will have
to endorse these principles.
These principles, conjoined with the traditional
necessary conditions for moral indifference, yield the
following necessary condition for indifference, call it the
"No Significant Status for Indifference" (NSSI) principle:
NSS I : Indi f feren t ( $ ) -> ~MU$ & ~IM$ & ~0U$ &
~0U~$ & ~ LE $ & ~ LE ~ $ .
What is indifferent is neither obligatory nor forbidden nor
what we ought to do nor what we ought to not do nor is it
the least we can do nor the least we cannot do.
But the following principle does hold:
]= (~0U$ & ~0U~$) v ( ~LE$ & ~LE~$ ) .->. ~MU$ & ~IM$
For ]= MU$ -> 0U$. Hence by transposition, ]= ~0U$ -> ~MU$.
Also ]= IM$ -> 0U~$. Hence, by transposition, ]= ’"011'"$ ->
~IM$. So ]= (~0U$ & ~01T$) -> "MU$ & ~IM$. Similarly, if
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we substitute LE for OU in the preceding, the results are
sound. So NSSI can be reduced to:
Indifferent ($ ) -> ~0U$ & ~0U~$ & ~LE$ & ~LE~$.
The occurrence of "~MU$ & ~IM$", though correct, is
redundant. Given our recently introduced operators, we can
concisely express the above as:
Ind i f f eren t ( $ ) -> 01$ & MI$.
Polarity Indifference
Let’s introduce yet another indifference operator,
"Polarity Indifference", to be read as "it is polarity
indifferent that":
PI$ =df 01$ & M I
$
So $ is polarity indifferent just in case it is both
optimality and minimality indifferent. (Informally, "If
your going to do either the least you can or the best you
can, then $ is a matter of indifference".)
404
It is easy to verify that polarity indifference
inherits the virtue of properly implying optionality and of
being indifferent to negation. That is, the following
obviously hold:
]= PI$ -> 0P$
]f 0P$ -> PI$
]= PI$ <-> PI~$
Since either of 01$ or MI$ suffice for 0P$, the first
principle holds "doubley". Similarly, since 01$ <-> 0I~$
and MI$ <-> MI^$, it follows that (01$ & MI$) <-> (0I~$ &
MI~$). So the third principle holds. Regarding the middle
principle, either of our earlier falsifying models for
0P$ -> 01$ or for 0P$ -> MI$ will obviously do.
Given our earlier reflections, coupled with these
definitions, the following obviously holds, we can now
express NSSI concisely as:
Indi f ferent ( $ ) -> PI$.
Thus polarity indifference is a strong necessary condition
for moral indifference.
Furthermore, we saw above, SU$ -> ~MI$ is universally
valid. Hence, given the definition of PI, it follows
immediately that:
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]= su$ -> ~PI$
Hence, also to its credit, polarity indifference, if
identified with moral indifference, would not result in a
violation of the Non-Indifference of Supererogation.
Polarity Indifference & Moral Indifference
We saw previously that neither optimality indifference
nor minimality indifference can be equated with moral
indifference. Each is too weak. For each can hold for
some $ when $ is intuitively not morally indifferent.
However, the cases that made this evident were ones where
something was optimality indifferent, but not minimality
indifferent in the first case, and in the second, where
something was minimality indifferent but not optimality
indifferent. Hence each counterexample to identifying the
one form of indifference with moral indifference was a case
where the item in question was neither morally indifferent
intuitively nor polarity indifferent by our proposal. This
suggests the possibility that we have already found moral
indifference: it is just polarity indifference. That is,
not only is PI$ a necessary condition for moral
indifference, but it is also sufficient. Let’s explore
this possibility.
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Let’s patch together the earlier diagrams to see what
polarity indifference would look like.
PIS
~$-wor Id — ** -- $
-wo r 1
d
l l
i i
i i
i i
i I
l i
"$-world — ** -- $
-wo r 1
(We make the simplifying assumption that there is both a
maximal and a minimal level of acceptable value). So
something is polarity indifferent just in case if we are
going to opt for one of the extreme levels of acceptable
value, it is a matter of indifference as to whether $ or
occurs
.
If we think of a languages resources to express or come
close to expressing indifference operators as those
available w/o introducing such operators as primitive, then
just as optionality is the closest that the traditional
scheme can come, (and this isn’t very close since
"indifference" is altogether a misnomer here), then
polarity indifference is the closest we can come in our
language’s resources. And indeed, given our available
resources, this is the strongest definable indifference
operator. For polarity indifference properly implies both
minimality indifference and optimality indifference and
407
each of these in turn properly implies optionality. So our
question is equivalent to asking whether indifference is
definable via our current object language resources.
Alas, the fact of the matter is that moral indifference
cannot be defined because it cannot be plausibly identified
with polarity indifference either. Let’s see why we
should suspect that this is so. Consider the following
abstract scenario, where $ is polarity indifferent:
PI$, but not Indi f ferent ( C 1
)
:
$-world -- ** --
~$-world
: *
:
: \
! ! all $-wor Ids
:
: /
: *
$-world -- -- ~$-world
Here if I do either the best or the least I can do, it
doesn’t matter whether I do $ or don’t. Nonetheless, if I
am going to do anything less than the best but better than
the least, it is not a matter of indifference at all. In
fact, doing any better than the least while falling short
of the best requires doing $ on this scenario. Clearly
such models are possible and given our intended
interpretation of such models, it seems quite dubious to
say that $ is a matter of indifference in such a scenario.
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case.
Consider a slightly more complicated concrete
Sorry, but it involves charities once again:
PICC1), but not Indifferent fCl) :
(just Cl & C3 )
-wor 1 d -- ** — (just C2 & C3)-world
: *
:
:
\ a11 (just Cl & C2 )
-worlds
:
: /
: *
: *
'
' \ all (just C3)-worlds
:
: /
: *
(just Cl)-world — ** — (just C2)-world
Here imagine things to be as follows. There are three
eligible charities and I can give to any combination,
except all three. Now the value of these permissible acts
of giving are as follows. Giving to C3 is almost but not
quite twice as good as giving to either C2 or to Cl and the
latter pair of acts of giving is on a par. Imagine that
things are additive from here. So that giving to C3 along
with either Cl or with C2 (but not both) are the best
options; whereas giving to both Cl and C2 (but not C3) is
the next best option; and giving to just C3 is the next
best option, and, finally, giving to either just Cl or just
C2 are the minimally acceptable options. That is, (Cl &
C3) = (C2 & C3) > (Cl & C2) > C3 > Cl = C2.
In this scenario, if I do the least I can do, I either
give to just Cl or just C2 and if I’m going to give to only
one of these two, but not C3, then it doesn’t matter which.
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So in particular, MI(C1). Similarly, if I do the best I
can do, then I either give to just (Cl and C3) or to just
(C2 and C3). Furthermore, if I am going to opt for either
of these two combinations, it doesn’t matter which. So in
particular, 0P(C1). Hence, PI(C1). But as the diagram
indicates, if I opt for the next best charity thing, I give
to Cl and C2. Hence doing the next best thing absolutely
requires giving to charity 1 it is an inescapable part
of doing the next best thing. But then surely giving Cl is
not a matter of moral indifference. For there is a level
of acceptable value that it is absolutely essential to --
even if it is not essential to operating at the pole of
acceptability.
The Insufficiency of Optional
Non- I nd i f ference for Supererogation
Notice also that this indicates that we cannot take the
supererogatory to be simply that which is optional but not
indifferent. For we must maintain the following:
0P$ & ~Indi f feren t ( $ ) 17 SU$
For here, although giving to Cl is essential to something
that is supererogatory (namely, opting for the (Cl and C2)
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combo) and it is optional, but not indifferent, it is not
itself something that is supererogatory.
Of course this is not the only reason that we can’t
assume that supererogation is just non-indif ferent
opt ional ity . For obviously, if the least I can do is $,
and it is permissible for me to do then $ is neither
intuitively indifferent nor supererogatory, but it is
clearly optional. That is, since the least we can do is
never indifferent nor supererogatory but is sometimes
optional, the supererogatory and the morally indifferent do
not exhaust the morally optional. Our analyses already
bears part of this out:
]= ( LE$ & PE~$ ) -> (0P$ & ~SU$)
And this is not vacuously true since there are obviously
models where LE$ & PE~$ are satisfied:
~ Indi f ferent ( $ ) & 0P$ & ^SU$ :
/\
i i
some ~$-world — *!
: *
!
I \ all $-worlds
\/ /
So an additional constraint that we on any adequate
analyses of optionality, moral indifference and
supererogation is "The Insufficiency of Optional Non-
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Indifference for Supererogation"
IONS: 0P$ & ~ Indi f ferent ( $ ) SU$
So we have failed to find a way to introduce ordinary
moral indifference de f i n i t i ona 1 1 y . Nonetheless, as we
saw, even if we could not adequately represent moral
indifference, our scheme already allows us to express the
possibility that optional actions can have a significant
status that indifferent actions cannot — and this
certainly takes us some of the way toward overcoming the
deficiencies of the traditional scheme that most concerned
Urmson. Furthermore, we have been able to introduce
special operators expressing species of indifference weaker
then moral indifference. Finally, it is surely plausible
to think that although each of these forms of indifference
is too weak for ordinary moral indifference, they are
nonetheless necessary conditions of moral indifference.
That is, if something, $, is genuinely morally indifferent
then whether we opt to do the maximum or to do the minimum
it shouldn’t matter whether we see to $ or not. The
question that now arises is this: granting that we can’t
simply introduce ordinary moral indifference via the
operators that we have thus far devised, do we have the
semantic resources to introduce a plausible candidate for
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moral indifference as a new primitive operator? We now
turn to this question.
A Plausible Candidate: Complete Indifference
If we reflect on each case that was introduced in order
to reveal the inadequacy of our proposed candidates for
moral indifference (i.e. 01, MI, and PI), we find that the
cases have something interesting in common. In each
problematic case, there is something, $, that is pre-
theoretically not morally indifferent in virtue of the fact
that there is some level of permissible value that simply
cannot be achieved unless $ occurs. For in each case,
although seeing to $ was a matter of indifference at one
(or both) of the extremes of the range of the acceptable
alternatives, there was some place in the range where
seeing to $ was essential to achieving that level of
acceptable value. What these cases lack intuitively, is
precisely what we should expect from moral indifference:
$ is morally indifferent for me in some circumstance
just in case no matter what level of acceptable value
I might achieve, I can achieve it whether or not I
see to $ (and I exist in that circumstance to begin
with)
.
Or equivalently,
$ is not morally indifferent for me (in some
circumstance) just in case either there is some
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acceptable level of value available to me such thateither my seeing to $ or my seeing to ~$ is essentialto my achieving that level of value (or I don’t even
exist in that circumstance) .2
So for example, if I can achieve any morally acceptable
level of value currently available to me whether or not I
wear black socks today, then wearing black socks today is a
matter of moral indifference for me. On the other hand, if
there is some level of morally acceptable value available
to me that I can achieve only if I wear black socks today,
or only if I don’t wear black socks today, then my wearing
black socks today is not a matter of moral indifference.
On our framework, we can spell out this talk of levels
of acceptable value. Suppose that for some $ the following
three things are true: (i) for every acceptable course of
action where I see to $, there is at least one equally
ranked acceptable course of action where I see to and,
(ii) for every acceptable course of action where I see to
~$, there is at least one equally ranked acceptable course
of action where I see to ~$, and, (iii) I exist. This, on
our framework, amounts to saying that although there is an
acceptable alternative, there is no level of acceptable
value for which either $ or ~$ is essential. And we have
seen that, on the face of it, this is a plausible candidate
for the conditions of moral indifference. Since we have
allowed ourselves the liberty of speaking of grades of
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indifference — for example indifference with respect to
achieving the best level of acceptable value (Optimality
Indifference), let us introduce ordinary moral indifference
under the rubric "Complete Indifference":
[CI$] CI$ is true at a world i if and only if (i)
there is an i-acceptable world and (ii) for
every i-acceptable $-world there is an i-
acceptable $-world with the same rank and
(iii) for every i-acceptable ~$-world there is
an i-acceptable $-world with the same rank.
Diagrammatically, where at a level indicates that
there are at least two worlds at that level, an $-world and
a "$-world:
CI$ :
/\
:
: \
* ! ! $ ! at al 1 levels
: : /
\/
This, on our framework, amounts to saying that CI$ is true
at a world just in case it is not a dead-end world (the
asterisk indicates this) and every acceptable level of
value can be obtained w or w/o $ (!$! at each level).
Let’s turn
looking at the
to testing the adequacy of this analysis by
logical principles it supports.
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Complete Indifference and Our Prior Cons t ra i n t-
g
First of all, Cl plainly satisfies the Indifference to
Negation of Moral Indifference:
INMI
:
]= CI$ <-> C I~$
For there is an acceptable world and for every acceptable
$-wor 1 d there is an equally ranked acceptable ~$-world and
vice versa, just in case, there is an acceptable world and
for every acceptable "$-world there is an equally ranked
acceptable ~"~$-world and vice versa.
Note that complete indifference also satisfies the
following:
]= CI$ -> ~MU$
]= ci$ -> ~Mir
]= CI$ -> ~ou$
]= CI$ -> ~ou~$
]= CI$ -> ~LE$
]= CI$ -> ~LE~$
The first two are too obvious for comment. Suppose that
CI$ holds at i. Then there is an i-acceptable world and
for all such worlds, j, there is an i-acceptable $-world
and an i-acceptable ~$-world equal in rank with j. But
then 0U$ can’t hold at i. For it holds at i only if there
is an i-acceptable world such that all i-acceptables worlds
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from there on up are $-worlds. Similarly, 0U~$ can’t hold
at i. The cases against the fifth and sixth principles,
involving "LE" are precisely analogous. Hence, complete
indifference also satisfies the new constraint engendered
by our enriched vocabulary, NSSI.
By definition, it follows immediately that complete
indifference implies our other forms of indifference:
]= CI$ -> PI$
] = CI$ -> M I $
]= CI$ -> 01$
Furthermore, it is obvious that it also implies moral
optionality:
]= CI$ -> 0P$
It is also reasonably clear that these implications are
all proper implications. That is, the following negative
principles hold:
0P$ -> CI$
01$ -> CI$
]/ MI $ -> CI$
PI$ -> CI$
The following diagram suggests one simple falsifying model
that shows this at one fell swoop:
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0 P$ & M I $ & 01$ & PI$ &
** — :$: level
i i
i i
' * — all $-wo r Ids
i i
i i
** —
: $ : level
Since there is a level of acceptable value that can’t be
achieved w/o seeing to $, $ is not completely indifferent.
Nonetheless, since PI$ holds, so do MI$ and 01$ and 0P$.
The previous case that was used to show that we
couldn’t plausibly identify Polarity Indifference with
ordinary moral indifference provides a concrete case:
(just Cl & C3 ) -wor 1 d -- ** — (just C2 & C3)-world
: *
'
' \ all (just Cl & C2 ) -worlds
'
: /
: *
: *
'
' \ all (just C3)-worlds
:
: /
: *
(just Cl)-world — **_ -- (just C2)-world
Here, since the second best thing I can do is give to both
charity one and charity two, there is a level of acceptable
worlds that can’t be achieved unless I give to Charity 1.
Hence ~CI$. But if I do the best I can or the least I can,
seeing to $ is a matter of indifference. Hence PI$.
Obviously, this is also sufficient for 01$ & MI$ & 0P$.
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So far, so good. Let’s turn to the interface of
supererogation with our indifference operators.
Notice that complete indifference (along with SU) does
satisfy The Non- Indi f f erence of Supererogation — a
constraint that also emerged from our pre- theoret ic
reflections in Chapter Two:
For suppose that SU$ is true at i. Then there is an i-
acceptable world, j, such that all i-acceptable worlds from
there on down are ^-worlds. But, then the level that j is
on must be an exclusively ~$-world level. Hence CI$ can’t
hold.
Diagrammatically,
SU$ : ~CI$ :
Supererogation and Complete Indifference
SU$ -> ~CI$
/\ /\
\
>
* — $-world
*
not ! $ I at al 1 levels
>
• \
\/ /
all ~$-wor Ids /
\/
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It is also clear that our recent reflections indirectly
assure the validity of the Non- Indi f ference of
Supererogation given our analysis of supererogation and our
proposed identification of moral indifference with complete
indifference. For we have already seen that ]= SU$ -> ~MI$
and ]= CI$ -> M I $ , from which ]= SU$ -> ~CI$ follows
immediately by PC.
Furthermore, it does not follow that if $ is not
completely indifferent, but is optional, then $ is
supererogatory. That is, the Insufficiency of Optional
Non-Indifference for Supererogation is ratified:
0P$ & ~CI$ -> su$
For, although anything supererogatory will be optional but
not indifferent, something may be the least that I can do
while being optional but non-indif ferent — in which case
it is not supererogatory.
0P$ & "01$. but ~ S U
$
:
/\
I I
i i
i i
i i
! *
--
~$-world
: *
! ! \ all $-wor Ids
\/ /
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Here seeing to ~$ i s supererogatory and therefore, seeing
to $ is not supererogatory. But seeing to $ is optional,
while not being a matter of completely indifference.
There are a variety of other ways that this can
happen. They will all have in common what is suggested by
the following diagram:
0P$ & ~CI$, but ~SU$ :
/
Some all $-world
level or all ~$-
world level in
here
.
\
/\
:
: \
\/ /
not all
'$-wor Ids
\
some ~$-world
somewhere
/
Conclusion
So if we identify complete indifference with moral
indifference, we ratify the four principles that emerged in
Chapter Two: the Indifference to Negation of Moral
Indifference, the Optionality of Indifference, the
Classical Criterion of Adequacy, and the Non- I nd i f f er ence
of Supererogation. So given the constraints that our pre-
theoretic reflections of Chapter Two engendered, things are
coming out where they should. Furthermore, we saw that
minimality, optimality and polarity indifference were too
weak as candidates for ordinary moral indifference,
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although they were plausibly taken to be necessary
conditions of moral indifference. Yet we have seen that
our candidate for ordinary moral indifference properly
implies these weaker forms of special indifference — which
is just what we would expect of ordinary moral
indifference. We also ratify our new No Significant Status
for Indifference constraint. Finally, we also ratify the
Insufficiency of Optional Non-Indifference for
Supererogation: that what is optional but non-indif ferent
need not be thereby supererogatory. Hence the behavior of
the operators of our framework appear to have come out just
where they ought to have. Although no such results suffice
to vindicate our operator analyses and the underpinning
framework, they do tend to provide substantial
confirmation.
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Chapter 7 Notes
Stri c t ly
,
the optimality indifference of $ amounts tohe claim that among the acceptable alternatives, it isneither the case that there are all $-worlds from somepoint on up nor is it the case that there are all$-wor 1 ds from some point on up. In the case of
uppermost acceptable level, this amounts to the
condition that, among the acceptables, every $-world is
surpassed by some ~$-world and vice versa. Ignoring theLatter possibility will not matter for us in the long
r un .
no
2. Note that to say that $ is not morally indifferent forJane Doe is not to say that $ is non- indi f f erent for
Jane Doe. For the former, but not the latter, is true
in all circumstances where Jane Doe does not exist. If
we wanted to introduce the non- indi f ference of $, we
would use the following condition: ~Indif ferent ( $ ) &
MU ( $ -> $).
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CHAPTER 8
SOME PARADOXES, PUZZLES AND OBJECTIONS
Int roduct ion
Since we have finished developing our deontic system,
it is time to turn to some objections that might be raised
to our proposed applications of this framework. In this
chapter I will do just that. Five objections will be
considered. These objections will all ultimately reduce to
objections to the effect that we have misrepresented at
least one of the targeted idioms in our semantic framework.
In each case, I will either argue that the accusation is
simply mistaken or I will argue that even if the accusation
is correct, it is hardly telling for our system. Along the
way, and as a bonus, I hope that we will be provided with a
variety of interesting insights.
"Ought" and Supererogation
Recall that the traditional sort of case that was
thought to refute Utilitarianism is just a special case of
supererogatory action: a supererogatory alternative that
happens to be optimal. That is (roughly), a case where not
only does occur throughout the lower end of the range,
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but $ itself occurs throughout the upper end of the range
of the acceptables: the poles are opposed with respect to
some $ for $). In such a case, our framework yields:
SU$ & 0U$ :
/\ \ all $-worlds
: •' /
: *
i i
i i
: *
'
' \ All "$-worlds
\/ /
That is, on our framework, as we have seen, there are
models where in some world "(SU$ & 0U$)" is true, or
equivalently:
su$ -> ~ou$
Indeed, we laid it down, as one of our constraints in
Chapter Two, that any adequate analysis of supererogation
would have to allow for the possibility of supererogatory
actions that are optimal, as in this case. Nonetheless,
someone might question the legitimacy of this constraint.
After all, both the friends of supererogation and the
utilitarians (along with everyone else) took it for granted
that "ought" expresses "obligation". But then, such
friends of supererogation ought to have thought that in any
case of supererogation, it would be false to say that the
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agent ought to have done the supererogatory thing. Hence
they were, or should have been, disposed to reject the
above principle.
Independent of these considerations, recall our case
used to motivate our supererogatory bests argument. Our
mai Iperson enters a building that even the fire personnel
have thought too dangerous to warrant a direct rescue
attempt. Our mailperson succeeds in rescuing the infant,
but barters his own life in the process. Now we imagined
that the situation was such that what the mailperson did
was the best thing he could have done in the situation.
But then it would be correct on our framework to say to him
"you should go in and rescue the infant".
This may strike the reader as odd. I think it is.
Indeed, if we had a crystal ball and thereby knew that if
the mailman went in then, although he would succeed in
rescuing the child, he would be killed, it would still be
correct on our framework to say "You ought to rescue him
even though you’ll be killed"! Surely there is something
incorrect about saying this. But just what is it that we
feel is incorrect? Does the incorrectness consist in its
being false to say so in the circumstance or does the
inappropriateness lie elsewhere?
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Consider a different case. I'm sitting at a restaurant
and I overhear you saying that you will order some pigs
feet. I turn around and tell you that you ought to order
something lower in fat such as fish or fowl. Is this
appropriate? Not unless you and I have a special
relationship (we’re family or I’m your nutritionist or your
physician, or I’m your gymnastics coach, etc.)! Is the
inappropriateness of this utterance semantic — is what
I’ve said inappropriate because its false? Perhaps, but we
can easily imagine that I’m right. You might be
overweight, have a serious heart condition and your blood
pressure might be sky-high. Here what I’ve said may be
perfectly appropriate semantically, however inappropriate
conversationally.
I think that it is plausible to think that something of
this sort is going on in the first case. For one thing,
there is a natural hesitancy (or should be) to tell other
people what they ought to do — even on minor matters —
unless asked. But here we have no minor matter. If we
tell the person that they ought to attempt the rescue here,
we are recommending the action to the person, and in this
case we are recommending that they risk their life for a
stranger. Even if the reader does not believe that the de
facto hesitancy we typically feel about such
recommendations is rationally based, surely she can
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recognize the psychological fact of the hesitancy and the
chastisement that would ensue if someone were to non-
chalantly recommend life-risking activities in such
situations. Furthermore, there is also a natural hesitancy
about recommending a course of action that we ourselves
would shun in the situation. Indeed, there is a hesitancy
to recommend a course of action if we are not reasonably
sure that we would take it if similarly circumstanced.
Surely these are important aspects of our linguistic
conventions and it would not be surprising if
conversational implicatures and more stringent utterance
appropriateness conditions were operating in moral
discourse than in most other forms of discourse. Indeed,
it would be surprising if this were not the case! When the
risks of a certain course of action are high, we should
proceed cautiously before advising such a course -- even
when asked. The day, I hope, has passed in philosophical
circles when the mere oddity of an utterance is taken to be
conclusive evidence of its falsity. The richness and
complexity of linguistic conventions does not make life
that easy.
On behalf of our position we can also recite the
utilitarian maxim: "one ought to do the best one can". We
noted that this had an axiomatic ring to it, and no doubt
this accounts for the resiliency of utilitarianism. We
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have found no reason to reject thisv''^ v' 1' LUXS maxim (although we have
suggested an alternative agent-relative interpretation).
Furthermore, to countenance supererogation, as we have
already seen, there is no reason why it need be denied.
For once we reject the identification of what we must do
with what we ought to do, the maxim is no longer in
conflict with the possibility of supererogatory bests. It
is the utilitarian identification of what is best with what
is obligatory that conflicts with the pre-theoret ic
possibility of supererogatory action that is best or less
than best. For those of us who prefer to proceed
cautiously, adopting a minimum mutilation strategy when we
find an otherwise attractive theory problematic in some
respect, we can have our cake and eat it to. We accept the
utilitarian maxim and accept the possibility of
supererogation. What we reject is the identification of
what we must do with what we ought to do and we take the
former to express deontic necessity.
Furthermore, even though, in principle, we might be
able to give a pragmatic account of ethical discourse that
would suffice to explain why it was systematically
inappropriate to tell others that they ought to do
something (when it is supererogatory), is it so clear that
there is no context in which such utterances are
appropriate? Consider the following alteration in the
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rescue case. Imagine that you and I are retired inner city
police officers who have laid our lives on the line on
numerous occasions. We are old friends and ex-colleagues.
Having assessed the situation we look at each other and
both indicate to one another that we are going to attempt
the rescue. As we run for the building I trip over a toy
in the yard and sprain my ankle. I try to stand up, but it
is hopeless. You are leaning over me and I say to you "You
ought to go in yourself. Don’t worry about me".
I can find nothing odd about this case (other than the
convenience, for my purposes, of the role of the yard toy).
That there seems to be nothing inappropriate in what I
utter tends to confirm the story we sketched earlier. For
here, we are old friends and each of us believed that we
were going in together before I fell. Furthermore, we may
suppose that I am recommending a course of action that I
would indeed be taking if I was in your shoes and you
believe that. Neither do I think that it can plausibly be
maintained that the fact that each of us indicated to the
other that he was going in somehow renders obligatory what
was earlier supererogatory. After all, we didn’t promise
each other, and even if we did, I doubt that this would be
sufficient in the circumstances to make it obligatory.
Most of us would assume that I was at liberty to change ray
mind at almost any point. For example, if instead of
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tripping over a toy, I j us t changed my mind as we
approached the house, it would not follow that I was now
failing in a very recently acquired obligation to go in.
Furthermore, don’t some of our most morally admirable
advocates frequently recommend actions that we pre-
theoret ical ly take to be supererogatory bests? Surely
resistance fighters and concentration camp incarcerees did
just that on many occasions during World War II. No doubt
activists for social justice have done so: consider Martin
Luther King, Ghandi, Mother Theresa, Nelson & Winny
Mandela. Surely these people have at times suggested to
others that they ought to do things that most of us would
take to be supererogatory bests.
So we should conclude that the frequent oddity in
question is not semantic. Although it may reveal
theoretically significant features of the practice of
ethical discourse, it does not reveal that it is not
possible for an action to be both supererogatory and such
that the agent ought to perform it. So we will stand by
this consequence of our theory without any misgivings.
We should also note that most writers on supererogation
assumed that an action was supererogatory only if it was
optimal. Hence the friends of supererogation, virtually
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expresses obligation,
all of whom also assumed that "ought"
ought to have explicitly rejected any analysis of "ought"
as optimizing. They should have argued that since (i)
there are supererogatory actions and (ii) no such actions
are obligatory and (iii) all SU ch actions are optimal (iv)
to say an action is obligatory is to say that it ought to
be done, it follows that what ought to be done and what is
best are distinct.
But we have found reason to deny both of the last two
links in this dubious chain. For we have found ample
reason to think that "ought" invariably means optimizing
(modulo contextual parameters) — whether the context is a
moral one or not. We have also found reason to doubt that
"ought" expresses moral obligation. Our reflections have
separated what has to go if one countenances
supererogation, from what was carelessly thought to have to
go. The supererogationist need not deny that in the first
set of cases (Supererogatory Bests) used to argue against
Utilitarianism, the individual really ought, morally
speaking, to have done the action in question. He can
stoutly maintain that even in the case of a supererogatory
optimal action, the action really (morally) ought to be
performed -- however presumptuous it might ordinarily be to
tell this to the agent.
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Let me note also that our analysis allows for the
possibility that Jane Doe’s seeing to $ is supererogatory
and Jane Doe shouldn’t see to $. This observation might
also be presented as a complaint against our analysis.
However, I think the sort of response we gave to the
previous complaint would also be in order here. For
example, consider the following case:
/\ \ all (save both kids)-worlds
:
: /
: *
* \ all (save just one kid)-worlds
!
: /
: *
'
' \ all (save no kids)-worlds
\/ /
Here, we suppose that it is supererogatory to save any of
the two kids in the building or both. In particular, if
you do the least you can do, you don’t save any kids —
instead you run down the block, pull the alarm and direct
the professionals to the scene. So even if you save just
one of the kids, doing so is supererogatory. Now suppose
that you go in and save one of the kids — but just one of
them. Afterward, you criticize yourself by saying "I
shouldn’t have saved just one kid — I should have saved
both". Why couldn’t this be perfectly true? After all, if
you had done the best you could have, you would have saved
both, and hence not just one. But if you should have saved
both, then, since saving both precludes saving just one,
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you shouldn’t have saved just one. Nonetheless, saving
just one was itself supererogatory, even if it was not the
best of ray supererogatory options.
I see nothing wrong with this case. To be sure, if we
were standing by afterward when you were criticizing
yourself, we would no doubt think that there was something
inappropriate about the self-criticism. But what we would
take to be inappropriate about it would not be the falsity
of your remark, it would be the emphasis involved. I
suspect most of us would respond by saying something like:
Look, what you did was more than you had to do to begin
with. When you criticize yourself for not having done
still more, you’re not putting things in their proper
perspective. You should feel glad that you did as much
as you did! Had you just run down the block, pulled the
alarm and directed the professionals to the scene, no
one would have been rightly able to accuse you of having
done something wrong.
Both of these complaints, as I see it, confuse the
truth-conditions of the associated utterances with the
powerful pragmatic conventions associated with the felicity
conditions for their use.
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On The Non-Indifference of
Supererogatory Consequences
In the sixth chapter we saw that the consequences of
what is supererogatory need not themselves be
supererogatory:
] = $ “> $
’
] = SU$ -> SU $ 1
,
For one thing, tautological consequences -- and there are
always such for any $ can’t ever be supererogatory. For
their negations can’t obtain at all, and a fortiori, they
can t obtain at the lower end of the range of acceptables.
Less trivially, we saw that something might be both the
consequence of doing something supererogatory and the
consequence of doing something entailed by doing the
minimum. In such a case, this consequence can’t be
supererogatory either.
However, it might be maintained that the following
weaker principle, the Non-Indifference of Supererogatory
Consequences is an intuitively legitimate principle:
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NISC: If ]- $ > $’ then SU$ only if ~Indi f ferent ( $ ’ )
That is, the logical consequences of what is supererogatory
are never matters of moral indifference. For example, if
it is supererogatory for me to rescue one of the children
then it cannot be a matter of moral indifference that I
rescue someone. Hence, it might be maintained that
although that which is essential to doing something
supererogatory is not necessarily itself supererogatory, it
can never be a mere matter of moral indifference.
If this is right, we are in trouble. For we can’t
prove NISC’s validity on our framework. Consider how we
might try for a moment:
Suppose that every $-world in every model is also an
$ 1 -world and that SU$ holds at some world, i, in some
arbitrarily chosen model, M. Then we wish to show
that ~CI$’ holds at i also. That is, we must show
that there it has already been assured that there is
at least one level among the i -accep t ab 1 es that is
either an all $’ level or an all ~$* level. Well if
SU$ holds at i, then by definition, (i) all the
minimal i-acceptable worlds are ~$-worlds and
(ii) there must be some i-acceptable $-world, j. So
j must also be an $’-world.
Now what? None of the information accepted tentatively for
the conditional proof seems to assure that there is any
level among the acceptables that is uniform with respect to
$ or with respect to
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Here is what a formal counter-model would look like:
] = $ ~> $ * . but SU$ & CIS
’
:
/\
/ : :
!* — $
-wo r 1 d (so also an $’-world)
!
$
’ ! at all levels ! !
: *
\ ! ! \ All ~$-worlds
\/ /
Here we assume that (i) at every single level among the
accept ables
,
there is an $’-world and a ~$’-world, (ii) $
entails $’, (iii) at some level there is an $-world -- and
hence also an $’-world -- and (iv) finally, that from some
point on down all we have are ~$-worlds. Hence on our
framework, what we have is:
] = $ -> $
’
/> ] = SU$ -> ~CI$ ’
.
So it would seem that either we have failed to represent
supererogation or moral indifference. Or are appearances
deceiving? Luckily, sometimes they are.
If we reflect on our purely formal model in
abstraction, it is not clear what to say. But, if instead,
we try to utilize the model as a guide to constructing a
concrete case that mimics the structure of the counter
model, we can then reflect on an intuitive case. Let’s do
this :
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1 = C1 ~> $*
.
but SU(C1) & CI($M :
/\
/ : :
!* — C 1-world (so also
!$’: at all levels ! ! an $’-world)
; *
\ ! ! \ All "'Cl-worlds
\/ /
Suppose that it is supererogatory for me to give a check
for $100 to Charity 1. That is, I am permitted to do so
and if I do the minimum that is acceptable, I won’t. Now
what might $ be in this case? It roust be a consequence of
Cl. Well here’s an obvious consequence: I give a check to
someone or some agency. Now first of all, to take care of
the level where the indicated Cl-world is, we may suppose
that I might also give them cash instead of a check -- with
the same mileage all around. Clearly in any ordinary
circumstance, if giving a $100 check to Charity 1 is
supererogatory, then this is so in virtue of the fact that
giving them $100 per se is supererogatory. Furthermore
let’s suppose that I can opt for this level without giving
a check to anyone. In fact, why can’t I opt for any of my
acceptable levels without giving someone (or some agency) a
check? Surely, it is possible in principle that I could
with equal convenience to all concerned either (i) use some
checks or (ii) not use any checks and use a credit card, a
money order, traveler’s checks -- or even that increasing
rarity, good old cash.
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Now this concrete case mimics our formal counter-model
and seems clearly possible in principle. Quibbling about
whether the proposed case is one of supererogation is
beside the point here. All ray cases are but fingers
pointing. What about the consequence: giving a check to
someone ($’)? In the scenario envisioned, isn’t it
intuitively correct to say that giving someone or some
agency a check ($’) is itself a matter of moral
indifference? It certainly seems to be. Yet it is a
logical consequence of doing something (that we are
supposing) is supererogatory.
The above "dialectic" is not really feigned -- it is
autobiographical, and, I submit, methodologically
revealing. I did think initially that the Non- Indi f ference
of Supererogatory Consequences was a valid principle (and I
suspect that it had an initial ring of plausibility to the
reader). In fact I was sufficiently sure that it was
valid, and sufficiently confident that my account would
ratify it, that I stated that it was valid and left an
insertion mark to remind me to insert the proof later on
when I was dotting my "i"’s and crossing my "t"’s. I got
about as far as the above attempted direct proof and then,
figuring I must be missing something, began trying to
construct a counter-model with the thought that my failure
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to generate such a model would reveal the missing link in
the needed "proof”. It became clear that no inconsistency
was forthcoming and the principle was indeed invalid modulo
^ system . After a very brief moment of apprehension I
looked at the formal model again. But reflecting on the
formal counter-model -- and here is the important point --
made finding an intuitive counter-model to the principle a
snap
.
This, for me, is an object lesson in one of the ways
that formal studies can be substantial. They should
sharpen both our native understanding of the concepts they
attempt to formally represent, and of their
interrelationships. If they surprise us, so much the
better. When this happens, as in this case, we are getting
some substantial mileage out of the formal work: we are
gaining insight into the status of the logical connections
that we began with -- and took tentatively as initial data.
So it does not look like the Non- Ind i f ference of
Supererogatory Consequences is intuitively valid after all.
Since our theory guided us efficiently to this insight, its
failure to validate this principle only tends to confirm
that we are on the right track.
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Deontic Conditionals
Imagine that I find myself in a bizarre situation of
the following sort. Someone let’s me know that he intends
to murder his mother. I try to convince him, using various
rationales, not to do this horrible thing, but alas, it
becomes apparent, that I’m powerless to prevent or even
postpone the event. Hoping to at least minimize the horror
to come, I try to persuade him with: "Well, then the least
you can do is kill her as painlessly as possible." He
agrees to settle on a painless surprise execution, rather
than that which he had originally intended.
This is a perfectly ordinary use of the Least-Can-Do
idiom and I suspect that it is the consideration of cases
of this sort that have led some to suggest to me (in
conversation) that either the least you can do is such and
s uch simply implies that such and such would be wrong to
do, or is at least compatible with the possibility that
such and such would be wrong to do . For in the above case
it might appear that the speaker is correctly saying to the
would-be-matricide that the least he can do is kill her
painlessly - and surely his killing his mother painlessly
is wrong. However, the former claim is clearly a mistake.
For in the case above the speaker cannot be plausibly
interpreted as claiming that the least the villain can do
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is painlessly murder, and hence murder, the poor
individual! The "Well, then " is crucial. In the context,
this claim is clearly elliptical for "If you are going to
kill your mother, then the least you can do is kill her
painlessly." So the above dialogue, although it involves a
perfectly felicitous use of the Least-Can-Do idiom,
provides no direct evidence at all for the claim that the
1 eas t
—
y_Q_u can do is such and such implies that such and
su ch would be wrong to do
. Also, we have seen other cases
where this idiom is used where it is transparent that the
implication does not hold. (Recall, for example, the "it’s
the least I could do for a friend" response to a friend’s
expression of gratitude for help given.)
But what of the claim that the least you can do is such
and such is at least compatible with the proposition that
such and such is wrong to do ? It might now be claimed that
this compatibility does hold, since it holds in the case in
question, although it is not immediately obvious that it
does. Let’s state this in the form of an objection to our
framework
:
In the case envisioned above, by your own admission,
it is true that i_f x is going to kill his mother,
then the least x can do is kill her painlessly, while
it is also true in the case envisioned that x is in
fact going to kill his mother. Therefore, it follows
immediately that the least x can do is kill x’s
mother painlessly. But on the proposed framework, we
have the principle: ] = $ - > $’ = > ] = LE$ -> L E $ ’ .
That is, you are committed to the principle that if
something is a logical consequence of the least you
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can do, then the least you can do is see to that
consequence. Hence, you are thereby committed to theproposition that the least x can do is kill his
mother simpliciter. For x’s killing his motherpainlessly logically implies x’s killing his mother,tinaily, your framework also commits you to ]= LE$ ->
r
E$
,‘
•
!° l
it als ° follows that it is permissible for xto kill his mother! But clearly x’s killing his
mother is wrong. Hence even if the least you can dois such and—
s
uch does not invariably imply that such
ajjd such would be wrong to do
. it is at least
compatible with it — contrary to your framework.
This objection rests on a confusion that is best
brought out by considering a parallel case that is clearly
fallacious. In this case the objection is to standard
deontic logic and it is generated by replacing (in both the
dialogue and the objection) all occurrence of the Least-
Can Do idiom with must an idiom for plain old moral
obligation :
In the new case, by your own admission, it is true
that i
f
x is going to kill his mother, then x must
kill her painlessly, while it is also true in the
case envisioned that x is in fact going to kill his
mother. THEREFORE, it follows that x must kill x’s
mother painlessly. But on the proposed framework, we
have the principle: ]= $ -> $’ = > ]= MU$ -> MU$ ’ .
That is, you are committed to the principle that if
something is a logical consequence of what you must
do then you must see to that consequence. Hence, you
are thereby committed to the proposition that x must
kill his mother simpliciter. For x’s killing his
mother painlessly logically implies x’s killing his
mother. Finally, your framework also commits you to
]= MU$ -> PE$. So it also follows that it is
permissible for x to kill his mother! But clearly
x’s killing his mother is wrong. Hence even if you
(morally) must do such and such does not invariably
imply that such and such would be wrong to do
,
it is
at least compatible with it -- contrary to your
framework
.
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The fallacy should be familiar to the ethical theorist
with a rudimentary acquaintance with deontic logic. Surely
in the case above I am not claiming, nor committing myself
to the claim, that the villain must painlessly murder, and
hence murder, his mother. Similarly, in the former case, I
am not claiming, nor committing myself to the claim, that
the least the villain can do is painlessly murder, and
hence murder, his mother. Either objection is flawed at
the outset: its first "Therefore" is unwarranted. The
crucial sentences, "if x is going to kill his mother, then
the least x can do is kill her painlessly" and "if x is
going to kill his mother, then the x must kill her
painlessly" are not conditionals of the familiar sort that
are subject to factual detachment. Neither conditional has
a logical form that, coupled with the truth of the
gr ammat i ca
1
antecedent, allows us to validly detach the
gr ammat i ca 1 consequent.
Consider how easy it would be for all of us to get off
the hook if this sort of detachment held in moral contexts.
If it held in general, then any time someone was going to
do something wrong -- no matter how hideous -- as long as
there was a less bad way to do this wrong thing then it
would be the case that the person ought to do this hideous
thing in this less bad way and hence, ought to do this
hideous thing simpliciter. For example, it would follow, I
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suspect, that when the Nazis sent Jews to their deaths in
gas chambers on the guise that they were going to get a
much needed shower, they did what they ought to have done.
For the defense would be clear. They were going to gas
them in the showers anyway, right? Right. But if they
were going to gas them, then they ought to have gassed them
on the guise that they were going for a nice shower,
right?. Right. (For they ought to have minimized the time
that the victims had to contemplate their impending death
in utter horror -- and what better way given that they were
going to be gassed in facilities nominally used for
showering?) But you can’t gas them on the guise that they
are getting a comforting shower unless you gas them, right?
Right. So the Nazi’s ought to have gassed such Jews.
Reasoning doesn’t get more specious than this!
In our initial case, we have a situation exactly
analogous to that of a contrary-to-duty imperative or
conditional obligation — as our mock case indicates. As
we saw briefly in Chapter One, detachment fails in the case
of conditional obligation and there is every reason to
think that the same phenomenon is operating in our present
case — a case of what we might call "Conditional
Minimization". Since we have disassociated "ought" from
moral obligation, we might think of the familiar examples
of "contrary-to-duty imperatives" as "Conditional
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Maximizations", since the examples are invariably poised as
conditional "ought"’s rather than "must"’s. From our
standpoint, "Conditional Obligations" or contrary-to-duty
imperatives should be thought of as conditional "must"s,
rather than conditional " ought "s.
The phenomenon is a general one in deontic circles.
For example, consider conditional "indifference". It may
be true in the situation envisioned that if x is going to
murder his mother then it is morally indifferent that he
murders her while he’s wearing Bermuda shorts. But we
don t want to conclude that it is morally indifferent
simpliciter that he murders his mother while he’s wearing
Bermuda shorts. For in the case envisioned it is surely
plausible to think that, if it is not morally indifferent
to murder his mother in the first place, then it won’t be
morally indifferent to murder his mother while wearing
Bermuda shorts. Similarly, we can have conditional
supererogation. Suppose that I am going to commit some
theft. It might be true that if I’m going to commit the
theft, then the least I can do is turn myself in, return
the stolen goods and apologize. Suppose that I do commit
the crime and then go on to not only turn myself in, return
the stolen goods and apologize, but do volunteer work at a
youth program to help dissuade young delinquents from
pursuing a life of crime. This might be more than I had to
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do, given ray theft. In such a case, it might be true to
say, prior to ray theft, "if you are going to commit the
crime then it will be supererogatory to do the volunteer
work at the youth program". Nonetheless, factual
detachment may fail here as well. For it may be that
having committed a crime is a prerequisite for my working
at this program. Typically, justice demands that if we
wrong someone, we make up for it. But it is possible to
make up for it "twice over". We can go beyond the minimum
in making amends for past misdeeds.
So even if it is true that if our villain is going to
murder his mother then the least he can do is do it
painlessly and it is also true that he is going to murder
his mother, we cannot thereby conclude that the least he
can do is murder her painlessly. For if the villain in
question did the least he could do, he’d do what he must do
which would preclude matricide altogether presumably. The
fact that he is going to murder his mother does not change
the fact that the least he can do is refrain from murder —
painless or otherwise.
As we stated at the outset of this essay, our
investigation will be restricted to unary deontic
operators. Representing deontic operators that are
superficially conditional in their grammatical form
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requires an enriched vocabulary. In particular, such
"conditional" deontic operators, would be taken as
primitive and the unary ones would be introduced
definitional ly in the familiar fashion. It should also be
clear that, and how, our semantic framework could be easily
adapted to this new task. Roughly, for statements of the
form "If $ then *$ ’
" , where "*" is one of our deontic
operators and this if-then statement is the sort of special
conditional in question, we would have a circumstance-
relative acceptability relation that yielded up a set of
worlds that would now be X 1 -accep t ab 1 e , where i is our
world of evaluation as before and X is the set of worlds
where $ holds. We would of course have to require that any
such X‘ -acceptable world would be in X — i.e. it would
have to be an $-world. Similarly, there would be an X 1 -
relative ordering of these X ' -accept ab 1 es and then
restricted to these worlds and this ordering, we would
evaluate the consequent as usual vis a vis this ordering of
these worlds. Where X is the set of all worlds (i.e. where
$ is a tautology), we get the equivalent of our plain old
i-acceptability.
The one novelty in this procedure would be handling the
various indifference operators. Each primitive
indifference operator would be introduced as a dyadic
rather than binary operator. The reason for this is plain
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on reflection. For not only do we sometimes say that given
one thing some other thing is a matter of indifference, but
we also say that given one thing it is a matter of
indifference whether we do some second or some third thing
where the second and third thing are not even related
logically frauch less one being the negation of the other).
For example, "if you are going to kill one of the five,
then it is a matter of indifference whether you kill Bob or
kill Alice
. So, where * indifference stands for any of our
four forms of indifference, our four primitive dyadic
operators would be of the form: "Given $, it is a matter of
indifference whether $’ or The semantics for this
sort of sentence would be roughly as follows. As mentioned
above, we get an X‘ -ordered set of acceptable worlds, where
X is the truth set for $. Then whole the sentence is true
if, relative to this ordered set of worlds, we can achieve
any of its levels of value whether we do ($’ and not $’’)
or vice versa. We then introduce the corresponding binary
indifference operator derivatively: "Given $, $’ is a
matter of *indifference" is defined as "Given $, it is a
matter of *indifference whether $’ or . Finally, unary
indifference would be introduced in the familiar way: $ is
a matter of *indifference" as "Given ($ v ~$), it is a
matter of * indi f ference whether $ or For example:
Primitive:
Derivative: CI($/$’) -df C I ($/$’, ~$ ’
)
CI$ =df CI(($ v ~$)/$,~$)
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In the context of presenting a substantial enrichment
of the Von Wrightish deontic logics, I do not think that
presenting such a conditional version of our system is
crucial. These developments and refinements of the simpler
theory would have introduced distracting complications had
they been placed in focus in this essay, and since, with
the exception just mentioned, the developments and
refinement are clear enough in outline to those familiar
with dyadic deontic logic, the non-centrality of these
developments and refinements in this essay is warranted in
my judgment. The system of unary operators that we have
presented here provides us with plenty to reflect on. The
corresponding conditional version of our language will be
presented elsewhere — along the lines suggested above.
1= SU$ -> LE ~$ ?
We noted in Chapter Six that the truth conditions for
"SU$" are equivalent to the truth conditions for (PE$ &
LE~$). So that the following holds in our framework:
]= SU$ <-> ( PE $ & LE ~$
)
At the syntactic level, this would justify introducing our
supererogation operator definitionally as follows:
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su$ =d f ( PE $ & LE ~ $ ) .
Hence, in particular, our framework yields,
]= SU$ -> LE
~$
Call this principle " S L ~ "
.
We have already noted that this is an odd result.
Consider any of the imagined cases of supererogation that
we have been considering. The relevant associated instance
of SL for any of these cases seems quite odd. For
example, suppose that it is supererogatory for me to rescue
the child. On this principle it would follow that the
least I could do was not rescue the child. Or, if it is
supererogatory to give to both Charity 1 and Charity 2,
then it would follow on this principle that the least I
could do was not give to both. Does the oddity indicate
that our standard readings of our operators is flawed, and
if so where?
Consider the following case. Suppose that it is
supererogatory (and best) for me to save more than one of
two children caught in a fire. Then it would seem odd to
say to me "The least you can do is not save both children".
After all, uttering this would ordinarily seem to suggest
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that it would be better to save just one of the children
than to save both children, and perhaps that it would be
better still to save neither. Yet no such assumptions are
warranted in the envisioned situation. Indeed, the
opposite is the case: it would be best to save both, though
supererogatory. However, what if what is said is "the
least you could do is save just one of the children"? If
the reader finds the presence of "just" odd here, I think
that is because it is at least redundant conversationally.
For in the situation envisioned, to say "the least you can
do is save one of the children" already suggests that the
option in question is one where you don’t save both. But,
in the context, saving just one of the children is
equivalent to saving one of the children but not saving the
other. Now isn’t it intuitively plausible to think that if
the least you can do is see to ($ and $’) then the least
one can do is $ and the least you can do is see to $’?
That is, isn’t distribution of LE over "and" intuitively
plausible? For example, if the least you can do is call
the doctor’s office and tell them your not coming, then it
is also the case that the least you can do is call them,
isn’t it?. But then "the least you can do is save just one
of the children", in the context, is equivalent to "the
least you can do is save one, although not both" which
would appear to imply "the least you can do is not save
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both of the children" by the aforementioned principle. Of
course, you wouldn’t just utter the latter and leave it at
that, for that would me highly misleading -- but felicity
is not the current issue.
So whatever the ultimate explanation of the prima facia
oddity in saying that $ is supererogatory for you and ~$ is
the least you can do, it is not transparent that it reveals
a defect in our framework. For as with most logical
puzzles, we seem to generate this puzzling result from
principles that seem intuitive enough at first glance.
However, let me say that if this problem shows
something is wrong with our intended interpretation of the
main operators, I think the problem is with LE, not with
SU. That is, if this oddity indicates that our intended
interpretation has gone astray, it is with our
interpretation of LE, not SU, (given their semantics) that
the problem lies. Let me explain.
Roughly, we took the truth-condition for "The least you
can do is see to it that $" as "$"’s truth throughout the
lowest ranked of one’s acceptable worlds. Officially:
[LE$]: LE$ is true at i if and only if (i) there is
an i-acceptable world, j, such that every i-
acceptable world that j is ranked at least as
high as is an $-world.
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D iagrammat ical ly
,
LE$ :
/\
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
: *
'
' \ all $-wor Ids
\/ /
Now recall the picture for supererogation:
SU$ :
/\
i i
i i
: * — $
i i
i i
: *
; I \ no $-worlds
\/ / (i.e. all "$-worlds)
Roughly, it is supererogatory to see to it that $ just in
case it is permissible to see to it that $ and if I opted
for any of ray minimally acceptable alternatives, I would
not see to $. This, in isolation, is a plausible picture
of supererogation.
We get the problematic principle SL" only when we add
the semantic clause we have proposed for "LE" (namely
[LE]), read as "the least one can do is see to it that", to
our clause for supererogation ([SU]. But a similar oddity
can be generated w/o using the supererogation operator.
Here is a principle that holds for our system:
454
]- ( L E $ & LE ( $ -> $’)) -> LE $
'
Consider the following instance of this principle. I
stumble upon a fierce fire in a building that holds a child
in a precarious position. Circumstances are such, we will
suppose that although it is permissible for me to attempt a
rescue of the child, in all my minimally acceptable worlds,
I go down to the intersection, pull the fire alarm and wait
and direct the fire personnel to the fire when they arrive.
Hence, in the proposed framework, the least I can do is go
down to the intersection, pull the fire alarm and wait and
direct the fire personnel to the fire when they arrive. So
far so good. But suppose now that it is simply not
possible for me to do this and still attempt to rescue the
child. Then, all my acceptable worlds are worlds where it
is true that if I go down to the intersection, pull the
fire alarm and wait and direct the fire personnel to the
fire when they arrive, then I don’t attempt to rescue the
child. Hence, on the proposed framework, the least I can
do is see to it that if I go down to the intersection, pull
the fire alarm and wait and direct the fire personnel to
the fire when they arrive, then I don’t attempt to rescue
the child. This is a bit odd, but perhaps not odd enough
by itself to generate serious concern . 1 But the next
result is obvious. Since every minimally acceptable world
is one where it is true that (i) I go down to the
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intersection, pull the fire alarm and wait and direct the
fire personnel to the fire when they arrive, and (ii) if
so, then I don’t attempt to rescue the child, it follows
that all of my minimally acceptable worlds are ones where
it is true that (iii) I don’t attempt to rescue the child.
This immediately yields the truth of "The least I can do is
not attempt to rescue the child", on the current
interpretat ion
.
Clearly, it is this last thing that it is particularly
odd and the oddity in question is really the same as that
at the heart of the problem with SL . For our analysis of
supererogation yields that something can’t be
supererogatory if I can do it while opting for one of my
minimally acceptable options. This we found to be
intuitively plausible. Indeed, our first candidates for
supererogation arguably failed on pre-theoret ic grounds
precisely because they violated this constraint. But if
something, $, is supererogatory only if none of my
minimally acceptable options include $, then, by bivalence
(which isn’t in question here), they must all be ~$-worlds.
That is all of my minimally acceptable worlds must be
worlds where I don’t do this supererogatory thing, and
hence worlds where the negation of this supererogatory
thing obtains. So far this is entirely unproblematic and
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does not tell against the plausibility of our intended
reading of "SU" given our semantics for "SU".
It is only when we introduce [LE] and read it as
elliptical for "The least Jane Doe can do is see to it
that" that the problem of SL^ ensues. But the problem
really appears at the level of [LE] alone as we have just
seen. For we have just seen that it can be intuitively
unproblematic for some $, to say that the least Doe can do
is see to $ and it can be transparently true that Doe can’t
see to $ unless Doe sees to ~$ ’ . Nonetheless, it will
follow from [LE] that if this is so, then it is also true
that the least Doe can do is see to it that if $ then
and hence, the least Doe can do is see to it that --
and these latter claims do seem odd — especially the last.
This suggests that the deontic context "The least Doe can
do is see to $" does not satisfy certain principles that MU
and OU do seem to satisfy, given their intended
interpretation. For example, the following inference are
in question:
(1) DOE can’t see to both $ and $’
(2) Therefore, the least Doe can do is see to it
that if $ then
and
(1) DOE can’t see to both $ and $’
(2) The least Doe can do is see to $
(3) Therefore, the least Doe can do is see to
''$’
457
(Notice that the analogous inferences for "must" and
"ought" are generally thought to be sound -- the latter
almost universally.)
I think that in each case where we want to say that it
is supererogatory for Doe to see to $\ and thus get on our
framework the corresponding odd sentence that has the form
"The least Doe can do is see to it that
,
we can
elaborate the case in such a way that there will be some
other thing $ such that is is not odd at all to say that
the least Doe can do is see to $ and it will also be true
that Doe can’t see to both $ and $’ . For example, suppose
that it is supererogatory to see to it that I rescue the
child. Then it follows on our analysis that the least I
can do is see to it that I don’t rescue the child. But it
is not implausible to think that in the situation imagined
that (i) the least I can do is go down to the intersection,
pull the fire alarm and wait and direct the fire personnel
to the fire when they arrive and (ii) I can’t do this
unless I don’t rescue the child. Thus the problem is not
with our analysis of "SU" on its intended interpretation,
but with our analysis of "LE" on its intended
interpretation.
Perhaps, a full-fledged linguistic theory about this
idiom would endorse the above inferences as semantically
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sound and then try to explain why the utterances would be
aberrant on non-semantic grounds. I don’t wish to explore
this possibility here. I am satisfied to have properly
located the source of the problem with SL~ in our
interpretation of LE and to have identified the principles
involving the Leas t~Can-Do idiom that are in question. I
don’t do this out of complacency. Rather I wish to argue
that even if the final verdict is that our reading of LE is
wrong, that fact would not be that telling to my analysis.
Let’s see why
.
Suppose that we assume that the above principles
involving the least-can-do idiom are unsound and that hence
our intended interpretation of "LE” is unsound. It might
be argued then that although the conditions that I give for
"LE" are necessary, they are not sufficient. We might
argue that although being true throughout the lower end of
the range of acceptables is a necessary condition not all
things that are true throughout the lower end of the range
of one’s acceptables are such that each is the least we can
do. We have already seen how the argument might go for the
insufficiency, but the argument for the necessity of our
conditions is a plausible one. For it is intuitively
plausible to think that if it is true of some $ that the
least Doe can do is see to $, then $ must be something Doe
would see to no matter how she discharged her obligations
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minimally acceptable
provided that she discharged them in a
way. But then it is clear how we might plausibly read
LE
. Suppose that only some proper subset of those $’s
that are true throughout the lower range of one’s
accept ables are such that it is true to say the least one
can do is see to $. We then need only stipulate that this
proper subset of bona fide "Least"’s is rich enough that
for any sentence, $\ that is true throughout the lower
range of acceptables there is some sentence, $ -> $’, that
is also true throughout the lower range of acceptables
where $ is a bona fide "Least". We would then be
perfectly justified in reading our "LE", with our
semantics, along the lines of "Doing the least S can do
involves (or 'entails’) $" or "The least S can do involves
seeing to $ So that although it might be false to say
the least I can do is not save both children, it could
nonetheless be true to say that my doing the least I can do
involves not saving both of the children. For it would be
true that there is something, $, such that it is true
simpliciter that the least I can do is see to $ and I’m not
able to see to $ and save both children.
Notice, in particular, that if "LE" is reinterpreted as
just suggested, then SL^ is unproblematic. For now it
comes to this:
If it is supererogatory for Doe to see to it that $
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then Doe’s doing the least Doe can do involves Doe’sseeing to ~$
.
This principle strikes me as intuitively sound. For if it
is supererogatory for me to save both the children, then ray
doing the least I can do must involve not saving both of
them. For if not, then I could save both the children
while nonetheless doing the least I can — which is
untenab le
.
Indeed, the initially mentioned equivalence, ]= SU$ <->
(PE$ & LE $), would now be given the following reading:
It is Supererogatory for Doe to see to $ if and only
if it is permissible for Doe to see to $ and Doe’s
doing the least Doe can do involves Doe’s seeing to
Finally, the analogues to the above two problematic
inferences, which are at the heart of the problem with SL~,
would read as follows:
(1) DOE can’t see to both $ and $’
(2) Therefore, Doe’s doing the least Doe can do
involves Doe’s seeing to it that if $ then ~$’
and
(1) DOE can’t see to both $ and $’
(2) Doe’s doing the least Doe can do involves Doe’s
seeing to $
(3) Therefore Doe’s doing the least Doe can do
involves Doe’s seeing to
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on the face of it.
All of these sound plausible to me
particular, there is no oddity about them that I can
detect
.
i n
So if there is a problem with our semantics for SL~ on
our intended reading of the operators, the fault lies with
our reading of " LE " and that fault can be easily rectified
by a slight shift in the initially proposed reading of
"LE"
.
T— e—Paradox of Disjunctive Supererogation
Recall that we saw earlier in Chapter Six that although
our theory implies that a disjunction is supererogatory
only if one of its disjuncts is (]= SU($ v $’) SU$ v
SU$’), it does not imply that a disjunction is
supererogatory only if both of its disjuncts are ( ]f SU($
v $’) SU$ & SU$
’
). We also saw that given the
substitutability of provable equivalents for SU ( RE S ) , the
latter is equivalent to the claim that a disjunction is
supererogatory only if its first disjunct is ( SU($ v $’) -
> SU$). Let’s call this latter principle "SU-D is junct i ve
Simplification" (SDS). Hence our system is committed to
the "Invalidity SU-Disjunctive Simplification":
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ISDS: ]/ SU($ v $’) -> SU$
We noted that this was an odd result and it is time to
assess its significance.
Recall, why SDS doesn’t hold by [SU]. If SU($ v $’) is
true at i then condition (i) for SU$ must be satisfied at
i. For if all the lower worlds are ~($ v $)-worlds then, a
fortiori, they are 1-worlds. However, all this requires
is that there is an i-acceptable
~$-world ranked lower than
any i-acceptable $-world. But this may be true vacuously.
For there may simply be no i-acceptable $-worlds whatever,
so that all i-acceptable worlds satisfy condition (i) for
SU$ trivially. But in this situation condition (ii) will
fail for SU$ at i there will simply be no i-acceptable
$-wor 1 d
.
Since we have seen above that SU$ is semantically
equivalent to (PE$ & LE~$), another way to see why SDS is
not valid is in terms of this equivalence. For suppose
that S U ( $ v $’). Then by this equivalence, we have PE($ v
$’) & LE ~ ( $ & $’). Now although ]= LE~($ v $’) -> (LE~$ &
LE ~ $ ’ ) and ]= PE($ v $’) -> (PE$ v PE$’), PE($ v $’) ->
(PE$ & PE$’). So, since SU($ v $’) doesn’t guarantee that
$ and $’ are each permissible, it doesn’t guarantee that
each is supererogatory..
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The envisioned countermodel would look like this:
SU($ v $ » ) & :
/
A
(a) no {-worlds
\
: $ ’
-wor 1 d ( b
)
< i
i i
: *
:
: \ no $ * -worlds (c)
\/ /
Here fa) there are no acceptable {-worlds at all, (b) there
is an acceptable {’-world, but (c) there are no acceptable
$’
-worlds at the lower end of the range of acceptables.
But then there will be an acceptable ($ v $’)-world (from
(b)) and there will be no acceptable ($ v $’)-worlds at the
lower end of the range (from (a) and (c)). So SU($ v $’)
holds, but SU$ fails. Thus we have a model where a
disjunction is supererogatory, but its first disjunct is
not
.
Before turning to the surprising character of this
result, let’s specify just where our system does come out
regarding those principles in the immediate neighborhood.
Among other things, this will allow us to specify a related
principle which pinpoints the problem that ISDS reveals
indirectly.
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Note first that if we strengthen the antecedent by
adding that PE$, the result, call it "Strengthened SU-
Disjunctive Simplification" (SSDS), does hold:
SSDS: ]= SU( $ v $’) & PE $ . -> . SU$
For suppose that SU($ v $’) holds. Then, as we’ve just
seen, condition (i) for SU$ must then be satisfied at i.
But if PE $ is satisfied at i, then, by [PE], there is an i-
acceptable $-wor Id, and hence condition (ii) for SU$ is
also satisfied at i. So if a disjunction is supererogatory
and one of its disjuncts is permissible then that disjunct
must also be supererogatory. Or, equivalently, if a
disjunction is supererogatory but one of its disjuncts is
not, then this can only be because that disjunct is
imperm i ss ib 1 e
.
Furthermore, as we have seen, although a disjunction
may be supererogatory w/o both of its disjuncts being
supererogatory, nonetheless one of them must be. Hence
the following immediate consequence is forthcoming:
] = SU($ v $
’ ) & ~SU$ . -> . SU$
’
So we get the following summary corollaries:
]= SU($ v $’) & PE $ & PE $ ’ . -> . SU$ & SU$’
]= SU($ v $’) & ~SU$ . -> . IM$ & SU$’
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The first says that if a disjunction is supererogatory and
each disjunct is permissible, then both are supererogatory.
And the second says that if a disjunction is
supererogatory, but one of the disjuncts is not, then this
disjunct must be impermissible while the other is
supererogatory.
It should be clear that the countermodel for SDS is not
just one way in which this principle fails. For precisely
the condition under which SU($ v $’) -> SU$ might fail is
the one where SU($ v $’) & IM$ holds. That is, the
following thesis, call it, the "Principle of Wrongful
Supererogating" (PWS), holds given our semantics:
PWS: ]= (IM$ & SU$’) -> SU ( $ v $’)
For suppose that ( IM$ & SU$’) holds at i. Then since SU$
’
holds, there is an i-acceptable ~$’-world, j, ranked lower
than any i-acceptable $’-world. But since IM$ holds, there
simply is no i-acceptable $-world. Hence j must in fact be
an (~$ & ~$’)-world, which is to say a ~($ v $’)-world.
But since there are no i-acceptable $-worlds, then the only
i-acceptable ($ v $’)-worlds there are must be $’-worlds.
So j is ranked lower than any acceptable ($ v $)-world and
hence condition (i) holds for SU($ v $’). But, since SU$
holds, there is an i-acceptable $-world, and a fortiori,
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So condition ( i i
)
there is an i-acceptable ($ v $’)-world.
must also hold for SU($ v $') - m which case SU($ v $')
holds simpliciter.
Diagrammat ical ly
,
IM$ & SU$ ’ :
/\
* - $ ’ -wo r 1
d
/
no
$-wor Ids *
\
I no $’
-worlds
\/ /
SU($ V $
’
)
:
/\
i
* -- ($ v $’ ) -world
i i
i i
= > : *
\/ /
no ( $ v $
’
)
-worlds
PWS is, as I see it, the most perspicuous way to state
the oddity that is merely implicit in ISDS. For precisely
the condition under which SDS fails is that in which
SU$’and IM$ holds and it is the fact that SDS can fail in
this way that is odd.
So let’s shift our focus to PWS. For PWS immediately
prompts the following objection:
On your analysis, ( IM$ & SU$’) -> SU($ v $’) is
universally valid. But on the intended reading, this
amounts to saying that it is a logical truth that if
it is both impermissible to see to it that $ and
supererog-atory to see to it that $’, then it is
supererogatory to see to it that either $ or $’ is
the case. But I can see to that by seeing to $ --
something which is impermissible. Hence on your
account it is possible to do something supererogatory
by doing something forbidden!
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To illustrate the force of the objection, consider the
following case. It is wrong for me to kill my mother and
it is supererogatory for me to save the child from the
burning building. Hence, by the aforementioned principle,
it is supererogatory to see to it that either I save the
child from the burning building or kill my mother. Now
suppose I kill my mother instead of saving the child. Then
I have seen to it that either I’ve saved the child or
killed my mother. But the latter is supererogatory. Hence
I’ve done something supererogatory in virtue of killing my
mother
!
For clarity, let me stress that killing my mother in
the envisioned scenario is not itself supererogatory and
that in general the problematic result is not that certain
forbidden things can turn out to be supererogatory on the
proposed framework. On the contrary, an impermissible case
of supererogation demonstrably can’t happen on the proposed
framework. For on the proposed framework, SU$ -> ~IM$ is
universally valid. The objection is not that forbidden
things are supererogatory on the proposed framework, but
rather that
:
It is possible on the proposed framework to do one
thing that is supererogatory in virtue of doing some
other thing that is forbidden.
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With this in mind, consider the following analogous
objection involving moral obligation:
°n Your analysis, ( IM$ & MU$’) -> MU($ v $’) is
universally valid. But on the intended reading, this
amounts to saying that it is a logical truth that ifit is both impermissible to see to it that $ and
obligatory to see to it that $’, then it is
obligatory to see to it that either $ or $’ is the
case. But I can see to that by seeing to $ —
something which is impermissible. Hence on your
account it is possible to do something obligatory bydoing something forbidden!
To illustrate, consider the following analogue to our
previous case. It is wrong for me to kill my mother and it
is morally obligatory for me to send her. Hence, by the
aforementioned principle, it is morally obligatory to see
to it that either I kill my mother or send her a card. Now
suppose I send my mother a bomb on her birthday and thus
kill her instead of sending her the card. Then I have seen
to it that either I killed her or sent her the card. But
the latter is obligatory. Hence I’ve done something
obligatory in virtue of killing my mother!
The reader who is even faintly familiar with deontic
logic, will recognize that this is just the Paradox of
Disjunctive Obligations in feeble disguise. In its more
familiar form, the allegedly problematic principle cited
would be one regarding the aggregation of disjunctive
ob 1 igat ions
:
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(MU$ v MU$ ’ ) -> MU ( $ v $ ’ )
But given the nature of the surrounding informal objections
to these principles, my form is more direct. For they all
point out that one of the $’s in the lefthand disjunction
can be something outright wrong, but then the obligatory
disjunction on the righthand side can be satisfied by
merely doing this wrong thing. So the heart of the
objection is that it is possible to do an obligatory thing
in virtue of doing something wrong (or to satisfy an
obligation in virtue of doing something wrong). Hence the
objection can be more perspicuously made if directed
against the principle:
( IM$ & MU$
’ ) -> MU ( $ v $ ’ )
Now the vas t majority of presentations of deontic logic
are susceptible to this objection. The minimal VW-deontic
logic that we presented in Chapter One validates these
principles and hence so do all of its extensions, including
that classic: Standard Deontic Logic. Indeed, SDL and its
extensions, since it endorses the obligatoriness of
tautologies (and hence their permissibleness), guarantees
that something is obligatory in every model. Since the
negation of whatever is obligatory in any such model is
permissible, it also guarantees that something is
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impermissible in every model. Hence, it guarantees that
for every model, there is some $ and $’ such that their
disjunction is obligatory, $’ is obligatory and $ is
impermissible. And the phenomena is more pervasive still.
For we can run an analogous objection involving PE since
all such logics will countenance (PE$ & IM$) -> PE($ v $’).
Hence they may all be accused of allowing for the
possibility that I have done something permissible in
virtue of doing something forbidden.
Furthermore, in as much as those who have committed
themselves to the above principle have invariably been
willing to interchange "ought" with "obligatory" (as we
have already seen), they have clearly expresses a
disposition to accept our reading of the following:
(0U$ v 0U$’ ) -> 0U($ v $’
)
(0U$ & IM$) -> 0U($ v $’
)
And each of these is indeed valid on our framework. Hence,
once again we generate the analogous paradox that in virtue
of doing something wrong I can do something I ought to do.
Similarly, we can easily extend the objection to LE.
So the phenomena is not peculiar, by any means, to the
one deontic operator for obligation. For the disjunctive
aggregation formulations, (*$ v *$’) -> *($ v $’), if the
truth of one of the first disjuncts is sufficient for the
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truth of corresponding deontic disjunction then the truth
of one of these disjuncts coupled with the impermissibility
Of the second disjunct will certainly suffice. Hence they
all hinge on the point that since one of the $'s in the
lefthand disjunction can be something that is wrong, the
deontic disjunction can be satisfied by simply seeing to
this wrong thing. So the phenomena in question is
pervasive and we might as well think of these paradoxes
collectively as "Paradoxes of Deontic Disjunction" -
including the Paradox of Disjunctive Supererogation.
at the very least, I’m in good company in generating
these paradoxes.
Let me note that if there is a quick fix available, it
is not at all clear what it could be. Since the complaint
is not against the necessity of the proposed conditions,
but against there sufficiency, it is natural to explore
ways to strengthen our proposed conditions for SU, MU, OU,
and LE by adding some additional condition to their current
truth conditions. But the condition that the complaint
seems to suggest is that, roughly, nothing can be
supererogatory, or obligatory, etc. unless it is not
implied by anything that is impermissible. The problem
with this is obvious. Let $ be anything impermissible and
let $ be anything that is supposed to be unprob leraat ical ly
supererogatory, obligatory, etc. But if $ is impermissible
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then so is anything conjoined to it. So if there is
anything impermissible at all in any model, there will
always be something impermissible that implies any
proposition. Hence on the most natural fix suggested by
the nature of the complaint, nothing will be
supererogatory, obligatory, etc.
For example, it is impermissible for me to work for the
Mafia. Yet working for the Mafia implies working. So on
the current proposal, I can’t be obligated to work! Surely
to say that it is obligatory for me to work is not to
imply, willy nilly, that it is O.K. for me to do any work
at all. For presumably, it is both obligatory for me to
work and obligatory for me to not work for the Mafia. In
general, to say that something is obligatory is not to
imply that any way of fulfilling the obligation is
acceptable. So when it comes to fulfilling my obligation
to work, there are both permissible and impermissible ways.
And my obligation to work certainly withstands the
existence of the latter.
Similarly, there are many things we ought to do. But
alas, it is a familiar experience (probably firsthand for
most of us) where our desire to achieve something we ought
plays a role in our achieving it in a way that we
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shou 1 dn * t
.
This leads us to quarrel with the means, but
not to quarrel with the end.
Now consider the case of supererogation. Suppose that
it is supererogatory for me to donate to Charity 1. Now
what if I accomplish this by stealing funds from Charity 2?
It would be intuitively false to say that what I did was
supererogatory, for what I did included something
impermissible. But would it be false to say that one of
the things that I accomplished by doing what I did do was
supererogatory? Well, one of the things I plainly did
accomplish was giving to Charity 1. But by hypothesis,
this was something that was supererogatory. We can’t have
it both ways! So I did accomplish something supererogatory
in doing what I did -- I just accomplished it the wrong
way. Similarly, let us suppose that it is supererogatory
for me to save a child from a burning building. Now
suppose that the way I accomplish this is by dragging
another child into the building and using her as a
fireblock. Hardly something that I should receive a parade
for, but again, one of the things that I have accomplished
thereby is something that by hypothesis was supererogatory.
Cases of this sort can be generated at will. I do
volunteer work at a youth drug program and become their
main connection. I join the Peace Corp and work undercover
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for an oppressive regime. I leave a big tip on the table,
but taking it off triggers the bomb I also left under the
table. I stop to pick up a hitchhiker, and while he’s
sleeping I eject him from the car at 100 MPH. I pass up
lucrative jobs to teach, but then teach the students that
safe sex is for weaklings. I help an elderly blind person
across the road, but lead him into an uncovered manhole.
To be sure, in the cases above it would be mis leading
to say of the impermissible component of the action, "Gee
that was supererogatory — what a nice guy!" — and leave
it at that. But would it be so misleading to say this and
then continue with "But it was terrible to do it the way
you did!" or "But it was terrible to do it coupled with
that other thing!" For example, if we know that someone
stole from an AIDS research charity in order to give money
to a Save- the-Moles charity, we would not be disposed to
say "How nice of you to have given to the Save-the-Moles
charity" -- and leave it at that. But would it be so
inappropriate if we said this and continued with "But how
terrible of you to steal from that AIDS research charity in
order to do it!"? I don’t see why not. Granted, the worse
the associated deed, the less prone we are to go this "some
of what you did was very nice, but" route. But what of it?
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In fact in many cases where the impermissible thing was
minor enough compared to the associated deed, we are prone
to overlook it and unhesitantly say that the associated
action was supererogatory. For example, suppose that it is
morally wrong for me to gamble with my families vital
funds, but on impulse, I do so anyway. Suppose that I also
happen to win very big and I give half of the money — a
substantial sum to Charity 1. Here their would be no
pre theoretical hesitation stemming from the impermissible
gambling. We would unhesitantly say that I had done more
than I had to.
Even professional criminals have been moved to do
supererogatory things in the midst of criminal activity.
For example, suppose that a criminal is in the process of
robbing some goods from a crippled passerby (not a
particularly admirable crime) and a car veers out of
control --coming right for the passerby. Suppose there are
two relevant options. The safe one is to jump out of the
way, the highly risky one is to try to pull the crippled
passerby out of the way. Further, suppose the risks are
such that even if it was a friend standing alongside the
crippled individual, we would not be disposed to say that
the individual was obligated to try to save the crippled
individual. Now suppose that the criminal does try. Would
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we hesitate to say that it was supererogatory for her to do
so
- ^ don t think so not even if we knew what the
criminal had been up to a moment before.
So I want to say that it is not so implausible, on
reflection, to accept PWS (nor to accept the analogues to
PWS for MU, OU, and LE). To say that it is supererogatory
to see to it that I save the child or kill my mother is not
to say that however I see to this disjunction is worth
writing home about. After all, it is not supererogatory to
see to it that both ((either I save the child or kill my
mother) and kill my mother) — indeed it is impermissible
to do so. My position is that we can say "it was
supererogatory for you to see to that disjunction, but
terrible to see to it by killing your mother" and speak the
truth. We would probably be saying something that it was
quite aberrant to say in such context. But in the
envisioned context it would also be quite aberrant to say
"Gee, Mount Everest is taller than your mother" -- its
truth not withstanding.
477
Chapter 8 Notes
1
. It is at
standard
least a familiar enough phenomenon with
deontic operators.
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CHAPTER 9
SUMMATION AND CONCLUSION
Summation
In Chapter 1, we briefly examined the foundations of
deontic logic and articulated the context that we would
subsequently be presupposing in this essay. In particular,
we carefully examined the ancient Traditional Deontic
Scheme, consisting of the Tripartite Classification and the
Deontic Square of Opposition. It was shown that the
Tripartite Classification and the Deontic Square were
tautologically equivalent to one another and that each was
tautologically equivalent to the principle of No Conflicts:
~ ( OB $ & OB ~$ ) . That is, in any Deontic System of wffs
containing just the logical resources of ordinary
propositional logic (no genuinely deontic theses or rules),
the Traditional Scheme was provably equivalent to ~(0B$ &
0B~$). Hence, the fundamental presupposition of the
Traditional Scheme is the impossibility of conflicts of
obligation. We took this to mean that the targeted concept
of obligation that is central to the Traditional Scheme is
a concept of strict obligation: one that is plausibly
interpreted as not being subject to conflicts. Since the
classical literature on supererogation presupposes the
impossibility of conflicts, we took this to mean that it
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also presupposes a concept of strict obligation and hence
that the classical conception of supererogation falls
within the classical context. The classical context is
also one in which the concept of obligation is a unary one
Study of dyadic concepts of obligation, "Conditional
Obligation", is a more recent "post-classical phenomena",
and we have only touched on conditional obligation and
conditional deontic operators in this essay. In these
respects, our investigations have also been conducted
within this classical context.
Twentieth Century Deontic Logic began, essentially,
with Georg Henrik von Wright in the 50’s. We examined his
early unary system of deontic logic ("VW") and noted that
it was weaker than what has become the modern classical
system of deontic logic: SDL. SDL, but not VW, entails the
principle of Necess i tat ion — that all logical truths are
obligatory. The fact that SDL has become the modern
classic is no accident. Work in modal logic, stemming from
work in the logic of alethic modalities by Lewis and
Langford [Lewis and Langford 1932], had come to be the
dominant area of logical research outside of classical
logic. Hence there was a natural tendency to subsume
deontic logic to modal logic. With the relatively recent
event of Kripke-style semantics for the classical systems
of alethic modal logics, vastly extended by Lemmon and
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Scott s applications of Kripke’s approach, the subsumption
of classical unary deontic logic to a special case of modal
logic was secured. However, this had the shuffle, because
the adopted Kripke-style semantic clause for the result
that Von Wright’s early unary system, VW
,
was lost in the
necessity operator of modal logic unavoidably yields
Necess i t at i on
. Since Von Wright’s system is weaker than
SDL, it seemed desirable, on purely logical grounds, to try
to devise an alternative semantic framework for deontic
logic, one that would not only be adequate to SDL and its
extensions, but to VW itself. This led to the articulation
of a class of deontic logics, suitably called "VW Logics",
after Von Wright. We devised a general semantic framework
for these logics by modifying the semantic clause for the
necessity operator in such a way that the validity of
Necess i tat ion was not an automatic consequence. Luckily,
this new framework, which constituted the fundamental
framework we adopted for this essay, involved only a minor
alteration in the Lemmon-Scott approach. (It was
subsequently argued that this modification was
philosophically well-motivated and that Necess i t at i on
should not have the status of a logical truth if the
necessity operator is to be interpreted as expressing
deontic necessity.)
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Toward the end of Chapter 1, the fundamental
presupposition of the Traditional Scheme was again taken up
and a class of still more general deontic logics allowing
for the possibility of conflicts of obligation was
articulated. The VW-logics were then seen to be just a
special subset of this larger class of deontic logics. We
also proposed a semantic framework for these conflict-
allowing logics, one that stemmed from the Scotch-Jennings
generalization of Kripke-style semantics, but modified in
such a way as to once again disallow necess itat ion the
status of a logical truth. We then saw that various
semantic constraints (clauses placing restrictions on the
admissible models) could be specified in this framework
that would validate the sample logics we had examined —
including VW and SDL.
In Chapter I it was argued that the standard semantic
clause for necessity was not appropriate when interpreted
as deontic necessity. The semantic framework for the VW-
logics was then recommended as an alternative to that of
the now standard Lemmon— Scott approach — an alternative in
which the Lemmon-Scott modal logics could be subsumed. 1
In Chapter 2, we examined the classical conception of
supererogation, its conflict with utilitarianism, and some
of its broader implications (both alleged and factual). We
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began by examining classical characterizations of
supererogation and noting that one fundamental tenet of the
classical conception of supererogation is the Optionality
of Supererogatory alternatives. We also noted that
although most of these characterizations entailed that
something was supererogatory only if it was a best
alternative, this was a mistaken presupposition. This led
to a precise articulation of the two fundamental objections
to utilitarianism from the supererogat ion is t ’
s
quarter.
The first objection was the traditional one to the effect
that since some supererogatory actions are optimal and all
supererogatory actions are gratuitous, utilitarianism is
false. The second (more recent) objection was the one to
the effect that since some supererogatory actions are sub-
optimal and all supererogatory actions are permissible,
utilitarianism is false. Hence the classical conception
supports the general possibility of non-ob 1 igatory best
actions and permissible less-than-best actions. In a word,
the classical conception supports the possibility of
permissible sub-optimizing, contrary to utilitarianism.
We turned next to making a case for the difference
between moral optionality and moral indifference and for
the principle of the Non-Indifference of Supererogation.
This principle, coupled with the optionality (and
possibility) of supererogation, entailed the possibility of
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non indifferent optional alternatives. Urmson’s often
repeated accusation that not only did utilitarianism rule
out the possibility of supererogation, but so did the
Traditional Scheme itself, was examined. The accusation
rested on the assumption that the Traditional Scheme
implicitly rules out the possibility of supererogation by
entailing Strong Tripartism: that each action is either
obligatory, forbidden or morally indifferent (but no more
than one of these). For a supererogatory action could fall
into none of these three categories. We saw that this
accusation was due to the presence of a rather pervasive
tendency among deontic logicians, ethicists in general and
supererogat ionists in particular -- Urmson included. The
tendency was to presuppose that the condition, neither
obligatory nor forbidden
, expressed moral indifference. It
naturally led Urmson, and others to equate the claim that
every action is either obligatory, forbidden or optional
(neither obligatory nor forbidden) with Strong Tripartism -
- hence to identify the Tripartite Classification of the
Traditional Scheme with Strong Tripartism. We saw that
this presupposition, is unjustified, despite its
pervasiveness. Those actions that we are permitted to do
and permitted to not do are certainly morally optional, but
they need not be morally indifferent. For one thing,
supererogatory actions are optional but they are hardly to
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be classified as indifferent thereby. Hence, despite
repeated cries to the contrary, there is no conflict with
supererogation and the Traditional Scheme.
However, even though the Traditional Scheme does not
conflict with supererogation, neither does it provide a
place for it. It lacks the resources to characterize
either the supererogatory or the morally indifferent --
both proper and exclusive subclasses of the morally
optional. Hence, although the Traditional Scheme is
essentially adequate for its limited tasks, it needs
supplementation in order to handle these additional tasks.
So it appeared desirable to seek an enrichment of the
resources of the Traditional Scheme — one that would allow
for the representation of both supererogation and moral
indifference. We laid down various constraints on such an
enrichment, and saw that, among other things, the classical
conception of supererogation calls for the possibility of a
ranked range of permissible alternatives.
In Chapter 3 I began by confronting utilitarianism with
the two cases of supererogation we considered in Chapter 2
and asking what minimal change would be needed in the
former view to countenance these objections. To enhance
our chances of succeeding in this task, a componential
analysis of utilitarianism was offered with the hope that
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we could thus isolate a component of utilitarianism as the
culprit". Aside from the fact that this is good
theoretical practice generally, at least one way of
motivating utilitarianism, vis a vis "we ought to do the
best we can
,
has a sufficiently plausible ring that one is
naturally reticent to glibly deny it. But this led us
quickly to a stumbling block, namely the pervasively
accepted Bipartisan Presupposition (BP): that being morally
obligated to do something is equivalent to being such that
you (morally) ought to do that thing. For this quickly
rejoined the components of utilitarianism that we had just
labored to set asunder. So joined, it looked as if
utilitarianism had to go in one fell swoop if we were to
countenance the supererogat ionist ’ s two objections. For
since BP is a more pervasive and fundamental presupposition
than either of the two competing doctrines, denying BP
merely to countenance one component of utilitarianism
appeared methodologically ill- motivated. We thus found
our minimal mutilation strategy quickly forestalled.
But if an independent case could be made for denying BP,
we could get back on track. The rest of Ch3 was primarily
intended to do just that. A case was made for claiming
that even i_f "ought" did express moral obligation in
ethical contexts, "must" also expresses it in such
contexts. For it was transparent that "must" fits the
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can and "can’t" and that
standard equivalences involving "
the latter two standardly express permissibility and
impermissibility in moral contexts. But "permissible" and
impermissible", in turn, fit the corresponding
equivalences involving "morally obligated" with equal
transparency. Hence, "must" clearly can play the role of
the operator that enters into the standard and fundamental
deontic equivalences involving permissibility and
impermissibility. With this justification for taking BP to
entail the further equivalence between "must" and "ought"
in moral contexts, we turned our focus to this alleged
equivalence. As we examined various familiar non-ethical
contexts for using must" and "ought" we found that they
consistently diverged both pragmatically and semantically.
Furthermore, it became clear that if a reason could be
provided for thinking that only one of these terms
expressed moral obligation (deontic "necessity"), surely
the more plausible candidate would be "must", not "ought".
For, at the very least, some doubts about whether analogous
things held for "ought" were being generated by considering
non-ethical contexts. Indeed our reflections began to
suggest that generally speaking, although "must" entails
"ought", the converse implication does not hold: the
relation between "must" and "ought" is one of proper
entailraent -- with the former properly entailing the
latter. We found that ethical contexts provided no
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must" and
exception to this general relationship between "
ought : these terms are not mere stylistic variants of one
another in ethical contexts. Hence, given the arguable
identification" of what "must" expresses in ethical
contexts with moral obligation, we found that there were
reasons for thinking that BP was false after all -- despite
its being a landmark assumption of Twentieth Century Anglo-
American ethics. Hence we had found reasons for rejecting
BP that turned out to be happily independent of the
supererogationistic considerations that we began with.
But along the way we managed to provide some
independent motivation for the targeted result of our
methodological conservatism. Not only did we isolate and
undermine the only component of utilitarianism that was in
direct conflict with the possibility of supererogatory
bests and less-than-bests
,
but we found some additional
indirect support for one salient feature of that which
remained unscathed: that what you ought to do, morally
speaking, is to optimize in some sense. For an analysis of
"ought" in terms of optimizing with respect to some
relevant class of alternatives seemed to be an invariant
salient feature of both ethical and non-ethical uses of
"ought". Thus (i) we found no reason to reject this thesis
due to supererogationistic concerns and (ii) we found new
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reasons for accepting some version of this thesis on
grounds independent of utilitarian intuitions. Happily,
our minimum mutilation strategy had succeeded.
Finally, aside from the various entailment and non-
entailment relations examined, more than once our
reflections on various ethical and non-ethical uses of
must
,
and ’ought" (and kin) suggested a rather natural
semantic structure that could be used to account for the
presence and absence of various logical implications: to
wit a ranked range of acceptable alternatives. We noted
that these results seemed to harmonize with the picture
that emerged from our reflections on supererogation in
Chapter 2. In particular, the possibility of non-
obligatory best actions and permissible less-than-best
actions falls out of the natural semantic framework that
appeared to underpin "must" and "ought". And the framework
of a ranked range of acceptable alternatives, as we had
seen in Chapter 2, appeared to be precisely what was called
for by the classical picture of supererogation. Thus two
evidentially independent phenomena appeared to be
converging on a single semantic structure. This provided
our rationale for examining this structure and exploring
its potential deontic applications in detail -- the task of
Part II of this essay.
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We began our detailed examination of the informally
characterized framework that emerged in Chapter 3 in the
first chapter of Part II. Most of Chapter 4 was dedicated
to examining and refining the natural semantic structure
initially motivated in Chapter 3. Since the framework
would attempt to highlight certain key features by
suppressing others, we attempted to indicate just where
things were being suppressed and how what was left should
be interpreted, in the light of what was left out. For
example, we suppressed agency, but saw that on the intended
interpretation, the system was sensitive to the fact that
the operators were to be seen as capable of being
interpreted as implicitly two-place (e.g. MU$ as Jane Doe
must see to $) . Here is where we provided a philosophical
rationale for denying that necess i tat ion should have the
status of a logical truth in a deontic logic so
interpreted. This also called for a minor modification of
the virtually universally accepted Traditional Definitional
Scheme
.
We also examined two possible background theories
about how our ranking of acceptable alternatives should be
interpreted. One of these would see the ranking as
deriving from an absolute, once and for all, ranking of all
possible worlds. The other would see it as stemming from
an agent-relative ranking of just those possible worlds
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that an agent existed in, where this ranking
.ight, in so»e
cases, reverse the comparative rank that a pair of worlds
enjoys from the absolutist standpoint. The issue of agent-
relativity is one of the dominant issues of contemporary
ethical research. We took the safe course and articulated
a background theory that took us just to the point where
further development would have to take sides on this issue.
However, we did make as strong a case as we could for the
agen t
- re 1 at i ve approach and argued that it was tenable
enough to warrant further consideration. Finally, we
returned to "must" and "ought", provided truth-conditions
for them and then explored some of the more salient logical
principles for these operators in the light of our proposed
semantics. We noted once again that the way things were
coming out fit rather well with certain features of the
classical picture of supererogation.
In Chapter 5, we turned to another deontic idiom. We
began by noting that the proposed truth-conditions for
"ought" had a mirror-image at the bottom-end of the range
of acceptable alternatives: roughly, truth in all the
minimally ranked acceptable alternatives. Hence our
framework "predicted" the possibility of an idiom with
these mirror-image truth-conditions in our language. I
argued that such an idiom was not only possible given the
proposed semantic resources, but that there was such an
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idiom in constant use in ordinary moral discourse, to wit:
the Least You Can Do” idiom. I argued that the "can" of
this idiom was the "can" of permissibility and the "least"
of this idiom suggests just what it sounds like, so that to
say that the least you can do is x is roughly equivalent to
saying that your permissible minimum calls for x. Since
this idiom has been systematically invisible to ethicists,
even those with a strong linguistic orientation and those
who are friends of supererogation, I spent a fair amount of
time exploring some of its more salient uses and pragmatic
features
.
We found that the proposed semantics fit well with the
examined behavior of this idiom. I also noted that
reflection on this idiom alone could have led us to exactly
the semantic framework we were led to in Chapter 3. Thus
had we begun with this idiom, we might have been led to
search the language for idioms with precisely the semantic
conditions that we there proposed for "must" and "ought".
Our reflections on the behavior of "must" and "ought" and
our separate reflections on the behavior of the "Least Can
Do" idiom tended to corroborate one another. Hence,
collectively, they boost the separate evidential support
each gives for the appropriateness of our proposed semantic
framework beyond that of their mere sum. Thus we get a
kind of internal corroboration from our reflections on
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these modal auxiliaries" (broadly construed a la Kratzer’s
persuasively argued recommendation). Yet the possibility
of supererogat ing would seem to quite naturally suggest the
possibility of permissible behavior that doesn’t involve
any supererogation. If supererogation is an excess over
something, it would seem to be an excess over the minimum
that is permissible. Hence the presence of this idiom in
our moral discourse provides linguistic support for the
supererogat ionist ’ s case and, in turn, the classical
picture supports the possibility of doing the permissible
minimum. So we also had a certain degree of external
corroboration between the super erogat i on i s t ’ s intuitions
about ethical cases and our linguistic intuitions about the
behavior of this idiom -- just as we did for the behavior
of "must" and "ought".
In Chapter 6 we returned to supererogation itself, or
what we took as a working hypothesis to be its equivalent:
"Doing More than One Has to Do". We noted that this idiom
is also part of our natural ethical discourse and indicated
that, on the face of it, its intuitive logical behavior
looked very much like what we were led to expect for
supererogation. We then turned to the problem of
representing its truth-conditions in our semantic
framework. We considered three false starts and each,
especially the last, made it clear that a correct
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representation of the idiom would have to have the result
that anything that was supererogatory would have to be
precluded by doing the minimum that was permissible. This
led to the candidate condition that we adopted: to
supererogate is roughly to do something permissible that is
precluded by operating at the minimal range of one’s
acceptable alternatives. The fact that an option is
permissible, but absent at the bottom-end of one’s
acceptable alternatives guaranteed that the only
permissible courses of action involving a case of
supererogation would have to lie "beyond" the minimal range
of one’s accep tables.
Since the logic of this operator was unfamiliar, we
examined some of the most salient features of its behavior
in fair detail. We began by noting that our elected
candidate shared the virtues, but lacked the vices of the
previous discarded candidates. These virtues and absent
vices involved constraints that we had previously found to
be independently plausible. We then turned to examining
its behavior both in isolation (in formuli that did not
contain any other deontic operators) and vis a vis its
interaction with the five fundamental statuses of the
Traditional Scheme. Next we looked at its logical
interactions with "ought" and with "least". In the process
of doing this, it became clear that things were coming out
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just where we expected them to — expectations engendered
by our examination of the classical conception of
supererogation in Chapter 2. We noted that there were two
validated logical principles, ones that hadn’t been touched
on one way or another earlier, that appeared somewhat
problematic. Having noted these, we postponed assessing
their significance until later.
At this point, we had swung full circle. Discounting
our first chapter (where we merely provided a context for
the main work of this essay), we began with the problem of
supererogation and our independent reflections on a family
of modal auxiliaries had led us right back where we
started. The framework that these modal auxiliaries
appeared to call for seemed to match that which had been
independently motivated by our reflections on
supererogation. And we had uncovered an idiom of standard
pre-theoretic ethical discourse, the "More than You Had to"
idiom, which, if it doesn’t express supererogation, is as
close as you can get without being there!
All that remained, as far as deontic applications of
our framework was concerned, was to see if we could express
ordinary moral indifference in our framework. We took this
up in Chapter 7. We began by recalling some of the
constraints that a reasonable candidate for ordinary moral
495
indifference would have to meet, and turned to possible
candidates. The first candidate, optimality indifference
(roughly utilitarian optionality) satisfied a number of the
salient constraints, but nonetheless could not plausibly be
identified with ordinary moral indifference. Similarly for
its mirror image, minimality indifference. To help us see
more clearly why these failed, we returned to moral
optionality and noted how many different conditions
involving "Ought" and "Least" were compatible with it.
This led to a new constraint, one that we weren’t in a
position to articulate in Chapter 2, because we hadn’t yet
distinguished "ought" from "must", nor had we uncovered the
"Least Can Do" idiom. This led us to the notion of
Polarity Indifference — the conjunction of optimality and
minimality indifference. We noted that Polarity
Indifference had the advantages of not being subject to the
counterexamples to the two previous candidates, of
possessing all the virtues that these candidates had, and
of satisfying our new constraint as a bonus. Perhaps this
was, after all, ordinary moral indifference. However, we
saw that this could not be plausibly maintained, but seeing
why made it clear what was needed. These concepts, were
essentially concepts of conditional indifference in
disguise. The first, carving out things that are matters
of indifference provided that we are going to do our best,
the second, carving out things that are matters of
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indifference provided that we are going to do the least
that we are permitted to do, and the last carving out
things that are matters of indifference if we are going to
do either the best or least we are permitted to do. But
ordinary moral indifference is not conditional on operating
at any particular level in the range of one’s acceptable
alternatives. For ordinary moral indifference is
indifference throughout all levels of one’s acceptable
alternatives. Hence we took something to be a matter of
genuine moral indifference, "complete indifference",
provided that at every level of acceptable alternatives,
that level is achievable with or without doing this thing.
We then saw that this candidate met all the constraints
that we had thus far weighed our earlier impeached
candidates against.
So as it turned out, there are a number of operators
that are semantically specifiable in our framework and that
deserve to be called "indifference operators", but only one
that deserves to be deemed a plausible candidate for
ordinary moral indifference. When we turned to the
interaction of our elected candidate for supererogation
with this newly proposed candidate for moral indifference,
their interactions were just as they should have been if
our operators represented their target concepts. Hence we
had some additional confirmation that our analyses of both
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supererogation and moral indifference were on target. And
this was all accomplished by a relatively simple semantic
structure that appeared to be presupposed by the classical
picture of supererogation.
In the last chapter proper, Chapter 8, we considered
five objections to the applications of our framework. It
was argued that none of these objections was telling to our
system. In the process of addressing these objections, we
saw that our concepts are all susceptible to
condi t ional izat ions of the same sort as that for
"Conditional Obligation". We also provided a rough sketch
of how our framework could be generalized to account for
conditional versions of our operators. The only apparent
novelty here is that, conditional indifference calls for a
triadic, rather than dyadic operator. For since the
sentence, "if I’m going to give to a charity then it is a
matter of indifference whether I give to Charity 1 or give
to Charity 2" is typical for conditional indifference, we
need to represent this as a relationship between two
propositions that are conditional on a third. Dyadic and
monadic indifference were then seen to be derivative.
Other than this, the conditional versions of our monadic
operators, the derivative definability of our monadic
operators and the condi t ional izat ion of acceptability to a
circumstance at the semantic level look like standard fare,
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C one 1 us ion
We began with supererogation and rehearsed the
intuitive case for the s uper er oga t i on i s t ’ s complaints
against utilitarianism. We maintained that although there
ft
was a prima facia case against utilitarianism, one that at
least justified further reflection, little had been done
outside of the somewhat relentless polemic. We set
ourselves a different task: just what would a deontic
scheme that countenanced supererogation look like and what
sort of semantic framework would appear to buttress this
scheme? After all, the target of the s upe r e r oga t i on i s t ’ s
criticism stood in stark contrast to the friends of
supererogation in putting its cards on the table: the
scheme was the traditional one and the framework was
optimizing with respect to a set of relevant alternatives.
Furthermore, the utilitarian thesis that we ought to do the
best we can had a near axiomatic ring to it. So we set out
on the task of trying to accomplish for the friends of
utilitarians had already accomplished for themselves. We
adopted supererogation what the a minimal mutilation
strategy and stuck to it -- thus endorsing, and producing
additional support for the utilitarian theses that what you
ought to do is optimize with respect to some relevant class
of alternatives. We were led, by a somewhat circuitous
route, to a new deontic scheme and a natural semantic
499
framework that appears to be quite suitable to this new
scheme. Along the way, we uncovered a number of familiar
idioms that appeared to call for just the semantic
structure that supererogation called for. Thus we had some
external corroboration for the structure proposed for these
idioms and that proposed for supererogation. Furthermore,
each of the linguistic phenomena, the interaction of "must
and "ought", the "Least Can Do" idiom, and the "More than
You Had to Do" idiom, taken separately, appeared to
converge on the same structure. Thus each tended to
predict the presence of the semantic resources for
expressing the others. The fact that these possibilities
in each case are in fact realized in idioms actively used
by all of us, boosts the evidence that the proposed
structure is in fact deeply embedded in our pre-theoretic
conceptual scheme -- and it boosts it far beyond that of
the mere sum of the evidence that each idiom provides in
isolation. Hence my first thesis is that something much
like the deontic scheme and semantic framework proposed is
deeply embedded in our pre-theoret ical conceptual scheme.
We also saw that our linguistic reflections lend
support to the supererogat ionist ’ s objections to
utilitarianism. My second thesis is that the
supererogationist’s claim that, contrary to utilitarianism,
permissible sub-optimizing is possible, now enjoys a degree
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of support that goes far beyond anything that it has
previously enjoyed. Indeed, I would maintain that the
presumption is now clearly in favor of the soundness of its
complaint against utilitarianism and that the ball is in
their court
.
Furthermore, I maintain that the deontic scheme and the
semantic framework defended here elevates the case of the
friends of supererogation for the centrality of this
concept in our pre-theoretic moral thinking. In addition,
the force of the accusation of a paucity of conceptual
resources, a well-founded accusation against the vast
majority of supererogat ionists (Chisholm stands out
virtually alone as a notable exception), has been
conversely de-elevated. The classical picture of
supererogation appears to be on the right track generally,
not just in its particular complaints against
utilitarianism.
I would also submit that whatever the ultimate
assessment on the details of the scheme we have argued for
here, a substantial step has been taken toward articulating
the deontic scheme that the classical conception of
supererogation calls for. The resources are now available
to elevate the debate beyond the "Tomahto! No! Tomayto
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level to the more positive task of putting ones cards on
the table. We owe this to the utilitarians and the
supererogat ionists owe it to themselves.
However, before someone starts calling out a victory
parade, let me note the consequences of what is probably
obvious to the astute reader: that what has been
accomplished herein falls within the province of formal
phi 1 os ophy
.
First of all, we have not provided any substantial
analysis of what it is for a world to be acceptable, hence
we have not provided an analysis of any of the five
fundamental statuses of the traditional scheme. Of course,
an analysis of the acceptability of a world would
automatically yield an analysis of the five fundamental
statuses. In turn, an analysis of the permissibility of a
state of affairs (for an agent) would provide what we need
for an analysis of acceptability: a world would be
acceptable to an agent (at a time from a world) just in
case the world is accessible to the agent (at that time
from that world) and the agent does not do anything that is
not permissible in the world (as of the time in question).
But I haven’t provided either of these. So we have not
provided a deeper substantial understanding of
permissibility or acceptability. In a nutshell, although
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we have a deontic scheme that appears to be presupposed by
the supererogat i on i s t and deeply embedded in our pre-
theoretical thinking, we have not provided any substantial
conceptual analysis to anchor it.
Secondly, even if we provided a substantial analysis of
permissibility (or acceptability) that seemed to fit well
with this scheme and with our pre- theoret ic judgments, we
would not necessarily be done. For we also need a
rationale for sub-optimizing, and we might get interesting
necessary and sufficient conditions for permissibility (or
acceptability) that provide the nice fit alluded to,
without it being the case that these conditions provide a
rationale for the permissibility of sub-optimizing. This
is even clearer when we entertain the possibility that both
permissibility and acceptability are unanalyzab le . This,
after all, could be the case and we would then be forced to
take one of these as primitive. Clearly, if this is done,
a separate rationale for the permissibility of sup-
optimizing is called for. That is, even granting that it
can be permissible to sub-opt imize , inquiring minds want to
know why this is so. So we have not provided a rational
for this crucial implication of our system. Of course, we
would hope that if permissibility or acceptability is
analyzable, then such an analysis would wear the needed
rationale on its sleeve, but there is no a priori guarantee
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that it would. In as much as these are after all the
perennial issues, I can only be disappointed that I must
remain silent on them.
Thus we neither have a substantial philosophical
analysis of the operators of our scheme nor a rationale for
one of the schemes most salient features. Although its a
frightening thought, perhaps we do presuppose such a
deontic scheme, as I have argued, but nonetheless it is
f ounda t i on 1 es s -- it simply has no philosophically
satisfactory rationale. I hope not and I think that the
presumption is against it. The fact that we can provide
such a degree of articulation, even at a somewhat formal
level, provides us with good reason to be hopeful and good
warrant for searching, but it provides us with no
assurances. What we do have is a rich class of logical
data that can serve to test a proposed background theory
and that can serve as a guide in the construction of such a
theory. We also have an intuitively motivated semantic
formal structure that can also serve as a guide to
discovering a substantive background theory -- one that
would generate an isomorphic substantive structure. So
although I submit that the presumption is in favor of our
scheme, this is a weak epistemic status -- the "proof" is
in the pudding. There is much work that still needs to be
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done before we can be warranted in resting comfortably with
this scheme and its intuitively interpreted semantic
f ramework
.
Although we have not made any detailed exploration of
the alternative applications of our scheme and its semantic
framework, we did note (in Chapter 3) the potential for
applications outside of deontic contexts. These seem
worthy of further exploration, and the semantic structure
and the potential associated expressive resources warrant
independent study (perhaps along the Lemon-Scott lines, if
the applications prove to be sufficiently rich).
My main thesis then is quite simple and regrettably
more humble than I would like: the proposed deontic scheme
and the deontic interpretation of the associated semantic
framework, along with its more general potential
applications, is sufficiently promising to warrant further
investigation by the community. This much, I do stand by
conf ident ly
.
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Chapter 9 Notes
1* In an unpublished piece, an analogue to the fundamental
theorem for canonical models for the standard framework
was demonstrated for this alternative framework -- thus
showing that the proposed semantic framework was indeed
adequate to the enriched class of modal logics ( VW
logics) specified.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
INFORMAL SEMANTICS & DIAGRAMS FOR DQ
T-h e Traditional Definitional Scheme Revised
On our primary intended interpretation of the
operators, they are agent and time-relative. So that MU,
PE and IM, for example, can be read as elliptical for "as
of t, Jane Doe must see to it that" and "as of t, Jane Doe
can see to it that" and "as of t, Jane Doe can’t see to it
that", respectively
.
1 Ignoring the issue of time, each of
these readings of the positive statuses (deontic operators
not preceded by ~) entail that Jane Doe exists. Hence, a
statement whose main operator is such a positive status
holds at no world where Jane Doe does not exist. So for
example, we do not want "Jane Doe must (can) see to it that
p" to be true at a world unless she exists at that world —
even if p is a tautology. Thus contrary to the Standard
Deontic Logic (SDL), we agree with Von Wright’s exclusion
of the obligatoriness of tautologies from the class of
deontic logical truths (although our reasons are not the
same) 2 . Similarly for the remaining positive statuses.
For the same reasons, the definitional scheme for the
five basic statuses (obligation plus the four below) is
slightly non-standard. For example, we assume that
although ~(Jane Doe can see to it that ~p) will be true at
any world where she doesn’t exist, (Jane Doe must see to it
that ~p) will be false at all such worlds. Since this
conflicts with the standard definition of Permissibility as
"'Obligatory'", we must deny the standard definitional
scheme. However, all that is required is that we add to
the standard definiens (where appropriate) the equivalent
of Doe must see to it that (p -> p). For, first of all, we
assume that if Jane Doe exists, then she must see to the
consequences of anything that she must do and we assume
that she always must see to it that she opts for one of
here permissible courses of action. Hence she must see to
it that anything that is a consequence of her so opting
obtains. But since (p -> p) is a sure consequence of every
permissible course of action, if she exists, she must see
to it that (p -> p) obtains. Secondly, we assume that if
Jane Doe does not exist, then all claims to the affect that
she must see to it that p are false. Hence, we take Jane
Doe must see to it that (p -> p) to be necessarily
equivalent to Jane Does exists.
With this rational in mind, the following slightly non-
standard definitions will be utilized (only the second
matches the traditional definition because the traditional
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definiens is already "posit
[ PErmi ss ib i 1 i t y ] PEp
[ IMperm iss ib 1 i t y ] IMp
[GRatuitousness] GRp
[ Opt ional i ty ] QPp
ive" )
:
= df ~MU~p & MU ( p -> p )
=df MU~p
<-> ~MUp & MU ( p -> p )
<-> ~MU~p & ~MUp & MU ( p -> p)
Worlds and Acceptability
First let me sketch the background to our semanticframework. We assume that in a given agent’s deontic
situation there are a variety of "worlds" that the agent
can "access". We can think of these roughly as ways the
concrete world might turn out if the agent there were to
follow certain exhaustive courses of action (life plans)
that are still available to the agent. 3 Of these
accessible worlds, some are such that the agent’s
performance is acceptable henceforth, others are not. The
worlds where the agent’s performance henceforth is
acceptable are those accessible ones where the agent’s
performance (as of the time) consists exclusively of
permissible actions. Hence, on the intended
interpretation, if we made all this explicit, we would have
two four-place relations: one world’s being accessibile to
an agent as of time at a world and one world’s being
acceptable to agent as of time at a world -- where the
later would be a sub-relation of the former. However, for
greater comparison with standard deontic logic, we suppress
explicit reference to agents, times and to accessibility.
We assume that a given structure is relativized to a single
Jane Doe and that two worlds are acceptable to Jane Doe
only if they are both accessible to Jane Doe as of the
moment where they are past-wise identical wrt to "hard
facts " .
On Serial ity
With this as background, the first component of the
intended semantic framework is, with one proviso, standard.
There is a relation A, relating worlds to worlds, where Aji
iff j is morally acceptable from i (or j is an i-acceptable
world). Thus we have a dyadic relation on worlds as with
standard modal and deontic logics. However, unlike the
framework for standard deontic logic, but in common with
the standard framework for modal logic, our framework
allows for the possibility of dead-ends worlds. We do not
assume that seriality holds: that every world is related to
at least one world. This departure is a natural
consequence of our primary intended interpretation. For
where Jane Doe does not exist, she can put in no
performance. Hence there are no worlds that she can access
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and hence none she can access where her performance is
acceptable. We are assuming that we are implicitly
tracking the^deontic situation of a single agent’s (or
single group s) performance in various worlds where the
agent (or group) exists. Obviously, there are many worlds
where the agent in question will not exist -- indeed where
no ordinary agents will exist. In fact, on our primaryintended intepretat ion
,
seriality would indicate the
special deontic situation where we take ourselves to be
tracking the performance of an extraordinary agent, one
that exists in every world. However, a secondary
interpretation of seriality would be one where we are not
tracking the performance of an agent at all, divine or
otherwise. Here the acceptabilty relation would not be
deemed subordinate to any agen t - r e 1 at i ve accessibility
relation.
The Semantic Clauses for the Operators
In keeping with the above, we are implicitly
representing Jane Doe’s existence at a world i by (Ej)Aji
and we are asuming that she has obligations only where she
exists. Hence we require that Mlfp is true at i only if
(Ej)Aji. Thus our semantic clause for MU is also slightly
non-standard
:
MUp is true at a world i iff (i) there is an
i-acceptable world to begin with and (ii) every
such world is a p-world.
It follows from this semantic clause for MU
,
along with the
above definitional sheme, that any wff whose main
connective is a positive status, will have as part of its
truth-condition, that (Ej)Aji. For any such wff will
entail MU( p -> p) and being obligated to see to a tautology
at a world, i, is now equivalent to there being an i-
acceptable world. This slightly non-standard semantic
clause for deontic necessity provides us with a rational
for denying MU(p -> p), and thus representing Von Wrights
original deontic logic (a proper sublogic of SDL) in the
same semantic-syntactic framework as SDL. For SDL, but not
VW, we would keep the semantic clause above for MU and add
the constraint that there are no dead-end worlds:
(i) (Ej)Aji. That is, the only difference between an SDL
semantics and a VW semantics is that the former, but not
the latter would endorse seriality. 4
The Full Structure
So far, things are relatively standard and MU looks
like a familiar necessity operator (with the exception that
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it presupposes that there is an acceptable world). However
additional structure is generated by imposing an ordering
on all those worlds that are acceptable from some world i.That is, for each world i that has i-acceptable worlds,
these worlds will be ordered relative to i. (in
particular, the i-acceptab les will be weakly ordered). So
that, although each of these will be worlds where all thatJane Doe does in them is morally acceptable, some of them
will be ranked higher than others. Formally, this will
mean that for each i that has acceptab les relative to it,
we will have an i-relative relation k <=i j defined onthese acceptables. These i-relative relations will impose
a weak ordering on the i-acceptab les : k < = i j will be
connected, reflexive and transitive wrt to the i -
acceptables. That is:
(i) if Aji and Aki then j >-i k or k J-ij;
(ii) if Aji then j j;
(iii) if j >-i k then Aji and Aki.
Intuitively, we should think of j >-i k as implicilty
asserting that Jane Doe’s performance in j (as of t) is
more acceptable than her performance in k (as of t) from
the standpoint of her situation in i at t (where "x is more
acceptable than y" is read as entailing that x and y are
acceptable)
.
5
This framework allows us to represent and distinguish a
relatively rich array of deontic concepts. First, we can
distinguish the moral "must" from the moral "ought". What
s must do at i (what is deontically necessary) is whatever
s does at all (and at least one) of his i-acceptable
worlds, homogeneously conceived. In contrast, what s ought
to do at i (what is deontically optimific) is whatever s
does at all the best of (and at least one of) his i-
acceptables. These conditions entail that the moral "must"
properly implies the moral "ought". Secondly, the
structure provides for a perfectly symmetrical semantic
analogue to "ought". What is involved in s’s doing the
least he can do at i (what is deontically minimal) is
whatever s does at all the lowest ranked among his i-
acceptab les
.
6
These conditions will validate the wffs: MUp -> (OUp & LEp)
and (OUp v LEp) -> PEp (but not there converses). For the
first, we need only note that at any world i, if p is
invariant among the i - accep t ab 1 es then it is invariant
among the highest ranked of these and among the lowest
ranked of these. For the second wff, we need only note
that each of the antecedent’s disjuncts will hold at a
world i only if there is an i-acceptable p-world and hence
only if PEp holds at i also. We can also represent the
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supererogatory. What is beyond that, which s must do at iis whatever is precluded by the lowest ranked of the i-acceptables
,
but is included in some i-acceptable world.This turns out to be syntactically reflected by the wff:
E p & PEp and hence what is beyond that which s must, do13 a definable operator. We are also able to distinguish
moral indifference from moral optionality — as we must
since what is supererogatory is morally optional though
never morally indifferent. What is completely indifferentfor s to do at i is whatever is to be found, along with its
negation, at every level among s’s i-acceptable worlds. Incontrast, what is optional for s to do at i is whatever isdone by s in some i-acceptible world and also not done by sin some i-acceptable world. This immediately yields the
result that although complete indifference implies
optionality the converse does not hold. It is also easy to
see that these conditions entail that whatever is
supererogatory is optional but non-indi f ferent
.
A number of less important operators are also definable
via this semantic framework. I mention these primarily to
indicate the considerable increase in expressive power that
one gets from this simple structure. However, a second
reason bears on pragmatics, broadly construed.
Philosophers and linguists often talk about a semantic
framework "predicting" the presence of an idiom in a
natural language. But clearly, such a purely semantic
framework only predicts that the semantic resources are
available. 7 It does not, by itself, necessarily predict
that any particular expressive capacity is actively
employed in the language. For this we would, at the very
least, need to couple the semantic theory with a pragmatic
one containing information about the commun i cat i ona 1 needs
of the present or past speakers of a language. From the
standpoint of a broad account of a natural language,
explaining the fact that certain available semantic
resources are unutilized might, in some cases, be as
interesting as explaining the fact that certain other
semantic resources are utilitzed. Similarly for the
relative frequency with which utilized resources are
utilized.
Just as the structure suggests an exact analogue to
"ought" (namely, the least one can do), the structure also
suggests an exact analogue to what is beyond the least one
can do. I call this "the suboptimal". What is subopt imal
for s to do at i is whatever s does not do at any of his
best i-acceptab les but does do at some one of his i-
acceptables (OlPp & PEp). I called moral indifference
"complete indifference" because the structure has the
capacity to express various grades of weaker indifference.
For example, what is optimality indifferent for s at i (cf.
utilitarian optionality) is whatever is done by s in some
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s in
one of his best i-acceptab les worlds and not done byone of his best i-acceptables (~OUp & ~OlPp & PEp;.Analogously, what is minimality indifferent for s at i iswhatever s does at one of his least i-acceptables worlds^
aad fails to do at one of his least i-acceptables (~LEp &LE p & PEp). 8 What is polarity indifferent for s at i iswhatever is both optimality indifferent and minimalityindifferent for s at i. Finally, what is weakly
tCeren t for s at J is whatever is either optimalityindifferent or minimality indifferent for s at i. Thegrades of indifference, along with optionality are rankedaccording to their implicational strength as follows (ahigher item implies all lower items, items on the samelevel are independent):
Complete indifference
Polarity Indifference
Optimality Indifference Minimality Indifference
Weak Indifference
Optional ity
.
Expressive Capabilities Summarized
Here are the chosen operators and there official
primary readings:
Primitive Operators :
MUp - Jane Doe MUst [is morally obligated to] see to
it that p
;
OUp - Jane Doe OUght to see to it that p;
LEp - The LEast Jane Doe can do involves seeing to it
that p
;
CIp - It is Completely Indifferent for Jane Doe to
see to it that p;
Definable Operators :
PEp - It is PErmissible for Jane Doe to see to it
that p
IMp - It is IMpermissible for Jane Doe to see to it
that p
GRp - It is GRatui tous for Jane Doe to see to it that
P ;
OPp - It is Optional for Jane Doe to see to it that
P ;
BLp - It is Beyond the Limit of what Jane Doe must do
to see to it that p
;
SOp - It is Sub-optimal for Jane Doe to see to it
that p
;
OIp - It is Optimality Indifferent for Jane Doe to
see to it that p
;
MIp - It is Minimality Indifferent for Jane Doe to
see to it that p;
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seePip - It is Polarity Indifferent for Jane Doe to
to it that p;
WIp It is Weakly Indifferent for Jane Doe to see to
it that p
;
Fixed Point Semantic Diagrams
Relative to a world i (a "fixed point"), the following
diagrams illustrate the truth-conditions of the deontic
wffs at i. The vertical paired lines represent the i-
acceptable worlds ordered. These vertical line pairs
should be interpreted as "compressed bars", since the
ordering is weak rather than linear (i.e. there may be
ties). Higher levels of a bar contain better worlds than
lower levels. A dot on a bar indicates an i-acceptable
world. A dot with an adjacent " p " indicates that there is
an i-acceptable p-world. "All p" indicates that all the
associated worlds are p-worlds. "All levels !p!" indicates
that both p and ~p occur at all the associated levels of
worlds. An asterisk above an operator indicates a
primitive operator.
PRIMARY OPERATORS:
*
MUp :
/\
\/
*
OUp:
/\
PEp:
/\
IMp:
/\
GRp:
/\
\/
\/
\/ \/
*
LEp:
/\
BLp:
/\
\
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i
i
1
i
i
i \
i
i
i
i
all ii ii no ii
P * - p
i
*
i
P *
- ~p
i
*
i
/
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
/
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
OPp:
/\
\
p somewhere
and
~p somewhere
/
\/
*
CIp:
/\
! \ all p
1
1 ;
: /
1
1
'
*
1
»
1
1
* p
i
1
1
1
1
*
i
*
1
1 : \ : \
1
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SECONDARY OPERATORS:
SOp: 0 1 p
:
MIp : SPIp wPIp
/\
:
: \ ail
! ! / "p
: *
i i
! * — p
\/
\ "all p
/ "all ~p
*
\/
/\
\ "all p
/ "all "p
\ "all
/ "all
*
:
! \ "all p
: :/ "all "p
\/
and i ii i
i i
or
all p
i t
: i\ "all
all ~p
: :/ "all
\/ \/
Informal Truth Conditions
MIJp 1 : all i-acceptable worlds are p-worlds and there is
at least one i-acceptable world.
PEp ' : there i s at least one i-acceptab le p-world
.
IMp 1 : there is at
i-acceptable
least one
p-wor 1 d
.
i-acceptable world, but no
GRp 1 : there i s a t least one i-acceptab le "p-world.
OPp 1 : there i s at least one i-acceptable p-world and at
least one i-acceptable "p-world.
OUp 1 : there is an i-acceptable world such that all i-
acceptable worlds ranked at least as high as this
one are p-worlds.
LEp 1 : there is an i-acceptable world such that all i-
acceptable worlds ranked at least as low as this
one are p-worlds.
BLp 1 : (i) there is an i-acceptable world such that all
i-acceptable worlds ranked at least as low as this
one are "p-worlds and (ii) there is at least one
i-acceptable p-world.
CIp 1 : (i) there is at least one i-acceptable world and
(ii) for every i-acceptable world, there is an i-
acceptable p-world with the same rank and there is
an i-acceptable "p-world with the same rank.
[Neither p nor "p are essential to the attaining
of any acceptable level of value -- every
acceptable level of value can be obtained with or
without p.]
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l
'O
SOp 1 : (i) there is an i-acceptable world such that alli-acceptable worlds ranked at least as high as
this one are p —worlds and (ii) there is at least
one i-acceptable p-world.
0 1
P
1
•' there is at least one i-acceptable world and for
each i-acceptable world: there is an i-acceptable
p-world ranked at least as high and there is an i-
acceptable ""p-world ranked at least as high.
[There is some "upper" level of value such that
from there on up, every acceptable level of value
can be obtained or surpassed with or without p.]
MIp 1 : there is at least one i-acceptable world and for
each i-acceptable world: there is an i-acceptable
p-world ranked at least as low and there is an i-
acceptable ""p-world ranked at least as low.
[There is some "lower" level of value such that
from there on down, every acceptable level of
value can be obtained or dropped below with or
wi thout p
.
]
PI 1 p : there is at least one i-acceptable world and for
each i-acceptable world: (i) there is an i-
acceptable p-world ranked at least as high and
there is an i-acceptable ""p-world ranked at least
as high and (ii) there is an i-acceptable p-world
ranked at least as low and there is an i-
acceptable ""p-world ranked at least as low.
WIp 1 : there is at least one i-acceptable world and for
each i-acceptable world: (i) there is an i-
acceptable p-world ranked at least as high and
there is an i-acceptable ""p-world ranked at least
as high o_r (ii) there is an i-acceptable p-world
ranked at least as low and there is an i-
acceptable ""p-world ranked at least as low.
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Appendix A Notes
1. Unless there is likely to be some confusion, I will use
the colloquial "can" for permissibility, rather than
ability.
2. The pervasive presence of 0(p v ~p) as a thesis in
deontic logic is no doubt due to the nearly equally
pervasive tendency to give "Op" the non-agent
relativized reading: "it ought to be the case that p"
.
It loses all its plausibilty once we read it as
relativized to a contingent agent.
3. I say "might" with an eye to the possibility that for
some event p (but not q) that is in the agent’s control,
"q given p" might have the same probability as "~q given
p" no matter what the agent does in a situation.
4. I suspect that the standardness of seriality for
standard deontic logic is no doubt in part also due to
the pervasive tendency to give "Op" the non-agent
relativized reading: "it ought to be the case that p".
However, it is also due to the tendency to subordinate
monadic deontic logic to normal modal logics, where [](p
-> p) is always a theorem.
5. Other constraints on acceptability and >=i that are
plausible on the primary intended interpretation bear on
iterated formuli. These constraints, and their
associated formuli, will be explored elsewhere.
6. For ease of exposition, I will take the liberty at times
to speak as if it were guaranteed that there is always a
highest and a lowest ranked "level" of worlds. A
"level" of accessible worlds is any equivalence class on
the i-accept ab 1 es wrt the relation: k = i j.
7. Of course some of these resources must be utilized if we
are to be justified in positing the framework as one
that is operating in a given natural language.
8. These species of indifference can be thought of as
special cases of conditional complete indifference --
provided that there is at least one best world:
p is optimality indifferent : if you are going to do
what is best then p is a matter of complete
indi f ference
;
p is minimality indifferent : if you are going to do
only the minimum then p is a matter of complete
indif ference
.
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APPENDIX B
FORMAL SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS FOR DQ
Syntax
Vocabulary :
The usual ingredients of a propositional language with T
(the tautologous constant), augmented by these unary
operators: MU, OU, LE, Cl.
Grammar
:
The set of well-formed formuli, DQ-wffs, is the smallest
set satisfying the following conditions:
(a) all propositional variables are in DQ-wffs;
(b) if p and q are in DQ-wffs, then so are:
~P . (P & q) , . . . , (p <-> q)
and
MUp
,
OUp
,
LEp
,
CIp
;
(c) T is in DQ-wffs.
Def init ions
:
D 1 . PEp = df ~MIT p & MUT.
D 2 . IMp =df Mir p.
D3 . GRp = df ~ MUp & MUT.
D4 . OPp = df ~ MUp & ~MIF p & MUT.
D5 . BLp -df LEFp & PEp.
D6. £0p =df OIT
p
& PEp.
D7 . 0Ip -df ~ oup & ~ oir p & MUT.
D8
.
MIp =df ~LEp & ~ LET p & MUT.
D9 Pip =df OIp & MIp.
DIO . WIp =df OIp v MIp
.
Semantics
Frames :
F is a Normal DQ-Frame iff F - < W , A, >= > where
(1) W is a set [worlds];
(2) A is a subset of W 2 [acceptability relation: w’
is acceptable from w];
(3) >- is a subset of W 3 such that:
(a) For any i,j,k in W, (k >=i j or j >-ik) iff
( Aj i & Aki )
;
(b) For any i,j,k,l in W, if j >-i k and k >-i 1
then j > -i 1
.
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[ Note on ( 3
)
:
1. (a) implies that >=i is Rflx wrt A 1
, >-i is
connected wrt A 1 and >
-\ is confined to A 1 .
Respectively:
(c) if Aji then j >-ij;
(d) if Aji and Aki then j >=\ k or k >-ij;
(e) if j >-i k then Aji and Aki.
2. The quasi-ordering relation, >-i, as (e) above makes
explicit, is confined to the members acceptable to
the relevant world (the i of >=i ). In other words,
the models impose a wor ld-relat ive weak ordering -- a
weak ordering imposed on the acceptables of the world
in quest ion
. ]
Ass i gnmen t s :
P is an assignment on F iff F - <W, A, > - > is
a normal DQ-Frame and P is a function, P: PV ->
Power(W), defined on PV (Propositional Variables).
(So P assigns a "proposition" to each atomic formula.)
Normal Models :
M i s a normal DQ-Model iff M - < F P>
,
where F -
<W, A, >= > is a normal DQ-frame and P is an
assignment on F.
Truth at a world in a Model :
(Note: "M]=i p" is to be read as "p is true at world i in
model M"
.
)
Let i be in W in a model M - < F, P> , where F =
<W
,
A
,
>= >
,
then :
0) M]-i T: i is simply in W in M.
1) /V]=ip: i is in P(p), provided p is a prop,
variable.
2) M] - i ~ p : not M] = i p
.
3) M\- i ( p & q): both JV] = i p & M\ - i q
.
4) M\ = i ( p v q): either /Vj^ip or yV]=iq.
5) A/] = i C P -> q): if Af] = i p then M]-i q.
6) Af] = i ( p <-> q): M)- i P i ff - i 4 •
7) EjAji & ( j ) ( i f Aji then A/]=jp).
8) M)=i OUp: E j ( A j i & (k)(if Aki & k >=i j then
Afl=kp)).
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9 ) M] i LEp
.
E j ( A j i & (k)(if Aki & k - c'i j then
^]-kp)).
10) M]=iCIp: ( k ) [if Aki & A/]=xp then (El) (Ali &
k
-i 1 & M~\ - 1 p)] & ( k ) [if Aki & A^]=k p then(El) (Ali & k
-=il & A/]=ip)] & (Ej)Aji.
(Note: k =<ij =df ~j > -
1
k
; j -"i k =df j >=ik & k >=ij.)
Derivative Deontic Conditions
:
11) M] - i 77p
12) M] = i 7Afc
13) M] = i C7?p
14) M] = i 07p
15) M) = i #Zp
16) M\ = i SOp
17) M] = i OJp
18) A/] = i MIp
19) M] = i 77p
20) A/] = i WIp
E j ( A j i & M\ =j p) .
EjAji & (j)(if Aji then A/]=j~p).
E j ( A j i & not M] =j p) .
Ej(Aji & M]-jp) and Ej(Aji & not A/]=jp).
M] =i PEp & Af] = i LET p .
A/] = i PEp & A/] =i 0zr P .
(Ej)Aji & neither A/]=i00p nor M\=iOlTp.
(Ej)Aji & neither Af] = i LEp nor M\- i LET p .
Both Af] =i OIp & A/] =i A/Ip.
Either A/] = i OIp or M}-iMlp.
Derivative Semantical No t i ons
:
Truth in a model
:
M]-p: M]-ip
,
for every world i in the model M.
Validity wrt a class of models C:
c]=p: A/]=p, for all models, M in the class C.
Consequence wrt a class of models C:
Ac]=p: For every model M in C: if for every wff q in A,
M}~ q , then M]-p.
Implication wrt a class of models C:
qc ]
=
p
:
(q}c ] =p
.
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APPENDIX C
THE DQ LOGICS
MDQ — The Minimal DQ-Logic :
The following characterization of the ’'minimal" DQ-
logic is predicated on the assumption that the logic (set
of theorems) thus syntactically characterized is identical
to the logic semantically characterized as the set of DQ-
wffs valid in all DQ-models.
Note : " ranges over the three "strong" operators: MU
,
OU,
LE\ whereas " #" ranges over all four primitive operators.
The Minimal (smallest or basic) DQ-logic :
Assuming that the minimal DQ-logic axiomat ical ly
defined is also the logic that holds for all DQ-models we
can take the relevant class of DQ-logics to be all those at
least as strong as this minimal logic. It would then be
desirable to prove, if possible, that for every normal DQ-
logic, there is a DQ-model that precisely characterizes
this logic. We would then have shown that the proposed
semantic framework is adequate to the proposed class of
logics. This will be explored elsewhere.
S is a Normal DQ-logic iff S is a proper subset of
DQ-wffs such that:
(1) S contains all tautologus wffs; [PC]
(2) S contains all wffs of the forms:
Al. p, where p is tautologus
A2. MUp -> ( LEp & OUp)
A3. (LEp v OUp ) -> ~MIT
p
A4 . *(p->q)->(*p->*q)
as . cip -> cr
p
A6. ( LEp v OUp) -> ~CIp
A 7 /p -> MUT
Rl. ]~ P and ]- (p -> q) / ]~ q
R2. ]- (p -> q) / ( *p -> *q)
R3. ]- p <-> q / ] — ] — CIp <-> Clq
[PC]
[ MLO ]
[LOP]
[K* ]
[IN]
[LOI]
[#T]
[MP]
[RM* ]
[El]
Normal DQ-Logics :
(a) MUp -> (LFp & OUp)
(b) (LEp v OUp) -> ~Mir p
(c) *(p ~> q) -> ( *P -> *q)
;
(d) cip -> cr p
(e) ( LEp v OUp) -> ~CIp
(f) /p -> MUT
[MLO]
[LOP]
[K* ]
[NIN]
[LOI]
[#T]
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(3) If S contains any wffs p and (p -> q)
,
then S also contains q; [MP]
(4) If S contains any wff (p -> q) , then
S also contains ( -> -*q ) . [ RM* ]
(5) If S contains any wff (p <-> q) , then
S also contains ( C/p <-> (7/q ) [El]
[ Note : The requirement that S be a proper subset of DQ-
wffs, along with clauses (1) and (3), guarantees
that all normal DQ-logics are negation-consistent.]
Some Theorems of Minimal DQ:
T 1 *p -> *T
T2 ~MU~ T
T3 ~LE~T
T4 ~OU~T : ( S im i
1
ar ly
)
T5 . T: [ T2-T4
]
T6 . ~PE~T :
T7 . *p - > PEp:
T8 . *p -> ~*~p
T9. ( *p V *q) -> * ( p V q)
T 1 0 . * ( p & q) <-> ( *p & *q)
Til . PE ( p V q) <-> PEp v PEq
)
T 1 2 . PE (
p
& q) -> (PEp & PEq)
T 1 3 . PEp & MU ( p -> q) • -> . PEq
T14 . LEp & MU ( p -> q) • -> . LEq
T 1 5 . OUp & MU ( p -> q) • -> . OUq
T16
.
CIp > ~MU~p:
T 1 7 . CIp - > PEp:
T 1 8 #p -
>
PEp:
T 1
9
~#~T:
T20 CI~p -> CIp:
T21 CIp - > PE ~p
:
T22 OPp < -> (PEp & PE
~
P) :
T23 CIp - > OPp.
T24
.
SUp - > OPp
T25 . SUp - > ~CIp
T26. SU~p <-> ( LEp• & PE~P)
T27 . (OUp & L E p ) -> SUp
T27 . (~0U~ p & LE~p) -> SUp
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APPENDIX D
THE DEONTIC QUADDECAGON
SUp
sir P
PART I
Imp 1 icat
a
: Arrow-lines represent implications.
Main Operators :
PFp: p is permissible for s MUp: s must see
o p
IMp: p is impermissible for s OPp: p is
optiona or s
Olfp: s ought to see to p
LEp : the least s can do involves seeing to p
Slfp'. it is supererogatory for s to see to p
CIp: it is completely indifferent that s see to p
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SUP
or P
cr P
PART II
Contraries : Indicated by adjoining interior lines ( )
and single-crossed perimeter lines ( ).
Sub-contraries : Indicated by adjoining double-crossed lines
( ) •
Contradictories : Indicated by adjoining triple-crossed
lines ( ).
We are assuming that Jane Doe exists. If not, there are no
s ub — c on t r a r i es and hence the items marked as contradictor
ies are mere contraries.
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Appendix D Notes
1* The Deontic Dodecagon", a twelve— sided version of these
diagrams (the current diagrams minus the two nodes for
complete indifference — which I then thought was
definable as the conjunction of optimality and
minimality indifference) dates back to the Spring of
1985. In November 1986 I sent a copy of the Dodecagon,
(along with my prospectus for this dissertation) to
Roderick Chisholm. In July 1987, I received a letter
from Professor Chisholm, along with a copy of Hrushka
and Joerden 1987, which he had just received. He
pointed out the striking similarity between their
diagrams and mine and Professor Chisholm was
characteristically kind enough to volunteer to provide
me with some rough English translations of some of the
essential components of their article. The article is
in the philosophy of law and the translations (and
personal conversation with Professor Chisholm)
explicitly indicate that the conceptual scheme they
endorse is quas i-normat i ve . We are to imagine that some
authority (such as the law) has, as a matter of fact,
explicitly laid down various commands, permissions,
liberties, etc. pertaining to each and every state of
affairs. They then explore the logic of a variety of
normative statuses in the light of this idealization.
The translations provided indicate that the concepts,
expressed in English, are roughly the following: that
which has been permitted
,
that which has been commanded ,
that which has been forbidden
,
that which has been
advised
,
that which has been advised against , that which
has been explicitly- left open. Since it is assumed that
the commander rules explicitly on everything, the logic
of these concepts have features that one might otherwise
not expect. For example, the logic endorsed for these
concepts is such that it is assumed that if something
has not been explicitly left open then it has either
been explicitly forbidden or explicitly commanded. No
analogue to our notion of the minimum that duty allows
appears to be identified in their scheme. The strongest
concept of indifference identified appears to be that
which is both explicitly left open and neither advised
nor advised against. The equivalents of ought and
"ought not" are associated with the commanded and the
forbidden, rather than the advised and advised against.
Their concept of supererogation (along with much of the
tradition, as we saw) appears to be one that entails
that all supererogatory acts are advised but not
commanded. Despite these differences and the errors
that they suggest, the parallels are obviously
significant enough to warrant some small pleasure in the
thought that we are both on the right track.
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APPENDIX E
THE NINEFOLD CLASSIFICATION
As with the Tripartite Classification, the slimmest
partitions (those without sub-par t i t i ons ) are meant to be
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Arrow-lines
running from external operators show the location of the
associated non-exclusive classes in the partition. As one
might expect, all the action is within the optionality
class. To see what parts of the partition exhaust other
non-exclusive positive operators look for the operators
occurrence in continuous boxes (perhaps in parenthesis if
its use for designating one of the nine exclusive and
exhaustive classes within the diagram is redundant). The
key is the same as that for the Deontic Quadecagon.
< <_ 0p _> >
SU
/ \
OU
" LE SU
" SU OU
( OU) " SU
" SU "Cl
MU OU "OU Cl IM
LE " LE
UE) ~ MU PE SU
"OU
LE
OU
<- PE ->
< - GR - >
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